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Abstract. There are various notions of specificity, ranging from Fodor & Sag’s 
(1982) referentiality view to Givón’s (1983) discourse prominence view. Ionin 
(2006) discusses the relation between these two perspectives by analyzing the 
English indefinite this. She represents indefinite this as a referential operator in 
the sense of Fodor & Sag (1982), but also adds the felicity condition of 
“noteworthiness”. She notes that it is an open question how these two 
properties of indefinite this are linked to each other. Wright & Givón (1987) 
claim that the discourse prominence is primary and that referential properties 
are derived from it. I argue that the contrary holds: On the analysis of German 
indefinite demonstrative dies (‘this‘) and so’n (‘such-a’) I demonstrate how we 
can derive discourse properties of indefinite demonstratives from their 
referential properties.  
 
1	   Introduction	  
Specificity is a semantic-pragmatic notion that distinguishes between 
different uses or interpretations of indefinite noun phrases. It is related to the 
communicative notion of “referential intention”. A speaker uses an indefinite 
noun phrase and intends to refer to a particular referent, the referent “the 
speaker has in mind”. This function of the indefinite has various 
consequences for sentence and discourse semantics. In this article I focus on 
two aspects of specificity: Fodor & Sag’s (1982) notion of referentiality and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Part of this presentation is joint work with Sofiana Chiriacescu (so’n) and Annika Deichsel 
(indefinite dies).  I am grateful to the audience of Sinn und Bedeutung for helpful comments, and 
to Sofiana Chiriacescu, Annika Deichsel, Cornelia Ebert, Donka Farkas, Ljudmila Geist, Jeanette 
Gundel, Dag Haug, Irene Heim, Elsi Kaiser, Hans Kamp, Edgar Onea, Albert Ortmann, Alice ter 
Meulen for constructive comments and considerable assistance on earlier versions of this paper. 
The research is supported by the German Science Foundation by a grant to the project C2: Case 
and referential context, as part of the Collaborative Research Center 732 Incremental 
Specification in Context at the University of Stuttgart. Furthermore, I gratefully acknowledge the 
support of the Fritz Thyssen Foundation and the VolkswagenStiftung (opus magnum).  
 
In Reich, Ingo et al. (eds.), Proceedings of Sinn & Bedeutung 15,  
pp. 9–30. Universaar – Saarland University Press: Saarbrücken, Germany, 2011. 	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Givón’s (1983) notion of discourse prominence as the central effect of 
specific indefinites. This two-sided behavior of specific indefinites was 
illustrated by the referential and discourse properties of indefinite this in 
English (Perlman 1969, Maclaran 1980, Prince 1981, Ionin 2006). The 
demonstrative this in English has an “indefinite” or “presentative” use, as in 
(1) and (2a). In (1) the noun phrase this man is clearly indefinite as it appears 
in an existential context. It is discourse- and speaker-new and Ionin (2006) 
argues that it is felicitously used if it introduces an interesting or 
“noteworthy” property into the discourse. The use of indefinite this in (2b) is 
not felicitous as the given information is not noteworthy, but rather expected 
(examples from Maclaran 1980 and Ionin 2006):  
(1) There is this man who lives upstairs from me who is driving me mad 
 because he jumps rope at 2 a.m. every night. 
(2) a. I put a/this 1$ stamp on the letter and realized too late that it was 
 worth a fortune. 
 b. I put a/*this 1$ stamp on the letter. I wanted to mail the letter to 
 Europe. 
Besides these discourse properties, Prince (1981) also discusses particular 
referential properties that are characteristic for specific or referential in-
definites (Fodor & Sag 1982). Indefinite this always takes wide scope with 
respect to extensional operators, as illustrated in (3a). On the other hand, the 
indefinite noun phrase a poem in (3b) is ambiguous between a wide-scope 
reading and a narrow-scope reading, thus allowing for the inference that 
different students might have read different poems. 
(3) a. He gave an A to every student who recited this poem by Pindar.  
    (à Only one poem overall) 
 b. He gave an A to every student who recited a poem by Pindar. 
   (à Possibly many poems) 
Indefinite this in (4a) always allows an existential entailment or 
presupposition, while the ordinary indefinite article a does not. (5a) shows 
that it is a presupposition, since it allows an existential inference even under 
negation. 
(4) a. Alice wanted to kiss this sailor boy. (à There was a sailor boy) 
 b. Alice wanted to kiss a sailor boy.    (-/-> There was a sailor boy) 
(5) a. Mary didn’t buy this pink truck.    (à There was a pink truck)  
 b. Mary didn’t buy a pink truck.      (-/-> There was a pink truck) 
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Fodor & Sag (1982) observe that the use of indefinite this is different from 
the use of the definite article in such contexts. The definite article pre-
supposes familiarity of speaker and hearer with the associated referent, while 
the indefinite demonstrative only indicates familiarity of the speaker, but 
unfamiliarity of the hearer. It is the prototypical instance of a specific (or 
referential) indefinite noun phrase. Its definition (6) expresses that a specific 
or referential indefinite introduces a new discourse referent such that the 
speaker has a “unique individual in mind”. Heim (2011, ex. (56)) formulates 
Fodor & Sag’s (1982) original idea in a two-dimensional semantics with a 
context set c and an evaluation point i. The indexical or referential meaning 
of an indefinite only depends on the utterance context, as it is the case for 
regular indexical expressions. Ionin (2006) adds a felicity condition to this 
definition in order to motivate the use of such a referential indefinite, as in 
(7). The use of indefinite this is only felicitous if the speaker contributes a 
noteworthy property to the introduced referent.   
(6) Referential indefinites (Fodor & Sag 1982, Heim 2011, ex. (56)) 
 [[aref α]]c,i is defined only if there is a unique individual that the speaker 
of c has in mind in c, and this individual is in [[α]]c,c;   
where defined, [[aref α]]c,i = this individual. 
(7) Indefinite this (Ionin 2006: 187) 
 A sentence of the form [sp α] φ expresses a proposition only in those 
utterance contexts c where the following felicity condition is fulfilled: 
the speaker of c intends to refer to exactly one individual xc in c, and 
there exists a property u which the speaker considers noteworthy in c, 
and xc is both α and u in c. When this condition is fulfilled, [sp α] φ 
expresses that proposition which is true at an index i if xc is φ at i and 
 false otherwise. 
Ionin (2006) combines the two characteristics of indefinite this in her 
definition (7): (i) the “referential intention” of the speaker yielding the 
semantic property of high referential strength described above; and (ii) the 
noteworthiness property closely related to the pragmatic property of high 
prominence in the discourse. She discusses the relation between these two 
properties, but without conclusion. Wright & Givón (1987) focus on dis-
course prominence and compare the grammaticalization of indefinite this 
with the indefinite article a. They argue that such indefinite articles first 
acquire a pragmatic discourse function and only then the referential function. 
Generalizing the empirical data they found, Wright & Givón (1987, 29) 
maintain the claim (8) and argue that grammaticalization starts with 
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pragmatic discourse functions and then proceeds to semantic functions such 
as high referential strength. 
(8) Implicational relation between pragmatic and semantic reference 
 “If a nominal is prag-referential, then it is most likely to also be SEM – 
 referential (but not vice versa)” 
With this short overview on indefinite this we are now in a position to 
formulate the research questions of this paper with respect to specificity: (i) 
Are discourse prominence and referentiality two instantiations of specificity, 
(ii) if so, are they related, and (iii) if they are related do they exhibit the 
implicational relation in (8) or the opposite. I argue that (8) does not correctly 
describe the situation with indefinite this in English and with its two German 
equivalents. While the analysis of indefinite this in English might not be 
conclusive (cf. Ionin 2006) the comparison with the two German specific 
indefinite articles dies and so’n (< so+’n, ‘such+enclitic indefinite article’) 
indicates that the semantic function is primary and the discourse prominence 
derived. 
Section 2 summarizes different types of specificity and discusses the 
different ways to group these subtypes together. Section 3 presents the 
semantic analysis of specificity in terms of referential anchoring. Section 4 
and 5 provide information about the different uses and functions of German 
indefinite dies and so’n. Section 6 discusses some of their discourse functions 
and section 7 focuses on their referential properties. Section 8 presents an 
analysis of the function of indefinite demonstratives and section 9 formulates 
a first hypothesis concerning the semantics of such demonstratives in terms 
of referential anchoring. Section 10 concludes with a brief summary and 
some new research questions. 
2	   Types	  of	  Specificity	  
The notion of specificity is associated with various types of data and 
accounted for in different theories (see Farkas 1994, Ionin 2006, Kamp & 
Bende-Farkas 2006, and von Heusinger 2011 for an overview). I suggest to 
classify the various notions of specificity in seven types: (i) Specificity in 
opaque contexts (referential specificity) expresses a contrast between a 
reading that allows existential entailment (9a) and a reading that does not 
(9b); (ii) scopal specificity (often also including type (i)) refers to the ability 
of certain indefinites to escape scope islands like the conditional in (10a), that 
a universal quantifier cannot escape (10b); (iii) epistemic specificity ex-
Specificity, Referentiality and Discourse Prominence   13 
presses the contrast between speaker’s knowledge (11a) and speaker’s 
ignorance (or indifference) (11b) about the referent of the indefinite. 
(9) a. Paula believes that Bill talked to an important politician.  (-> there is 
  an important politician) 
 b. Paula believes that Bill talked to an important politician. (but there is  
  no important politician) 
(10)  a. If a friend of mine from Texas had died in the fire, I would have  
  inherited a fortune. (possible reading: there is a friend of mine 
and…) 
 b. If each friend of mine from Texas had died in the fire, I would have  
 inherited a fortune. (not possible: for each of my friends, if one of  
  them…) 
(11) a. A student in Syntax 1 cheated in the exam. I know him: It is Jim  
  Miller. 
 b. A student in Syntax 1 cheated in the exam. But I do not know who it  
  is. 
(iv) specificity is sometimes associated with different types of familiarity 
such as d-linking, partitivity, and presuppositionality: the indefinite is part of 
an already introduced set, as in (12a), or not, as in (12b); (v) specificity is also 
related to topicality as in (13a), where the topical element can be understood 
as a specific expression, while (13b) only expresses an existential claim. 
(12) a. 50 students entered the room. I knew two girls.  
 b. 50 students entered the room. They greeted two girls (already in the
 room). 
(13) a. Some ghosts live in the pantry; others live in the kitchen. 
 b. There are some ghosts in this house. 
There are two further notions of specificity that concern the forward 
referential potential of indefinites: (vi) specificity as noteworthiness assumes 
that the presentative this in (14) signals that the speaker intends to assert a 
noteworthy property of the referent, as in (14a), while (14b) is reported to be 
infelicitous since no such property is mentioned. (vii) specificity as discourse 
prominence refers to an aspect of discourse prominence, namely “referential 
persistence” or “topic shift”, i.e. the potential of an indefinite to introduce a 
referent that will be mentioned  again and may even become a topic in the 
subsequent discourse. 
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(14) a.  He put a/this 31 cent stamp on the envelope, and only realized later 
 that it was worth a fortune because it was unperforated. 
 b. He put a/#this 31 cent stamp on the envelope, so he must want it to 
 go airmail. 
(15) a. There was a king and the king had a daughter and he loved his 
 daughter … 
 b. There was a king and # the season was very short and hot … 
These different subtypes of specificity can be roughly categorized into larger 
groups as in Figure 1 with a referential notion, a familiarity notion and a dis-
course prominence notion of specificity.  
 
            specificity   
    
 
  
referential notion  
(sentence semantics and pragmatics) 
familiarity-based notion  
(backward reference) 
discourse prominence  
(forward reference) 
    
 
 
 
  
(i)  
referential 
specificity 
(ii) 
scopal 
specificity 
(iii)  
epistemic 
specificity 
(iv) 
partitivity, 
presup-
positionality, 
backgrounding 
(v)  
topica-
lity 
(vi) 
note-
worthiness 
(vii)  
discourse 
prominence 
 
Figure 1: Family tree of specificity 
 
Researchers on specificity differ in their assumptions on (a) which subtype 
qualifies for specificity proper and (b) how many representations are 
necessary to cover these types. Fodor & Sag (1982) take the subtypes (i)-(iii) 
as the central notion of specificity and assume the single representation (6) 
for them. Farkas (1994) argues that (i)-(iv) are independent subtypes but with 
similar effects. She suggests different representations, which are, however, 
similar in the effect that they reduce the restrictor set of the indefinite. Kamp 
& Bende-Farkas (2006, submitted) assume that epistemic specificity is the 
central notion which is basically the same as (i) and from which we can 
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derive effects described under (ii). Prince (1981) and Ionin (2006) analyze 
indefinite this and show that (vi) is related to (i)-(iii). Givón (1983) focuses 
on the discourse prominence aspect (vii) and assumes the implicational 
hierarchy of object domains in Figure 2, according to which a discourse 
prominent expression implicates that the associated referent is intended by 
the speaker, and what is intended also has a reference in the world. It is the 
general scheme from which Wright & Givón’s (1987) more specialized 
implicational relation (8) above is derived. 
 
discourse prominence > speaker’s intentions > reference in the “world” 
Figure 2: Ranking of specificity types according to Givón (1984: 135) 
 
3	   Referential	  Anchoring	  
Different contrasts associated with different kinds of specificity can be best 
unified by the following generalization: In its prototypical use, the concept of 
specificity is associated with the communicative notion of referential 
intention. Grammatical contrasts, such as specific articles, indefinite pro-
nouns or differential object marking associated with this function are also 
used to express relations between discourse entities which do not express 
“referential intentions” in the literal sense. Rather, it seems that specificity is 
a grammaticalized means to structure the relations among discourse items: A 
specific indefinite is referentially anchored to a salient discourse participant 
or another discourse referent, i.e. “the referent of the specific expression is 
linked by a contextually salient function to the referent of another 
expression“ (von Heusinger 2002: 45). Under this account the context has to 
provide two parameters: the anchoring function and the anchor itself. The 
speaker has to be able to specify the anchoring function, while it must be 
unfamiliar for the hearer, the same way as the intended referent must be 
unfamiliar. Still the hearer has to represent the fact that there is an anchoring 
function. The anchor, however, must be familar to both speaker and hearer, 
which allows speaker and hearer to share the scopal properties of the 
indefinite. This concept of specificity is a refinement of Fodor & Sag’s 
(1982) original account in terms of referential (Kaplan-style) expressions. 
Below I present a sketch of the theory by stepwise modifying Fodor & Sag’s 
(1982) original proposal. They assume two semantic representations for exis-
tential indefinites and referential indefinites, as in (16). 
(16) a. [[aquant N]] = λQ. ∃x. [N(x) & Q(x)] 
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 b. [[aref N]] =  is defined only if there is a unique individual that the  
  speaker of the sentence has in mind, and this individual is N 
The definition (16b) might be adequate for English indefinite this, but it has 
been shown that it is not sufficient to account for various other types of 
specific indefinites. It needs additional modifications affecting the parameters 
listed in (17): 
(17) Modification of the original Fodor & Sag (1982) account (= (4b)) 
 (i)  replacing the uniqueness condition by an explicit anchoring 
function  
 (ii)  allowing for other anchors than the speaker 
 (iii) allowing for different content of the anchoring function 
The uniqueness condition in definition (16b) is ‘built in’ by a function from 
the anchor to the referent: f(anchor) = referent. The second modification 
concerns potential anchors, which can be the speaker in (18), but also some 
other attitude holder in (19). But we can abstract even further, as the anchor 
can also be realized by a quantifier phrase, as in (20).  
(18) Paula believes that Bill talked to an important politician. 
(19) a. George: “I met a certain student of mine today.” 
 b. Jack: “George said that he met a certain student of his today.” 
(20) Every husband had forgotten a certain date – his wife’s birthday. 
The third modification affects the status of the content of the anchoring 
function. The anchor must in principle be familiar to both speaker and hearer, 
i.e. it must be contextually given or accessible. The content of the anchoring 
relation must be hearer-new in order to distinguish between specific 
indefinites and definites. (21) and (22) demonstrate that the exact definition 
of the function may even be unknown to the speaker (see Enç 1991: 20 for 
discussion): 
(21) The teacher gave every child a certain task to work on during the 
 afternoon. 
(22) Each reporter was assigned to a certain politician by the editor of the 
 paper. 
We can summarize the modifications and give the informal definition of 
referential anchoring in (23):  
(23) Informal definition of specificity in terms of referential anchoring 
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 A specific indefinite a N is represented by an anchoring function f from 
an anchor to an individual and this individual is N. Both the anchor as 
well as the anchoring function must be given in the context 
 a) anchor is speaker- and hearer-given 
 b) content of anchoring function is hearer-new 
Von Heusinger (2002 based on earlier work) cashes out the idea of referential 
anchoring in terms of parameterized or Skolemized choice functions, also 
known from Kratzer (1998) and Chierchia (2001, 2005). The idea is that the 
indefinite article can translate into the complex pronominal element fx with x 
being a parameter that might be bound by some context agent or some 
quantifier phrase that has wider scope than the indefinite. The function f 
applied to the anchor yields a choice function that is applied to the set 
denoted by the descriptive content of the indefinite yielding the referent, as in 
(24) adapted from Roberts (2007) (for alternative treatments of this idea see 
Kamp & Bende-Farkas (to appear), Onea & Geist 2010). 
(24) Referential anchoring with parameterized choice functions 
 i) complex pronominal element fx 
 ii) x parameter (= anchor), the argument of f, binding is pragmatically 
given 
  a) might be bound by some context agent (speaker etc.) 
  b) might be bound by a wider scope QP to yield intermediate scope 
 iii) f(x): a choice function that takes a set denoted by DC as its argument 
  and yields an element of that set 
In summary, the concept of referential anchoring provides a consistent 
account of specificity. It links the notion of referential intention to a semantic 
representation with an anchoring function and an anchor. The anchor must be 
familiar to speaker and hearer, while the content of the function must not be 
familiar to the hearer (and is generally familiar to the speaker). Still the 
hearer has to establish a permanent representation for the specific indefinite, 
based on the assumption of the existence of such an anchoring function. 
Thus, this account ties in with the other concepts of specificity, including 
familiarity-based and discourse-based concepts, discussed in the next 
sections. 
4	   Indefinite	  dies	  
German has a proximal demonstrative dieser, diese, dies(es), and a not very 
productive distal jener, jene, jenes. The proximal demonstrative has various 
functions, the most important of which are listed in Table 1: 
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a) deictic discourse status further 
characterization 
ex. 
b) anaphoric  speaker- and hearer-known perceivable in 
situation 
(25) 
c) discourse 
deictic 
speaker- and hearer-known discourse-given (26) 
d) recognitional  speaker- and hearer-known reference to 
discourse (items) 
(27) 
e) indefinite speaker- and hearer-known, 
but discourse-new 
shared (personal) 
knowledge 
(28) 
f) emotional speaker-known 
hearer-new, discourse-new 
unaccented (29) 
g) deictic speaker-known emotional / social 
distance  
(30) 
Table 1: usages of dies in German 
 
(25) Nimm diesen Apfel. 
Take this apple. 
(26) Es war einmal ein König. Dieser König hatte eine Krone. 
Once upon a time there was a king. This king had a crown. 
(27)  Er sagte: „Ich liebe Dich“, und mit diesen Worten ging er. 
He said „I love you“, and with these words he left. 
(28)  Weißt du was mit diesem Telefon passiert ist, das immer in deinem 
Zimmer war? 
 Do you know what happened to that (dieses) phone that used to be in 
your room? 
(29)  Gestern kam ich in eine Bar und da war dieser Fremde, der mich die
 ganze Zeit anstarrte. 
 Yesterday I walked into a bar and there was this stranger who stared at 
 me all the time.’ 
(30) Und dann traf ich diesen Nachbarn von dir. 
And then I met this neighbour of yours. 
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The deictic use (25), the anaphoric one (26) and the discourse deictic one (27) 
are expected from the general function of demonstratives. They are clearly 
definite and discourse-given. The recognitional (or “anamnestic”) function 
(27) is discourse-new, but speaker- and hearer-given, i.e. definite. The 
indefinite (or presentative) use in (29) is speaker-given, but discourse-new 
and hearer-new. Lakoff (1974) describes an emotional use of the 
demonstrative in (30) and subsumes the indefinite use under it. However, I 
maintain that the indefinite use is independent as it is the case for the English 
indefinite this. The recognitional and indefinite uses are somewhat informal, 
but still to be found in written texts. 
5	   Indefinite	  so’n	  
German provides another indefinite demonstrative, namely the form so’n, 
which derives from the demonstratives for properties so ‘such’ and the 
reduced and enclitic indefinite article ‘n. It can substitute most, if not all, 
instances of indefinite dies in German. This form is rarely found in formal 
language, but quite frequent in informal registers. The spelling varies 
between so’n and son. Both forms can be found in the literature as well as in 
written versions of informal registers. It is controversial whether it constitutes 
an independent determiner with its own semantics, or is a merged form with a 
compositional semantics of demonstrative and indefinite article plus some 
pragmatic rules (as in the case of German prepositions with weak definite 
articles). Henn-Mennesheimer (1986) and Lenerz & Lohnstein (2004) assume 
that it consists of two underlying forms, while Hole & Klumpp (2004) 
maintain that it constitutes one form. They argue that so’n shows a plural 
paradigm in (31), which cannot be explained by a merged form since the 
indefinite article in German has no plural form (See also Chiriacescu 2011, 
von Heusinger (to appear) for more examples and a detailed discussion. Note 
that we could not find examples for the genitive): 
(31)  Paradigm of so’n 
Sg.  Pl.  
Nom. so’n Pullover Nom. so’ne Pullover 
Gen. so’nes Pullovers Gen. so’ner Pullovers 
Dat. so’nem Pullover Dat. so’nen Pullover 
Akk. so’nen Pullover Akk. so’ne Pullover 
 
German has a second demonstrative for properties, namely solcher, solche, 
solch(es), which behaves in function and distribution like English such. So is 
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more flexible as it does not take nominal inflection. It has various functions, 
but we focus on usages with adjectives and unmodified nouns as in Table 2: 
 
notion discourse status further 
characterization 
ex. 
a) gradable + deictic speaker- and hearer- known 
refers to a grade (32) 
b) gradable + anaphoric speaker- and hearer- known 
refers to a grade  (33) 
c) deictic speaker- and hearer- known 
refers a to a property 
or to a type (kind) 
(34) 
d) anaphoric  speaker- and hearer- known 
refers a to a property 
or to a type (kind) 
(35) 
e) intensifier  speaker-known shifts the standard upwards (only with 
gradable nouns) 
(36) 
f) „hedging“  noun for exact description is 
unknown 
denotation is extended (37) 
g) indefinite speaker-known, hearer-new, 
discourse-new 
unaccented  (38) 
h) emotional speaker-known emotional / social distance  
(39) 
Table 2: usages of so in German 
(Ehlich 1986, Eisenberg 1994, Umbach & Ebert (to appear)) 
 
(32) Ana ist so groß. 
 Ana is so tall.  
(33) Ana ist 1,80m groß. Maria ist auch so groß. 
 Ana is 1.80m tall. Mary is also so tall. 
(34) Er hat so ein Auto. 
 He has such-a car. 
(35) Maria hat ein Auto mit Heckklappe. So ein Auto hat er auch. 
 Mary has a car with a hatchback. Such-a car does he also have. 
(36) Er ist so ein Kind / so ein Pedant. 
 He is such a child/ pedant. 
Specificity, Referentiality and Discourse Prominence   21 
The deictic and anaphoric uses of demonstrative so are illustrated with 
adjectives and nouns in (32) – (35). So refers to a grade if applied to 
adjectives and to a situationally or anaphorically given property if applied to 
nouns. It can trigger an intensified reading if applied to (unmodified) nouns 
that are inherently gradable, as in (36). So can trigger different kinds of 
hedging processes, as in (37), where it signals that the client can identify the 
referent, but does not have the correct lexical item at hand. With semantically 
bleached nouns like type, man, guy or with nouns in their typical 
environment, as in (38), neither an intensified nor a hedging function seems 
appropriate. Rather the form signals that a speaker-known, but hearer- and 
discourse-new referent is introduced. So’n also shows an “emotional” use, as 
in (39). In the following we focus on the indefinite function of so’n. 
(37) Kunde im Geschäft: „Haben Sie so eine Klammer?“ 
 Client in shop: Do you have such a clip? 
(38) Da gibt’s so’nen Lehrer in meiner Schule in den ich verliebt bin.  
 There is such -a teacher in my school whom I’m in love with. 
(39) Peter hat so’n Hund gekauft. 
 Peter bought such-a dog. 
6	   Discourse	  Properties	  
Prince (1981) and Ionin (2006) report that indefinite this in English is only 
felicitous if the referent is taken up in the discourse and a noteworthy 
property is asserted with respect to it. Givón (1983) presents a quantitative 
study on the referential persistence of referents introduced by indefinite this. 
Here I can only report a first impression from corpus searches and the results 
from a pilot study on discourse prominence. A referent introduced by in-
definite dies or indefinite so’n is typically picked up in the subsequent 
discourse, as in (40) and (41). Please note that the two indefinite determiners 
can replace each other and can also be replaced by the indefinite article (for 
more examples see Chiriacescu 2011, von Heusinger (to appear)). 
(40)  Da war dieser Typ aus Deutschland, den ich in einem Hostel auf der 
 neuseeländischen Insel Waiheke kennen lernte. Vielleicht hieß er 
Wolfgang, vielleicht Volker - nicht so wichtig. Ich erinnere mich nur, 
dass er nett, ... (Cosmas) 
 ‘There was this guy from Germany who I got to know in a hostel on the 
New Zealand island Waiheke. May be he was called Wolfgang, maybe 
 Volker – not that important. I just remember that he was nice… 
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(41)  In unsrer Stadt gibts so’n Mann er ist nicht irgendeiner, nein, er ist 
 unser  neuer Bürgermeister, er sieht aus wie ein Vogelstrauß. (Google) 
‘In our city there is such-a man, he is not anyone, no, he is our new 
 mayor, he looks like an ostrich.’  
I distinguish three different types of discourse prominence that can be 
measured. (cf. Givón 1983, Chiriacescu & von Heusinger 2010): (i) referen-
tial persistence or the number of anaphoric expressions referring back to the 
discourse referent; (ii) topic shift potential or the distance between the 
discourse referent and its use as topic in the subsequent discourse, and (iii) 
discourse activation or the level of activation that determines the DP-type of 
the next anaphoric expression (according to the Givenness Hierarchy of 
Gundel et. al. 1993). Sofiana Chiriacescu and Annika Deichsel performed a 
pilot sentence continuation test. 10 subjects read the small fragment in (42) 
and were asked to continue it with five sentences. We then analyzed the five 
continuation sentences according to the three discussed parameters. I present 
the results from referential persistence (see Chiriacescu 2011 and Deichsel 
2011 for more results). We counted the absolute number of all referential 
items that were anaphorically linked to the expression ein / so’n / dieser 
Mann in Figure 3.  
(42)  Das Essen in dem Restaurant war wirklich total lecker, aber ziemlich 
 teuer. Als ich nach fünf Gängen beim Dessert war, hab’ ich gesehen, 
 wie ein / so’n / dieser Mann Sekt bestellte. 
 ‘The meal in the restaurant was really excellent, but quite expensive. 
When I got to dessert after five courses, I saw that a / such-a / this man
 ordered champagne.’ 
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Figure 3: Referential persistence of ein / so’n / dieser Mann in (42) 
 
The sum of all items referring back to the indefinite in the five sentences 
provided by the 10 subjects is 29 for indefinite dies, 24 for indefinite so’n, 
but only 8 for the indefinite article ein. This clearly indicates a difference be-
tween indefinite dies and the indefinite article ein, with indefinite so’n taking 
an intermediate position. We can safely conclude that both indefinite demon-
stratives signal discourse prominence. 
7	   Referential	  Properties	  
The two indefinite demonstratives also show particular referential properties. 
I can only provide a few test sentences concerning referential specificity in 
(43) and (44), scopal specificity in (45) and epistemic specificity in (46). 
Table 4 summarizes the results of my own judgments and of the judgments of 
some informants (we also did a pilot questionnaire which confirmed the first 
intuitions – see Chiriacescu 2011 for so’n and Deichsel 2011 for dies).  
The indefinite article in (43) and (44) allows a referential and a non-
referential reading, with a preference for the latter. The use of indefinite dies 
is only compatible with the referential reading, while so’n has a preference 
for a referential reading, but is compatible with a non-referential reading, 
which is particularly obvious in (44). 
(43) Eva will einen / so’n / diesen Film über Eliade sehen. 
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 Eva wants to watch a / such-a / this movie about Eliade. 
(44) Maria will einen / so’nen / ?diesen Prinz auf einen weißen Ross heira-
ten. 
 Mary wants to marry a / such-a / this prince on a white horse. 
The indefinite article ein in (45) signals a preference for narrow scope, the in-
definite dies always indicates wide scope, and the indefinite so’n either 
allows a wide-scope reading or a narrow-scope reading of the referent (co-
variation with the universal quantifier), but then with a wide-scope reading of 
a property that is characteristic for all referents. We find similar intuitions for 
the epistemic reading in (46): The indefinite article allows both readings 
(with a preference for a non-specific reading), the indefinite dies only the 
(epistemic) specific reading, and the indefinite so’n clearly signals the 
specific reading, but may also by compatible with the non-specific reading, 
however, intuitions are unclear and blurred by other functions of so+n.  
(45) Jeder meiner Kollegen hat ein / dies / so’n Buch von Eliade gelesen.  
 Each of my colleagues read a / this / so-a book by Eliade. 
(46) Ein / so’n / dieser Student in der Einführung hat beim Examen ge-
schummelt.  
 A / this / such a student in the introduction has cheated in the exam. 
 
Table 4: Referential properties of ein, so’n, dieser 
This brief overview of the referential properties of the two indefinite 
demonstratives clearly indicates a high referential strength in contrast with 
the indefinite article ein, but also some differences between dies and so’n. 
Dies is more like the English indefinite this, always referential, scopal and 
epistemic specific, whereas so’n shows more variation which has to be inves-
tigated in more detail. 
 Referential 
specificity 
(43) + (44) 
Scopal specificity 
(45) 
Epistemic 
specificity 
(46) 
ein non-ref > ref narrow > wide non-spec > spec 
so’n ref > (non-ref) wide > narrow (with wide 
scope for a property) 
spec (*non-spec) 
dieser ref (*non-ref) wide (*narrow) spec (*non-spec) 
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8	   Demonstration	  and	  Topic	  Shift	  
I assume a Kaplan- (1977/1989) style semantics for demonstratives according 
to which a demonstrative expression refers directly to its referent. The 
expression needs an accompanying demonstration (ostension), which raises 
the attention of the hearer to the intended referent. This semantics can be 
applied to demonstrative dies referring to entities, and to demonstrative so, 
referring to properties, as in (47) (see also Roberts 2002). 
(47) Deictic readings of demonstratives 
 a. [[dies N]] = is defined only if there is a demonstration d focussing on 
(raising the attention to) a unique referent such that  the referent is N 
(some additional conditions that the referent must be close to speaker 
etc.) 
 b.  [[so’n N]] = is defined only if there is a demonstration d focussing on 
(raising the attention to) a unique property P and there is a referent x 
such that x is N and P. (some additional conditions that the referent
 must be close to speaker etc.) 
Demonstratives are used without demonstration in their anaphoric use. They 
even introduce new discourse items as discussed in this article. It seems that 
the act of demonstration to a visible or perceivable object is shifted to the 
intention of the speaker towards a referent, which is unknown to the 
addressee. We can formulate a preliminary hypothesis that demonstrative 
nouns raise the attention of the hearer towards a new discourse item in (i) the 
(visible) situation, (ii) in the previous text, or (iii) in the subsequent text. We 
modify (47) to an informal definition of indefinite readings of demonstratives 
in (48): 
(48) Indefinite readings of demonstratives 
 a. [[diesindef N]] = is defined only if there is an intention of the speaker 
to focus on (to raise the attention to) a unique referent such that  the 
referent is N. 
 b.  [[so’nindef N]] = is defined only if there is an intention of the speaker 
to focus on (to raise the attention to) a unique property P and there is
 a referent x such that x is N and P.  
If the hearer recognizes the referential intention of the speaker, the hearer will 
establish a permanent discourse representation for the introduced referent: (i) 
indefinite dies: for an individual discourse referent; (ii) so’n: for the intended 
property and therefore also for the individual that falls under that property. 
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This provides the link between a noteworthy property (see Ionin 2006) and 
the prominence of the discourse referent (Givón 1983). 
9	   Referentiality	  and	  Discourse	  Prominence	  
In the last section we have sketched the shift from a deictic or anaphoric use 
of a demonstrative to an indefinite use. The idea is that one of the 
fundamental functions of demonstratives is to raise the attention towards a 
new referent. In this section I want to propose the link to the semantics of 
specific indefinites spelling out the relation between the referential properties 
and the discourse properties of the indefinite demonstratives in German (and 
English). Definition (48) for the indefinite reading of demonstratives includes 
as one of its central conditions the speaker’s intention. We have seen earlier 
that definition (23), repeated as (49), for specificity semantically represents 
this intention as an anchoring function between an attitude holder (or some 
other discourse referent) and the intended referent. This anchor is speaker- 
and hearer-given, but the content of the anchoring function is hearer-new, and 
therefore the intended referent is new, too. 
(49) Informal definition of specificity in terms of referential anchoring 
 A specific indefinite a N is represented by an anchoring function f from 
an anchor to an individual and this individual is N. Both the anchor as 
well as the anchoring function must be given in the context 
  a)  anchor is speaker- and hearer-given 
  b)  content of anchoring function is hearer-new 
If we use this definition for representing the informal concept of “referential 
intention” in (48) we can formulate (50) for a semantics of indefinite demon-
stratives. For both the anchor must be the speaker (thus reflecting the 
“demonstrative” or indexical nature). For dies the anchoring function yields 
the intended referent, while for so’n the anchoring function yields a property 
with which we uniquely identify the referent (reflecting the original nature of 
so as a demonstrative of properties). Thus indefinite so’n only indirectly pro-
motes a referent to high referential strength and high discourse prominence. 
(50) Indefinite readings of demonstratives 
 a. [[diesindef N]] = is defined only if there is an anchoring function 
from the speaker to an object such that the object is N. 
 b.  [[so’nindef N]] = is defined only if there an anchoring function from 
the speaker to a property P such that the referent is N and that 
 there is a referent x such that x is N and P.  
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We can conclude that the referential property of “referential intention” is the 
core meaning of indefinite demonstratives. It is best represented by refer-
ential anchoring. We can then derive from this core-meaning the discourse 
function of “raising attention” as illustrated in section 8. We can also account 
for the differences between the two indefinite demonstratives – they are of 
different semantic types, they are represented by different semantic repre-
sentations (giving rise to different semantic properties) and thus they also 
trigger different kinds of discourse prominence as reported above.   
10	   Summary	  
I have shown that German has two additional indefinite articles, indefinite 
dies and (informal) so’n corresponding to English indefinite this. Both 
articles have grammaticalized from deictic expressions. They are different: 
indefinite this derives from the demonstrative for objects, while so’n derives 
from the demonstratives for properties. They are used to signal discourse 
prominence and they show a strong tendency for a referential meaning (wide 
scope with respect to other operators, rigid reference etc.). Indefinite dies has 
a higher discourse prominence and a higher referential strength than 
indefinite so’n, which only indirectly promotes the referent to high referential 
strength and high discourse prominence. I have argued that the shift from the 
deictic or anaphoric use of a demonstrative to an indefinite use can be best 
explained by a semantics of “referential anchoring”. This semantics makes it 
possible to represent the “referential intention” of the speaker in an adequate 
way, qualifying for a specific interpretation of these demonstratives. The 
specific semantics then allows for discourse prominence, e.g. for referential 
persistence. In this view the referential properties are primary and the 
discourse properties are derived, contradicting Wright & Givón’s (1987) 
claim. This picture needs more empirical coverage and a carefully worked out 
semantic representation, which are two challenging research issues. 
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Abstract. The most common philosophical view about the notion of existence 
is that it is a second-order property or existential quantification. A less common 
view is that existence is a (first-order) property of 'existent' as opposed to 
'nonexistent' (past or merely intentional) objects. An even less common view is 
that existence divides into different 'modes of being' for different sorts of 
entities. In this paper I will take a closer look at the semantic behavior of 
existence predicates in natural language, such as 'exist', 'occur', and 'obtain', 
arguing that existence predicates in natural language support the two less 
common philosophical views. I will develop explicit analyses of existence 
predicates in their time-relative and space-relative uses which will explain why 
they apply to some kinds of entities, but not others. 
 
1	   Introduction	  
The most common philosophical view of existence is that existence amounts 
to existential quantification (the Quinean tradition) or is a second-order 
concept (the Kant-Frege tradition). A less common philosophical view is that 
existence is a first-order property distinguishing between nonexistent (past, 
possible, or merely intentional) objects and existing objects. An even less 
common philosophical view is that existence divides into different ‘modes of 
being’ for different kinds of entities (a view held, for example, by Aristotle, 
Heidegger, Sarte, Ryle, and more recently McDaniel).1 The aim of the 
present paper is to take a closer look at how the notion of existence is in fact 
expressed in natural language. In natural language, it appears, existence is not 
so much expressed by quantification, which can be shown to be neutral as 
regards any distinction between existent and nonexistent objects that one 
might draw. Rather existence is expressed by predicates, and that is, first-
order predicates. Furthermore, there is, at least in English, no single existence 
predicate, but rather at least three: exist, occur (or related predicates such as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For a recent defense of the Quinean view, see van Inwagen (1998). For a recent defense of a 
view of existence dividing into different modes of being see McDaniel (to appear a, b). 
In Reich, Ingo et al. (eds.), Proceedings of Sinn & Bedeutung 15,  
pp. 31–54. Universaar – Saarland University Press: Saarbrücken, Germany, 2011. 	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happen or take place), and obtain. The semantic behavior of such existence 
predicates (regarding the kinds of entities that they can apply to and the sorts 
of adverbial modifiers they allow) reveals a notion of existence that divides 
into at least three different kinds of modes being, reflecting the distinction 
between endurance and perdurance, as well as their space-related analogues, 
but also the particular mode of being of such entities as states, facts, 
conditions, and laws. Existence predicates reflect such distinctions primarily 
in their time- and space-related uses, but in fact the location-independent uses 
of existence predicates should best be understood as derivative upon their 
location-dependent uses.  
I will first clarify the notion of an existence predicate itself as well as 
some fundamental semantic differences in natural language between 
constructions of existential quantification and existence predicates. I then 
discuss the semantics of the three existence predicates exist, occur, and 
obtain in greater detail.  
2	   The	  Notion	  of	  an	  Existence	  Predicate	  
While many philosophers take existence to amount to just existential 
quantification, it has hardly escaped philosophers’ attention that natural 
language displays existence predicates, in particular, of course, the predicate 
exist. A number of philosophers, most notably Frege, have taken exist to be a 
special, second-order predicate, applying to concepts rather than individuals. 
However, from the point of view of natural language semantics, exist clearly 
is a first-order predicate.2 It does not require, like putative second-order 
predicates, predicative terms, but rather requires expressions in subject 
position that act as singular terms, as in (1a, b) and (2a, b), or that act as 
quantifiers binding individual variables, as in (1c):3 
(1) a. The president of France exists. 
 b. Mars exists. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Philosophers that have argued that exist is a first-order predicate include Miller (1975, 1986, 
2002), Salmon (1987, 1989), and McGinn (2000). 
3 Exist also allows for bare plurals or mass nouns in subject position, in which case it does seem 
to express existential quantification: 
 
(i) a. Giraffes exist. 
  b. Gold exists. 
 
However, as will be shown later, bare plurals and mass nouns in the subject position of exist-
sentences are in fact kind-referring, and thus singular terms. This means that exist is a first-order 
predicate in sentences like (i-a, b) as well. 
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 c. Some planet exists. 
(2) a. The king of France does not exist. 
 b. Vulcan does not exist. 
When exist is viewed as a first-order predicate in positive existence 
statements as in (1a, b, c), it is generally taken to express a trivial or almost 
trivial property, the property every entity has or, less trivially, the property 
that every present and actual entity has. The occurrence of exist in negative 
existentials, as in (2a, b), is more difficult to handle.  The main focus of this 
paper is the application of time- or space-relative uses of existence predicates 
to particular kinds of entities, but for an appropriate discussion of existence 
predicates a few words are necessary concerning negative existentials.  
There is a significant debate of how to analyse negative existentials with 
singular terms, while treating exist as a first-order predicate. On one view, the 
subject term in negative existentials is an empty term, exist expresses the 
trivial property everything has, and negation is taken to be external negation. 
On that view, (2b) will mean: ‘it is not true that Vulcan exists’. On another 
view, the Meinongian view, the subject term in a true negative existential 
always stands for an entity, but a ‘nonexistent’ entity, an entity of which exist 
is false. There is also a third, hybrid view, that of Salmon (1987, 1998), on 
which the subject term in true negative existentials sometimes stands for an 
object of which exist is not true, namely an object that has existed only in the 
past or a merely possible object. If the subject of the negative existential is a 
fictional term, though, Salmon takes it to be empty, with negation then being 
external negation.  
Negated existence predicates in existentially quantified sentences pre-
sent a particularly interesting phenomenon which appears to give support for 
the Meinongian view. Meinongians have long argued that existential quan-
tification, unlike predication with exist, is not existentially committing.4 This 
is displayed by the following ‘Meinongian’ statement: 
(3) There are things that do not exist.   
The Meinongian statement in (3) can hardly serve as a piece of ‘linguistic 
evidence’ for the Meinongian view, though: a sentence like (3) serves to 
express a philosophical position, rather than being a ‘natural’ sentence of 
natural language, a sentence that can be used without thereby making explicit 
a philosophical conviction. But there are constructions in natural language 
that appear to involve intentional objects as semantic values of subject terms 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Recent Meinongians include Parsons (1980) and Priest (2005). 
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in negative existence statements. The relevant sentences are entirely natural 
in the sense that they hardly sound like the expression of a philosophical 
view. These are examples: 
(4) a. Some people John mentioned do not exist. 
 b. Some things John thought of do not exist.  
In (4a, b) the subject consists of a definite description formed, crucially, with 
an intentional verb, such as mention or think of. Such verbs appear to take 
intentional ‘nonexistent’ objects as arguments when the intentional act they 
describe is not successful, and these entities appear to be the ones the 
existential quantifiers in (4a,b) range over. 
If intentional ‘nonexistent’ objects are involved in existentially quan-
tified negative existentials as in (4), then they may just as well be involved in 
negative existentials with apparent empty proper names and descriptions 
associated with a failed or pretend act of reference (and in particularly des-
criptions formed with intentional verbs as in the woman John mentioned does 
not exist). However, this paper is not the place to defend such a view further.5 
What is important in the present context is simply the difference displayed by 
existential quantification and existence predicates in natural language.  
The apparent ability of natural language quantifiers to range over non-
existent objects is not the only respect in which existential quantification in 
natural language differ from existence predicates. There is a further fun-
damental difference between sentences with an existence predicate and with 
existential quantification. Existential quantifiers in natural language may 
range over entities of any kind whatsoever, but existence predicates in natural 
language are generally restricted to a particular kind of entity. Thus, exist is 
restricted to enduring objects (basically material objects), at least in its tensed 
form. For perduring entities, that is, events, occur (or happen or take place) is 
the appropriate existence predicate instead. Moreover, for entities of the sort 
of states or facts, abstract entities in a certain sense, there is a specific 
existence predicate in English, namely obtain. 
The apparent variety of existence predicates in natural language raises 
the question of what makes a predicate an existence predicate in the first 
place. This question obtains importance in view of the fact that in the history 
of philosophy there have been a variety of views as to what ‘modes of being’ 
there are. Thus Sartre took conscious entities to engage in a distinctive mode 
of being and in the phenomenological tradition ‘being experienced’ was 
considered a mode of being (even the only one). The question thus is: is there 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See McGinn (2000) for a philosophical defense of that view. 
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a criterion that tells us whether a predicate is an existence predicate in a 
linguistically relevant sense? There is in fact a very clear criterion for exis-
tence predicates, namely the semantic behavior of predicates under negation. 
Negative existentials display the peculiarity that they can be true even if the 
subject does not refer to or stand for an actual object. Other predicates simply 
do not display that particular feature. Ordinary predicates when negated will 
in such a case lead to sentences that intuitively lack a truth value (such as the 
present king of France is bald).  
Intentional verbs like think of, mention, or describe, as already men-
tioned, arguably take intentional objects as arguments (John thought of the 
woman Bill mentioned). Unlike existence predicates, though, they do not sys-
tematically yield truth when negated. Thus, the sentence below may very well 
be false, even if the woman John described does not exist: 
(5) Bill did not think of the woman John described. 
Ordinary (non-intentional) predicates thus are subject to the following 
condition: 
(6) a. A (intransitive) predicate P is an ordinary predicate iff for any world 
w and time t, for any singular term T, if T does not stand for an 
actual entity in w, then neither [T not P]w, t = true nor [T not P]w, t = 
false. 
By contrast, existence predicates are subject to the following condition 
(formulated so as to remain as neutral as possible regarding the treatment of 
negative existentials):  
(6) b. Criterion for Existence Predicates 
An (intransitive) predicate P is an existence predicate iff for any 
world w and time t, for any singular term T, if T does not stand for a 
(present, actual) entity in w, then [T not P]w, t = true. 
Applying the criterion to some putative existence predicates, exist obviously 
is classified as an existence predicate, as are occur and obtain given the 
possible truth of the sentences below: 
(7) a. The event John mentioned did not occur. 
 b. The situation John described did not obtain.  
Live and be alive are putative existence predicates, but by the criterion they 
do not come out as such: 
(8) The person Mary mentioned does not live / is not alive. 
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Live and is alive presuppose that the object they apply has been alive before; 
they do not specify the actual existence of an object of thought. The criterion 
also rules out as existence predicates a range of other predicates that 
according to particular historical philosophical views might be regarded as 
such, for example being experienced. 
With this clarification of the notion of an existence predicate as such, let 
us now focus on the semantic differences among different existence 
predicates as well as their time- and space-related application.  
3	   The	  Difference	  between	  exist	  and	  occur 
Existence predicates when they occur in a positive sentence in a tensed form 
have a particular lexical meaning relating an entity in a certain way to its 
location in time. Let us first look at the two existence predicates exist and 
occur. We have already seen that tensed exist applies to ‘enduring’ objects 
(which I will call simply ‘objects’), whereas occur applies to ‘perduring’ 
object’, that is, events.  
The categorial restrictions of exist and occur give support for ‘three-
dimensionalism’ as opposed to ‘four-dimensionalim’ regarding material 
objects. On a four-dimensionalist view, events and objects are both space-
time worms bearing the same relation to space and time: they are both 
‘spread out’ in space and time. This means that they both occupy a spatio-
temporal region by having parts that occupy the subregions of the spatio-
temporal region. Given the four-dimensionalist view, it is hard to see how 
time-relative exist could be restricted to one sort of four-dimensional object 
rather than another. By contrast, on a three-dimensionalist view, objects and 
events will be fundamentally different kinds of entities, bearing 
fundamentally different relations to time: objects endure, whereas events 
perdure. These restrictions are easy to formulate on a three-dimensionalist 
view 
The standard view of endurantism draws the distinction between en-
during and perduring entities as follow (Lewis 1986, Hawley 2001): An 
enduring entity occupies a time t by being wholly present at each moment of 
t, whereas a perduring entity occupies a time t by some part of it being 
present at any moment of t. Endurance thus requires complete presence of an 
object at each moment of its lifespan. By contrast, perdurance requires only 
the presence of a part of an entity at any moment of its duration. The notions 
of endurance and perdurance correspond to time-relative existence and 
extension, in the following sense of Fine (2006): enduring entities exist at a 
time, which means they are completely presence at each moment of the time; 
Existence Predicates  37 
by contrast, perduring entities are extended over a time, which means only a 
part of them needs to be present at any given moment of the time. This way 
of drawing the distinction means that perduring entities can have temporal 
parts, whereas enduring entities cannot. Entities such as organisms, artifacts, 
and entities with lasting spatial boundaries, such as countries or stones, are 
among the enduring entities, whereas events are examples of perduring 
entities.  
The distinction between enduring and perduring entities in terms of 
time-related existence and extension seems well suited for capturing the 
lexical meanings of exist and occur. However, exist cannot just express the 
property that holds of an object x at a time t iff the whole of x is present at 
each moment of t, and occur cannot just express the property that holds of an 
object at a time t iff for any moment t’ of t, some part of x is present at t’. 
This would allow both occur and exist to apply to momentaneous events. 
Exist and occur will in addition impose particular sortal constraints on the 
entities they can apply to. Exist imposes the condition that the entity it applies 
to not be able to have temporal parts, in virtue of the kind of entity it belongs 
to. Occur imposes the condition that the entity it applies be able to have 
temporal parts, in virtue of the kind it belongs to.  
Thus the lexical meanings of tensed exist and of occur will be as 
follows: 
(9) a. The lexical meaning of tensed exist 
For an entity x that cannot have temporal parts, for a time interval t, 
x ∈ [exist]t iff for every t’ < t, the whole of x is present at t’. 
 b. The lexical meaning of occur (preliminary formulation) 
For an entity x that can have temporal parts, for a time interval t, x ∈ 
[occur]t iff for every t’ < t  some part of x is present at t’. 
There is a problem, though, with giving the meaning of exist and occur as in 
(9), and that is that it fails to account for the fact that exist is a stative verb, 
whereas occur is an eventive verb. It is remarkable that in natural languages 
there is generally no stative existence predicate of events, even though 
‘extension in time’ appears to be a state. English occur clearly is an eventive 
verb: it takes adverbials modifiers that are typical of event predicates, such as 
suddenly or quickly, modifiers that are impossible with stative predicates; 
moreover it allows for the progressive (the event is occurring right now), 
which again is typical of eventive predicates. Occur thus does not describe a 
state of extendedness over a time, but rather it describes a transition, or rather 
38   Moltmann 
a series of transitions, from an event part being at a time to another event part 
being at a subsequent time.  
In order to account for this difference between exist and occur, it is 
useful to adopt the Davidsonian view of the semantics of verbs on which 
events (and states) act as implicit arguments of verbs. Given the Davidsonian 
view, the implicit event arguments of verbs will also be the referents of the 
corresponding nominalizations such as the occurrence of the murder or the 
existence of the house. Occur will thus express a two-place-relation between 
occurrences and (occurring) events and exist a two-place relation between 
states of existence and (existent) entities.   
Occurrences appear to be a kind of temporal abstraction from the 
occurring events. This is indicated by the differences in the kinds of pre-
dicates that occurrences and occurring events accept: occurrences, unlike 
occurring events, do not accept qualitative predicates: 
(10) a. The murder was grisly / brutal. 
 b. ??The occurrence of the murder was grisly / brutal. 
Occurrences do allow for other types of event predicates, though, for example 
temporal and attitudinal predicates: 
(11) The occurrence of the murder was sudden / unexpected. 
Thus it appears that occurrences are events that retain none but the temporal 
features of the corresponding occurring events. Occurrences may therefore be 
viewed as transitions from the presence of a proper part of the occurring 
event at a time to the presence of a proper part of the occurring event at a 
subsequent time. I will take the ‘presence’ of an event part at a time to be a 
temporal trope: the relational trope that is the instantiation of the temporal at-
relation (AT) in the event and the time. Within the Davidsonian semantics of 
events, the lexical meaning of occur can thus be reformulated as follows, 
where f is the function mapping an n-place relation and n entities to the 
instantiation of the relation in those entities: 
(12) The lexical meaning of occur 
For a time t and events e and e’, <e, e’> ∈ [occur]t iff e = the sequence 
of transitions from f(AT, e’’, t’) to f’(AT, e’’’, t’’) for any subsequent 
times t’, t’’ < t for which there are event parts e’’ and e’’’ of e. 
What about momentaneous events, a flash or a crack? The account 
applies here as well: the occurrence of such a momentaneous event is simply 
a single trope that is the manifestation of the temporal ‘at’-relation with 
respect to that event and the moment it occurs.  
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The Davidsonian semantics of verbs can also be applied to exist. Exist is a 
stative verb, satisfying standard linguistic criteria for stativity. Also its 
nominalization existence clearly describes a state rather than an event. 
Looking at the range of predicates that can apply to ‘existences’, though, it 
appears that existences are states of a particular sort: existences have fewer 
properties than one might have thought states of existence should have. For 
example, a state of existence, one might think, should have a spatial location, 
being located just where the object is during its existence. But sentences with 
exist do not allow for spatial modifiers:6 
(13) a. *John exists in Germany. 
 b. *The king of France existed in France. 
Obviously, the location modifiers cannot be predicated of the state of 
existence, and thus existences, if they are Davidsonian event arguments, 
simply cannot have spatial location. 
The location modifiers in (13a, b) may be understood in another way 
than as predicates of the Davidsonian event argument. In natural language 
semantics, two different kinds of adverbial modifiers in fact need to be 
distinguished: adverbials that act as adjuncts and adverbials that act as 
complements. If an adverbial modifier is obligatory, it will be a complement; 
if it is not, it may be adjunct (though it need not be). As an adjunct, an 
adverbial acts as a predicate of the state or event described. As a complement, 
it provides an argument of the relation expressed by the verb, and thus 
generally provides a component that is constitutive of the described event or 
state.7 Exist does not allow for location modifiers as complements either, 
when it applies to material objects. The reason is that material objects do not 
exist in space: for an entity e to exist at a spatial location l requires e to be 
completely present at each sublocation of l. But this is impossible for material 
objects. Material objects are rather extended in space: they occupy a space by 
having some part being at any sub-region of the space. Since material objects 
have spatial parts, they cannot be completely present at each sublocation of 
their location.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 There is one important exception to this generalization, namely exist-sentences with bare 
plurals and mass nouns, which in fact are kind-denoting terms: 
 
(i) Giraffes exist only in Africa.  
 
I will turn to those in Section 3. 
7 A variety of syntactic tests distinguish adjunct and complement adverbial modifiers, which I 
will not go into. 
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Recent linguistic semantic work on stative verbs can help give an answer to 
the question why exist resists location modifiers as adjuncts. It has long been 
observed that in fact most stative verbs do not allow for location modifiers 
and thus display what is known as the Stative Adverb Gap (Katz 2003). 
Among those verbs are know, own, and weigh: 
(14) a. ??John knows mathematics in France. 
 b. ??John owns a watch in Munich. 
 c. ??John weighs 100 kilos in Germany. 
In fact, such verbs also resist a range of other modifiers, such as manner 
modifiers, and they cannot form the complement of perception verbs: 
(15) a. ??John owns a watch with a lot of effort. 
 b. ??John knows French in a strange way. 
(16) a. ??Mary heard John know French. 
 b. ??Mary saw John weigh 100 kilos. 
Exist in fact patterns with that class of verbs also in these two respects: 
(17) a. *The house has existed for a few years in a strange way. 
 b. *John saw the house exist for many years. 
Maienborn (2007) has proposed an ontological account of the Stative Adverb 
Gap, tracing it to the particular nature of the state most stative verbs 
describe.8 Maienborn argues that stative verbs take states as arguments that 
are abstract in the sense of a Kimean conception of events or rather states. A 
Kimean account of states will consist in a specification of the existence and 
identity conditions of states on the basis of a property, an individual, and a 
time, as below.   
(18) The Kimean account of states 
 a. For a property P and an object o, f(P, o) obtains at a time t iff o ∈Pt. 
 b. For properties P, P’, o, o’, f(P, o) = f(P’, o’) iff P = P’, o = o’. 
The Kimean account of states amounts to an implicit definition of states. This 
means that states will have only those properties as intrinsic properties that 
are specified by the account itself. Thus, they will have properties of temporal 
duration, but not of spatial location. On a Kimean account, states will come 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 There is an alternative proposal concerning the Stative Adverb Gap, namely that of Katz 
(2003).  Katz argues that stative verbs lack an event argument position. But see Maienborn 
(2007) for discussion. 
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out as abstract in the sense of not involving a particular manifestation; rather 
all there is to a Kimean state is what is specified by the account itself.9 
The condition of complete presence that exist imposes requires some 
qualifications. It cannot be that strictly all the parts of an enduring object 
need to be present at any moment of the lifespan of the object; this should 
only hold for atemporal parts, not the parts that a material object may have 
only at some point during its lifespan (Fine 2006). Also the atemporal parts 
need to be understood appropriately. An object may have functional parts 
which can be constituted by different material at different times and thus are 
not strictly speaking material parts. Furthermore, the question arises whether 
complete presence should not also include essential features of an object, 
such as its configuration or form if it is essential or qualitative features.  In 
any case, what defines existence at a time should be the recurrence of features 
and parts constitutive of an object throughout the time, not the presence of 
material parts as such.  
4	   Space-­‐Relative	  Existence	  
Ordinary material objects generally cannot bear the existence relation to a 
spatial location because they cannot be completely present at the spatial 
sublocations. But there are entities for which space-relative existence is 
possible. Fine (2006) in fact argues for a generalization of existence at a time, 
as complete presence at a time, to existence at a spatial location, that is, 
complete presence at a location. Fine gives the example of a composite aroma 
of coffee and vanilla whose presence at a location, he argues, requires the 
presence of both the aroma of vanilla and the aroma of coffee. This example 
is not unproblematic from the present point of view, though: aromas do not 
go along very well with the existence predicate exist: 
(19) a. ??The aroma exists in that room. 
The reason why aromas do not go along with exist appears to be an 
ontological one. Aromas as particulars simply cannot be wholly present at 
different locations. Only aromas as kinds can, as in the examples below:10 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Verbs that describe Kimean states contrast with verbs that describe what Maienborn calls 
‘Davidsonian states’. The latter include verbs like stand, sit, and sleep. Concrete states do allow 
for location and manner modifiers and can be the object of perception. 
10  Sounds and physical fields for Fine are other cases of entities involving complete presence at 
a given location. I find the example of sounds even more problematic than aromas. Sounds 
neither as particulars nor as kinds seem to accept existence predicates, including location-relative 
existence predicates in particular: 
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(19) b. This kind of perfume does not exist in France anymore. 
 c. This kind of aroma only exists in oriental countries. 
What are aromas as particulars? Arguably aromas as particulars are tropes 
without a bearer: they are mere spatio-temporally located features. Tropes in 
fact in general do not go along very well with space-relative existence pre-
dicates: 
(20) ??The greenness of the plants exists everywhere in the garden.  
Space-relative exist with tropes is not possible because tropes as particulars 
(with or without a bearer) cannot be present at different locations at once. 
But there are entities, particular sorts of abstract entities, with which 
space-relative exist is perfectly natural. One such case is languages. Lan-
guages can be completely present at different places, and they do allow for 
location modifiers with exist:11 
(21) This dialect does not exist in this region anymore. 
It is easily explained why languages have space-relative existence. The lo-
cation of a language is the region where the language is spoken, and every 
part of that region should count as a location of the language, and of course 
the entire language. 
Other entities that display space-relative existence include condition-
like entities such as situations and laws, which also allow for space-relative 
obtain, as will be discussed later. 
Another important case of abstract entities displaying space-relative 
existence are kinds. This requires a little linguistic elaboration. It is a com-
mon view among linguists that kinds can be the referents of bare mass nouns 
and plurals, in particular with predicates like widespread or rare:12 
(22) a. Ants are widespread. 
 b. White gold is rare. 
Whereas kind reference of bare plurals and mass nouns with predicates like 
widespread is considered unproblematic, linguists are not unanimous that 
bare plurals and mass nouns are always kind-referring. Some linguists, in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(i) a. ?? The sound exists throughout the house. 
       b. This kind of sound does not exist in modern opera houses anymore. 
 
11 Thanks to Roger Schwarzschild for bringing this example to my attention. 
12 Obviously these need not be natural kinds, but may include kinds of artifacts – in fact kinds of 
any sorts of entities. 
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particular Carlson (1977) and Chierchia (1998), held the view that bare mass 
nouns and plurals are (almost) always kind-referring (with the predicate being 
responsible for different readings). Other linguists hold the view that with 
some predicates, such as eat or buy bare plurals or mass nouns express 
existential quantification ranging over the instances of the kind (such as 
quantities or individuals). The present discussion fortunately can stay entirely 
neutral as regards those two linguistic views. There are a range of tests for 
kind reference that tell if a given occurrence of a bare mass noun or plural 
can only be kind-referring, and these tests show clearly that with exist a bare 
plural or mass noun must be kind-referring.  
First, anaphora when they take a bare plural as subject of an exist-
sentence as antecedent stand for the entire kind, not one of the instances that 
an existential quantifier would range over:  
(23) a. Dinosaurs do not exist. But they once did exist. 
 b. Three dinosaurs do not exist. *But they (three dinosaurs or other) 
once did exist. 
Moreover, bare plurals and mass nouns can be modified by a relative clause 
whose predicate is an instance-distribution predicate: 
(24) Dinosaurs, which used to be widespread in Europe, do not exist 
 anymore. 
Also temporal modifiers of exist with bare plurals or mass nouns show kind 
reference:  
(25) a. Dolphins still exist. 
 b. Dinosaurs no longer exist. 
The same holds for aspectual predicates such as continue or cease: 
(26) a. Dinosaurs continued to exist. 
 b. Dinosaurs ceased to exist. 
Finally, bare mass nouns and plurals do not allow an interpretation on which 
they act as existential quantifiers taking wide scope over other quantifiers or 
negation in the sentence, unlike ordinary existentially quantified NPs: 
(27) a. Dinosaurs do not exist anymore. (impossible as: for some dinosaurs 
 x, x does not exist anymore) 
 b. Two dinosaurs do not exist anymore. (ok as: for two dinosaurs x, x 
does not exist anymore) 
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Thus, bare plurals and mass nouns in exist-sentences stand for kinds, in the 
relevant (linguists’) sense. 
An important observation about exist-sentences with kind terms is that 
they also allow for terms referring to kinds of events:  
(28) Great wars still exist. 
The crucial observation now is that exist-sentences with kind terms, 
including terms for kinds of events, allow for location modifiers:13 
(29) a. Giraffes still exist in Africa. 
 b. Political protests do not exist in Bhutan.   
What does the existence of a kind amount to, and the existence of a kind 
at a location in particular? Given the semantics of existence statements with 
kind terms, obviously, the existence of a kind as such means that there is an 
actual instance of the kind, and the existence of a kind at a location means 
that there is an instance of the kind at the location. That is, the existence of a 
kind at a location means that the kind is instantiated in an individual at the 
location (or at a part of the location).  
Location-relative existence applied to kinds should also amount to 
complete presence at the relevant locations. But in what sense could a kind be 
completely present at a location, being instantiated in an individual at the 
location?  It should somehow mean that all the parts of the kind are present at 
the location of the individual instantiating the kind. But what are the parts of 
a kind? One might think that the parts of a kind are the instances of the kind, 
a kind being a sort of plurality of all its instances (or all its possible 
instances). But this would give the wrong result since not all the instances can 
be at any location at which a kind is instantiated. In fact, the more common 
view about the parts of a kind is that the parts are the characteristics of the 
kind, that is, the attributes that together make up the ‘essence’ of a kind. 
Complete presence of a kind at a location would thus mean instantiation of all 
the attributes of the kind in an individual at the location.  
There is one remaining puzzle concerning the space-relative existence 
of kinds. One might have thought that an existence statement locating a kind 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 There are in fact two linguistically relevant notions of kind: referents of bare plurals or mass 
nouns and kinds as referents of definite singular kind terms as in (i) below. Only the former not 
the latter allow for space-relative exist, as seen in (ii): 
 
(i) The giraffe is mammal. 
(ii) a. Giraffes exist everywhere. 
       b. ??The giraffe exists everywhere.   
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at a spatial region such as (29a) should state the complete presence of the 
kind at each sub-location of the location mentioned by the location modifier, 
just as a time-relative existence statement requires the complete presence of 
the individual at each moment of its lifespan. This is not the case in (29a), 
though, which does not require the complete presence of the kind ‘giraffes’ in 
each part of Africa. It is in fact sufficient that the kind be completely present 
just at the locations in Africa, and it suffices that there be just some instances 
of the kind in Africa.   
It seems that this puzzle has less to do with space-relative existence for 
kinds as such than with the semantics of English locative sentences. A weak, 
existential condition seems to be part of the semantics of locative modifiers in 
general, for example in the sentence below: 
(30) John resides in Munich. 
In Munich specifies that John’s residence is located somewhere in Munich, 
not that it is located everywhere in Munich or all over Munich.14 
Not just location modifiers with in, but also those with a variety of other 
spatial prepositions locate the described event or individual in fact just 
somewhere within the location mentioned. This is illustrated with location-
relative existence statements below: 
(31) a. Giraffes exist outside of Africa. 
 b. Giraffes still exist near the coast. 
Also the location modifiers in (31) do not give the precise location of the 
entity in question. Thus, for a term T, in T locates an entity somewhere in the 
location that T refers to, outside T locates it somewhere outside that location, 
and near T locates it somewhere ‘near’ that location.  
Only special locational modifiers such as throughout and all over 
require that every part of the location mentioned is where the entity or event 
in question is located: 
(32) a. Giraffes exist throughout Africa. 
 b. Giraffes exist all over the world. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Existential quantification is in fact also involved in the semantics of temporal modifiers: 
 
(i) John resided in Munich last year. 
 
Last year requires John to have resided in Munich at some point in the last year, not throughout 
the last year. 
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This is because such location modifiers are in fact quantificational, 
containing an explicit (all in (32b)) or implicit (thoughout) quantifier ranging 
over the parts of the location. 
A distinction thus needs to be made between the location mentioned by 
the location modifier and the strict location, the location that is in fact where 
exactly the entity or event in question in located. The complete-presence 
condition of exist needs to be fulfilled only with respect to the parts of the 
strict location, not the location mentioned. 
With an ordinary location modifier, an existence statement concerning a 
kind requires just that the kind be instantiated in an individual at some 
sublocation of the location mentioned by the modifier, the strict location. But 
would this not require that the kind be present at each sublocation of the 
location of a relevant instance of the kind? This is certainly not the case. The 
location of an instance should in fact count as a minimal location for the kind. 
The reason for that is this. Kinds inherit their location from the location of 
their instances; they cannot have a location in any other way. Thus they could 
not possibly be located at a proper part of the location of an instance of the 
kind.  
As a consequence of the possibility of the space-relative existence of 
kinds, kinds can be multiply located. That is, exist may locate a kind at 
different locations, which amounts to the kind being ‘entirely’ present in 
instances of the kind at those locations. This matches well the Aristotelian 
view of universals as being able to be multiply located, located just where the 
instances are located.  
The existence of a kind at a location obtains in virtue of an entity that 
completely instantiates the kind being at the location. Note that this in-virtue 
condition does not require that the instances of the kind ‘exist’ at the location 
in question. A requirement that the instances exist at the location could not be 
fulfilled by instances that are enduring objects and thus cannot exist at 
locations. Moreover, such a requirement could not be fulfilled by instances 
that are events, since events do not ‘exist’ in the first place. Rather for the 
existence of a kind at a location l, it suffices for an instance to simply be at l. 
The relation of being at a location is applicable both to enduring objects and 
to events.  
Kinds generally have properties in virtue of their instances exhibiting 
particular conditions. So far the examples involved kinds as referents of bare 
mass nouns and plurals. In the linguistic semantic literature, it has been 
argued that kinds in this sense obtain certain of their properties in a 
particularly strict sense from their instances. Ever since Carlson (1977), it has 
become a common view to take the application of so-called stage-level and 
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individual-level predicates to kinds to be obtained from predicates applying 
to individuals on the basis of existential and generic quantification over 
instances of the kind. Individual-level predicates generally are taken to be 
predicates that are true of individuals throughout their lifespan. Such 
predicates generally exhibit a generic reading when applied to kinds, as in 
(33a): 
(33) a. Firemen are intelligent. 
Stage-level predicates are generally taken to be predicates that are true only 
of a ‘temporal stage’ of an individual. Such predicates generally exhibit an 
existential reading when applied to kinds, as in (33b): 
(33) b. Firemen are available. 
On the Carlsonian view, individual-level predicates are lifted to kind pre-
dicates on the basis of generic quantification over individuals and stage-level 
predicates on the basis of existential quantification, as below:15 
(34) a. For an individual-level predicate P, for a kind x, x ∈ [Pkind] iff Gn y 
[y I x; y ∈ [P]]. 
 b. For a stage-level predicate P, for a kind x, x ∈ [Pkind] iff ∃y [y I x; y 
∈ [P]]. 
Given the Carlsonian view, the question arises, should exist be classified 
as a stage-level predicate or as an individual-level predicate? Exist when 
applied to kinds of concrete objects clearly triggers an existential not a 
generic interpretation. But exist is not easily classified as a stage-level 
predicate. Exist necessarily holds of an entity throughout its life span. A 
characterization of stage-level predicates as predicates expressing accidental 
properties seems to do better. Concrete entities generally exist only 
accidentally, not essentially. Since this paper does not provide the space for 
an in-depth discussion of the stage-level/individual-level distinction as such, 
let us just note that exist, if anything, goes along with the class of predicates 
generally classified as ‘stage-level’, rather than those classified as 
‘individual-level’.       
Exist as a stage-level predicate applying to kinds could obviously not be 
obtained by the condition in (34b), by existential quantification over 
instances with the application of exist to particular instances. Location-
relative exist as a kind predicate is not obtained from location-relative exist as 
a predicate applying to individuals. Rather location-relative exist involves 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Gn is the generic quantifier, see Krifka et al. (1995). 
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existential quantification over instances fulfilling a ‘weaker’ condition than 
existence relative to the location in question.  
Exist is not alone in that respect. The same also holds for certain other 
‘stage-level’ predicates, such as recognize: 
(35) John recognized gold (in virtue of coming across some instances). 
In order for John to recognize gold, he must have ‘come across’ an instance, 
though ‘recognize’ would not apply to that instance. Recognize applies to a 
kind rather directly, requiring a weaker condition on an instance, that of 
having ‘come across’ an instance.16  
To conclude, some stage-level predicates, including exist and recognize, need 
not apply themselves to an instances; rather only a weaker condition than that 
expressed by the predicate itself may be applied to an instance.  
There is another reason not to trace the existential reading of exist with 
kinds to a Carlsonian account of stage-level predicates with bare mass nouns 
or plurals in general. The reading of exist involving existential quantification 
over instances is equally available for certain other kind terms than bare mass 
nouns and plurals, in particular demonstrative kind terms of the sort this 
flower or this animal:17 
(36) a. This flower exists in many countries in Europe. 
 b. This animal does not exist in this region anymore. 
To summarize, space-relative exist can apply to kinds because of the 
particular nature of kinds, their ability to be completely present at different 
locations at once. 
5	   The	  Existence	  Predicate	  obtain	  
We have seen that location-relative exist expresses the condition of complete 
presence at all the relevant sublocations. The same condition is in fact ex-
pressed by location-relative obtain, even though obtain imposes different 
requirements on the entities it can apply to. Obtain, recall, is an existence 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Another example of a stage-level predicate applying to a kind ‘directly’ is disappear, as in 
Geach’s (1968) example below: 
 
(i) Dinosaurs have disappeared. 
 
Here in fact no existential quantification is involved at all in the interpretation of the predicate. 
17 Obviously demonstrative kind terms like this flower behave differently in that respect from 
definite kind terms of the sort the giraffe, see Fn. 10. 
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predicate that applies to entities such as states, situations, conditions, and 
facts. It does not apply to material objects, persons, or events: 
(37) a. The state / situation / condition / fact obtains. 
 b. *The house / The person / The event obtains. 
The restriction imposed by obtain cannot be one to abstract objects: obtain 
does not apply, for example, to mathematical objects, properties, or pro-
positions. 
Obtain like exist is an abstract state verb. Moreover, it has a time-
relative as well as a space-relative application, with entities such as states, 
situations, or conditions: 
(38) a. The state / situation / condition still obtains. 
 b. The state of emergency / The same situation / The same condition 
  obtains in Arizona. 
Time-relative and space-relative obtain does not apply to facts, though. The 
reason clearly is that facts are themselves already location-wise complete. 
What characterizes the entities to which obtain is restricted is that they 
are constituted by certain conditions holding, that is, by certain properties or 
relations holding of an object or a number of objects.  Let me call those 
entities condition-like entities and the conditions in question constitutive 
conditions. Some condition-like entities go along with canonical descriptions, 
that is, descriptions that display exhaustively the nature of the entity in 
question. Facts have canonical descriptions of the form the fact that S, states 
have canonical descriptions of the form the state of NPs being VP, and 
similarly conditions have standard descriptions of the sort the condition of 
NP’s being VP. It is the canonical description that explicitly displays the 
property or relation whose holding is constitutive of the fact, state, or 
condition. The states will thus be abstract states as described earlier. In fact, 
the four kinds of entities to which obtain applies are precisely the kinds of 
entities for which a Kimean account would be suitable (that is, the account 
Kim originally proposed for events discussed earlier).18 This account, recall, 
gives identity and existence conditions in terms of a property or relation 
holding of an object or a number of objects as well as possibly a location. (Of 
course the property of relation may itself be complex, involving connectives 
or quantifiers.)   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 This implies a Strawsonian view of facts, on which facts are not in the world, but abstractions 
from things going on in the world (Strawson 1950), rather than an Austinian view (Austin  
1979). 
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Time-relative and space-relative obtain involves as its application condition a 
condition that like the application condition of location-relative exist, is the 
condition of complete presence at the relevant sublocations of the ‘strict 
location’. But in the case of obtain, the condition manifests itself in 
somewhat different ways. Obviously, for an entity e to ‘obtain’ at a time 
interval t, the constitutive conditions must hold of the objects in question at t, 
and in fact at all the moments of t. If not, the entity may not be a state, but 
rather a sort of event, involving a transition from one state to another, distinct 
state. Similarly, it is plausible that if obtain applies to an entity e relative to a 
strict spatial location l, this will require the fulfillment of the constitutive 
condition of e at relevant sublocations of l. Thus, the sublocation condition 
holds for location-relative obtain just as it did for location-relative exist.  
It remains then the complete-presence condition. What could the 
complete presence of a situation, state or condition at a time or location 
consist in? That is, what could count as the parts of a condition-like entity? 
The objects and times from which condition-like entities are obtained (in the 
‘Kimean’ way) certainly do not count as parts of such entities. This manifests 
itself in the fact that they are not treated as parts by part-related expressions 
of natural language: part of the situation, part of the condition, or part of the 
state can never ‘mean’ a participant or location of the situation, condition, or 
state. Furthermore, if the parts of condition-like entities include properties, it 
is hard to make sense of them being ‘present’ at a time. The only suitable 
candidates for involvement in the complete presence condition are in fact any 
constitutive sub-conditions. This corresponds well to the way the part-of 
construction is used in natural language: part of the condition, part of state, 
part of the situation can only make reference to constitutive subconditions. 
Thus, condition-like entities, unlike material objects, do not have spatial 
parts, and unlike events, they do not have temporal parts. Their only parts are 
constitutive subconditions. It is relative to them that complete presence at 
sublocations needs to be fulfilled when obtain applies. Thus for a situation, 
condition, or state e to obtain relative to a location means that all the 
constitutive subconditions of e are fulfilled at all the relevant sublocations of 
l. Because condition-like entities have neither temporal nor spatial parts they 
can be completely present, in the sense of complete obtaining, at different 
times as well as different places. In that sense, they ‘endure’ both throughout 
time and across space.  
The closeness between obtain and exist manifests itself also in that exist 
can apply to all the entities to which obtain can apply. Thus, (39a) and (39b) 
(with location-relative exist) are fairly acceptable, unlike sentences with exist 
applying to events: 
Existence Predicates  51 
(39) a. The state / The situation / The condition / The fact exists. 
 b. The same state / situation / condition still exists in some countries. 
Location-relative obtain thus shares the condition of complete presence at the 
relevant sublocations with location-relative exist. The way obtain differs from 
exist resides in its sortal restriction to condition-like entities as well as the 
particular notion of ‘presence’ it involves: exist requires presence in the sense 
of spatial or temporal location, whereas obtain requires presence in the sense 
of a property being true of an object relative to a location. (What makes exist 
in (39a) and (39b) acceptable is obviously that the presence condition 
imposed by exist is extended so as to cover the ‘holding-at-a-location’ 
condition as well.) 
Condition-like entities raise the question on what grounds their 
constitutive conditions hold, be it at a time, at a place, or absolutely. There 
are in fact two fundamentally different kinds of condition-like entities: those 
based on empirical facts (about the time or spatial location, or the world), and 
those based on normative conditions or conditions resulting from 
‘declarations’ (which may or may not be restricted to a time or a spatial 
location). The state of someone’s mind or health is a state of the first kind, as 
are habits; a state of war, requirements etc are condition-like entities of the 
second kind. The first kind of state holds in virtue of what is taking place at 
the relevant location; the second kind of state holds by declaration or 
whatever may ground normative conditions. Thus for a condition-like entity 
to obtain at a location, either all the various things need not happen at the 
location in virtue of which the condition can be said to obtain or else the 
relevant condition, with all its subconditions needs to have been put into 
place for that location. Either way, the condition-like entity will need to enjoy 
endurance throughout the location as long as the constitutive condition holds. 
Note that both obtain and exist are applicable to normative condition-like 
entities, including laws: 
(40) a. The law still obtains / exists in some countries. 
  b. The requirement for a president still exists / obtains in many 
countries. 
6	   Conclusion	  
Existence predicates in English, I have argued, form a clearly characterized 
semantic class of predicates. In their location-relative use, exist and obtain 
have a nontrivial meaning, specifying the complete presence of an entity at 
the relevant sublocations. Occur, by contrast, tracks the temporal locations of 
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subevents of an event, describing an event that reflects the mere temporal 
structure of the occurring event.  
There is one remaining question, and that is: what is the meaning of 
location-independent uses of existence predicates?  It is important to note that 
location-independent uses of existence predicates still impose the same sorts 
of restrictions on the kinds of entities they can apply to. Location-
independent exist like location-relative exist is inapplicable to events. 
Location-independent exist is also applicable to mathematical and other 
abstract objects, unlike location-dependent exist. Location-independent 
obtain, unlike location-dependent obtain, is applicable to facts. But it is still 
inapplicable to entities other than condition-like objects. The preservation of 
the sortal restrictions is an indication that the location-independent meaning 
of existence predicates is derivative upon their location-relative meaning.  
How can the location-independent meaning then be derived from the 
location-dependent one? Time-independent exist applying to abstract objects 
may be obtained from time-relative exist by universal quantification over 
times. That is, exist is true atemporally of an object o if it is true of o at all 
times (which means o is completely present at all times). Exist with that 
meaning could not apply to events: it would require the complete presence of 
an event at all times, which is impossible. 
Can the time-independent use of obtain can be derived from the time-
relative use in that way as well, namely by universal quantification over 
times? In the case of obtain, this should mean complete fulfillment at all 
times of the constitutive conditions of the condition-like entity. Facts that are 
constituted by the holding of a property of objects at a particular time could 
not fulfill this condition, though. Thus, the time-independent use of obtain 
must be derived differently for that case. It is plausible that condition-like 
entities that are complete regarding the parameters of the holding of the 
constitutive condition are completely present at any time (and any space). 
Time-independent obtain still presupposes that the entity it applies to be 
condition-like and that is because it is derived from location-relative obtain, 
which which specifically relates to the constitutive conditions of the entities it 
applies to. 
Can space-independent exist be derived from space-relative exist? This 
would require complete presence everywhere of entities that exist space-
independently. Complete presence everywhere is of course impossible for 
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material objects (which are extended in space). Perhaps space-relative exist is 
in fact itself derived from time-relative exist by form of analogy.19 
Overall, we have seen that tied to the notion of existence is fun-
damentally that of complete presence throughout a location. This condition is 
inapplicable to some entities, such as events. It is in this sense that events 
might be said to have ‘being’ in a weaker sense. What is constitutive of 
objecthood is recurrence of the essential parts or features of an entity across 
locations, which is what the more fundamental notion of existence amounts 
to. 
It has sometimes been argued that our linguistic intuitions about the 
verb exist should not be taken too seriously, for making either a semantic or a 
philosophical point, since exist is a relatively recent verb and tied to a more 
‘technical’ use in philosophical contexts.20 I think this caution is unjustified. 
We have seen that our intuitions about the verb exist are in fact very 
systematic and allow for a natural explanation within a fairly well-established 
ontological view. Furthermore exist is not alone in displaying the relevant 
semantic behavior. In English, the existence predicate obtain behaves 
strikingly parallel to exist. The linguistic intuitions associated with exist thus 
are better viewed as displaying an important underlying concept of location-
relative existence rather than peculiar features of a somewhat special lexical 
item. 
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How the Emergence of Propositions Separates Strict Interfaces
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Abstract. How does a child utilize inferences in acquisition and ultimately sepa-
rate inferences from implicatures from semantic composition? How exactly does
a child recognize a truth-functional proposition? It is argued that the child begins
with rich, free inferences that are systematically replaced by syntax/semantics
compositional rules. Strict syntax/semantics interfaces are discussed and linked
to the syntax of subject auxiliary inversion and acquisition evidence of copying
(Is Bill is busy?) and long-distance movement in opaque contexts (What did she
say she bought?). A connection between Tense, propositions, and Phase bound-
aries is argued to be a critical syntax/semantics interface.
1 Acquisition Goals: the Syntax/Semantics Interface
While acquisition has been conceived of largely in syntactic terms, it is intu-
itively obvious that semantics and pragmatics motivates a child to unlock mys-
terious adult utterances, not just their unusual syntactic character. But what,
actually, are the steps a child takes if syntax, semantics, and pragmatics con-
verge upon her? Where does she begin and how can she simplify the process?
The original notion of the autonomy of syntax offered an illusory image that the
child could see through every linguistic situation to see the syntactic skeleton
within. It cannot be so simple.
Our account will be deliberatively intuitive, dwelling upon imprecise no-
tions of propositionality and presupposition, but it parallels in spirit the idea
of compositionality: each syntactic step has a semantic and pragmatic conse-
quence. The hope is that an intuitive discussion helps us see just where more
rigorous formalization is appropriate and where it may not be.
∗ Acknowledgements: Thanks to the Sinn and Bedeutung audience and audiences at IASC: in Ed-
inburgh, Assymmetry conference in Montreal, Information Structure conference at Potsdam, and
the Ex-FA conference in Campinas, Harvard, and UMass where parts of this talk have been pre-
sented and to Cedric Boeckx, Seth Cable, Noam Chomsky, Jill deVilliers, Kyle Johnson, Wolfram
Hinzen, Bart Hollebrandse, and Ian Roberts for helpful remarks. Errors are mine, not theirs.
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1.1 Learnability
If an interaction with semantics and pragmatics is assumed to be relevant, then
in classic terms, the set of possible grammars should go up exponentially and
the learnability problem is then dramatically increased. The child must identify
the optimal grammar not only in terms of syntactic derivation, but in terms of
the set of meanings she map onto it as well. If structure X defines a set of
possible meanings within the grammar, then each member of the set must be
evaluated for presence in a particular grammar, not just the syntactic structure.
It should be obvious that we must reverse that logic: the presence of semantic
and pragmatic factors should serve to constrain the set of possible grammars,
not expand them. How could that work? What prevents a child from making
articles recursive: the the hat. One answer could be that syntax does not prevent
this possibility, but that no semantics can be attached to a recursive article
that would make sense: an object cannot be specific in two ways. In fact, a
pragmatic meaning is not that far off: the the hat I like could mean the hat of
the hats that I like. So we would want the exact semantics of the syntax – the
semantics of recursion in fact – to be incompatible with this option.
If one takes the literature in formal semantics as a starting point, it is far
from obvious how to make it work for the child. First we must see that there is
a significant division between the inherent logic of cognition, and the special
logic of a syntactic semantics. The difference is important if we wish to see ex-
actly which acquisition hooks are actually used by the child. Formal semantics
has not, to my knowledge, explicitly sought to articulate such a distinction.1
1.2 Interface Hypothesis
Let us begin then, with an interface hypothesis which serves as a motivating
desideratum:
(1) Strong Interface Hypothesis: Every step in acquisition must satisfy
syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic criteria.2
An acquisition pragmatic principle is a natural consequence:
(2) Pragmatic Principle: Connect to Context as quickly as possible.
From an acquisition perspective, we need an hypothesis of this kind to explain,
for instance, the fact that small children can project and interpret single words.
1 This article is written from an acquisition perspective and there well may be appropriate literature
of which I am unaware.
2 The hypothesis is surely too strong because there may be morphological or movement (scram-
bling) operations which fail to constitute a shift for each criterion.
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Let us elaborate a simple example to see how pragmatics and semantics can
participate in syntactic triggering. In an early approach to the interface ques-
tion, Lebeaux (2000) argued that semantics served to confirm syntactic hy-
potheses which are derived from context. How does a child acquire the passive?
If he can independently determine meaning from context, and then generate a
syntax to match the meaning, then semantics/pragmatics confirms the syntax
(as in Roeper (1982)). Suppose the child hears:
(3) The cheese was eaten by the mouse.
If the child knows semantically and pragmatically that it must be the mouse who
ate the cheese, therefore cheese must be restored to a position after eat where
that meaning is available. If UG syntax can find an operation – reverse object
to subject movement – which restores cheese to the object position, then the
meaning will be consistent with common sense. Once acquired, but only then,
the syntax can become autonomous and can generate a meaning inconsistent
with pragmatics (plausible real-world knowledge) such as:
(4) The mouse was eaten by the cheese.
The emergence of propositional representations can, as we shall see, be repre-
sented from this interface perspective. In broad terms, children first:
(5) Represent propositions as events.
In general, the emergence of propositional interpretations can be profoundly
clouded by general inference capacities. For adults, strictly speaking, the in-
ference is not warranted but often occurs. Ultimately, the child must separate
logical implicatures from insecure situational inferences. That is, she must cre-
ate an autonomous semantic space – constrained by syntax – which blocks the
inappropriate use of general inference.
(6) Move from rich inference to constrained compositional readings.
The differences between inference, implicature, and syntactic compositional
semantics are part of the acquisition challenge. The immediate relevance of
inference is obvious to any parent whose child’s first word is “no”. It is often
not clear exactly to what the “no” applies. When a child resists socks, does
“no” mean:
(7) Don’t put any socks on me or don’t put those socks on me.
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And the child is confronted with the same conundrum when the parent says
“no!”. We assume a situational salience of something in a “Common Ground”,
but it is not only unwarranted, but the failure of inference is a reasonable moti-
vation for a child to acquire an articulated grammar.
2 How Do Propositions Emerge?
Propositions, as well as logical inferences and systematic implicatures, have
a long history in philosophy and they are the subject of many definitions in
Propositional Logic. At the same time, there are those (Hinzen 2007; Chomsky
2007) who have suggested that the notion proposition needs to be delicately
introduced into linguistics and may not have a single logical definition. Our
discussion will follow this tradition. Nonetheless one goal must ultimately be
to say how a child arrives at a notion of proposition that is useful in traditional
syllogistic reasoning:
(8) John is a man. All men are mortal.⇒ Therefore John is mortal.
All indications are that this kind of explicit reasoning is far from nursery school
children. At the same time, many implicit logical relations are undoubtedly
present and a prerequisite for every stage of acquisition.
We should note that our approach is orthogonal to formal semantics. Many of
the rich and detailed distinctions found in formal semantics are natural fod-
der for experimentation in the future. We aim to look at the “moving parts”
in acquisition. This may leave the reader unsatisfied because we will avoid a
rigorous treatment which may be found in philosophical discussions. Many in-
teresting questions arise, for instance, whether and when children grasp upward
and downward entailments for which there are ongoing experiments.
Nonetheless, the most primitive first stage kinds of initial entailments in lan-
guage seem to refer to how thinking of any kind operates. What belongs to
presuppositions or entailments about thought in general, and what calls for a
special mapping onto linguistic structure? To trace the acquisition path wisely,
we need to draw this line correctly. Our account builds from the point where
a proposition is a syntactic projection that is distinct from a semantic prim-
itive. Ultimately, it must all be embedded in a realistic version of children’s
pragmatic experience.
2.1 Syntactic Propositions and Deniability
Where should we begin to look for “moving parts”? One prominent feature of
propositions is the notion of deniability which happens to be elicited precisely
by syntactic movement, inversion:
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(9) John is playing baseball⇒ is John playing baseball
The movement of the Tensed element cancels the property of assertion and au-
tomatically introduces deniability via a yes/no question construction. Therefore
our definition of propositions is:
(10) Propositions are deniable: True or False.
We argue, consistent with classic syntactic claims, that this property results
from a strict interface between syntax and semantics which pivots upon this
UG claim (Klein 2006; Schulz 2003):
(11) Universal Grammar: Tense projects a proposition.
This has led to concepts like “Propositional-Island Constraint” for tensed clau-
ses. A child should, if UG is innate, grasp this notion of proposition, not im-
mediately, but very early, as a UG reflex of the acquisition of Tense.
Yes/no questions via inversion give overt manifestation of this:
(12) John is singing⇒ is John singing
Most of the meaning of yes/no questions, we claim, emerges automatically via
a Strict Interface, and therefore predictably, emerges before other properties
of propositions, clouded by inference, but after entailments that are direct re-
flections of cognitive organization. First we look at the child’s semantic and
pragmatic environment and the kinds of propositional distinctions, hanging in
a world of inferences, that a child must ultimately master.
2.2 Non-Assertion Propositions
Other forms of meaning that are stateable as propositions include:
(13) Entailments Implicatures Presuppositions
Each of these properties is close to situational pragmatic reasoning that does
not depend upon language (at least in my estimation). Entailments are not sub-
ject to deniablility (unless elevated to an overt assertion) – and they are prereq-
uisite to the composition of any kind of meaning, linguistic or non-linguistic.
Therefore I claim, that propositions are obscure, but in some measure they are
part of any form of knowledge, as when we presuppose the existence of an
object when we speak of it.
(14) Hypothesis: The capacity for “proposition” is innate and immediate,
but not necessarily available to conscious deduction.
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Presuppositions and their triggers are notoriously difficult to pin down, but they
emerge as intuitively critical in what follows.3
2.3 Entailments
Such a notion of proposition is present in much of our thought, but not au-
tomatically subject to any other linguistic operation like: denial, contrast, or
deductive consequence.
For example if:
(15) John has a blue car.
It entails the proposition: John has a car. A sentence like:
(16) John likes the car.
has the existential presupposition that:
(17) A car exists.
But we do not expect that children – nor probably animals – lack this mental
capacity. It underlies not only language but many actions. It is plausible to ar-
gue that more sophisticated structures partake of this connection. For instance,
understanding:
(18) John was sad that the Bruins lost.
involves sad [clause] where the truth of the complement is assumed (“Speaker-
factivity”). It could, therefore, share a presuppositional basis with blue car.
We predict therefore that adjective complements should be easier for cognitive
reasons than attitude verbs that create opaque contexts. Thus:
(19) a. John was unaware that the Bruins lost.
b. John did not think that the Bruins lost.
(19a, b) might seem pragmatically close in content, but the grammar delivers
the meaning of the complement in different ways, where (a) has speaker or
Common Ground factivity, but (b) is marked without a fixed truth value. Legere
(2008) has shown that this is true in acquisition. With sentences roughly like in
a carefully controlled experiment, 92% of 5yr olds understood (20a), but only
62% understood (20b)
(20) a. She is happy she has a hat.
3 See Beaver & Geurts (2010) for an overview.
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b. She knows she has a hat.
This kind of data is consistent with diverse contexts under which presupposi-
tions are triggered as the literature attests.
2.4 Implicatures
Linguistically-based implicatures involve derived propositions usually by con-
trast.
(21) a. John has some of the marbles.
b. ⇒ John does not have all of the marbles.
Linguistically-based implicatures involve derived propositions usually by con-
trast.
(22) a. John has some of the marbles.
b. ⇒ John does not have all of the marbles.
Nevertheless implicatures, at least some of those relating to quantification, ap-
pear to involve an extra semantic operation that takes more time and shows
up later in acquisition (see work by Snedeker and colleagues (e.g. Panizza,
Chierchia, Huang & Snedeker (in press) for recent discussion)). They occupy
a different propositional corner.
2.5 Entwined Inferences
What stands in contrast to all of these forms of logical reasoning are rather sim-
ilar situational inferences, which form a backdrop to all language and mingle in
subtle ways with grammatical properties. Such inferences are ever-present but
less constrained and not subject to logical verification. For instance, for (22),
while some⇒ not all is fixed, I might infer that someone other than John has a
few marbles. But such an inference is insecure: some of the marbles could be
under the couch, not in someone else’s possession. In general we make what
should be a virtually self-evident claim:
(23) Acquisition shifts, systematically, from an over-reliance upon infer-
ence to a reliance upon systematic semantics.
This view leads to the natural question: What is the system whereby the shift
occurs: Does a child know when a situational interpretation corresponds to
the grammar or when it is an inference that exceeds the meaning grammar
carries? This is a significant acquisition problem whose solution will engage
many dimensions of linguistic theory.
62 Roeper
2.6 Inferences and Grammar
Before we proceed, we would like to demonstrate how intimately woven un-
substantiated inferences can compromise systematic semantics in the eyes of a
child. They are immediately available to children and confound the acquisition
path. One can easily conclude the truth of both (24b, c) from the observation
of (24a).
(24) a. Situation: John observes Bill drinking beer.
b. John saw Bill drink beer. = Event
c. John saw that Bill drinks beer. = Proposition
The event seems to entail the proposition and the proposition seems to entail the
event, although neither conclusion withstands careful scrutiny (Higginbotham
1983). But it is a part of how we commonly understand things, and court cases
will show it. Imagine this scene:
(25) Mary said “Bill saw John drink beer.”
Now if someone were asked in court:
“Did Mary say that John drank beer?”
Most people would in fact say “yes”.
But linguists know that if you saw John drinking, but did not know what it was,
someone might say: “You saw John drink beer – you just did not realize it was
beer.” And if you only saw empty bottles afterwards, you might say: “you saw
that John drank beer” without entailing that you saw him drink beer.
Some constructions are ambiguous:
(26) She saw the boys drink beer. = Event perception
or Proposition = She saw (that) the boys drink beer.
If a child at first depends upon these inferences in the initial state (as do adults
understanding children), they can be legitimately confused as to whether the
construction they heard was the representation of an event in a small clause or
a proposition.
This reasoning extends to False Belief environments that surround opaque ut-
terances as well. We commonly allow inferences to overrule opacity in our
understanding as well. Consider this scene:
(27) Grandma asks Dad: “What did Mom buy at the store?”
and he answers: “Plastic toys.”
“How do you know?”
Dad: “I heard a friend talking to Mom on a cell phone at the store and
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I asked the friend: “What did Mom say she bought at the store?” and
the friend said she had said “Plastic toys.”
Although under two recursive verbs of “saying” the complement is opaque and
technically Dad does not necessarily know what she bought, this inference is
commonly accepted in normal communication as a basis of “knowing”. There-
fore it is something a child easily hears and must, ultimately, learn to qualify
or discount in his construction of the sentence:
(28) What did Mom say that she bought __
Acquisition experiments aim very precisely at creating situations where adults
will apply a notion of opacity to the complement of say, but in real life we are
often entitled to make this inference.
Suppose again this were a court case, one could imagine a defense lawyer
seizing upon the distinction and asking a witness, who is under oath:
(29) A: “Do you know what she bought at the tobacco store?”
B: “Yes, I know she bought drug paraphernalia.”
A: “How do you know?”
B: “She told me she bought drug paraphernalia.”
A: “Has she ever lied to you?”
B: “Yes.”
A: “Then she could have been lying?”
B: “She could have.”
A: “Then in fact you do not know that she bought drug
paraphernalia, because you never saw it and she
might have been lying.”
In a court, reasoning of this kind, pivoting on the illegitimacy of common in-
ferences is a standard technique to downgrade the value of testimony. Here is
a putative adult caught in the fact that his statements, under oath, depended
upon an inference and not actual knowledge. What he actually knew was that
she said she bought drug paraphernalia but this was allowed to shift to: Know
that she bought drug paraphernalia. No one would be indicted for perjury for
such an assertion: He said he knew what she bought, but he didn’t, therefore
he lied. Moreover, the information would not be disallowed as evidence. The
fact that she said she bought drug paraphernalia could be legitimately relevant
to the judgement, in a juror’s mind, that she did buy drug paraphenalia.
If adults are easily uncertain about the boundaries of semantic meaning, then it
must be a challenge for a child as well because his experience has inconsistent
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information. Sometimes “saying that” can be relied upon to introduce a truth,
and sometimes not. It is no wonder that children must learn to disentangle the
meaning from the inferences when such inferences are a part of normal life.
There is subtle naturalistic evidence that children may take the verb say to carry
a factive complement. In the adult language factive complements for verbs like
know are deletable (b) as opposed to non-factive verbs like think (c) with which
we generate the opaque complement via verbphrase-prominalization with the
word so (d):
(30) a. A: John went outside.
b. B: I know.
c. B: *I think.
d. B: I think so.
Children are known to do the same in conversation but with the non-factive say
being treated like a factive, although adults do not do this:
(31) “Can we have cookies?”
“Yeah, Mom said.”
In fact, the Childes database has examples with exclamations that feel non-
adult, as if a factive complement has been deleted, which suggests that a child
might first understand the word that way.
(32) “You said!”
We turn now to an examination of acquisition data. Much of this data can be
regarded as experimental hints – in a way like “??” grammatical judgments –
that need to be subject to more careful scrutiny, as do many grammaticality
judgments, but which nonetheless carve out the terrain that needs exploration.
3 The Emergence of Tense and Propositionality
Where does a child begin? One-word utterances like
(33) “uh-oh”, “no”, “dat”, “fish”, “milk”, “juice”
have the same variety of interpretations, expanded by intricate inferences that
they do for adults who say:
(34) “John!”, “No way!”, “Beer!”
and leave it to speaker/hearer inferences to fill in the communication. Parent
and child must both exercise inferential capacities, which often run awry, pre-
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sumably providing the child with motivation to acquire more grammar in order
to be clear. Nonetheless, the efficiency of such inferences must be present early
on to make the utility of one-word utterances a good starting place for children.
The child who says “milk” is, often but not always, trying to express an imper-
ative like “please give me some milk”. Early work in acquisition claimed that
children had full sentences here, but there is no more reason to believe that than
the notion that adult exclamatives should be expanded as full sentences.
Potts & Roeper (2005) argue that the same analysis holds for two-word utter-
ances, which are like expressives for adults:
(35) Exclamations: You fool! You idiot! You jerk!
These utterances are not equivalent to a tensed sentence:
(36) You are an idiot.
The latter has a profoundly different force, just as a parent who screams at a
child “You idiot!” is not dealing with the same meaning as a psychologist who
solemnly pronounces:
(37) Your son is an idiot.
Where the tensed element implies reference to evidence like intelligence test
scores.
Expressive exclamations cannot be cancelled or tagged or take articles:
(38) *You idiot, but it does not look that way.
*You idiot, aren’t you.
?*You an idiot.
3.1 The Pre-Propositional Stage
A child utterances often seem to carry exclamative force:
(39) “it big” or “dat here” or “Mommy sock”
They are therefore plausibly using the syntax of expressives, though his com-
municative intent might be closer to an assertion, the notion that it is an asser-
tion is then an inference.
Therefore we argue that they are pre-propositional. They show no indications
of a proposition, like tense-marking, tag-questions or even proto-tag questions
(as far as we know):
(40) *It big, isn’t it?
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*It big, huh?
What drives us – in particular children – to abandon these rich inferences in
favor of grammar? We are left with many uncertainties in a world of pure in-
determinate inference. We seek the precision and reliability of assertions that
have an evidential relation to context.
3.2 The Semantic Side of Root Infinitives
What exactly happens when the child moves from (a) to (b):
(41) a. he big ⇒ b. he is big
He is taking both a big semantic and a big syntactic step. There is evidence
very early that precisely its deniable propositional character is quickly recog-
nized, when a child uses Verum Focus in a context where someone claims that
something is not working:
(42) “ it IS working!” (Danilo Azcarate 3,4yrs)
Thus we have early evidence that a putatively UG-mediated and innate con-
nection falls into place easily and quickly, much like children once standing up
quickly learn to walk.
A large literature on Root Infinitives argues specifically that children initially
lack Tense (see Wexler (to app.) for a summary). What the literature fails to
address is the fact that propositions are carried by tense. Therefore until the
child can project a proposition – which we define as carrying deniability – the
semantics as well as the syntax can be inhibiting the move from expressions
like:
(43) a. Hände waschen [hands to wash]
b. wäscht die Hände [washes the hands]
The child who moves from (43a) to (43b), not only raises the verb and adds
a tense-marking, but adds a deniable proposition as well. It is notable that an
important form of language disorder is the failure to express tense. We take
that to be not only a syntactic, but a semantic failure, and the step toward tense
recognition to engage the strict interface between syntax and semantics.
A close look at a child’s departures from the adult language indicate that the
notion of proposition is psychologically present.4 Why do we ask a yes/no
4 We have undertaken no analysis of languages that lack Tense marking. It is perfectly possible that
UG has a few innate avenues where propositionality is linked to syntactic markers or constructions.
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question with inversion?5 Why don’t we just add a word that carries that mean-
ing, like whether:
(44) a. Is John here?
b. *Whether John is here?6
It is really a strange fact that we can signal that a whole proposition is question-
able by just moving an auxiliary. We argue that something deeper is at work:
an operation on the notion proposition.
We argue that the interpretation arises from what we call a syntax/semantics
Strict Interface. An application of this principle leads to Chomsky’s Strong
Minimalist Thesis:
(45) Strong Minimalist Thesis (SMT):
Each syntactic Phase undergoes semantic interpretation.
(Chomsky 2005, 2008)
It now becomes plausible that if something is removed from the Phase – like
tense-marking – then it cannot be interpreted, which I call Vacate Phase. Thus if
a clause is a Phase, then moving something out of it, blocks an interpretation.
Movement is motivated to create new discourse meaning, like questions, but
also to avoid meaning.
Consider the contrast between (46a) and (46b), two questions around the same
proposition:
(46) a. Can you t play baseball?
b. You can play baseball, can’t you?
In (46b) the proposition is advanced and then the tag asks for confirmation
or disconfirmation. In (46a) the proposition is never assumed, although recon-
struction allows the system to know what the proposition would be.
In other words, by movement out of the Phase, the pragmatic projection to
a presupposition of a question, as in (b), does not occur. The trace of Aux-
movement allows reconstruction of thematic meaning, but the proposition car-
ried by tense is not projected if the tense is not pronounced in the Phase.
This requires technical expression that differentiates Phase Head and Phase-
5 See Roeper (2011) and deVilliers & Roeper (to appear) where a detailed minimalist syntactic
account is provided.
6 Note that it can be said in German (M. Zimmerman pc),
i. Ob er da ist [whether he here is]
but with some presupposition difference, as if the proposition is in the Common Ground, which is
hard to pin down.
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complement, limited reconstruction, and a relation between pronunciation and
presupposition which we will not articulate here, but which Strict Interfaces
allow (see Roeper (2011)):
(47)
[CP can [IP you trace play baseball]
Phase-Head Phase-complement
Only the Phase Complement is initially transferred to interpretation (Boeckx
2008). UG and a Strict Interface delivers, by movement out of the complement,
a block on the propositional presupposition. By hypothesis:
(48) Strict Interfaces are a part of UG and therefore immediately available
to a child.
Now the odd fact that inversion undoes a presupposition follows directly from
Strict Interfaces and the seemingly natural whether-question option is automat-
ically rendered superfluous.
If indeed, this is UG-derived, hence innate, then it should be available for chil-
dren very early. In fact, Van Valin (2002), advocating a similar view of the role
of Tense, shows that precisely overtly tensed elements invert first: “Is, are, was,
do, does, did, have, has and had occur in inverted questions at the initial stage
67% of the time, while can, could, may, might, shall, shoul, will occur only
14%.”
Moreover, further operations become quickly possible. As mentioned, young
3yr olds say things like:
(49) “it IS working” (Danilo Azcarate 3.4 years)
showing an awareness of Verum Focus, requiring Contrastive stress on the
tensed element, presupposing the Tense-Proposition connection. In fact, we
have explicit dialogues that reveal the presence of the presupposition when, via
copying, the tense continues to be present in the clause for children:
(50) Father: Do you want to go outside?
Child: No.
Child (to friend): Do you don’t want to go outside ?
The copying, by maintaining the auxiliary inside the Phase, preserves the pre-
supposition and asks a question about it, while the inverted case not only lacks
the presupposition, but acquires a suggestion reading:
(51) Don’t you want to go outside?
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Other examples include:
(52) a. “ Where are we ARE?” (Danilo Azcarate 3.8 yrs)
b. = Where is it that we are?
which is uttered in a strange forest, with the meaning like a cleft (52) where
the fact that we are somewhere is presupposed.
Now let us ask more carefully what the copying implies. It has been noted and
debated for 40 years in the acquisition.7 It occurs for a brief period of time,
before tag-questions are available (Jesney 2007):8
(53) “Is Bill is busy” “Can you can do that”
“Is it’s Stan’s radio” “Is this is the powder”
“Is that’s a belt” “why do you’re going outside”
“why do you’re giving juice” “why do you’re cutting the meat”
“what’s he’s doing” “what’s the mouse is doing”
“why is there’s big tears” “what is the woman is doing”
“why do deze don’t unrase” “why did you didn’t want to go”
Under our hypothesis, the yes/no questions should have the meanings of tag-
questions, not open yes/no questions, although the claim is hard to prove, and
the wh-questions are like clefts with presupposed relatives (why is it you’re
cutting meat).
Under the Strict Interface, syntax and semantics converge. One reason that a
child would use copying is precisely to preserve the presupposition. A second
reason is that copying transformations can be first learned at phonetic opera-
tions with Total Reconstruction, thus the interpretation would involve treating
both the copy and the trace as if it were the full tensed element.
This notion of Total Reconstruction has been articulated by Sauerland & El-
bourne (2002) and Miyagawa (2005). If the child first does Total Reconstruc-
tion, then we predict that even non-copied inverted SAI questions initially are
like tag questions. Here is a pilot experiment that goes in that direction. Con-
sider the contrast between:
(54) a. anyone can lift a ball→ exhaustive = everyone
b. can anyone lift a ball→ Qp-neg→ anyone = Free Choice
(or exhaustive reading)
7 See Guasti (2006); deVilliers, deVilliers & Roeper (2010) for some references.
8 Fitzpatrick (2005) shows inversion changes presupposition in wh-questions too. Note the con-
trast: why don’t you go outside (no required presupposition) and how come you don’t go outside
(necessary presupposition). Conroy (2006) shows that variation in inversion in wh-questions in
children patterns with this distinction.
70 Roeper
This Scene was given to a child and the child was asked:
(55) [insect, dog, fish, child]
Can anybody play with a ball?
→ adult: yes, the child or dog (yes-bias chooses)
An adult if asked, would give “no, not a insect or a fish” to a tag-question:
(56) Anybody can play with a ball, is that right?
If the child has a yes-bias (and because anybody has a person or personlike
bias), we would expect “yes” for “Can anybody play with a ball” instead the
4yr old child gave a tag-like response:
(57) “no, not the fish or the insect”
Even for an adult, the copied version seems to prefer this Free Choice, not
universal reading :
(58) → Can anybody can play with a ball?
To sum up, the experiment supports both the notion of Total Reconstruction
and the presupposed proposition reading.
What can we conclude from the early evidence:
(59) a. early use of inversion
b. verum focus
c. copying to create tag-questions
d. disorder linked to Tense
We take this to reflect a mechanical and strict interface between syntax and
semantics.
What is astonishing and critical is that this evolution happens very early
with children in the 2-3 yr range, while the block of a presupposition under
attitude verbs like say, think, tell which are not inherently more complex, is not
worked out until several years later, to which we now turn.
We argue below that the presence of easy pragmatic inferences that overrule
what strict syntactic/semantic connections require, like those courtroom con-
fusions outlined above, are an important part of why some realizations of Strict
Interfaces seem not strict to children and delay acquisition.
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4 The Inference toward Default Tenselessness
Later stages, nonetheless, show an application of inferences to what may be a
default Tenseless repesentation. Children show:
(60) Event interpreted as proposition.
Proposition interpreted as event.
In a pilot experiment conducted by Mary Wilson and associates at Laureate
Learning Corporation, 6 children were given scenes and sentences like this:
5/6 answered “Amy” (or comparable for other stories) for “who heard that
Jack played the trumpet in his room.” None of the children did the reverse:
took heard Jack play the trumpet to be “grandma”. Therefore a tensed clause
was taken to be, or entail, an untensed small clause event, but not the reverse.
While the primary direction is: Proposition ⇒ Event, there is some evidence
of the opposite as well.
While adults know when an inference from a proposition to an event is war-
ranted, a child may not.
4.1 Inferences that Overrule Grammar
Inference, however, hangs in the air over many situations and is the motive for
many statements. Thus the statement above:
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(61) “Don’t you want to go outside?”
is usually expressed as a suggestion not a request for a propositional judge-
ment of truth or falsity equivalent to: ‘Is it the case that you don’t want to go
outside.” Because such pragmatic goals as suggestion are the purpose of the
speech act, there is an understandable inclination to build this into the gram-
mar directly. However, we believe it is of apiece with inferences that overrule
the overt meaning of the grammar.
Schulz (2003) explored the contrast in a series of experiments with numerous
similar stories like this one:
(62) Kermit went shopping and he was supposed to buy eggs.
Then in the evening, he got really hungry, but he said “I have nothing
to eat in the house.” He didn’t remember the eggs.
Did he forget to buy eggs?⇒ no
Did he forget that he bought eggs?⇒ yes (Schulz 2003)
A group of 38 children 4-6 yrs made errors on both types. 82% of the children
made errors on these sentences and Schulz states that “younger children treat
factive verbs as non-factive.” Consider the younger children who were most
prone to take the non-factive and interpret it as factive: “Did he forget to buy
eggs” to mean “did he forget that he bought eggs” and answer “yes”.
Unlike the Strict Interface discussed above, verbs like forget are negative im-
plicatives which means they do not carry a fixed truth, but rather an implica-
tion. The fact that he forget to buy eggs does not entail that he did not buy
eggs strictly, just that he forgot the obligation at some point. Inference must
be applied to know which implication to apply. Consider these more elaborate
scenarios.
A boy is supposed to buy eggs to make omelettes. He forgets and brings
no money to the store. When he comes home, his mother says, “Did you forget
to buy eggs?”. He says yes and quickly runs back to the store to get some eggs.
His father comes home and says:
(63) “Did you forget to buy eggs?”
The natural, pertinent answer is “no” because he did eventually buy eggs, but
he also had forgotten as well. Most adults would answer such a question with
the most recent and relevant answer: No. Now consider an altered context:
Suppose the father comes home, and says “Johnny is always forgetting things
– I bet he forgot to buy eggs.” “Did you forget to buy eggs?” Now the answer
might be “Yes, even though he got them eventually.” This answer would, in a
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way, respond to both interpretations.
The conclusion is that the child must decide by a broader situational inference
– which should not be collapsed with Conventional implicatures – to decide
which event should be the basis of an answer. So we see that direct syntac-
tic projections, implications, and inferences are all pertinent. It is possible, at
early stages, that a child arrives at a neutral reading, which gives free rein to
inferences? Suppose she deleted any tense marking and instead generated a
gerund:
(64) Did he forget about buying eggs?
This could allow both meanings: forget to buy or forget that he bought. We
consider this a plausible syntactic move. It is plausible in part because the
act of deletion would signal (unconsciously) the fact that the grammar was
incomplete. It is exactly what the children did in the hear him play the trumpet
scenario.
4.2 False Belief
A great deal of work has surrounded the fact that children make errors in False
Belief contexts. In deVilliers et al. (2010); Roeper (2011); deVilliers & Roeper
(to appear) we have developed an approach that parallels our discussion of
inversion at the syntactic level. Children allow Total Reconstruction to occur
with respect to a syntactic chain which enables them to obey the Strong Min-
imalist Thesis. Children are known to give the wrong answer in this scenario
(“birthday cake” instead of “paper towels”):
(65) This mother snuck out one night when her little girl was asleep and
bought a surprise birthday cake. The next day the little girl saw the
bag from the store and asked, “What did you buy?” The mom wanted
to keep the surprise until later so she said, “Just some paper towels.”
– What did the mom say she bought?⇒ “a birthday cake”
We argue that when the wh-word is interpreted in the lower clause, the SMT
demands interpretion there, and then they give a factive answer. Thus they put
the what back into the second trace position:
(66) What did she say [ (what) she bought trace.]
That position is inside the first Phase and therefore is interpreted there. The
interpretation for the adult is ultimately altered by the impact of the higher verb
allowing the lower CP to inherit a feature in syntax. The Total Reconstruction is
exactly like what we saw with auxiliary inversion. In fact several other branches
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of adult behavior coincide with this analysis to enhance its plausibility. First in
French it has been argued that wh-in-situ, unlike the fronted case, entails a
presupposed propositon:
(67) Il
he
va
goes
où.
where
vs. Où
where
va-t’il.
goes he
The first entails that one went somewhere, while the second might be answered
with “nowhere”. In addition, in German, it has been claimed that (substandard)
partial movement where the wh-word is repeated requires factivity for some
speakers (Herberger 2001):
(68) Was
what
hat
has
sie
she
gesagt,
said
was
what
sie
she
gekauft
bought
hat.
had
Although this is regarded as substandard and obscure, the effect is exactly what
we find with children, who are also known, in a variety of languages, to spon-
taneously repeat (see deVilliers & Roeper (to appear)):
(69) “What did she say what she wanted for her birthday.”
And finally when a wh-word is in-situ in English the “correct” reading emerges,
as this contrast reveals:
(70) What did he guess t the number was t. [=what was his guess]
Did he guess what the number was. [=guess correctly or just make a
guess]
Thus, looked at carefully, the child’s decision falls within the options of UG
and is shown in parallel adult behavior.
But why do children persist in this reconstruction so much longer than
for yes/no questions? In our initial court cases, we discussed how we develop
beliefs from imperfect verbal evidence. In these experiments, a story with two
prongs is developed, both of which in the larger world of inferences is roughly
plausible. The experiment, in effect, seeks to see when children are able to use
a precise interpretation of grammar to see which is appropriate. Adults must
likewise sense that this discrimination is called for. If adults also allow infer-
ences to exceed what grammar allows, then why should children not do the
same? If say often takes factive complements and if they are allowed to infer a
proposition from a small clause with an event (see John drink), then the manner
in which the child uses inference to expand, and overinterpret, then their ma-
neuver is within the larger comprehension strategies available to human beings.
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Ultimately, the child must grasp that the momentum of the story is precisely
a call for the hearer to contrast what was bought with what was said to have
been bought, and therefore the factive assumption must not be made.
5 Conclusions
The reasons, then, that children pass through the misanalysis of SAI years be-
fore they reliably handle such False Belief environments involves both the fact
that UG favors an SMT analysis of clauses and that they must grasp the role of
contrast in the story narrative.
We have allowed several ideas to circle around the Strict Interface that: Tense
entails a proposition. We have argued that
1. it motivates the first major step to a transformation in the Root infinitive
stage.
2. it promotes Total Reconstruction in order to maintain a tag-question
meaning in early yes/no questions and in later long-distance questions,
and
3. it allows deletion in some tensed clauses to fulfill pragmatically invited
inferences.
This article seeks primarily to embed these syntactic options within a larger
semantic and pragmatic context by showing that what children do largely re-
mains in the repertoire of adult response to language as well.
What must the child do to become an adult? She must recognize certain con-
texts, particularly those where contrast is part of the rhetoric of a narrative,
that calls for, in effect, blocking our usual broad inferences about the possible
meanings of human utterances.
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Abstract. It has recently been argued (by Harris and Potts 2009: 523–552) that
so-called non-speaker oriented readings of appositives are a matter of pragmatic
perspective shift and thus do not show that appositives contribute to descriptive
content. In contrast, I argue that appositives are indeed building blocks of propo-
sitions and that non-speaker oriented readings are de dicto readings of classical
presuppositions (definedness conditions on concepts) in modal contexts. Down-
ward entailing modal contexts, like surprise contexts, provide the key to this
conclusion: here, appositives provide a useful means to ensure that an individual
retains its relevant properties across the modal space.
1 Introduction
The question whether appositives, like “, a virgin,” as in (1), are building blocks
of descriptive meaning is answered in the negative by Harris and Potts (2009)
(henceforth: HP) but in the positive by Schlenker (to appear).
(1) . . . she, a virgin, would have a child . . .
In particular, HP hold that ‘non-speaker oriented’ readings, as attested by (3)
(from Amaral et al. 2007), as opposed to ‘speaker oriented’ readings as attested
by (2) (from Potts 2005), are a matter of perspective shift: an appositive is
usually used to implicate that the speaker is committed to the proposition that
the referent has the property (in (2), that Chuck is a psychopath), but pragmatic
factors can shift the attribution of that commitment to someone else, typically
the holder of an attitude (in (3): Sheila).
(2) Sheila believes that Chuck, a psychopath, is fit to watch the kids.
(3) Sheila believes that Chuck, a sweetheart if ever there was one, is fit to
watch the kids.
∗ I am greatly indebted to the members of the groupMeaning and Understanding across Languages
at the Oslo Center for Advanced Study 2010, particularly to Regine Eckardt, as well as to the
audience at the lecture at Sinn und Bedeutung 15 in Saarbrücken in September 2010 on which this
paper is based.
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In contrast, I will argue that ‘non-speaker oriented’ readings of appositives are
de dicto readings and that under such readings, appositives do contribute to
descriptive content: they help build propositions in contexts like (4).
(4) Mary could not believe that she, a virgin, would have a child.
Generally, I will propose that appositives introduce ‘classical’ presuppositions,
i.e., definedness conditions on functions from evaluation indices, starting with
individual concepts and projecting to propositions. In extensional contexts and
on de re readings in intensional contexts, they are “mere” presuppositions, but
on de dicto interpretations in intensional contexts, they enter into the argument
propositions, thus making a genuine contribution to truth conditions.
I thus follow Schlenker (to appear) in pursuing a semantic strategy for
dealing with appositives generally and ‘non-speaker oriented’ interpretations
particularly.1 Our tactics are a bit different, though: while Schlenker uses facts
about the French subjonctif and Sequence of tense to show that non-restrictive
relative clauses can interact with mood and tense operators, concluding that
they convey a mixture of assertion and presupposition, I will use facts about
downward entailing intensional contexts to show that nominal appositives can
interact with attitude predicates, constraining their argument propositions, and
conclude that they convey more traditional presuppositions.
HP offer two major arguments in support of their pragmatic strategy. First,
they present experimental evidence to show that non-speaker oriented readings
are available outside intensional contexts. I try to counter this in part by arguing
that their extensional contexts are intensional after all and in part by appealing
to a mechanism of ‘concealed quotation’.
Second, conducting a corpus study of appositives under attitude verbs,
HP report a bias for speaker orientation. However, their attitude predicates are
all upward entailing (if monotone). By contrast, in downward entailing attitude
contexts, such as surprise contexts, there is a bias for non-speaker orientation.
Thus there is no empirical basis for marginalizing this orientation.
I confront the arguments supporting HP’s pragmatic account in Sect. 2.
In Sect. 3, addressing the semantics of surprise predicates, I show how the bias
for non-speaker orientation in such contexts provides indirect evidence that
appositives contribute to propositions, and present direct evidence that they do,
in terms of entailment patterns derived from standard analyses.
1 A note on terminology: the term “appositive”, or “apposition”, is sometimes used to cover both
nominal appositives like the indefinite descriptions in (1)–(4) and non-restrictive relative clauses
(which form the main concern of Schlenker (to appear)), or even other forms of non-restrictive
modifiers; though most of the points made in this paper are probably relevant for appositives in
that broad sense, I will concentrate on nominal appositives in the form of indefinite descriptions.
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In Sect. 4 I demonstrate how this contribution can be captured through clas-
sical presuppositions, i.e., definedness conditions on functions from worlds.
The emerging picture is that when they are read de dicto, appositives provide
a means to ensure that an individual referred to in a modal context retains its
relevant properties across the modal space. Sect. 5 brings conclusions.
2 The Arguments for the Pragmatic Strategy
HP offer two major arguments in favor of their pragmatic theory of perspectival
orientation for appositives. One is a finding that perspective shift, from speaker
to non-speaker, occurs outside intensional contexts. The other is a finding that
in intensional contexts, non-speaker orientation is relatively rare. In this section
I examine this evidence and try to counter it.
2.1 Perspective Shif_t in Extensional Contexts?
HP present evidence from experiments eliciting informant judgments to show
that non-speaker oriented interpretations are available even when appositives
are in “matrix clauses” (pp. 530ff.). One of their cases is (5):
(5) I am increasingly worried about my roommate. She seems to be grow-
ing paranoid.
a. The other day, she told me that we need to watch out for the mail-
man, a possible government spy.
b. The other day, she refused to talk with the mailman, a possible
government spy.
The idea is that in (5a), the appositive a possible goverment spy is in a modal
context while in (5b) it is not. Schlenker (to appear) notes, however, that refuse
may well be an attitude verb. To me, it is clear that it is. A test will be if we can
detect a de dicto / de re ambiguity in a definite description in a refuse context,
and it appears that we can. Consider (6):
(6) Goddess Parvati, wife of God Shiva, lonely during one of her husband’s
long absences, molds a son from mud. Ganesh grows up, and one day,
Parvati tells him to guard the front door and not let anybody in while
she bathes.
a. Shiva returns home. Ganesh refuses to let his father in, and Shiva
beheads him.
b. Shiva returns home. Ganesh refuses to let the intruder in, and Shiva
beheads him.
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(6a) is true on a de re interpretation but false on a de dicto interpretation, while
the converse holds of (6b). This strongly suggests that one of HP’s key cases
does not show what it is supposed to show, namely, that a non-speaker oriented
interpretation is possible in an extensional context. But it is not their only case:
they also report non-speaker oriented readings in one or two contexts which
are much less clearly intensional, like (7):
(7) My brother Sid hates school.
He puts off his homework, a complete waste of time, to the last minute.
I see here two ways to salvage the semantic strategy, on which the orientation
of the appositive a complete waste of time toward my brother Sid is a de dicto,
intensional phenomenon: either
1. one can argue that put off is an attitude verb in disguise, or
2. one can argue that the appositive is a piece of quotation in disguise.2
Way 1 predicts that a non-speaker-orientation reading is unavailable if the verb
cannot under any conditions be an attitude verb. (7a) seems to bear this out:
(7) a. ?My brother Sid hates school. His homework, a complete
waste of time, earns him bad grades.
Way 1 also predicts that there can be a de dicto / de re ambiguity in a context
under a transitive verb like put off – and (8) might seem to show that there can;
the Senate might or might not subscribe to the characterization of the bill as
the most important one ever presented to it.
(8) The Senate has postponed the most important bill ever presented to it.
Way 2 is to appeal to a mechanism of ‘concealed quotation’ which can affect
descriptions generally, as, for example, in (9):
(9) The ship that could not sink sank on her maiden voyage in April 1912.
According to Geurts and Maier (2005), pieces of quotation create local dicendi
contexts with contextually anchored sources (for (9) on a quotation-in-disguise
analysis of the definite description, this source might be the White Star Line).
On a piece-of-quotation-in-disguise analysis of the appositive, (7) will receive
more or less the same interpretation as (7b).
(7) b. My brother Sid hates school. He puts off his homework,
2 At a more general level, this has been suggested by Anand (2007).
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“a complete waste of time”, to the last minute.
The contextually anchored sources are subject to constraints, and presumably,
one constraint would account for the mild infelicity of (7a) above. Anyway, if
the mechanism of concealed quotation is otherwise freely available, it serves
to create local attitude contexts with implicit attitude holders and thus to take
the edge off the evidence adduced by HP against a semantic strategy.
2.2 A Bias for Speaker Orientation in Intensional Contexts?
HP report on a corpus study designed to measure the frequency of non-speaker
oriented readings of appositives in embedded contexts, based on a sample of 31
embedding predicates; attitude predicates and verbs of saying (pp. 540–547).
They discover a bias for speaker orientation; non-speaker orientation appears
as an exception.
However, apart from non-monotone verbs like ask, the attitude verbs in
HP’s sample are all monotone increasing (upward entailing): believe, claim,
say, etc. Once we turn to downward entailing attitude predicates like surprised,
the picture actually seems to be reversed: there then appears to be a bias for
non-speaker-oriented readings. (10a) is a case in point:
(10) a. Mary is surprised that John, a Laestadian, wears a necktie.
In Laestadianism, a conservative Lutheran revival movement centered in the
extreme north of Scandinavia, men are (often) not supposed to wear neckties.
Hence it is surprising if a Laestadian man does wear one.
So the appositive in (10a) seems to contribute to the argument proposition,
constraining it; the intuition is that worlds where John is not a Laestadian are
not to be counted when the predicate surprised is evaluated. True, in contrast to
the case (3) in Sect. 1, with the non-factive, upward entailing predicate believe,
the appositive is here not controversial: there is (due to the factive predicate) no
conflict between the beliefs of the speaker and those of the attitude holder, but
it is still evident that the appositive is an ingredient in the object of the attitude
and hence that it is essentially oriented towards the holder of the attitude.
In fact, it is typical of appositives in surprise contexts that there is not that
much of a difference between a conjoined predicate and an appositive:
(10) b. Mary is surprised that John is a Laestadian and wears a necktie.
To be sure, there is a difference; there is a partition into background and focus
in (10a), corresponding to a distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ knowledge:
the property expressed in the appositive seems to count as ‘old knowledge’ of
John on the part of Mary, whereas the property expressed in the carrier clause
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seems to count as a piece of knowledge just acquired, triggering the surprise.
Speaker-oriented readings are possible in surprise contexts, but rare:
(11) Mary is surprised that John, a notorious casanova, betrays her.
That John is a notorious casanova is something the speaker knows, not Mary;
that she does not know it is the reason for her surprise.
The asymmetry between upward and downward entailing attitudes as to
what is the ‘normal’ orientation – toward the speaker with the former, toward
another individual with the latter – calls for an explanation. Could there be a
pragmatic explanation? Well, one might think that the ‘normal’ orientation is
what provides an explanation for the attitude in discourse relational terms – but
note that while that is indeed the normal case under surprised, cf. (10a), it is the
exceptional case under believe, cf. (3); in other words, non-speaker orientation
is consistently what would go to explain the attitude.
Other pragmatic explanations may be conceivable, but in the next section
I will suggest an explanation building on the semantics of surprise predicates,
and also supply more concrete evidence that non-speaker oriented appositives
under such predicates play a semantic role.
3 Appositives and the Semantics of Surprise
Below, I go into the semantics of surprise predicates and show that in regard to
the inference patterns that standard analyses predict, appositives in embedded
clauses commonly behave as if they were integral parts of those clauses. They
pattern with conjoined predicates in expressing properties that are relevant for
evaluating the surprise predicates, thus serving a significant semantic purpose.
3.1 Surprise Semantics and Contextual Perspectives
HP predict widely different inference properties for (10a) and for (10b): while
according to their theory of pragmatic perspective shift, (10a) means the same
as (10c) in the dimension of descriptive content and implicates (10d) in the
dimension of expressive content, there is no prediction that (10b) entails (10c).
(10) a. Mary is surprised that John, a Laestadian, wears a necktie.
b. Mary is surprised that John is a Laestadian and wears a necktie.
c. Mary is surprised that John wears a necktie.
d. Mary believes that John is a Laestadian.
In fact, scholars who have analyzed predicates like surprise agree that clauses
like (10b) do not entail clauses like (10c) but that clauses like (10c) together
with clauses like (10d) do entail clauses like (10b). As acknowledged by those
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scholars, our intuitions may not be so clear in these regards, and I will return to
the reasons for that below; but note at once that (10a) does not seem to entail
(10c) any more than does (10b). That is to say: contrary to what HP predict,
in certain contexts, appositives are intuitively not more detachable from the
descriptive content than conjoined predicates.
Asher (1987) identifies a class of ‘negative factive’ attitude verbs, obeying, i.a.,
the inference rule ‘weakened downward entailment’ (WDE) (a for the agent,
α for the attitude predicate at issue, β for believe):
(12) Weakened downward entailment:
aα φ ∧ JψK⊆ JφK ∧ aβ ψ ⇒ aαψ
This class contains a variety of predicates, but the adjective surprised is usually
considered as the paradigmatic case. Thus (10c) and (10d) are to jointly entail
(10b), but (10b) is not to entail (10c).3 There is a consensus on this: von Fintel
(1999), Sharvit (2002), and van Rooij (2006) concur in predicting (12).
The reason that (weakened) downward entailment is predicted by all is
that all assume the basic truth condition to be that the argument proposition is
a subset of something (the ‘unexpectation’ worlds) or has an empty intersection
with something (the ‘expectation’ worlds); cf., e.g., Sharvit (2002: 103):
(13) Semantics of Surprise according to Sharvit (2002: 103):J surprise K(w)(P)(a) = 1 iff P(w)⊆ NONEXP(a)(w)
And that is of course easier the stronger the argument proposition, P(w), is.
Reality is not quite so simple, though. It may often appear as if surprised
fails to entail downward, or even as if it entails upward. (14) would provide a
case in point for the former, (10b, c) might go to suggest the latter.
(14) John is surprised that Mary won a medal, but he is not surprised
that she won a bronze medal.
(10) b. Mary is surprised that John is a Laestadian and wears a necktie.
c. Mary is surprised that John wears a necktie.
The customary way to account for the apparent failure of surprise predicates
to entail downward, or their semblance of entailing upward, is to appeal to an
implicit restriction, surreptitiously modifying (as the case may be, weakening
or strengthening) the argument proposition in the putative conclusion.
3 Strictly, (10c) and “Mary believes that John is a Laestadian and wears a necktie” are to entail
(10b), but since (10c) presupposes that Mary believes that John wears a necktie, (10d) is enough.
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To be specific, when we pass from (10b) to (10c) to test whether the latter
follows from the former, it is very difficult to keep the context constant and not
let the property explicitly ascribed to John in the complement of the premiss
carry over, as an implicit restriction, to the complement of the conclusion. Thus
premiss and conclusion are easily judged to be equivalent.
Kadmon and Landman (1993) call this implicit restriction a ‘perspective’
and propose to code it as a contextual parameter in the meaning of surprised:
To be surprised that A is always relative to a certain perspective on A, a perspec-
tive that determines what it is about A that is surprising and in virtue of what it is
surprising. The perspective is a contextually determined parameter in the inter-
pretation of surprised, very much in the same way that a ‘modal base’ (Kratzer
1981) is a contextually determined parameter in the interpretation of modals.
[. . . ] The perspective enters into the semantics of surprised and affects the truth
conditions of sentences containing it. (Kadmon and Landman 1993: 381)
Perspectives “can be at least partly specified by explicit linguistic text”, e.g.:
(15) – I can’t believe she’s divorcing HIM.
– Yeah, such a rich man.
– No, such a KIND man!
von Fintel (1999) elaborates on Kadmon and Landman’s proposal by providing
“a semantics for the attitudes that is specifically sensitive to a shifting domain
of ordered worlds”. His (main) proposal for surprised is, slightly adjusted:4
(16) Semantics of Surprise according to von Fintel (1999: 122–125):J surprised K f,gw = λ pλα :Bα(w)⊆ p , Bα(w)⊆ fα(w),
fα(w)∩ p 6= /0 , fα(w)−p 6= /0 . ∀w′∈ maxgα (w)( fα(w)) : w′ /∈ p
Here f and g are parameters similar to the modal base and the ordering source
in Kratzer’s theory of modality, f assigning a set of worlds and g assigning a set
of propositions to the subject of surprised and the current index of evaluation.
The definedness conditions ( between : and . ) say that the subject of surprised
believes the complement p and the set of relevant worlds fα(w) and that the
relevant worlds contain p- and non-p-worlds. The content proper is, in words,
that in all the most expected of the relevant worlds, p is not true. Note that the
logical structure of this definition is the same as that of Sharvit’s definition (13);
the two definiens clauses are contrapositions of each other, and the attitude is
4 von Fintel does not actually define surprised but sorry, intending that definition to carry over to
surprised “with suitable adjustments”. I substitute a ‘denotation equation’ for his truth condition,
and I omit his coindex on the attitude predicate and on the functions f and g on the understanding
that f and g are here the functions fitting surprised.
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downward entailing. The essential novel feature of von Fintel’s definition is the
relativization to a set of relevant worlds compatible with the subject’s beliefs.
It is natural to think of fα(w) as the intersection of a set of propositions,
e.g., the proposition that Mary is a virgin, or that John is a rich man, or a kind
man, or a Laestadian, – or that the topic time is Good Friday:
(17) Bjarne was in Hamburg on Good Friday in 1984 and was outraged that
the brothels were open.
More generally, if the set fα(w) is the intersection over a set of propositions Φ
and p involves rigid or de re reference to an individual, with a name, a pronoun,
or a definite description on a de re interpretation, it is reasonable to expect Φ
to include the ascription of a property to that individual.
3.2 Surprise Semantics and Appositives
The way appositives function in the cases so far considered suggests that they
provide a means to ensure that individuals referred to in intensional contexts
retain their relevant properties across the possible worlds under consideration,
making explicit what would otherwise have to be left implicit and ascertaining
that certain properties are carried along throughout the modal space at issue.
In short, they contribute content that can be much at issue. In the next section,
I sketch a way to formalize this notion. But first, I will present evidence that
appositives matter for the truth conditions of downward entailing attitudes, and
provide an answer to the question why non-speaker oriented interpretations are
not rare but frequent when appositives are in such contexts.
Consider (18a–c). (18a) contains two instances of complex appositives,
appositives consisting of two predicates – Jewish man, Samaritan woman. In
(18b), the second member of each pair is deleted, in (18c), the first member is.
(18) In John 4 Jesus spoke with a Samaritan woman and asked for a drink.
She had two things against her: she was a woman, and a Samaritan.
a. She was surprised that he, a Jewish man, spoke to her, a Samari-
tan woman.
b. She was surprised that he, a Jew, spoke to her, a Samaritan.
c. She was surprised that he, a man, spoke to her, a woman.
There is a strong intuition here that (18a) entails neither (18b) nor (18c). That
is to say, surprise contexts are not closed under the weakening of appositives.
This is predictable if the appositives help to build the argument propositions,
but not – or only with difficulty (see below) – if they do not.
So why does this case present a different picture from a case like (10a, c),
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where the intuition that the first sentence fails to entail the second is weaker?
(10) a. Mary is surprised that John, a Laestadian, wears a necktie.
c. Mary is surprised that John wears a necktie.
Here, as with (10b) in relation to (10c) (see Sect. 3.1), it is difficult to blot out
the property explicitly ascribed to the subject of the first complement clause;
it easily influences the second as an implicit constraint on the relevant worlds.
This source of error is evidently eliminated in (18a/b) and (18a/c), presumably
because by explicating a property, we signal that implicit ones are not relevant.
Now if an appositive can never contribute to a proposition, the missing
inferences in (18) are mysterious: (18a–c) should then be equivalent.
Note, in addition, that the appositives in (18a) represent old information,
both in regard to the common ground and to the belief state of the experiencer:
the context entails both that he was a Jew and a man and she a Samaritan and
a woman and that she knew that. This makes a theory where appositives just
describe separate, scopeless bits of expressive content not seem very plausible;
in fact, they would appear to be superfluous in such cases. More clearly still,
noone needs reminding that someone referred to with she or Maria is a female:
(19) She became accustomed to the double-takes from male firefighters
who were surprised that she, a female, could head the station.
(20) Maria tells us that the students are surprised that she, a woman, talks
to them about math and natural sciences.
Admittedly, one might try to account for the missing inferences in (18) while
maintaining that (18a–c) are equivalent by appealing to discourse relations: it
could be argued that experiencer-oriented appositives in attitude contexts are
commonly intended as explanations; if the complex appositives in (18a) give
full explanations, then the simple ones in (18b or c) cannot be expected to do
so too. After all, the semantics of surprised refers to contextually determined
relevant beliefs, and the appositives could be argued to supply those by general
pragmatic principles. Hence it is difficult to actually prove that the appositives
make a semantic contribution.
But if we do assume that they do, we are able to answer the question why
subject-oriented readings are frequent in downward entailing attitude contexts
although they are infrequent in upward entailing ones. If under such readings,
appositives do restrict argument propositions, then there is a close analogue in
determiner domain restriction, more noticeable, because it is more useful, with
downward than with upward entailing determiners, cf. Heim (to appear):
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For all we can tell, every determiner may be construed with a covert restrictor
in addition to its overt one and thus apply to an effectively narrowed set of con-
textually relevant or salient entities. We just don’t see this as clearly with some
determiners as with others. the, along with every . . . , is not upward monotone,
so covert restrictors weaken the presupposition or assertion, giving an otherwise
truth-value-less or false claim a chance to be felicitous and true.
By analog, we can say that decreasing attitude contexts show a bias for subject-
oriented readings because here, such readings serve to weaken the statement,
giving an otherwise potentially false assertion a better chance to be true, while
increasing attitude contexts show a bias for speaker-oriented readings because
there, subject-oriented readings serve to strengthen the statement. If that is so,
we would expect negated versions of increasing attitude predicates to show a
propensity for subject orientation as well, and this seems to be borne out:
(4) Mary could not believe that she, a virgin, would have a child.
I conclude from the evidence that appositives can help build propositions. The
question is now how.
4 Appositives as Definedness Conditions
Faced with a picture of appositives in different roles in different contexts – in
nonmodal contexts or on speaker-oriented readings in modal contexts, they add
information on referents in a de re mode, but on non-speaker-oriented readings
in modal contexts, they add information on referents in a de dicto manner – I
will attempt to unite these two roles by describing appositives as introducing
definedness conditions on partial individual concepts, or more generally, as
these project, on partial functions from worlds, ultimately partial propositions.
This approach necessitates a method of intensional composition, roughly à la
Beaver and Krahmer (2001), and I will now specify the necessary machinery.
4.1 From Appositives to Partial Propositions
At the bottom, I posit a silent appositive functor A whose meaning is:5,6
(21) JA K = λPe(st)λx(se)λw : xw ∈ De , Pw(xw) . xw
Suppose we build the meaning of “surprised that Mary, a virgin, is pregnant”.
I consider the indefinite article in the appositive as spurious, i.e., disregard it.
(22) JA K(JvirginK) = λx(se)λw : xw ∈ De , Vw(xw) . xw
5 This is the indefinite case, where the first argument is a function from individuals to propositions;
a definite case, where this argument is an individual concept, is also definable.
6 Notation: Stuff between : and . are definedness conditions. Convention: fw(g) = f (g)w.
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This is the full appositive meaning, an operation on partial individual concepts.
It carries two presuppositions (definedness conditions): one projected from its
argument, the other coincident with its own content. (V = JvirginK.)
The proper name Mary is, standardly, taken to mean a constant, though in
principle a partial, function from worlds to individuals.
(23) JA K(JvirginK)(JMaryK) = λw :Mw ∈ De , Vw(Mw) .Mw
This is Mary with the definedness condition that she is a virgin.
For partial individual concepts like this to combine with properties likeJvirginK or J pregnant K, which are (as in Beaver and Krahmer 2001) functions
from individuals to propositions, they are lifted to functions from such e(st)
‘properties’ to propositions by the abstract filter functionF :
(24) JF K = λ f(se)λPe(st)λw : fw ∈ De . Pw( fw)
(25) JF K(JA K(JvirginK)(JMaryK)) =
λPe(st)λw :Mw ∈ De , Vw(Mw) . Pw(Mw)
This lifted DP meaning can be used directly in subject position, applying to
a property like J pregnant K, resulting in (26), or more generally in a position
hosting a DP after QR, maybe from object position. (V = J pregnant K.)
(26) JF K(JA K(JvirginK)(JMaryK))(JpregnantK) =
λw :Mw ∈ De , Vw(Mw) .Pw(Mw)
This is the partial proposition that Mary, a virgin, is pregnant.
4.2 From Partial Propositions to Surprise
Now we need a meaning for surprised which can take partial propositions and
project their definedness conditions appropriately. It is commonly assumed that
surprised introduces the presupposition that the subject believes the argument
proposition.7 This will now incorporate the presuppositions brought along by
the argument proposition, in particular, the one originating in the appositive,
because what the subject must believe is not the partial argument proposition
but its positive extension, the set of worlds where it is defined and not negative.
By the same token, what must lie outside the subject’s relevant expectations
for the attitude predicate to hold of its two arguments is not the first argument
itself but the set of worlds where it is true, which means that the definedness
7 van Rooij (2006: 217), following Asher (1987), assume that such predicates introduce two layers
of presupposition, the argument proposition itself and the proposition that the subject believes it;
however, von Fintel (1999), following Heim (1992), only assumes the latter layer, as I will too.
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condition (Mary is a virgin) and the content proper (Mary is pregnant) both
contribute to define the set of worlds at issue.
(27) is an augmentation of (16) in Sect. 3.1, based on von Fintel (1999):
(27) J surprised K f,g = λφλxλw :Bx(w)⊆ λw′φw′=1 .
maxgx(w)( fx(w))∩ [λw′φw′=1] = /0
(maxgx(w)( fx(w)) = those relevant worlds compatible with x’s beliefs
that x most expects)
(28), then, is the meaning of “surprised that Mary, a virgin, is pregnant”.
(28) J surprised K f,g(JF K(JA K(JvirginK)(JMaryK))(JpregnantK)) =
λxλw :Bx(w)⊆ λw′Mw′ ∈ De,Vw′(Mw′),Pw′(Mw′) .
maxgx(w)( fx(w))∩ [λw′Mw′ ∈ De,Vw′(Mw′),Pw′(Mw′)] = /0
Applied to Joseph, this becomes the partial function from worlds to truth values
that is defined iff Joseph believes that Mary is a virgin and pregnant and true iff
it is defined and the worlds where Mary is a virgin and pregnant all lie outside
the most expected relevant belief worlds of Joseph.
That may be a fair first attempt at a definition of the definedness and truth
conditions of (29a), but note two problematic aspects of it:
1. The definition of the attitude in (27) fails to predict a difference between
(29a) and (29b), that is, between appositives and conjoined predicates in
embedded positions.
(29) a. Joseph is surprised that Mary, a virgin, is pregnant.
b. Joseph is surprised that Mary is a virgin and (is) pregnant.
2. It seems contradictory to say, for (30) for simplicity, on the one hand that
for the proposition to be defined, the subject must believe that Mary is
pregnant, and on the other that for it to be true, the set of worlds where
she is must lie outside the subject’s most expected relevant belief worlds.
(30) Joseph is surprised that Mary is pregnant.
Now in fact, both problems can be tackled with one tool, by distinguishing in
the definition of surprised between the intersection over x’s ‘old beliefs’ in w,
Bx(w), and the intersection over x’s ‘full beliefs’ in w,B+x (w) (a subset of it).
It is the old beliefs that x’s most expected relevant worlds should be based on,
before the new belief coming from the argument proposition is formed, and it is
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the old beliefs that the presupposition inherited from the argument proposition,
originating in the appositive, should be required to include. So I propose this
amended definition (needless to say, to do a proper job of it, the notions of old
and full beliefs should be defined in terms of eventualities of surprise):
(31) J surprised K f,g = λφλxλw :Bx(w)⊆ λw′φw′ ∈ Dt ,
B+x (w)⊆ λw′φw′ = 1 .
maxgx(w)( fx(w))∩ [λw′φw′=1] = /0
(maxgx(w)( fx(w)) = those relevant worlds fromBx(w) that
x most expects)
This definition leads to the following revised definition of the definedness and
truth conditions of “Joseph is surprised that Mary, a virgin, is pregnant”, (29a):
(32) J surprised K f,g(JF K(JA K(JvirginK)(JmK))(JpregnantK))(J jK) =
λw :B j(w)⊆ λw′Mw′ ∈ De,Vw′(Mw′) ;B+j (w)⊆ λw′Pw′(Mw′) .
maxg j(w)( f j(w))∩ [λw′Mw′ ∈ De,Vw′(Mw′),Pw′(Mw′)] = /0
(maxg j(w)( f j(w)) = those relevant worlds in B j(w) that j expects the most.)
There are two layers of definedness conditions here: Joseph must have believed
and believe that Mary is a virgin and he must believe now that she is pregnant
(to accord with the truth condition, this must be a new belief); by contrast, on
the definition of the definedness and truth conditions of (29b), there is only one
substantial level of presupposition: Joseph must believe that Mary is a virgin
and (is) pregnant (and, sloppily, one of the two conjuncts must be a new belief).
Thus we have now a reasonable truth condition and a distinction between an
appositive and a conjoined predicate at the level of definedness conditions.
4.3 The Speaker Oriented Case: de re
How about speaker-oriented readings? Consider (33), akin to Potts’ (2):
(33) Mary is surprised that John, a notorious casanova, betrays her.
Mary is not aware that John is a notorious casanova. I will treat this reading as
a de re reading of the DP “John, a notorious casanova”, employing a designated
variable for the actual world – v – and an abstract actualizer operator – @:8
8 There are of course various ways of construing de re interpretations (for recent surveys of the
state of the art, see von Fintel and Heim (2009) and Schwager (to appear)); if @ as defined in (34)
is considered the general method, it would seem to imply that only definite DPs, with individual
concept, type (se), meanings, can have such readings; for indefinite descriptions, to the extent that
Appositives in Modal Contexts 93
(34) J@K = λ f(se)λw . fv
In extensional contexts, this operator is redundant. To see this, consider (35)
and its two semantic structures (36) and (37), one with, the other without @:
(35) Professor Duriarti, a notorious criminal, has escaped from prison.
(36) JF K(JA K(Jnotorious criminal K)(JDuriartiK))(JescapedK)
= λw :Dw∈ De ,N C w(Dw) . Ew(Dw)
(37) JF K(J@K(JA K(Jnotorious criminal K)(JDuriartiK)))(JescapedK)
= λw :Dv∈ De ,N C v(Dv) . Ew(Dv)
The main difference is that the presupposition stemming from the appositive is
on the construal in (37) anchored to v, the actual world. This does not make a
difference once the sentence is evaluated, though. What has been built above,
and all along, are not sentence denotations (truth values) but propositions. But
when these are ‘finished’ and are to be used as assertions or more generally as
representatives, they are applied to v, yielding a denotation, a truth value. And
then the difference between (36) and (37) is levelled out.
Returning to (33) and the de re interpretation of the embedded appositive,
when J@K applies to JA K(Jnotorious casanovaK)(JJohnK), the result is:
(38) J@K(JA K(Jnotorious casanovaK)(JJohnK)) =
λw [λw :Jw∈ De ,N C w(Jw) .Jw](v) =
λw :Jv∈ De ,N C v(Jv) .Jv
This is a partial constant function, defined if and only if the name John actually
denotes an individual and this individual is actually a notorious casanova, and
yielding, if defined, that individual no matter what. The partial proposition that
John, a notorious casanova, betrays Mary (here the type e(st) propertyBm) is:
(39) JF K(J@K(JA K(Jnotorious casanovaK)(JJohnK)))(JbetraysMaryK)
= λw :Jv∈ De ,N C v(Jv) .Bmw (Jv)
So far, this is parallel to (37), and the actualizer is redundant. But when (39) is
embedded in an intensional context, this changes. The full partial proposition
that Mary is surprised that John, actually a notorious casanova, betrays her is:
(40) λw :Bm(w)⊆ λw′Jv∈ De,N C v(Jv) ; B+m (w)⊆ λw′Bmw′(Jv) .
transparent evaluation readings are desired, one could consider a choice function analysis.
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maxgm(w)( fm(w))∩ [λw′Jv∈ De,N C v(Jv),Bmw′(Jv)] = /0
There are two cases: either the name John actually denotes an individual and
this individual is actually a notorious casanova, in which case the proposition is
defined iff Mary believes that this individual betrays her and true iff she is also
surprised that he does; or not, that is, John is not actually a notorious casanova;
then the proposition is only defined if Mary believes the empty set of worlds.
That may be thought to be possible; after all, one can have inconsistent beliefs.
If we want the proposition to be plainly undefined in case John is not actually a
notorious casanova, we could consider including the factive presupposition in
the definedness condition introduced by the attitude: λφλxλw : φw = 1 . . . .
Importantly, though, however the definedness conditions are dealt with,
in contrast with the de dicto construal, on the de re construal the content of the
appositive plays no role in the content of the clause (the second line in (40)) and
so does not affect its truth conditions: if John is indeed a notorious casanova,
the conjunctN C v(Jv) is superfluous.
4.4 Discussion
The analysis developed above has some welcome consequences but also some
problematic features. First, since the actualizer can apply below an appositive,
the analysis predicts that there can be de re readings of definite descriptions
with appositives read de dicto, – and this seems to be borne out:
(41) Thoas wants Iphigenia to sacrifice her own brother, a stranger who has
tried to steal the statue of Artemis.
Thoas is not yet aware that Orestes is Iphigenia’s brother. But he is well aware
that Orestes has tried to steal the statue of Artemis, and he is convinced that
Orestes is a stranger. If this is a natural reading of (41), it is derivable.
By the same token, however, it is predicted that there cannot be de dicto
readings of definite descriptions with appositives read de re, – and this question
seems more open. To test it, we may consider cases like (42).
(42) ?Gloucester wants his loyal son, a traitor to him, to inherit his title.
The only sensible interpretation is that the son that Gloucester wants to inherit
his title is Edmund, loyal in his belief worlds but actually a traitor. To the extent
that this interpretation is unavailable, it serves to confirm the prediction that if
the appositive is in the scope of @, so must the expression it applies to be. But
it may not be obvious that (42) is dubious. (43) is predicted not to be dubious:
the son that Gloucester wants to disinherit is Edgar, a traitor in his belief worlds
but loyal in reality. It is not clear that this derivable reading is more accessible
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than the intended but not derivable reading of (42).
(43) ?Gloucester wants to disinherit his loyal son, a traitor to him.
If (43) is indeed felt to be no more felicitous than (42), this reflects unfavorably
on the formalism developed in this section.
Another, more general, point of discussion that should be raised concerns
what Schlenker (to appear) terms the epistemic status of appositives in relation
to the presupposition-as-definedness-condition that their contribution has been
identified as. According to Schlenker, nonrestrictive relative clauses introduce
conditions similar to presuppositions but special in being easy to accommodate
(translucency). Thus their content, while not trivial, should be uncontroversial.
The close parallel between (35) and (44) indicates that Schlenker would intend
this characterization of nonrestrictive relatives to carry over to appositives.
(44) Professor Duriarti, who is a notorious criminal, has escaped from prison.
(35) Professor Duriarti, a notorious criminal, has escaped from prison.
The analysis proposed in this paper simply predicts that (35) lacks a truth value
unless Professor Duriarti is actually a notorious criminal, and the question is
how this definedness condition on the world of evaluation can be brought into
accord with Schlenker’s notion of a ‘translucent’ condition. On the face of it,
the two notions seem very different; in particular, it seems too strong to deny
(35) a truth value should the professor turn out not to be a notorious criminal.
The relevant notion of presupposition has been referred to as a ‘classical’
or ‘traditional’ notion, and my intention has been that this notion is appropriate
for some but not all triggers and coexists with a context oriented conception,
apt for triggers like again and also, start and stop, non-emotive factives, and
anaphoric definite descriptions. In these and more cases, being entailed by the
context is the ideal and accommodation is difficult. Appealing to a definedness
condition for appositives or nonrestrictive modifiers more generally can be seen
as a way to decrease the demands on the context and to allow for a comparative
ease of accommodation, and thus as a way to emulate ‘translucency’.
Thus as long as the information contained in the appositive, though new,
does not conflict with the information state of the addressee, she will typically
be willing to accept it on faith. Conversely, if that information does conflict
with the addressee’s information state, she may well be prepared to disregard
it and still assess the information contained in the carrier sentence:
(36) It says here: “Professor Duriarti, a notorious criminal, has escaped
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from prison.” Since he is innocent, I am glad to learn that he is a free
man.
The additional assumption needed is thus that (simplex) sentences containing
nonrestrictive modifiers can still have a truth value even if the modifier should
be false or undefined – and the need for such a notion of ‘accommodation’,
consisting not in adding information but in disregarding it, is shared by other
presupposition triggers which lend themselves to a definedness analysis, like
referential definite descriptions, as in (45), or gender markers, as in (46).
(45) – Who is the man drinking a martini? (from Donnellan 1966)
– It’s not a martini, but anyway, it’s Smith.
(46) – Pirmins
Pirmin’s
Mathelehrer
mathteachermasc
ist
is
ein
a
pädagogisches
pedagogical
Genie!
genius
(German)
– Es
it
ist
is
eine
a
Lehrerin,
teacherfem
aber
but
ja,
yes
genial
genius
ist
is
sie.
she
On the whole, a critical point of discussion is whether and to what extent the
analysis of appositives presented in this paper should be expected to extend to
nonrestrictive modifiers such as those exemplified by (47)–(49):
(47) The pharmacist was surprised that this old woman was interested in
condoms.
(48) My friends are surprised that shy and sweet me is learning self defense.
(49) She was startled to see the devoted detective Mickey Mouse shake
hands with his ruthless rival Black Pete.
In all these cases, the italicized NP or AP is redundant in the sense that it does
not contribute to the identification of the referent of the description it is part of.
In (47), this individual would be sufficient for the identification of the referent,
in (48), the pronoun I (am) would, and in (49), the name Mickey Mouse would
(cf. Matushansky (2008: 595ff.) for a recent analysis of this last construction).
All three descriptions are embedded in a downward entailing modal context,
and seem to give the same interpretive effect as the above-studied appositives:
they may not convey new, or even nontrivial, information, but the information
that they convey plays a critical role for the evaluation of the modal predicate.
What made it surprising to the pharmacist that this individual was interested in
condoms was the property of being an old woman, etc. So at least with respect
to the contexts in focus in this paper, a parallel treatment of several, if not all,
sorts of nonrestrictive modifiers appears as desirable – and to the extent that the
Appositives in Modal Contexts 97
different sorts turn out to display a different behaviour in other environments,
for instance, in simplex sentences, it is to be hoped that this can eventually be
described as a variation within the general frame of analysis developed above:
Supplements, including nominal appositives, nonrestrictive relatives, and the
types of nonrestrictive modifiers exemplified in (47)–(49), can contribute to
the content of a clause because they introduce presupposition-like conditions.
5 Conclusions
The point of departure for this study was the following double claim made by
Harris and Potts (2009) concerning the perspectival orientation of appositives:
1. Non-speaker oriented readings are independent of intensionality; they
are possible even in extensional contexts.
2. However, speaker-oriented readings predominate even in intensional con-
texts.
I have disputed both claims, the first by arguing that the relevant extensional
contexts are intensional after all, in the spirit of Hintikka (1973: 214):
Surprisingly often modal notions are tacitly being considered in apparently non-
modal contexts.
The second claim was countered by pointing out that the intensional contexts
considered by Harris and Potts are not representative; in fact, once downward
entailing attitude contexts are taken into consideration, non-speaker oriented
readings predominate. In turn, this realization paves the way for a recognition
that appositives are not generally vehicles of expressive meaning, orthogonal
to descriptive meaning, but that they do sometimes help to build propositions.
The prime piece of evidence for that consists in the observation that weakening
appositives fails to preserve the truth of certain attitude ascriptions, primarily
ascriptions of surprise. If a pharmacist is surprised that Mrs. Otis, an old lady,
is interested in condoms, it does not follow that she is surprised that Mrs. Otis,
a lady, is interested in condoms. Another fact which supports the ‘semantic
strategy’ is that appositives in surprise contexts often represent old information.
The function that appositives fill in this type of context is best understood
against the background of the theory of emotive factive attitudes like surprised.
When we ascribe surprise to somebody at a certain individual having a certain
property (like being pregnant or interested in condoms), we tacitly understand
some additional relevant properties (like being a virgin or an old lady), and
these are encoded in a contextual parameter providing a set of relevant (‘old’)
belief worlds. If, for fear of being misunderstood because the context might
not be sufficiently clear in this regard, we want to make a property explicit,
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expressing it in the form of an appositive is a natural move.
Thus in modal contexts, appositives act as reminders of properties which
are to follow an individual along through the set of worlds under consideration.
They provide a means to ensure that a thing retains its relevant properties across
the modal space. This task can be argued to be more important in downward
entailing than in upward entailing modal contexts, and that could be the reason
that (non-speaker oriented) appositives are more frequent there.
For modelling this behaviour of appositives in a way that also allows for
speaker-oriented interpretations, in extensional as well as intensional contexts,
a treatment in terms of partial meanings along the lines of Beaver and Krahmer
(2001) commends itself. I hope to have shown how such an approach can yield
coherent results in a fully compositional fashion: Starting from an abstract so-
called appositive functor, appositives add definedness conditions to individual
concepts, conditions that become definedness conditions on higher intensions,
finally on propositions. When these propositions are embedded under attitudes,
those definedness conditions (on the usual, de dicto construal) become integral
parts of them (to be exact, their positive extensions), and thus the intuition that
agent-oriented appositives convey attitude-relevant properties is accounted for.
As far as speaker-oriented interpretations are concerned, it is difficult to
discern a decisive difference between a ‘bidimensional’ view of appositives as
belonging to the dimension of implicature, to do with expressive meaning only,
and a ‘unidimensional’ view where appositives give definedness conditions on
partial concepts and propositions. Once we take non-speaker oriented readings
seriously, however, not only in upward entailing but also in downward entailing
modal contexts, it becomes clear that, at the very least, the two ‘dimensions’
should be able to communicate: the piece of content expressed in the appositive
should be allowed to merge with the larger piece expressed in its local context.
The present paper has presented one way to produce this effect.
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Abstract. This paper argues that the unaccusativity mismatch observed in the 
literature concerning the availability of there-insertion points to a syntactic 
difference between two classes of unaccusatives. The paper shows that the 
theme argument of change-of-location unaccusatives occupies Spec,ResultP, 
while that of change-of-state unaccusatives occupies Spec,vP. Insertion of 
there is blocked in the latter case, as the theme and the expletive compete for 
the same position.  
 
1	   Introduction	  
As is well known, there-insertion is possible in the context of unaccusative 
verbs but impossible with unergative and transitive verbs.1 However, only a 
subset of unaccusative verbs allows there-insertion (Levin 1993), leading to 
an unaccusativity mismatch (1a vs. 1d). 
(1) a. There arrived a man (in the garden)             (unaccusative-1) 
 b. *There walked a man (in the garden)              (unergative) 
 c. *There kissed a girl a boy (in the garden)            (transitive) 
 d. *There broke a glass (in the kitchen)           (unaccusative-2) 
In this paper, we argue that this unaccusativity mismatch points to a syntactic 
difference between the two classes of unaccusatives. Building on the “low-
there” hypothesis, recently proposed by Richards & Biberauer (2005), 
Richards (2007) and Deal (2009), we argue that the theme argument of the 
two classes of unaccusatives can occupy different structural positions within 
the vP, namely Spec,vP and Spec,ResultP, see (2a vs. 2b). Insertion of there 
is blocked, if the theme DP obligatorily occupies Spec,vP, because the two 
compete for the same position. This is the case for break-type verbs. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 We only discuss “presentational there”, i.e. expletive there in the context of lexical verbs. We 
will not be concerned with expletive there in the context of the copula be (i.e. in progressives, 
passives and existentials); see Deal (2009) for a recent discussion within the “low-there”-
hypothesis applied here. 
In Reich, Ingo et al. (eds.), Proceedings of Sinn & Bedeutung 15,  
pp. 101–115. Universaar – Saarland University Press: Saarbrücken, Germany, 2011. 	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(2) a. [vP there [ResultP  theme ]] 
 b. [vP *there/theme [ResultP ]] 
2	   The	  Standard	  Account	  of	  there-­‐Insertion:	  there	  in	  Spec,TP	  	  
Chomsky (1981, 1995 and subsequent work) proposes that there is externally 
merged in the derived subject position Spec,TP to satisfy the Extended 
Projection Principle (EPP) (i.e. to check the strong D-feature on T). On this 
logic, (1b, c) are ungrammatical for the following reason: in English, a 
language lacking Transitive Expletive Constructions (TECs), the subject and 
the expletive compete for a single specifier position, Spec, TP.2 In TEC-
languages such as Dutch in (3), the counterparts of (1b, c) are grammatical 
because these languages have two specifier positions available for subjects 
outside the vP.  
(3) dat   er      iemand   een appel  gegeten heft                 (TEC) 
 that  there someone an   apple  eaten     has 
Note that this standard analysis of there-insertion cannot account for the 
contrast in (1a, d) (cf. also Borer 2005, Deal 2009, Alexiadou 2011). 
3	   Against	  the	  Standard	  Analysis:	  there	  down	  in	  Spec,vP	  
The standard analysis of there-insertion has recently been challenged by 
Richards & Biberauer 2005, and Richards 2007 (see also Deal 2009) as it 
faces a number of problems which we can touch upon here only super-
ficially.  
In Chomsky (2000, 2001, 2004), there is a head with [uF] and probes from 
Spec,TP into TP and values T. This proposal faces a technical problem: only 
root nodes should probe. Since there in Spec,TP is not the root node (which is 
T), its probing is counter-cyclic. Moreover, it needs a number of extra 
assumptions to derive Bure’s Generalization, i.e. the observation that TECs 
are available only in languages with Object Shift(OS)/Scrambling of full 
DPs. (Why should the availability of a second specifier in the TP-region be 
related to the availability of a derived object position? (Cf. Alexiadou & 
Anagnostopoulou 2001, 2007, Richards 2004). 
 As the aforementioned authors argued, for conceptual reasons, MERGE-
Expletive should be a property of phase heads (C, v), i.e. expletives are 
externally merged either in Spec,CP or in Spec,vP. If an expletive occurs in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 A crucial assumption is that the subject must leave the vP (see Alexiadou & Anagnostopoulou 
2001, 2007). 
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Spec,TP, it must have moved there. The consequence is that the EPP on T is 
checked only via MOVE.  
 In agreement with Richards & Biberauer (2005) and Richards (2007), 
we conclude that i) there is not a probe but a goal (like any other nominal 
category/DP); ii) it merges in Spec,vP where it is in the probe domain of T; 
iii) it has the interpretable but incomplete φ-feature set [person], rendered 
active via an unvalued Case feature.3 It is probed by T and gets its case 
valued. T’s φ-feature set remains unvalued as there is φ-incomplete. T there-
fore remains active for Agree with the associate DP. Afterwards, there moves 
to Spec,TP.  
 As expletives are dummies (they do not have reference and cannot bear 
a theta-role), they can merge (externally) only in non-thematic specifiers, i.e. 
as a) the specifier of a defective head vpassive; b) the specifier of a defective 
head vunaccusative or c) the outer specifier of thematic v/Voice (the OS-
position).  
 The third option determines the availability of TECs; English lacks both 
TECs and OS as it has no outer Spec,vP/outer Spec,VoiceP (the 
complementarity between Expl and external arguments is due to the mutual 
exclusivity of thematic and non-thematic v in English).4 It also explains the 
complementarity between expletives and raised internal arguments of 
unaccusatives in (4)-(5); both target the non-thematic specifier of vPunaccusative. 
Note that under the traditional Expl-in-TP-approach (4c)/(5b) should be fine. 
It also explains why in languages that have both OS and TECs the former 
bleeds the latter (6): again, we have competition for the same position. 
(4) a. *There seems [TP a man to be ta man in the garden] 
 b. There seems [TP to be a man in the garden] 
 c. *[TP There [VP a man [VP arrived ta man]]] 
 d. There arrived a man 
(5) a. dat *(daar) gister       ’n skip gesink het                            (Afrikaans) 
  that (there) yesterday a ship sunk    has 
 b.  dat (*daar) ’n skip gister gesink het 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 But see Deal (2009) for the claim that there must have uninterpretable φ-features and that it 
locally probes the associate DP. This, she claims, is necessary in order to avoid the “too-many-
theres” problem (*There seemed there to arrive a train in the station). We do not discuss the 
feature content of there but concentrate on its configurational, i.e. external-merge properties. 
4 Something in addition has to be said about cyclic A’-movement of vP-internal elements which 
is, of course, possible in English. 
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(6)  a.  *dat  er     veel   mensen dat boek gisteren    gekocht hebbe    
   that EXPL many people  the book yesterday bought   have  (Dutch) 
 b.  dat   daar baie   mense baie/*die bier  gedrink het           (Afrikaans) 
  that EXPL many people many/the beer drunk   have 
The conclusion we can draw for English is that there is blocked if i) an 
external argument occupies the specifier of v/Voice or ii) an object raises to 
Spec,vdefective in passive or unaccusative structures.     
 Now, recall our mismatch within the class of unaccusatives in (1a vs. 
1d) replicated in (7): 
(7) a. There appeared a man in the garden. 
 b. *There melted a lot of snow on the streets of Chicago.  
The verb’s influence on there-insertion holds also in raising constructions 
(Deal 2009). 
(8) a. There seemed to appear a dagger in front of Macbeth.    
 b. *There seemed to melt a lot of snow on the streets of Chicago.   
Ideally, we should be able to explain the contrast between the two classes of 
unaccusatives along the same lines as the contrast between e.g. transitives 
and passives. More concretely, appear/arrive-verbs should make available an 
empty Spec,vP where there can merge, while melt/break-verbs should not 
make available such an empty Spec,vP; it follows then that Spec,vP of break-
unaccusatives must be occupied. The question then is: what is located in 
Spec,vP of melt/break-unaccusatives? 
4	   What	  Does	  there	  Correlate	  with?	  Two	  Classes	  of	  
	   Unaccusatives	  
4.1	   A	  Classification	  of	  Verbs	  Allowing	  there-­‐Insertion	  
Levin (1993) characterizes the verbs allowing there-insertion roughly as 
verbs of existence or appearance. They can be broken down into the 
following subclasses (a-f) of unaccusatives. Verbs of change of state (g) do 
not permit there although they are unaccusatives too:5 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Levin (1993) points out that verbs of manner of motion also allow for there in the context of 
directional PPs, but they differ in that the subject must follow this PP. 
 
(i) a. There arrived three gentlemen from Verona. 
 b. ??There arrived from Verona three gentlemen. 
(ii) a. *There ran a raggedy looking cat into the room. 
 b. There ran into the room a raggedy looking cat. 
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(9)  a. Verbs of Existence: blaze, bubble, cling, coexist, … 
 b. Verbs of Spatial Configuration: crouch, dangle, hang, kneel, …  
 c. Meander Verbs: cascade, climb, crawl, cut, weave, wind, … 
 d. Verbs of Appearance: accumulate, appear, arise, …  
 e. ?Verbs of disappearance: die, disappear, vanish, … 
 f. Verbs of Inherently Directed Motion: arrive, ascend, come, … 
 g. *Verbs of Change of State: bend, break, chip, rip, shatter, split, … 
4.2	   Is	  there	  a	  Causative	  Event	  in	  Spec,vP	  (Deal	  2009)?	  
Deal (2009) offers an account for the contrast between the two classes of 
unaccusatives concerning there-insertion that strongly influenced our 
analysis. Specifically, she proposes that there is inserted at the edge of a vP 
that lacks an external argument, i.e. into a non-thematic Spec,vP position. 
Unaccusatives rejecting there have Spec,vP already occupied by a causative 
event.  
 While we are sympathetic with her blocking account, her proposal faces 
a number of theoretical and empirical problems which we will not discuss 
here for reasons of space. Below, we make an alternative proposal about what 
blocks there-insertion at the edge of vP which, in turn, strongly builds on the 
work by Dobler (2008a, b). 
4.3	   Hypothesis:	  There	  Is	  an	  Internal	  Argument	  in	  Spec,vP	  
Hale & Keyser (2000) assume two different lexical syntactic representations 
for unaccusatives. With verbs such as arrive, occur, …, the theme is 
introduced within the complement of the verb, in the specifier of a small-
clause headed by a (potentially covert) P-projection (10a). With verbs such as 
break, open, … the theme is introduced in the specifier of the verb that takes 
an adjective as its complement (10b). ((10b) is a composite dyadic lexical 
projection, also called a complex predicate; see e.g. Beck & Johnson 2004, 
Embick 2004, McIntyre 2004). 
(10) a. [vP arrive [PP many guests [ Pcovert/in the garden ]]] 
 b.  [vP the sky [ v Aclear ]] 
 Hale & Keyser do not actually propose this solution, but with the 
background of the “low-there”-hypothesis discussed above, these structures 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(iii)  Suddenly there flew through the window [that shoe on the table] 
 
 Cases such as (iib) are called “outside verbals” in Deal (2009). Outside verbals do not 
obey the definiteness restriction (iii) and allow “a bewildery variety of verbs” (Milsark 1974). 
See Deal (2009) for an analysis of these cases. We concentrate here on “inside verbals”. 
106   Alexiadou & Schäfer 
could, in principle, explain the distribution of there in the context of 
unaccusatives. With clear-type predicates, Spec,vP is already occupied by the 
theme argument; with arrive-type predicates, Spec,vP is available. In the next 
section, we investigate whether this is the correct explanation for the 
unaccusativity mismatch observed with there.  
5	   Tracing	  the	  Position	  of	  Internal	  Arguments	  	  
Both structures in (10) above are bi-eventive/resultative. They differ con-
cerning the position where the theme argument is merged; either it is merged 
as the argument of the lower-event small-clause or as the argument of the 
higher-event verb. Over the years, there has been a lot of discussion about the 
correct analysis of resultative structures. Some authors argued that the small-
clause analysis is generally correct (e.g. Hoeckstra 1988), some claimed that 
the complex-predicate analysis is generally correct (e.g. Beck & Johnson 
2004).  
 Dobler (2008a, b) discusses transitive, resultative constructions and con-
cludes that both structures co-exist. The small-clause analysis is correct for 
transitive resultatives referring to a change of location, i.e. the position of the 
object in (11a) is similar to that of the theme argument in the unaccusative 
structure in (10a). The complex-predicate analysis is correct for transitive 
resultatives referring to a change of state, i.e. the position of the object in 
(11b) is similar to that of the theme argument in the unaccusative structure in 
(10b).  
(11) a. Thilo sent the plane to Yubara .  
 b. He wiped the floor clean. 
 To determine this, she investigated whether an existential operator in 
object position can be part of the presupposition of restitutive again. In what 
follows, we summarize her argumentation. 
5.1	   The	  Interaction	  of	  wieder/again	  and	  Existential	  Operators	  in	  
	   Object	  Position	  
Von Stechow (1996) argued in detail that the repetitive vs. restitutive 
interpretation associated with the adverb again is the result of a structural 
ambiguity. Evidence for this is provided by word order facts such as the ones 
in the German examples in (12), where the syntax disambiguates between the 
two interpretations. Von Stechow took this as evidence for the syntactic 
decomposition of the VP into a vP and a ResultP component. 
(12) a. Thilo öffnet   die Tür   wieder  
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  Thilo opened the door again    
  i) He had opened the door before                  (repetitive &  
  ii) The door used to be open                     restitutive)  
 b. Thilo öffnet wieder die Tür                           (only repetitive) 
As is well known, German definite objects always leave the vP, cf. (13) (von 
Stechow 1996, Dobler 2008a, b modifying Webelhuth 1992). The examples 
in (14) show that if the adverb again precedes the theme, it has necessarily 
wide scope over vP and ResultP, leading to a repetitive reading. If the adverb 
follows the theme, the adverb might either outscope just the ResultP, leading 
to a restitutive reading, or once again both the vP and the ResultP leading to 
the repetitive reading. 
(13) a. weil er (wohl)    das Buch (wohl)    gelesen hat 
  as    he particle  the  book  particle  read     has 
 b. weil er (wohl) [vP das Buch [vP(wohl) [vP tsubj tobj lesen]] 
(14) a. weil er  wieder die Tür  geöffnet hat  
  as    he  again   the door opened  has  
 a’.  wiederrepetitive [ die Tür [vP  tsubject  v   [AP tobj offen 
 b. weil er die Tür   wieder geöffnet hat 
  as    he the door again    opened  has  
 b’. [ die Tür [(wiederrepetitive) [vP  tsubject v  [AP (wiederrestitutive) tobject offen 
(15) shows that indefinite objects remain inside the vP (unless they get a 
strong interpretation). As shown in (16), this is compatible with both the 
small-clause analysis as well as the complex predicate analysis of re-
sultatives, if we assume that the subject is introduced by an extra projection 
(VoiceP): 
(15) weil er (wohl)  ein Buch (*wohl) gelesen hat 
 as    he particle a    book particle read   has 
(16) [VocieP Subject Voice [vP (Object) v [ResultP (Object) state]]] 
Von Stechow (1996) only discusses the interaction of definite DPs and again. 
Nissenbaum (2006) investigates scope-interactions between again and in-
definites. In (17), we get different readings, depending on where the 
indefinite is interpreted, within the vP or in the IP. 
(17) Someone is sneezing again 
 a. again [∃x.x is sneezing]                                          (different person) 
 b.  ∃x [x is sneezing]                                                         (same person) 
 c. [IP Someonei is [ [vP ti sneezing] again] 
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In German, the readings are determined once again by the surface order: 
(18) a. weil [wieder [VoiceP jemand [vP                    nießt            (different person) 
 b. weil              [VoiceP jemand [vP wieder nießt                   (same person) 
  as     (again)          someone   (again) sneezes 
Dobler (2008a, b) uses the scope-interaction between restitutive again and an 
indefinite object to investigate the position of the internal argument in 
transitive resultative constructions. The main goal of her investigation is to 
determine whether the internal argument is an argument of the result state 
(small-clause (SC) analysis) or of the verb (complex-predicate (CP) 
analysis). Importantly, only the small-clause analysis predicts that the 
existential operator can be interpreted inside the result-state clause, i.e. inside 
the presupposition triggered by restitutive again (cf. 19).6 
(19) [VoiceP Subject Voice [vP (Objectindef) v [againrest [RP (Objectindef) state ]]]] 
                        |                         |  
                    same             potentially different  
Dobler argues that the following interpretative picture emerges (in both, 
English and German): 
(20) Change of state: 
 Pandora scrubbed a donkey clean again 
 a. #again [∃x.x is a donkey and x is clean]           (SC-analysis) 
 b. ∃x.x is a donkey and again [x is clean]            (CP-analysis) 
(21) Change of location: 
 Pandora put a donkey in her stable again 
 a. again [∃x.x is a donkey and x is in Pandora’s stable]  (SC-analysis) 
 b. ∃x.x is a donkey and again [x is in Pandora’s stable]   (CP-analysis) 
Dobler concludes that the theme is (syntactically) the argument of the verb 
(vP) in change-of-state resultatives, while it is the argument of the secondary 
predicate (ResultP) in change-of-location resultatives. In the latter case, it 
can, of course, move out of the scope of again yielding reading (21b). 
 Below we list some further examples provided by Dobler (2008a) which 
test whether the relevant reading (restitutive again outscopes the indefinite 
theme) is available or not in English and German. (22)-(23) illustrate the 
situation with change-of-state predicates, (24)-(25) illustrate it with change-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The #-sign indicates that a reading ‘restitutive again > indefinite theme’ is not available. 
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of-location predicates. The contexts given before the test sentences are meant 
to exclude an irrelevant repetitive reading and force a restitutive reading:7 
(22) a. Context: Sally owns a brown mouse and a great number of white 
mice. While she is gone, Harry takes care of them and the brown 
mouse dies. Harry is freaked out and wants to cover up the loss… 
 b. #Er färbt wieder eine Maus braun. 
 c. #He dyes a mouse brown again. 
(23) a. Context: Yesterday, Sally visited a popsicle factory. There she had 
the opportunity to taste the popsicle mixture before it was frozen. 
She really loved it. 
 b. #Daheim angekommen hat Sally wieder ein Eis am Stiel 
 geschmolzen. 
 c. #Once she was home, Sally melted a popsicle again. 
(24) a. Context: Until about 200 years ago, bears used to live in the Alps. 
 b. Gestern haben Biologen wieder Bären in den Alpen angesiedelt. 
 c. Yesterday, scientists put bears in the Alps again. 
(25) a. Context: The island had a mountain that practically disappeared in 
the course of an earthquake. 
 b. Die Bewohner der Insel haben wieder einen Berg errichtet. 
 c. The inhabitants constructed a mountain again. 
5.2	   Conclusion	  
To conclude, Dobler (2008a, b) shows that there are two classes of transitive 
bi-eventive verbs that differ in whether the indefinite/existential object can be 
in the scope of restitutive again or not. Below, we list some further verbs of 
these two classes:  
Group A:  #restitutive again > existential operator 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The repetitive reading (repetitive again > indef) is available in English and German but it is 
irrelevant for the present argumentation. The sentences in (22b, c) have therefore the following 
interpretative properties: 
 
(i) a. again [∃x.x is a mouse and x is brown]  
          impossible reading (restitutive) 
   There is a brown mouse and there was a (different) brown mouse. 
 b. again [∃x.x is a mouse and x is dyed brown]  
   possible reading (repetitive) 
   A mouse is (being) dyed brown and at a previous time, there was a (different) 
  mouse that was (being) dyed brown. 
110   Alexiadou & Schäfer 
melt, freeze, cool, warm, empty, fill, open, close, paint (in) pink, 
dye brown, … 
Group B:  restitutive again > existential operator 
     put, place, donate, construct, build, …  
At first sight, it seems that group A contains verbs undergoing the causative 
alternation. However, this does not seem to be the correct generalization, as 
group B contains such verbs too (e.g. German (sich) ansiedeln and its English 
counterpart settle). Group A contains de-adjectival verbs, but we get the same 
result if we replace for example “paint pink” with “paint in pink”. The correct 
generalization is a division into change of state verbs and change of location 
verbs (as well as creation verbs ≈ cause to be in a location (see Dobler 2008a, 
b for detailed discussion)).  
 To explain these differences, we conclude with Dobler (2008a, b) that 
the direct object of change-of-state predicates is necessarily located outside of 
the Result phrase (when scope is computed). With change-of-location 
predicates, we note the reverse situation; the direct object can be located 
inside of the Result phrase (when scope is computed). Following Hale & 
Keyser (2000), we assume the structures in (26) for these two types of 
(transitive) verbs/predicates. (For structural variants of (26a, b) which are, in 
principle, compatible with the above findings, see Beck & Johnson (2004), 
von Stechow (2007), Dobler (2008a, b) or Ramchand (2008)). 
(26) a.  [VoiceP subject Voice [vP object v [RP Result ]]]         (change-of-state) 
 b.  [VoiceP subject Voice [vP v [RP object Result ]]]   (change-of-location) 
6	   On	  the	  Position	  of	  the	  Subjects	  of	  Unaccusatives;	  Are	  They	  
Blocking	  there-­‐Insertion	  in	  Spec,vP?	  
Dobler (2008a, b) investigated transitive constructions while we are interest-
ed in unaccusatives. Many of the verbs in Group A discussed in Dobler’s 
work express a change of state and have an unaccusative counterpart. If the 
widely held assumption is correct that the object of transitives has the same 
syntactic base position as the sole argument of unaccusatives, we expect that 
the unaccusative counterparts of these verbs should behave alike in terms of 
scope interaction between an indefinite theme argument and restitutive again. 
The transitives in Group B are change-of-location verbs. As noted in 4.1, the 
unaccusatives allowing there-insertion also express a change of location 
(come into existence ~ come to be in a location). We thus predict that these 
verbs should behave like transitive change-of-location verbs as far as scope 
interaction between an indefinite theme argument and restitutive again is 
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concerned. In other words, if the argument of change-of-state unaccusatives 
is responsible for the blocking of there-insertion, it should necessarily be 
located outside the ResultP in the specifier of the un-accusative vP and it 
should never occur inside the scope of restitutive again. On the other hand, 
the argument of change-of-location un-accusatives should be located inside 
the ResultP and thus inside the scope of restitutive again; if it stays there, it 
does not block there-insertion in Spec,vP.  
 These predictions are indeed borne out, as shown in the following two 
sub-sections.8 
6.1	  	   Verbs	  of	  Change	  of	  Location	  
Unaccusative verbs of appearance (27) and unaccusative verbs expressing an 
inherently directed motion (28) both allow, as predicted, the relevant reading 
where the indefinite/existential theme argument is in the scope of restitutive 
again.9 
(27) a. Context: Until about 200 years ago, bears used to live in Bavaria, 
but they were completely wiped out by the inhabitants in the 19th 
century. 
 b. Letzten Sommer ist wieder ein Bär in Bayern aufgetaucht/erschie-
nen. 
 c. Last summer, a bear appeared in Bavaria again.  
(28) a. Context: Until about 200 years ago, bears used to live in Bavaria, 
but they were completely wiped out by the inhabitants in the 19th 
century. 
 b. Letzten Sommer ist wieder ein Bär nach Bayern gekommen. 
 c. Last summer, a bear/bears came to Bavaria again.  
6.2	   Verbs	  of	  Change	  of	  State10  
Unaccusative verbs of change of state, on the other hand, do not allow the 
relevant reading; their indefinite/existential theme argument cannot be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 We would like to thank Eva Dobler (German), Andrew McIntyre, Walter Pederson, Marc 
Richards and Mike Putnam for their judgements.  
9 Levin (1993) notes that verbs of disappearance allow there-insertion marginally. Deal (2009) 
argues that these verbs do not allow there-insertion. We do not discuss this class here, as it is 
hard to test (see also footnote 10). 
10 There is a general complication with change-of-state verbs. Many of these verbs express “the 
disruption of material integrity” (Levin 1993). Since we are interested in a restitutive reading, 
these verbs are complicated to test; how can something start out broken, become united and 
break again? 
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interpreted as being in the scope of restitutive again. (Repetitive again can 
outscope the indefinite theme but this reading is irrelevant for the argument.) 
(29) a. Context: Yesterday, Sally visited a popsicle factory. There she had 
the opportunity to taste the popsicle mixture before it was frozen. 
She really loved it. 
 b. #Daheim angekommen ließ sie wieder ein Eis am Stiel schmelzen. 
 c. #Once she was at home she made/let a popsicle melt again.   
(30) a. Context: Many years ago, a type of squirrel existed which was 
yellow. Unfortunately, they all died due to a mysterious infection. 
 b. #Forscher haben es geschafft, dass sich in einem Labor wieder ein  
  Eichhörnchen gelb gefärbt hat. 
 c. #Scientists working in a Swiss laboratory managed to bring it about 
that a squirrel turned yellow again.  
6.3	   ‘Verbs	  of	  Change	  of	  State’	  under	  a	  ‘Come	  into	  Existence’	  
	   Reading	  	  
In addition to its use as a verb of change of state, the verb break also has a 
use as a verb of coming into existence, as in “The war broke (out)”. 
Similarly, the verb open has an appearance sense which can be paraphrased 
as ‘become visible’ or ‘come into existence’ in addition to its change-of-state 
sense. The question then is whether this difference is relevant for the 
availability of there-insertion. The judgements of our four informants shown 
in (31a, b) vs. (31c, d, e) suggest that such an effect indeed exists at least as a 
general tendency (1[(very good] - 5[very bad]). 
(31) a. There broke a vase in the living room                  5 4 4 4 
 b. There opened a window in the living room                 5 4 3 5 
 c. During the spring, there suddenly broke (out) a war in west India 
                                              5 2 2.5 2 
 d. Suddenly, there opened a cavity underneath their feet           1 2 2 3 
 e. Suddenly, there opened a gap in the middle of the street        3 1 4 3 
Crucially, and in accordance with our overall proposal, the ‘come into 
existence’ reading of these basically change-of-state verbs makes available 
the scope againrestitutive > indefinite: 
(32) a. Context: For hundreds of years, people could get into the mountain 
through a small hole/crack. After a strong earthquake, this entrance 
was blocked. But after a long period of rain,  
 b. A hole opened in the rock again which allowed people to enter.  
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 c. Im Laufe der Zeit hat sich aber wieder eine Lücke geöffnet. 
(33) a. Context: When we started here, all the walls were covered with 
numerous gaps and holes which we closed with great effort.  
 b. But during the storm, a huge gap opened again.   
 c. Durch den Sturm hat sich plötzlich wieder ein Spalt in der Wand 
geöffnet. 
 This suggests that the relevant parameter is not strictly syntac-
tic/categorial (adjectival vs. prepositional), but semantic/conceptual (change-
of-state vs. change of location/existence). However, this semantic parameter 
is syntactically reflected in the position available for the theme. 
 We thus conclude that the theme of change-of-location verbs originates 
inside the Result phrase where it can stay in principle. The theme of change-
of-state verbs is obligatorily located in Spec,vP, not in the Result phrase. 
There-insertion is blocked in the latter context as it competes with the theme 
argument, see (34). 
(34) a. [vP there [ResultP  theme]]     vs.     b. [vP theme/*there [ResultP ]] 
7	   Conclusion	  
In this paper, we argued that the unaccusativity mismatch observed in the 
literature concerning the availability of there-insertion points to a syntactic 
difference between two classes of unaccusatives. We showed that the theme 
argument of change-of-location unaccusatives occupies Spec, ResultP, while 
that of change-of-state unaccusatives occupies Spec,vP. Insertion of there is 
blocked in the latter case, as the theme and the expletive compete for the 
same position.  
References	  
Alexiadou, Artemis. 2011. Post-verbal nominatives: an unaccusativity 
diagnostic under scrutiny. In R. Folli & C. Ulbrich (eds.), Interfaces in 
Linguistics: New Research Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 56–77. 
Alexiadou, Artemis & Elena Anagnostopoulou. 2001. The subject in situ 
generalization, and the role of Case in driving computations. Linguistic 
Inquiry 32, 193–231.  
Alexiadou, Artemis & Elena Anagnostopoulou. 2007. The subject in 
situlenageneralization revisited. In H.-M. Gärtner & U. Sauerland (eds.), 
Interfaces + Recursion = Language. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 31–60. 
114   Alexiadou & Schäfer 
Beck, Sigrid & Kyle Johnson. 2004. Double objects again. Linguistic Inquiry 
35:1, 97–124.  
Borer, Hagit. 2005. Structuring sense, Vol. II. The normal course of events. 
Oxford University Press. 
Chomsky, Noam. 1981. Lectures on government and binding. Dordrecht: 
Foris.  
Chomsky, Noam. 1995. The Minimalist program. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press.  
Chomsky, Noam. 2000. Minimalist inquiries: The framework. In R. Martin, 
D. Michaels & J. Uriagereka (eds.), Step by step: Essays on minimalist 
syntax in honor of Howard Lasnik. Cambridge: MIT Press, 89–155. 
Chomsky, Noam. 2001. Derivation by Phase. In M. Kenstowicz (ed.), Ken 
Hale: A Life in Language. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1–52. 
Chomsky, Noam. 2004. Beyond Explanatory Adequacy. In A. Belletti (Ed.), 
Structures and Beyond: The Cartography of Syntactic Structures, Vol. 3. 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 104–131.  
Deal, Amy Rose. 2009. The origin and content of expletives: evidence from 
"selection". Syntax 12:4, 285–323. 
Dobler, Eva. 2008a. ‘Again’ and the structure of result states. In Proceedings 
of ConSOLE XV. 
Dobler, Eva. 2008b. Creating as putting something into the world. In 
Proceedings of ConSOLE XVI. 
Embick, David. 2004. On the structure of resultative participles in English. 
Linguistic Inquiry 35.3, 355–392. 
Hale, Ken & Samuel Jay Keyser. 2000. There-insertion unaccusatives. Ms., 
MIT.  
Hoekstra, Toen. 1988. Small clause results. Lingua 74:101–139.  
Levin, Beth. 1993. English verb classes and alternations: a preliminary 
investigation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
McIntyre, Andrew. 2004. Event Paths, Conflation, Argument Structure and 
VP Shells. Linguistics 42:3, 523–571. 
Milsark, Gary. 1974. Existential sentences in English. Ph.D. dissertation, 
MIT.  
Nissenbaum, Jon. 2006. Decomposing resultatives: two kinds of restitutive 
readings with ‘again’. Poster presented at NELS 37, University of 
Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, October 2006.  
Ramchand, Gillian. 2008. Verb meaning and the lexicon: a first phase syntax. 
Cambridge University Press. 
There-Insertion   115 
Richards, Marc. 2007. On object shift, phases, and transitive expletive 
constructions in Germanic. In P. Pica et al. (eds), Linguistic Variation 
Yearbook 6. Amsterdam, John Benjamins, 139–159. 
Richards, Marc & Theresa Biberauer. 2005. Explaining Expl. In M. den 
Dikken & C. Tortora (eds.), The function of function Words and 
functional categories. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 115–153.  
Richards, Norvin. 2004. A distinctness condition on linearization. Ms, MIT. 
von Stechow, Arnim. 1996. The different readings of wieder ‘again’: a 
structural account. Journal of Semantics 13, 87–138. 
von Stechow, Arnim. 2007. Syntactic and lexical causativization: BECOME 
and CAUSE again. Talk presented at ConSOLE XV, Brussels. 
Webelhuth, Gert. 1992. Principles and parameters of syntactic saturation. 
Oxford University Press. 

In Reich, Ingo et al. (eds.), Proceedings of Sinn & Bedeutung 15,
pp. 117–132. Universaar – Saarland University Press: Saarbrücken, Germany, 2011.
Optatives: Deriving Desirability from Scalar Alternatives∗
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Abstract. A compositional analysis of optative sentences is challenging for at
least two reasons: they encode desirability without having any overt marker, and
they are if -clauses with or without consequents, raising the question of whether
they are actually conditionals. In this paper I argue that optatives are condition-
als even when they do not have overt consequents. With respect to desirability, I
argue that in optatives modality is pragmatically derived. The investigation of op-
tatives sheds light on the interaction between syntax, pragmatics and discourse.
1 Introduction: Where Does Desirability Come from?
Structures like (1) are known as optatives in the literature, and they present
challenges in several respects.
(1) If only I had been taller, I would have played in the NBA.
The utterance of an optative like (1) signals the speaker’s desires, and yet there
is no lexical item encoding desirability. Notice that what is desired when a
conditional optative is uttered is not the antecedent proposition, i.e. that the
speaker were taller. What the speaker desires is the consequent, (2).
(2) A: If only I had been taller, I would have played in the NBA.
B: That would not have been necessary, you were such a great player!
What would have made a difference was if you had been in a better
college team.
A: Yeah. . . !, you are right. . . , If only I had played for UCLA, I would
have played in the NBA.
The dialogue in (2) illustrates that what is really desired is not being taller or
having played for UCLA. What the speaker really desires at the time of utter-
ance is to have played in the NBA. The antecedent proposition is not desired
per se but just as means to bring about the consequent, i.e to have played in the
NBA.
∗ I would like to thank Rajesh Bhatt, Lyn Frazier and Chris Potts for comments and help. Also
thanks to the audience of Sinn und Bedeutung 15, especially Cleo Condoravdi, Sven Lauer and
Malte Zimmermann.
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The main question this paper addresses is where desirability comes from. I
will propose that the modal meaning in optatives comes about pragmatically.
It arises from the discourse assumptions leading to the utterance of the opta-
tive, and is revealed by the topic-focus structure in optatives and the semantics
of conditionals. Optatives illustrate the importance of investigating meaning
within the larger context provided by discourse and paying attention to prag-
matic meanings derived from different components.
Overview: in §2 I investigate the syntax of optatives, in §3 I argue that all
optatives are conditionals, in §4 I show that optative conditionals differ with
respect to topicality, in §5 I argue that the reversal of topicality brings about
desirability by constraining the questions that license optatives in the discourse.
2 Scope and Structure
I will adopt the view that if -clauses restrict the domain of quantification of a
modal (Lewis-inspired proposal by Kratzer 1977). For a conditional to bring
about optativity, there must be a focus adverb in the antecedent that obeys
certain distributional restrictions. Let us consider the contrast between (3) and
(4).
(3) Optatives
If only I had left earlier/ If only he didn’t have a gun/ If I had only left
earlier/ If he had only always acted honorably/ If he only didn’t have
a gun/ If a hurricane only had razed the city/ If he had only not had a
gun/ Had I only read a letter
(4) Not Optatives (ungrammatical or not optative meaning)
a. If he had always only acted honorably.
b. *If he did only not have a gun.
c. If he didn’t only have a gun.
d. If he hadn’t only had a gun.
e. *Had only I read a letter. (Rifkin 2000)
Only is an adverb, and can attach at any level in the structure that is seman-
tically permitted. The data in (4) shows that in order to obtain an optative
meaning, the adverb must adjoin higher than vP. In (4a) there is no optative
meaning and only has attached either at the vP level or at the VP level (always
is adjoined at the vP level and only adjoins below it). The same is illustrated
by (4c) and (4d), in which negation is constituent negation at the vP level. The
structure below offers a summary of the positions where only may show up
with an optative interpretation (see Biezma in progress for details regarding
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the structures).
(5) [CP[TP only [TP[T only [T [PerfP only [PerfP [vP. . . ]]]]]]]]
To sum up so far, we have seen that the syntax of conditional optatives in-
volves a focus adverb scoping over a clause denoting a proposition (vP or TP).
In what follows I argue that it also needs to associate with the entire proposi-
tion.
If only does not associate with the proposition there is not optativity, (6b).
(6) a. If only mom invited grandpa, he wouldn’t come.
b. If only [F MOM] invited grandpa, he wouldn’t come.
The sentence in (6a) has an optative meaning, i.e. it is inferred that the speaker
wants grandpa not to come. The contrast in (7) illustrates the meaning of (6a):
(7) a. I wish so much to see grandpa, # If only mom invited grandpa, he
wouldn’t come.
b. I do not want to see grandpa this weekend,
√
If only mom invited
grandpa, he wouldn’t come.
I assume that the intonation in (6a) is just neutral intonation and as we see
in (7), with neutral intonation there is optative meaning. (6b), however, is not
an optative, i.e. it is not understood that the speaker does not want grandpa to
come. In (6b) the small caps on mom indicate emphatic intonation. In this case,
only associates with mom, and the optative meaning disappears.
(8) A: Grandpa is getting old. He only travels when the whole family tries
to convince him to get together.
B: Well, there is a possibility that mom ask him to visit us next week.
A: Don’t be stupid! If only [F MOM] invited him, he wouldn’t come.
In (8) the conditional does not carry an optative meaning even though there is a
focus adverb in the antecedent. The meaning of A’s utterance is that were mom
to be the only person inviting, he would not feel compelled to visit at all.
A second related argument to claim that optativity arises only when the
focus adverb associates with the entire proposition comes from the possibility
of having silent consequents.1 When the focus adverb does not associate with
the entire antecedent propositions, the absence of the consequent is ungram-
matical.
1 In §3 I argue that optatives with and without spelled-out consequents are indeed conditionals.
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(9) a. If only mom invited grandpa.
b. *If only MOM invited grandpa.
If we use the strategy of placing emphasis on a constituent to mark focus, (9b),
thus forcing the association of only with something that is not a proposition,
the result is a regular conditional and the consequent needs to be spelled out.
If there is no special intonation, (9a), and only can associate with the entire
proposition, it’s understood as an optative and the consequent can be silent.
In this section we have seen that optativity only arises when there is a
focus adverb c-commanding a proposition level constituent, and associating
with the entire proposition. In the next section we will see that, despite the
absence of consequents in some cases, optatives are always conditionals.
3 Optatives Are Conditionals
One of the main characteristics of optatives is that they are fine with a conse-
quent that is not spelled out. Indeed, this is even preferred and has been taken
to cast doubt on their characterization as conditionals. In what follows I review
Rifkin’s (2000) arguments against the view that optatives without consequents
(if only!2) are conditionals, showing that a closer look at the data undermines
Rifkin’s conclusions. The main claim made in this section is that in spite of ap-
pearances, if only! constructions have a conditional structure (cf. Rifkin 2000).
We do not see a conditional because the structures denote properties of proposi-
tions with a variable ranging over propositions that have been abstracted over.3
(10) Proposal: if only! constructions are abstractions over propositions
λ p.q⇒ p (where ‘⇒’ stands for the semantics of the modal)
In order to support the proposal in (10) I offer arguments to show that if
only! constructions do not denote propositions, but denote instead properties
of propositions, and to show that if only! constructions are conditionals. Argu-
ments of the first kind are presented in §3.1 and §3.2, of the second kind in
§3.3.
3.1 Embedding
Rifkin (2000) argues against if only! optatives being conditionals by showing
that they cannot be embedded, whereas regular conditionals can.
(11) a. Avi thinks that if it would snow, things would be good.
b. *Avi thinks that if only it would snow.
2 I adopt Rifkin’s (2000) label for optatives without spelled-out consequents in the rest of the paper.
3 See Biezma (in progress) for details.
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c. Avi thinks that if only it would snow, things would be good.
The data in (11a) illustrates a regular embedded conditional. (11b) shows that
if only! constructions cannot be embedded. The example in (11b) contrasts
with (11c), in which an optative spelling out the consequent can be embed-
ded. According to Rifkin, if if only! constructions were conditionals without
consequents they should behave like regular conditionals, but they don’t.
Rifkin’s (2000) observations regarding embeddability actually lend sup-
port for the view presented above according to which if only! constructions do
not denote propositions. This is the reason why they cannot be embedded in the
same way as optatives in which the consequent is spelled out, which do denote
propositions. The predicate think takes a proposition as argument, and if only!
constructions are not of the right type to instantiate this argument.
3.2 Conjunction
Rifkin (2000) claims that if if only! constructions were conditionals, they should
behave as conditionals across the board, and signals (12) as a counterexample.
(12) a. *If only Sue had money and if she had time, she would ski Mt.
McKinley
b. *If Sue had money, she would ski Mt. McKinley, and if only she
had money
c. If Sue had money, things would be good, and if she had time, she
could ski Mt. McKinley (Rifkin 2000: ex. (31), (33) and (32))
Rifkin (2000) uses the data in (12) to argue that if only! constructions do not
behave like regular antecedents of conditionals with respect to coordination. In
principle we could conjoin two conditionals without only, (12c), but we cannot
conjoin one with only and one without only, (12a) and (12b).
However, Rifkin himself points out that it is possible to conjoin two an-
tecedents with only.
(13) I can’t believe the picnic went so poorly!
a. If only Meg had brought a corkscrew and if only Jim had made a
decent salad
b. If Meg had only brought a corkscrew and if Jim had only made a
decent salad (Rifkin 2000: footnote 5, ex. (iv))
Rifkin’s (2000) observations regarding coordination also provide support for
the view according to which if only! constructions are properties of proposi-
tions. The contrast between (12a), (12b) and (13) is perfectly explained once
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we consider that if only! constructions are properties of propositions and not
propositions. The ungrammaticality of (12a) and (12b) is explained by the gen-
eral impossibility of conjoining two objects of different semantic types (propo-
sitions, in the case of regular conditionals, and properties of propositions in the
case of if only! constructions). This problem does not arise in (12c), since the
two conjuncts are regular conditionals (and hence of the same type), and does
not arise either in (13), where we have two if only! optatives conjoined.
3.3 Recovering the Consequent
Even though if only! constructions denote properties of propositions, they are
used in contexts in which it is possible to recover a consequent, thus supporting
the claim that they are conditionals. Example (14), where B’s response shows
that B has worked out the silent constituent in A’s statement, illustrates this:
(14) A: If only I were taller.
B: Then your desires wouldn’t have become true either.4
(14) illustrates that we process A’s statement as giving sufficient conditions
for a desired consequence to be brought about. After the utterance of an if
only!, we accommodate a consequent. In the most general case, as in (14),
such consequent is merely that the consequences of the antecedent being true
are desired.
The fact that we can take B to be contradicting A’s claim is important
because B’s claim is itself an overt conditional. The proform in B’s statement
provides the antecedent for the modal ‘would’. In this context, it picks out the
same antecedent as the one in A’s statement. What follows in B’s claim is the
negation of the implicit consequent in A’s claim, and thus we understand that
B is disagreeing with A.5 The shape of B’s disagreement provides support for
the view that upon hearing A’s utterance, we process a conditionalized claim.
3.4 Summary and Further Data
In this section we have seen arguments that support the view that if only! con-
structions are conditionals and we have proposed that in these cases the conse-
quent is a silent pronoun that is abstracted over to generate a property of propo-
sitions. With these ingredients we have been able to review Rifkin’s (2000)
original arguments and show that the data does not actually argue against a
view of if only! constructions as conditionals. There are further arguments that
can be provided to support the view that conditionals and optatives have the
same underlying logical form (contra Rifkin 2000). These include the fact that
4 I thank a Sinn und Bedeutung 15 anonymous reviewer for this data.
5 B’s utterance form is very telling since it is if α⇒¬β , the negation of the conditional statement.
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counterfactuality is not obligatory in optatives, the fact that the same ques-
tions follow up conditionals and optatives, and the behavior of stacked an-
tecedents. This discussion cannot be included for reasons of space (see Biezma
in progress).
4 Reversed Topicality
In this section, we turn to the issue of why the consequent can remain silent in
if only! constructions and take the first steps towards explaining desirability. It
has been argued in the literature that the antecedents of conditionals are topics
(Haiman 1978).6 In the kind of regular conditionals that interest us here, the
antecedent is an aboutness topic (Reinhart 1981).7 When the conditionals are
optatives, however, topicality is reversed. Since in optatives the focus adverb
scopes and associates with the antecedent proposition, α , it is the antecedent
proposition that is the focus. In these structures, the consequent, β , is now
the topic. Recall that it is crucial for optativity that the focus adverb scopes
and associates with the entire antecedent proposition. It is this that allows the
(sentence level) information structure to be reversed in this type of conditional
(we can also have focused elements in topic constituents, as in (6b) above,
while the constituent itself remains the sentence topic).
The fact that the consequent in optatives is the topic, thus treated as dis-
course old, explains why it can remain silent. The possibility of not spelling
out the consequent in optative conditionals is the result of topic drop (and this
also explains why speakers actually prefer not to spell out the consequent).8
The presence of focus adverbs in optatives plays a crucial role in ex-
plaining the reversal in topicality. So far we have only considered optatives
containing only in the antecedent, but optativity can arise with other adverbs
too:9
(15) a. English
If at least I had been taller, I would have played in the NBA.
b. Spanish
Si
if
(tan)
(as)
siquiera
least
/ tan sólo
as only
hubiera
had
sido
been
más
more
alto,
tall
habría
would have
6 Indeed, antecedents of conditionals can constitute topics of different kinds. See Ebert, Endriss &
Hinterwimmer (2008) a.o.
7 See Biezma (in progress) for arguments on this respect.
8 Notice that in regular conditionals, in which the antecedent is the topic, the antecedent can remain
silent (see Kasper 1992). This is the opposite of what we find in optatives, since in optatives
information structure is reversed.
9 Below there is data from English, Spanish and German. My account is meant to explain the case
of English and Spanish. Further research would be needed to discuss the German data.
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jugado
played
en
in
la
the
NBA.
NBA
c. German (optatives are preferred without a spelled-out consequent)
? Wenn
if
er
he
nur/
PRT
mal/
PRT
doch
PRT
hier
here
wäre,
be.subj
würden
would
wir
we
Fisch
fish
essen.
eat√
Wenn
if
er
he
nur/
PRT
mal/
PRT
doch
PRT
hier
here
wäre.
be.subj
What about desirability? Where does this come from? The data in (15) shows
that there is a range of focus adverbs whose presence in the conditional an-
tecedent brings about desirability, (with the constraints in §2). Given that on
the surface, optatives differ from conditionals only regarding the presence of a
focus adverb in the antecedent, but do not depend on the semantics of that par-
ticular focus adverb (there are several that do the trick), desirability needs to be
derived from the mere presence of a focus adverb, not from its truth conditions.
In what follows I argue that desirability arises from the interaction between the
types of interpretations associated with focus adverbs and the Immediate Ques-
tion Under Discussion.
5 Deriving Desirability
In this section we will finally tackle the issue of how desirability arises in op-
tatives. We have reached the following important conclusions: (i) in optatives
a focus adverb scopes over and associates with a proposition, §2; (ii) optatives
are conditionals that spell out the antecedent, §3; (iii) information structure in
optative conditionals is reversed with respect to regular conditionals, §4. We
will now bring these ingredients together to argue that desirability in optatives
arises because the focus adverb appeals to a scale setting up discourse licensing
conditions such that the question under discussion can only be a goal oriented
question. Desirability is analyzed as an implicature arising from the discourse
given an (implicit) goal oriented question.10
To reach this conclusion I proceed by first giving a brief overview of
Roberts’s (1996) discourse model, §5.1. Then I discuss the questions under
discussion that license optatives, §5.2. Afterwards I establish a link with the
scales in optatives, §5.3. Finally I show how desirability is derived, §5.4.
10 I am using the term goal oriented in a very broad sense. Goal oriented is meant to indicate
that the question inquires about how to bring about the desired state of affairs, without implying
agentivity.
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5.1 Topicality and the IQuD
Roberts’ (1996) theory of discourse is devoted to the recognition of the in-
terlocutor’s intentions in understanding the meaning of the utterance. Roberts
provides a framework for discourse as a sequence of intentional actions struc-
tured with a given goal. Following Stalnaker, Roberts considers that the main
goal of a discourse is the communal inquiry to discover what the actual world
is like. During discourse, the participants’ goal is to reduce the context set (a
set of possible worlds) characterized by the Common Ground (CG).
Roberts takes questions to be the obvious counterpart of an inquiry and
uses them as the formal objects reflecting interlocutor’s goals. In Roberts’ sys-
tem, we can track the speaker’s intentions by assuming that every utterance is
either an answer (pay-off move) to an (implicit) question that the speaker ac-
cepts to address (the immediate question under discussion (IQuD)), or a ques-
tion itself (set-up move). Assertions are pay-off moves because they choose
between the alternatives proffered by a set up move. In this system the in-
terpretation of every move involves two aspects: (i) the presupposed content,
which constrains the contexts in which an utterance can be made, and (ii) the
proffered content, which corresponds with what is asserted (in assertions) and
the non-presupposed content of questions and commands.
Besides recognizing that the primary goal of every discourse is a com-
munal inquiry, Roberts also recognizes the existence of more particular goals,
domain goals. These particular goals are ultimately what lies behind the type of
conversational inquiry conducted by the speaker. In the next section I explore
what are the domain goals behind the utterance of an optative (i.e. the IQuD).
5.2 Mention-Some and the IQuDs in Optatives
In this section we will discuss the role of optatives in the discourse. Our goal is
to identify the IQuDs that can be answered (paid off ) with an optative. This is
important because my objective is to link desirability in optatives to the IQuD.
Let us start by noting that, in general, in answers we find focus on the elements
that are under question, (16).
(16) A: What did Lauren buy?
B: Lauren bought [F BANANAS]
Even if B’s utterance is not preceded by an explicit question, we can assume,
given the structural characteristics of B’s utterance (syntax and intonation),
that the utterance is answering the question what did Lauren buy?. This fol-
lows from the fact that the question under discussion has to be congruent with
the utterance. So, in order to find out the IQuD in optatives, we first need to
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understand the semantics of the conditional, since the implicit question has to
be congruent with this too. A conditional if α , β claims (roughly) that in the
most similar worlds to the actual world in which α is true, β is true (à la
Lewis-Stalnaker). With this semantics in hand, and considering the informa-
tion structure of regular conditionals as discussed above (α is the topic), the
IQuD when a regular conditional is uttered would be as in (17).
(17) What does α bring about? or What would α have brought about?
The conditional uttered as answer to the question in (17) provides the answer
via the consequent, β , which bears focus.
(18) A: What would happen after the fall of the dictatorial Government?
B: If the Government fell, a democratic system would be estab-
lished.
The consequent proposition, a democratic system is established, is the answer.
As argued above, however, in optatives (if only α , β ) topicality is reversed
and β does not bear focus. The sentence focus is α , the antecedent, whereas β ,
the consequent, is now the topic. Given this, and considering the semantics of
conditionals, I claim that the (implicit) IQuD for optatives is (19).
(19) How do we bring β about? or How would we have brought β about?
The IQuD when an optative is uttered asks what are sufficient conditions
to bring about the consequent (the topic).
Notice that the questions in (19) are a special kind of question. They are
goal oriented questions. We understand that the speaker wants to know about
the best way to bring about β . In the case of goal oriented questions, we do
not ask about all the alternatives that bring about the truth of the embedded
proposition (β ), but about the best alternative that the addressee is aware of.
The questions in (19) have another important characteristic, they imply
that the proposition embedded in the question is desired by the speaker. To see
that this is so, let us consider the questions in (20).
(20) a. How do I get to the supermarket?
b. How do I get to play in the NBA?
c. How do I get to die?
The question in (20a) implies that the questioner wants to get to the supermar-
ket and asks about the best way to get there that the addressee is aware of,
(21).
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(21) John is walking on the street and John asks a passer-by a question.
John: How would I get to the supermarket?
Bill: Walk south and turn right on the next street.
If after Bill’s directions John starts walking north, Bill would be perplexed,
since he would wonder why he is going in the opposite direction to that of the
supermarket. He would be even tempted to call him out and indicate that he is
just walking opposite to what he indicated, south is in the other direction. This
is because John’s utterance implied that he wants to go to the supermarket. The
same strategy would show that in (20b) it is implied that the speaker wants to
play in the NBA. And (20c) is odd in most contexts because it implies that the
speaker wants to die and that is an odd desire to have.
If the IQuD when an optative is uttered is a goal oriented question, this
would provide us with an explanation for why we understand that optatives
convey the desirability of the consequent: the IQuD asks how to bring the con-
sequent about and implicates that the consequent is desired. However, we still
need to provide arguments to support the claim that the IQuD addressed by an
optative is of the kind in (19), i.e. goal oriented.
Notice that the claim that it is goal oriented questions that license opta-
tives is not trivial. If we just consider the semantics of conditionals and their
information structure, other types of questions may be expected to serve as
IQuDs leading to optatives. Paying attention only to the semantics of condi-
tionals and the reversal in information structure, one could also argue that (22)
could serve as an IQuD licensing an optative answer.
(22) What are the circumstances that would bring about β?
Given (22), a conditional in which the antecedent is the sentence focus would
be an appropriate answer, and this is exactly what we find in optatives given
the presence of a focus adverb. But, of course, if the IQuD were something like
(22), we would not explain desirability in optatives. (22) is not a goal oriented
question and we do not understand that the embedded proposition is desired.
Why can’t (22) be the IQuD for an optative? The important difference
between the questions in (19) (goal oriented) and questions like (22) is that
they privilege different readings. The questions in (19) privilege a mention-
some reading, whereas in (22) a mention-all reading is prominent.11 In the
mention-some readings, the answerhood conditions for a question require that
the answer meet the questioner’s goals. The relevant answer is then the one
11 How to account for these two readings in a theory of questions is a debate far from settled and
beyond the scope of this paper.
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indicating the best alternative for achieving the goal (mention-some questions
are goal oriented questions). It has been argued that some questions are spe-
cialized for mention-some readings (e.g. Asher & Lascarides 1998) argue that
how and where questions give rise to a mention-some reading in most of the
cases). In what follows I argue that the IQuD in optatives has to be a question
with a mention-some reading. Since such questions are typically goal oriented
questions this explains the desirability effects in optatives. In my explanation I
will appeal to the semantics of focus particles present in optatives. In the next
sections I will argue that certain aspects of the semantics of the focus adverbs
in optatives are crucial in establishing the IQuD addressed by an optative. In
particular, I will appeal to the fact that these adverbs are scalar.
5.3 The Scale in Optatives
In this paper I adopt Beaver & Clark (2008) analysis of conventionally focus
sensitive expressions (like only and at least). This analysis argues that such ex-
pressions encode a dependence on the IQuD. As these authors point out, their
proposal is not the first proposal claiming that there is a relation between focus
sensitive expressions and the IQuD. Other authors already established such link
with the discourse topic or the IQuD (von Fintel 1994; Roberts 1996). How-
ever, Beaver & Clark (2008) go a step further and claim that this relationship is
encoded in the meaning of the expressions and that these must comment on the
IQuD. In what follows I focus on only and conditional optatives containing this
adverb. According to Beaver & Clark (2008), “the function of exclusives like
only is to say that the strongest true answer to the IQuD is weaker than some
expected answer.” Thus, utterances containing only trigger a partial rank of al-
ternatives (the possible answers) ordered according to a contextually provided
scale (see Beaver & Clark 2008 for details).12 According to these authors, ut-
terances containing only carry the presupposition that “the strongest true al-
ternatives in the IQuD are at least as strong as the prejacent”,13 and that the
descriptive content of utterances with exclusives indicates that “the strongest
true alternatives in the IQuD are at most as strong as the prejacent”. With the
previous background in hand, let us see now how only works in optatives. Con-
sider the optative in (23).
(23) John had a job interview this morning. He drove there but his car broke
down. John called Tom, a mechanic friend, but by the time he got the
car running it was too late for John to make it.
12 The ordered alternatives do not need to logically entail alternatives lower in the scale.
13 The prejacent of an utterance containing only is the proposition denotated by the sentence in
which the exclusive is not present.
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Tom:If only I had arrived earlier
In order to make use of Beaver & Clark’s (2008) proposal, we need to adapt
it to the case of conditionals. The optative uttered by Tom is “If only I had
arrived earlier, John would have gotten to his interview on time”. With the
assumption that the antecedent proposition is focused, the prejacent itself is X.
In the context of the optative conditional, we obtain (24):
(24) If X, John would have gotten to his interview on time.
(Where X= Tom arrives on time and repairs John’s car)
The alternative values for X are presented in (25). The alternatives in (25) are
ordered according to a scale provided by what could intuitively be thought
of as likelihood (factors like the degree of deviation from the history of the
actual world, the effort required to bring about the truth of the proposition, and
plausibility can all play a role here). The strongest alternatives are the most
likely ones, while the weakest alternatives are the ones that require more effort,
are more implausible given the history of the world, etc.
(25) +(likely) John drove his car more carefully
Tom arrived earlier and fixed the car
Tom fixed the car faster
−(likely) John went out and bought a new car
In (25) we find a variety of alternatives. The order is provided by likelihood
and the amount of effort required to bring each about. Suppose that John is
actually a careful driver and Tom is habitually late. It would have been more
likely/easier for John to drive even more carefully than he actually did than
for Tom to arrive on time. John is actually rather poor, so the amount of effort
it would have taken for him to buy a new car, and the unlikelihood of that
happening, is much greater than for the alternative of Tom arriving on time.
I will follow Beaver & Clark (2008) with respect to the presuppositions
and descriptive content associated with only. Since we are dealing with alterna-
tives that are antecedents of (counterfactual) conditionals, we cannot ask for the
strongest true alternative. Instead, in the context of a conditional, we will look
for the strongest sufficient alternative. When Tom utters the optative in (23), he
presupposes that the strongest sufficient alternatives are at least as strong as the
antecedent proposition. The descriptive content associated with Tom’s claim is
that the strongest sufficient alternatives are at most as strong as the antecedent.
Let us examine the predictions made by this proposal with respect to (23).
Tom’s utterance carries the presupposition that the sufficient alternatives are at
least as strong as the chosen alternative. This is true, since the only other suffi-
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cient alternative (that Tom fixed the car more quickly) is as strong as the chosen
alternative (the other sufficient alternatives are weaker). The descriptive con-
tent associated with Tom’s utterance is that the strongest sufficient alternatives
are at most as strong as the chosen alternative. This is true given our scale, since
the stronger alternatives are not sufficient (the car breaking down had nothing
to do with John’s driving style).
The proposal above makes correct predictions regarding unacceptable op-
tatives in this context. Imagine that in the scenario above, Tom had uttered If
only you had driven more carefully!. This would have been deviant in the con-
text, since driving more carefully would not have had any useful consequences.
We would be surprised by Tom’s utterance. The deviancy is predicted. The de-
scriptive content associated with such a claim would have been false. This is
not the strongest sufficient alternative. Indeed, this is not a sufficient alternative
at all. With the assumption (following Beaver & Clark 2008) that only marks
the strongest sufficient condition, this optative is predicted to be deviant.
Let us turn now to another deviant optative. Suppose that in the scenario
above, Tom had uttered If only you had bought another car. This optative
would also have been deviant. John would have felt that Tom’s utterance was
a bit exaggerated. This is also predicted by the proposal above. The presup-
positions associated with Tom’s utterance would not be respected. There are
sufficient alternatives that are stronger than the chosen alternative. Again, the
proposal predicts that this optative is deviant.
The role of only in an optative is to signal the position that the antecedent
proposition occupies on a scale. We have followed Beaver & Clark (2008) with
respect to the presuppositions and descriptive content associated with only.
Given that our interest lies in only in the antecedent of conditionals, we have
not relativized the scale to truth, but to the sufficiency of the proposition to
bring about the consequent. The scales we have adopted order the alternatives
in terms of likelihood, with the most likely being considered stronger. This has
the result that propositions that are harder to bring about, or wildly implausible,
are characterized as weaker. This may appear rather unintuitive, but, as we have
seen, this scale fits our intuitions regarding the acceptability of optatives.
We have not discussed Beaver & Clark’s (2008) claim that only weakens
salient or natural expectations. A discussion of this point remains for future
work. It is worth noting that the case of conditionals is different from the case
of assertions discussed in Beaver & Clark (2008). It is unclear how expec-
tations would work in the antecedent of (counterfactual) conditionals. Notice
that in Beaver & Clark’s (2008) example Brad only got a Soames, getting a
Soames is understood as being ‘less’ than was expected/hoped for. However,
in the context of a conditional If only Brady had gotten a Soames! the judgment
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disappears. Expectations seem to work differently in the case of conditionals,
but this discussion lies outside the scope of the current work.
An optative provides the best/strongest alternative that a speaker knows
would bring about the desired consequent. If an optative is considered a pay-off
move, it requires an IQuD that asks for the best strongest alternative that brings
about the consequent. These are goal oriented /mention-some questions.
5.4 Desirability Derived!
When uttering an optative the speaker indicates that he is answering a mention-
some/goal oriented question. This is because of the congruence requirement
between the optative and the IQuD. Optatives require a IQuD that asks about
the best alternative amongst the set, and mention-some/goal oriented questions
do exactly that. Since only mention-some/goal oriented questions can license
optatives and these questions imply that the embedded proposition14 is desired,
we understand that the consequent in optatives is desired.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I have proposed an analysis of optatives that draws heavily on the
interaction between syntax, semantics, pragmatics and discourse to explain the
meaning of the construction. The focus of the paper has been the expression
of desirability in optatives. I have shown that the modal meanings associated
with desires can be derived pragmatically. There isn’t a “desirability modal” in
optatives. There is, however, a focus adverb that appeals to ordered alternatives
and invokes a question under discussion with desirability implicatures.
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Abstract. In this paper, I examine the definiteness problem raised by sentence-
internal même 'same' in French, as in this language (vs. English), même does 
not only combine with the definite determiner (le même), but also with the 
indefinite article (un même). Even if le même, like the same, does not behave 
like typical definite descriptions do, it contrasts with un même with respect to 
definiteness and distribution: un même is more indefinite than le même in that it 
does not trigger any presupposition at all; moreover, un même is more 
restricted in distribution than le même in that it only exhibits sentence-internal 
readings in antispecific contexts. I hypothesize that both le même and un même 
are quantifiers over a plural event that has been distributed, but also contain a 
domain variable: that of un même has to be quantificationally bound while that 
of le même can also be identified by the context. 
 
1	   Introduction	  
Sentence-internal same (like different) poses a problem of compositionality 
that aroused the interest of several linguists (Carlson 1987, Moltmann 1992, 
Barker 2007, Brasoveanu 2009, ...): due to its meaning involving comparison, 
the interpretation of same relies on the presence of a licenser (underlined in 
1) that does not directly combine with the DP containing same. Under the 
sentence-internal reading, (1) means that there exists some book x such that 
Mike read x and Sue read x (while the sentence-external reading depends on 
identifying some contextually salient book).  
(1) Mike and Sue read the same book. 
But in this paper, I will focus on another related issue raised by sentence-
internal same: even if DPs with sentence-internal same do not behave the way 
typical definite descriptions do, 'a same' is ungrammatical in English; C. 
Barker (2007: 428) formulates this definiteness puzzle as follows: 
Why does same require the definite determiner?  (Baker 2007: 428) 
However, French equivalent of 'same' même interestingly combines either 
with the definite (le/la/les même(s)) or the indefinite (un/une/de même(s)) 
In Reich, Ingo et al. (eds.), Proceedings of Sinn & Bedeutung 15,  
pp. 133–147. Universaar – Saarland University Press: Saarbrücken, Germany, 2011. 	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article. Moreover, le même behaves like the same in that it also presents 
indefiniteness effects. The same can always be translated by le même, but also 
by un même in certain cases; in other cases, un même cannot be translated by 
the same without changing the meaning.  
The main issue is thus to understand in which cases un même is licensed if le 
même already behaves like an indefinite. My goal is to describe the semantics 
and the distribution of un même and examine the theoretical implications with 
respect to definiteness and specificity. To this end, I will first compare le 
même and un même with respect to definiteness, then with respect to 
distribution, and I will finally suggest an hypothesis about the antispecificity 
of un même: I will propose that un même and le même are quantifiers 
containing a variable that gets interpreted in different ways. 
2	   Le	  même,	  un	  même	  and	  Definiteness	  
2.1	   Le	  même	  and	  Indefiniteness	  Effects	  
Sentence-internal même differs from other terms expressing identity and 
difference with respect to determiner use.  
(2)  a.  Julie et Paul ont lu le même livre/#le livre différent/similaire. 
  ‘Julie and Paul read the same/#the different/#the similar book.’ 
 b.  Julie et Paul ont lu ??un même livre/un livre différent/similaire. 
   ‘Julie and Paul read ??a same/a different/a similar book.’ 
Moreover, le même exhibits indefiniteness effects. First, it does not trigger a 
presupposition of unique existence as typical definite descriptions do (cf. 
Barker 2007: 428). This is shown in (3) presenting basic tests for 
presuppositions: even if the sentence is negated or questioned, the existence 
of a unique book that Luc and Flore read is not presupposed, but this is 
precisely what is at issue here. 
(3)  a.  Luc et Flore ont lu le même livre.  
  ‘Luc and Flore read the same book.’ 
 b. Est-ce que Luc et Flore ont lu le même livre? 
  ‘Did Luc and Flore read the same book?’ 
 c.  Luc et Flore n'ont pas lu le même livre.    
  ‘Luc and Flore did not read the same book.’ 
Also, le même can introduce a new discourse referent like indefinites (cf. 
Novelty Condition) as opposed to standard definites. 
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(4)  A: Pourquoi tu penses que Luc et Flore ont des goûts similaires? 
B: Pendant les vacances, ils ont lu le même livre. 
 ‘A: Why do you think Luc and Flore have similar tastes? 
B: They read the same book during the holidays.’ 
Furthermore, le même can occur in existential constructions unlike typical 
definites. 
(5)  a.  Il existe le même problème dans ces trois pays. 
 ‘There exists the same problem in these three countries.’ 
      b.  * Il existe le/ce problème dans ces trois pays.  
  ‘*There exists the/this problem in these three countries.’ 
Finally, le même can be non specific as exemplified in (6). This is not 
predicted based on Enç (1991) who argues that specificity corresponds to an 
inclusion relation in a contextually determined set; since the linking relevant 
for definite DPs is the identity relation and identity of referents entails 
inclusion, all definites are expected to be specific. 
(6)  Claire et Anne ont acheté la même robe.   
      ‘Claire and Anne bought the same dress.’ 
 a. Specific: there is a particular dress that the speaker has in mind that 
Claire and Anne each bought. 
 b. Non specific: there exists a unique dress – whatever it is, the speaker 
does not know which one – that Claire and Anne each bought.1 
So le même behaves like an indefinite in several respects. 
2.2	   Un	  même	  more	  Indefinite	  than	  le	  même?	  
If le même has the properties of an indefinite, how can un même contrast with 
le même? 
First, le même unlike un même triggers what I call a global presupposition of 
unique existence. As seen above, (3) does not presuppose the existence of a 
unique book that Luc and Flore read (usual presupposition of existence), but 
it presupposes that Luc and Flore each read a unique book (global 
presupposition of existence), as shown by Solomon (2009) for same. This 
idea is corroborated by the following examples: the infelicitousness of (7) 
points to a global existence presupposition, while that of (8) indicates the 
existence of a global uniqueness presupposition. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Note that specificity cannot be determined by scope when same is involved: because of its 
meaning, narrow scope of same does not entail covariation. 
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(7)  Est-ce que Luc et Flore ont lu le même livre? #Non, Luc n'a pas lu de 
livre. 
 ‘Did Luc and Flore read the same book? #No, Luc didn't read any 
book.’ 
(8) ??Luc et Flore ont lu le même livre pendant les vacances, et Luc a 
également lu les Misérables et Madame Bovary. 
 ‘??Luc and Flore read the same book during the holidays, and Luc also 
read les Misérables and Madame Bovary.’ 
On the other hand, un même does not trigger any presuppositions at all: when 
un 'a' is used, (9) does not presuppose that the children eat round a table, and 
(10) does not presuppose that each country only has one enemy.  
(9)  Dans la plupart des familles nombreuses, les enfants ne mangent pas 
autour de la/une même table. 
 ‘In most large families, the children do not eat round the/UN same 
table.’  
(10)  Quand deux pays ont le/un même ennemi, ils s'allient. 
 ‘When two countries have the/UN same enemy, they form an alliance.’ 
Furthermore, un même has to be non specific (what I call antispecificity) 
while le même can be either specific or non specific. (11) illustrates that un 
même unlike le même cannot be used when the referent can be identified by 
the context. 
(11) a.  Dans chaque système planétaire, toutes les planètes tournent autour
 de la/une même étoile. 
‘In each planetary system, every planet revolves around the/UN 
same star.’ 
 b.  Dans le système solaire, toutes les planètes tournent autour de 
la/*une même étoile. 
 ‘In the solar system, every planet revolves around the/*UN same 
star.’ 
So the semantic difference between un même and le même pertains to pre-
suppositions and specificity. 
3	   Le	  même,	  un	  même	  and	  Distribution	  
It appears that un même can always be replaced by le même, but the reverse 
does not hold. What is then the contrast between un même and le même with 
respect to distribution?  
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3.1	   DP-­‐internal	  Distribution	  of	  même	  
First, let's note that même does not exhibit the DP-internal distribution of 
standard adjectives, which supports the hypothesis that le même and un même 
are actually complex determiners. 
In fact, même cannot be used predicatively. 
(12)  a.  Ces livres sont *(les) mêmes.    
  ‘These books are *(the) same.’   
 b.  *Je ne le trouve pas même aujourd'hui. 
  ‘*I don't find him same today.’ 
Secondly, the only determiners compatible with sentence-internal même are 
the definite determiner le/la/les, and the indefinite one un/une/de. 
(13) a. lire *quelques/*divers/*certains/*plusieurs/*trois/de/les même livres. 
  ‘to read *some/*various/*certain/*several /*three/ø/the same books.’ 
 b. lire un/*leur/#ce/le même livre. 
  ‘to read a/*their/#this/the same book.’2 
Thirdly, même cannot be modified by adverbs. 
(14)  Luc et Flore ont lu le (*vraiment/*très/*presque/*tout) même livre. 
 ‘Luc and Flore read the (?really/very/?almost/very) same book.’ 
Finally, même cannot be coordinated with any adjective. 
(15) Luc et Flore ont acheté le (*petit et/*premier et/*seul et) même livre. 
‘Luc and Flore bought the (*small and/*first and/*only and) same 
book.’ 
Based on these data, I hypothesize that le même and un même are complex 
determiners. This is supported by crosslinguistic evidence: Braseovanu 
(2009) shows that in Romanian, while singular and plural 'different' are 
adjectival in nature (alt and diferit, respectively), 'same' is a determiner – the 
so-called demonstrative article (or pronoun) of identity acelaşi (agreeing in 
gender and number), which is the counterpart of the English 'the+same' rather 
than just 'same'.  
3.2	   Only	  one	  Reading	  for	  un	  même	  
But there are several distributional differences between un même and le 
même. First, un même unlike le même only has sentence-internal readings. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 # indicates that the sentence-external reading is possible, but not the sentence-internal reading 
that concerns us here. 
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In fact, le même appears in three kinds of contexts: it can have sentence-
internal readings (cf. 3); but it can also exhibit sentence-external-readings 
that depend on identifying some contextually salient book, whether 
deictically (16) or anaphorically (17); and it can occur in comparative 
constructions (18). 
(16) Regarde! Luc et Flore ont lu le même livre.   
 ‘Look! Luc and Flore read the same book.’ 
(17) J'ai lu Germinal pendant les vacances. Luc et Flore ont lu le même livre.  
‘I read Germinal during the holidays. Luc and Flore read the same 
book.’ 
(18) Luc et Flore ont lu le même livre que toi/l'année dernière/celui que tu as 
emprunté à la bibliothèque. 
 ‘Luc and Flore read the same book as you/last year/the one you 
borrowed from the library.’ 
On the other hand, un même only presents sentence-internal readings (19): it 
cannot appear in comparative constructions (20) and cannot have sentence-
external readings whether anaphorically (21) or deictically (22) constructed. 
(19) Une même expression peut avoir plusieurs sens. 
 ‘UN same phrase may have several senses.’ 
(20) On ne peut jamais employer *une/la même expression que Paul. 
 ‘One can never use *UN/the same phrase as Paul.’ 
(21) Paul a choqué l'assistance en employant une expression très familière. 
Ses collègues ne pourraient pas employer *une/la même expression. 
 ‘Paul shocked the audience by using a very colloquial phrase. His 
colleagues could never use *UN/the same phrase.’ 
(22) Ecoute ça! On employait *une/la même expression il y a dix ans. 
 ‘Listen to that! One used *UN/the same phrase ten years ago.’ 
So un même is more constrained than le même in that it only presents 
sentence-internal readings.  
3.3	   The	  Distributional	  Constraints	  on	  un	  même	  
Furthermore, the sentence-internal reading of un même is itself more 
constrained. To realize that, we need to first identify the distributional 
constraints common to le même and un même. 
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Le/un même requires distributive licensers, whether obligatorily distributive 
(some quantifiers, cf. 23a) or optionally distributive (plurals and 
conjunctions, cf. 23b). 
(23) a. Chaque enfant doit lire le/un même livre.   
  ‘Each child has to read the/UN same book.’ 
 b. Ces enfants/Luc and Flore doivent lire le/un même livre. 
  ‘These children/Luc and Flore have to read the/UN same book.’ 
Conversely, elements that cannot be distributive (singulars or collectives cf. 
24a, mass nouns cf. 24b) cannot license le/un même. 
(24) a. Luc/la classe doit lire #le/*un même livre.   
  ‘Luc/the class has to read #the/*UN same book.’   
 b. Le riz coûte #le/*un même prix. 
  ‘Rice costs #the/*UN same prize.’ 
Moreover, the relation between the licenser and le/un même resembles the 
relation between two scope-taking quantifiers. Thus, le/un même does not 
need to be c-commanded by its licenser as opposed to anaphors. 
(25) Le/un même joueur peut remporter tous les tournois. 
 ‘The/UN same player may win every tournament.’ 
Also, le/un même is sensitive to island constraints (adjunct constraint (26), 
coordination constraint (27), extraction constraints related to non-bridge 
verbs (28), wh-islands (29), subject islands (30)). 
(26) a.  Aucune région n'est en colère parce que #le/*un même nombre de
 députés a démissionné. 
‘No region is angry because #the/*UN same number of deputies 
resigned.’ 
 b. Aucune région ne peut élire le/un même nombre de députés. 
  ‘No region can elect the/UN same number of deputies.’ 
(27) a. Chaque électeur peut voter pour ce président et #le/*un même 
trésorier. 
‘Each voter can vote for this president and #the/*UN same 
treasurer.’ 
 b. Chaque électeur peut voter pour le/un même trésorier. 
  ‘Each voter can vote for the/UN same treasurer.’ 
(28) a. Si tous les habitants chuchotent que #la/*une même personne a 
 commis le crime, il n'y a pas d'espoir. 
140   Charnavel 
‘If every inhabitant whispers that #the/*UN same person committed 
the crime, there is no hope.' 
 b.  Si tous les habitants accusent la/une même personne, il n'y a pas 
d'espoir. 
  ‘If every inhabitant accuses the/UN same person, there is no hope.’ 
(29) a.  Quand Anne et Flore se demandent où #la/*une même personne ira,  
  elles finissent par le savoir. 
‘When Anne and Flore wonder where #the/*UN same person will 
go, they end up finding it out.’ 
 b.  Quand Anne et Flore critiquent la/une même personne, elles n'ont 
pas de pitié. 
 ‘When Anne and Flore criticize the/UN same person, they have no 
pity.’ 
(30)  a.  Qu'un individu commette #le/*un même acte peut constituer un  
 crime contre l'humanité et un crime de guerre. 
‘That an individual commits #the/*UN same act can constitute a 
crime against humanity and a war crime.’ 
 b.  Le/un même acte peut constituer un crime contre l'humanité et un 
crime de guerre. 
 ‘The/UN same act can constitute a crime against humanity and a war 
crime.’ 
Furthermore, le/un même is not only licensed by distributive DPs, but also by 
conjoined PPs, conjoined Ps, conjoined VPs, conjoined APs and possibly 
conjoined Advs, as observed for same and different by Carlson (1987) and 
Moltmann (1992), who based on such data proposed an analysis of same in 
terms of events. 
(31) a. Le/un même homme peut composer des opéras et jouer au football. 
  ‘The/UN same man may compose operas and play soccer.’ 
 b. Le/un même homme peut aimer peindre dans son atelier et à l'exté-
rieur. 
  ‘The/UN same man may like painting in his studio and outside.’ 
 c. Le/un même homme peut voter pour et contre un projet de loi. 
  ‘The/UN same man voted for and against the bill.’ 
 d. On peut peindre le/un même jouet en rouge et en bleu. 
  ‘One may paint the/UN same toy red and blue.’ 
 e. On peut cuisiner le/un même plat joyeusement et tristement. 
  ‘Luc cooked the/UN same meal joyfully and sadly.’ 
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I showed in Charnavel (2011) that moreover, le/un même is also licensed by 
several possible aspectual notions, such as frequentativity, iterativity (32, 33) 
or continuativity, durativity (34, 35), which can be expressed by several 
categories (verbs, adverbs, preverbs, nouns, adjectives). 
(32) Lire le/un même livre plusieurs fois est instructif. 
 ‘Reading the/UN same book several times is instructive.’ 
(33) La répétition de la/une même erreur n’est pas acceptable.  
 ‘The repetition of the/UN same mistake is not acceptable.’ 
(34) Il est difficile de continuer à travailler dans la/une même entreprise 
quand on aime le changement. 
 ‘It is hard to keep working in the/UN same company when one likes 
changes.’ 
(35) Une habitation prolongée dans le/un même logement peut poser 
problème. 
 ‘Extended habitation in the/UN same housing may pose problems.’ 
In all these cases, a plural event is involved, which is distributed over the 
overall running time in several ways depending on the aspect that is 
expressed. So I hypothesize that le/un même is an existential quantifier over a 
plural event (see Charnavel 2011 for more details); this event needs to have 
independently been distributed through participants or times as formalized 
below: le/un même takes two arguments, its restriction Y and the event 
predicate Z, and says that for every event en part of this (obligatorily) plural 
event, there is a corresponding individual xn in en part of the restriction set, 
and all these individuals xn are identical:  
(36) [[ le/un même]]  =λY<et>.λZ<e,vt>. ∃x1, x2… xn ≤ x (en-1 ≠ en; n is a positive 
integer and n ≥ 2) such that Y(xn)=1 and Z(xn)(en)=1, and xn-1=xn 
This is illustrated in (37). In (a), the event has been distributed through 
participants (possibly through a silent distributive operator): for every 
subevent e1 (Luc reading) and e2 (Flore reading), there is a book x1 and a 
book x2, such that x1 is identical to x2. In (b), the event has been distributed 
through times by the adverbial quantifier: for every subevent e1 (Flore 
reading at time t1) and e2 (Flore reading at time t2), there is a book x1 and a 
book x2, such that x1 is identical to x2.  
(37) a. Luc et Flore ont lu le même livre.  
  ‘Luc and Flore read the same book.’ 
 b. Flore lit toujours le même livre. 
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Besides, un même has further distributional constraints (note that in the 
previous examples, these additional constraints were fulfilled so that the 
constraints common to le même and un même could be independently 
examined). The presence of a plural event is a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition for licensing sentence-internal un même, which is only licensed by 
the following contexts: inside a DP (38), in the context of modality and 
genericity (39), in the context of arbitrary PRO (40), or in the context of 
hypotheses (41). 
(38) a.  Quatre générations sous un/le même toit 
  ‘Four generations under UN/the same roof.’ 
 b.  Ces quatre générations ont vécu sous ??un/le même toit. 
  ‘These four generations lived under ??UN/the same roof.’ 
(39) a.  Un/le même mot peut avoir plusieurs sens. 
  ‘UN/the same word may have several senses.’ 
 b. Un/le même mot a (généralement) plusieurs sens. 
  ‘UN/the same word (generally) has several senses.’ 
 c. Dans ce texte, ??un/le même mot a plusieurs sens. 
  ‘In this text, ??UN/the same word has several senses.’ 
(40) a. Utiliser un/le même mot de passe pour différents services, ordi-
nateurs et sites internet augmente les risques de se faire voler des 
informations personnelles. 
‘Using UN/the same password for different services, computers and 
websites increases the risks of having personal informations stolen.’ 
 b. J'ai utilisé ??un/le même mot de passe pour différents services, ordi-
nateurs et sites internet. 
‘I used ??UN/the same password for different services, computers 
and websites.’ 
(41)  a. Si un/le même joueur fait plus de 5 fautes, il est disqualifié. 
‘If UN/the same player makes more than 5 mistakes, he gets dis-
qualified.’ 
 b. ??Un/Le même joueur a fait plus de 5 fautes. 
  ‘??UN/The same player made more than 5 mistakes.’ 
So the intuition is that un même is licensed in contexts presenting a flavor of 
generality, i.e. when multiple situations are involved: it is unfelicitous as soon 
as a particular situation is at stake (antispecificity). 
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To sum up, I have proposed several hypotheses concerning both le même and 
un même: based on the fact that même does not exhibit the standard 
distribution of an adjective, I have hypothesized that un même and le même 
are complex determiners. Based on the observation that un même and le 
même require distributive licensers (individuals or times) and that they are 
sensitive to island constraints, I have proposed that un même and le même are 
quantifiers over a plural event. Furthermore, I have observed that un même 
has a more constrained distribution than le même: un même only exhibits 
sentence-internal readings in antispecific contexts. The question is now to 
know how to analyse the antispecificity of un même. 
3	   Un	  même	  and	  Antispecificity	  
Let's review in which sense un même is antispecific as opposed to le même. 
First, un même cannot be used when the speaker has an individual in mind as 
its referent. 
(42) Dans le système solaire, toutes les planètes tournent autour de la/*une 
même étoile. 
 ‘In the solar system, every planet revolves around the/*UN same star.’ 
Secondly, un même is not licensed if the referent of its DP has a linking 
relation with an antecedent, as shown by the absence of sentence-external 
readings with un même. According to Enç (1991), nonspecifics require that 
their discourse referents not be linked to previously established discourse 
referents, while specifics exhibit an inclusion relation or any other association 
with an antecedent. 
(43) Paul a choqué l'assistance en employant une expression très familière. 
Ses collègues ne pourraient pas employer *une/la même expression. 
 ‘Paul shocked the audience by using a very colloquial phrase. His col-
leagues could never use *UN/the same phrase.’ 
Thirdly, un même does not trigger any presupposition of existence. 
(44) Dans la plupart des familles nombreuses, les enfants ne mangent pas 
autour de la/une même table. 
 ‘In most large families, the children do not eat round the/UN same 
table.’ 
Finally, un même requires variability of situations. 
(45) Utiliser un/le même mot de passe pour différents services, ordinateurs et 
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 sites Internet augmente les risques de se faire voler des informations 
personnelles. 
 ‘Using UN/the same password for different services, computers and 
websites increases the risks of having personal informations stolen.’ 
(46) Quatre générations sous un/le même toit 
 ‘Four generations under UN/the same roof.’ 
(47) Un/le même mot peut avoir plusieurs sens.  
 ‘UN/the same word may have several senses.’ 
(48) Si un/le même joueur fait plus de 5 fautes, il est disqualifié. 
‘If UN/the same player makes more than 5 mistakes, he gets dis-
qualified.’ 
(49) a.  Dans chaque système planétaire, toutes les planètes tournent autour 
 de la/une même étoile. 
‘In each planetary system, every planet revolves around the/UN 
same star.’ 
 b. Dans le système solaire, toutes les planètes tournent autour de 
la/*une même étoile. 
 ‘In the solar system, every planet revolves around the/*UN same 
star.’ 
Thus in (49), the plurality of planets illustrates the requirement for même that 
there be several events: même expresses uniqueness across multiple events; 
furthermore, the plurality of planetary systems in (a) illustrates the 
requirement for the indefinite article combined with même that there be 
several situations: un même requires a covarying interpretation and expresses 
uniqueness relativized to a situation. 
Based on Von Fintel (2004)'s idea that quantifiers have a hidden domain 
argument, I propose that un même is not only a quantifier over a plural event, 
but also contains a domain variable (resource situation pronoun) whose value 
has to be quantificationally bound; it cannot be identified by a contextually 
supplied situation. That's why un même is licensed by contexts which contain 
a quantifier over situations or worlds.  
(50) [Dans chaque système planétaire]i, toutes les planètes tournent autour 
 d'unei même étoile. 
 ‘In each planetary system, every planet revolves around UN same star.’ 
On the other hand, the variable contained in le même can be either bound by 
the same operators (non specific reading) or identified by the context 
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(specific reading). This is formalized below. In the case of un même 
expressing uniqueness relativized to a situation, s needs to be 
quantificationally bound, but since le même expresses uniqueness either 
relativized to a situation or in a particular context, s is either 
quantificationally bound or contextually supplied in this case. 
(51) [[le/un même]] =λs.λY<et>.λZ<e,vt>. ∃x1, x2…xn ≤ x (en-1 ≠ en; n is a positive 
 integer and n ≥ 2) such that Y(xn)(s)=1 and Z(xn)(en)(s)=1, and  xn-1=xn 
 in s. 
The contrast between un même and le même is parallel to other phenomena. 
First, it is reminiscent of Florian Schwarz's dissertation (2009) concerned 
with the description and analysis of two semantically different types of 
definite articles in German (weak and strong). 
(52) a.  Hans ging zum    Haus.               (Schwarz 2009: 12) 
    Hans went to-theweak house 
  ‘Hans went to the house.’ 
 b. Hans ging zu dem   Haus. 
  Hans went to-thestrong house 
  ‘Hans went to the house.’ 
The weak article encodes uniqueness (relativized to a situation); the strong 
article is anaphoric in nature (dependent on a antecedent). The interpretation 
of the weak article definite depends on the interpretation of its situation 
pronoun, which can stand for the topic situation or a contextually supplied 
situation, or be quantificationally bound. 
So, le même contrasts with un même like the strong article with the 
weak article in that it has an anaphoric capacity that un même lacks as shown 
in sentence-external readings. Like the weak article, un même expresses 
uniqueness relativized to a situation, which can be analyzed by use of a 
resource situation pronoun. 
Nevertheless, the empirical divisions between the weak/strong articles 
and un/le même are different: the resource situation pronoun of the weak 
article can also stand for the topic situation or a contextually supplied 
situation while that of un même cannot: it has to be quantificationally bound. 
 
Moreover, the contrast between le même and un même is the reverse of the 
contrast observed by Beghelli and Stowell (1995) between each and every: 
the set variable of each must be identified by the context, while the set 
variable of every can also be bound by operators. 
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(53) a. Every dog has a tail.            (Beghelli and Stowell 1995: 32) 
 b. Each dog has a tail. 
(53a) can be construed as a claim about dogs in general, whereas (53b) must 
be construed as a claim about a particular set of dogs previously mentioned in 
the discourse. Thus, the sentence with each means that there is a particular 
situation s, a set X of all dogs in s, such that all the members of X have a tail, 
while the sentence with every means that in the default situation s where X is 
the set of all dogs in s, all members of X have a tail. When every-DPs occur 
in generic contexts, they are interpreted as though they were universal-
generic quantifiers because they contain restricted variables (ranging over 
sets) bound by a silent generic quantifier. When every occurs in a context 
associated with reference to a single situation time, it acquires its 
contextualized universal-distributive reading because it is bound by a silent 
definite quantifier (existential quantifier ranging over situation-time 
(existential counterpart of GEN)). 
Note that Beghelli and Stowell distinguish quantifiers ranging over 
situation-times from quantifiers ranging over events. This fits the present 
analysis since un même and le même, being quantifiers over events, could not 
be bound by quantifiers over events themselves, but can only be bound by 
hierarchically higher operators like quantifiers over situations. 
 
 Domain variable bound by operators Domain variable contextually 
supplied 
le même x x 
un même x  
every x x 
each  x 
4	   Conclusion	  
To summarize, même presents two main puzzles: a compositionality problem 
and a definiteness issue. Concerning the first one, I hypothesized that le 
même and un même are existential quantifiers over an event that has been 
distributed over participants or times. As for the second problem which was 
my main concern here, I observed that French un même documents the 
availability of the indefinite determiner with same, even if le même already 
presents indefiniteness effects. The distribution of un même shows its 
antispecificity and therefore questions the following generalization: definites 
are assumed to be specific while indefinites are specific or non specific; but 
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actually, le même is specific or non specific while un même is non specific 
(antispecificity). To account for that, I proposed that un même introduces a 
variable that has to be bound by operators over situations, while the variable 
introduced by le même can also be contextually supplied. I believe it would 
be worth further investigating this phenomenon and similar ones, as it may be 
fruitful to relate definiteness and specificity with the interpretation of domain 
variables in quantifiers. 
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Abstract. Searle (1989) posits a set of adequacy criteria for any account of
the meaning and use of performative verbs, such as order or promise. Central
among them are: (a) performative utterances are performances of the act named
by the performative verb; (b) performative utterances are self-verifying; (c) per-
formative utterances achieve (a) and (b) in virtue of their literal meaning. He then
argues that the fundamental problem with assertoric accounts of performatives is
that they fail (b), and hence (a), because being committed to having an intention
does not guarantee having that intention. Relying on a uniform meaning for verbs
on their reportative and performative uses, we propose an assertoric analysis of
performative utterances that does not require an actual intention for deriving (b),
and hence can meet (a) and (c).
Explicit performative utterances are those whose illocutionary force is made
explicit by the verbs appearing in them (Austin 1962):
(1) I (hereby) promise you to be there at five. (is a promise)
(2) I (hereby) order you to be there at five. (is an order)
(3) You are (hereby) ordered to report to jury duty. (is an order)
(1)–(3) look and behave syntactically like declarative sentences in every way.
Hence there is no grammatical basis for the once popular claim that I promise/
order spells out a ‘performative prefix’ that is silent in all other declaratives.
Such an analysis, in any case, leaves unanswered the question of how illocu-
tionary force is related to compositional meaning and, consequently, does not
explain how the first person and present tense are special, so that first-person
present tense forms can spell out performative prefixes, while others cannot.
Minimal variations in person or tense remove the ‘performative effect’:
(4) I promised you to be there at five. (is not a promise)
(5) He promises to be there at five. (is not a promise)
An attractive idea is that utterances of sentences like those in (1)–(3) are asser-
∗ The names of the authors appear in alphabetical order.
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tions, just like utterances of other declaratives, whose truth is somehow guar-
anteed. In one form or another, this basic strategy has been pursued by a large
number of authors ever since Austin (1962) (Lemmon 1962; Hedenius 1963;
Bach & Harnish 1979; Ginet 1979; Bierwisch 1980; Leech 1983; among oth-
ers). One type of account attributes self-verification to meaning proper. An-
other type, most prominently exemplified by Bach & Harnish (1979), tries to
derive the performative effect by means of an implicature-like inference that
the hearer may draw based on the utterance of the explicit performative.
Searle’s (1989) Challenge
Searle (1989) mounts an argument against analyses of explicit performative
utterances as self-verifying assertions. He takes the argument to show that an
assertoric account is impossible. Instead, we take it to pose a challenge that can
be met, provided one supplies the right semantics for the verbs involved.
Searle’s argument is based on the following desiderata he posits for any
theory of explicit performatives:
(a) performative utterances are performances of the act named by the per-
formative verb;
(b) performative utterances are self-guaranteeing;
(c) performative utterances achieve (a) and (b) in virtue of their literal mean-
ing, which, in turn, ought to be based on a uniform lexical meaning of
the verb across performative and reportative uses.
According to Searle’s speech act theory, making a promise requires that the
promiser intend to do so, and similarly for other performative verbs (the sincer-
ity condition). It follows that no assertoric account can meet (a-c): An assertion
cannot ensure that the speaker has the necessary intention.
“Such an assertion does indeed commit the speaker to the exis-
tence of the intention, but the commitment to having the intention
doesn’t guarantee the actual presence of the intention.”
Searle (1989: 546)
Hence assertoric accounts must fail on (b), and, a forteriori, on (a) and (c).1
Although Searle’s argument is valid, his premise that for truth to be guar-
anteed the speaker must have a particular intention is questionable. In the fol-
lowing, we give an assertoric account that delivers on (a-c). We aim for an
1 It should be immediately clear that inference-based accounts cannot meet (a-c) above. If the
occurrence of the performative effect depends on the hearer drawing an inference, then such sen-
tences could not be self-verifying, for the hearer may well fail to draw the inference.
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account on which the assertion of the explicit performative is the performance
of the act named by the performative verb. No hearer inferences are necessary.
1 Reportative and Performative Uses
What is the meaning of the word order, then, so that it can have both reporta-
tive uses – as in (6) – and performative uses – as in (7)?
(6) A ordered B to sign the report.
(7) [A to B] I order you to sign the report now.
The general strategy in this paper will be to ask what the truth conditions of
reportative uses of performative verbs are, and then see what happens if these
verbs are put in the first person singular present tense. The reason to start with
the reportative uses is that speakers have intuitions about their truth conditions.
This is not true for performative uses, because these are always true when ut-
tered, obscuring the truth-conditional content of the declarative sentence.2
An assertion of (6) takes for granted that A presumed to have authority
over B and implies that there was a communicative act from A to B. But what
kind of communicative act? (7) or, in the right context, (8a-c) would suffice.
(8) a. Sign the report now!
b. You must sign the report now!
c. I want you to sign the report now!
What do these sentences have in common? We claim it is this: In the right
context they commit A to a particular kind of preference for B signing the
report immediately.
If B accepts the utterance, he takes on a commitment to act as though he,
too, prefers signing the report. If the report is co-present with A and B, he will
sign it, if the report is in his office, he will leave to go there immediately, and
so on. To comply with an order to p is to act as though one prefers p. One need
not actually prefer it, but one has to act as if one did. The authority mentioned
above amounts to this acceptance being socially or institutionally mandated.
Of course, B has the option to refuse to take on this commitment, in either
of two ways: (i) he can deny A’s authority, (ii) while accepting the authority, he
can refuse to abide by it, thereby violating the institutional or social mandate.
Crucially, in either case, (6) will still be true, as witnessed by the felicity of:
2 Szabolcsi (1982), in one of the earliest proposals for a compositional semantics of performative
utterances, already pointed out the importance of reportative uses.
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(9) a. (6), but B refused to do it.
b. (6), but B questioned his authority.
Not even uptake by the addressee is necessary for order to be appropriate, as
seen in (10) and the naturally occurring (11):3
(10) (6), but B did not hear him.
(11) He ordered Kornilov to desist but either the message failed to reach
the general or he ignored it.4
What is necessary is that the speaker expected uptake to happen, arguably a
minimal requirement for an act to count as a communicative event.
To sum up, all that is needed for (6) to be true and appropriate is that (i)
there is a communicative act from A to B which commits A to a preference for
B signing the report immediately and (ii) A presumes to have authority over B.
The performative effect arises precisely when the utterance itself is a witness
for the existential claim in (i).
There are two main ingredients in the meaning of order informally out-
lined above: the notion of a preference, in particular a special kind of preference
that guides action, and the notion of a commitment. The next two sections lay
some conceptual groundwork before we spell out our analysis in section 4.
2 Representing Preferences
To represent preferences that guide action, we need a way to represent prefer-
ences of different strength. Kratzer’s (1981) theory of modality is not suitable
for this purpose. Suppose, for instance, that Sven desires to finish his paper
and that he also wants to lie around all day, doing nothing. Modeling his pref-
erences in the style of Kratzer, the propositions expressed by (12) and (13)
would have to be part of Sven’s bouletic ordering source assigned to the actual
world:
(12) Sven finishes his paper.
(13) Sven lies around all day, doing nothing.
But then, Sven should be equally happy if he does nothing as he is if he finishes
his paper. We want to be able to explain why, given his knowledge that (12)
and (13) are incompatible, he works on his paper. Intuitively, it is because the
preference expressed by (12) is more important than that expressed by (13).
3 We owe this observation to Lauri Karttunen.
4 https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/citd/RussianHeritage/12.NR/NR.12.html
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Preference Structures
Definition 1. A preference structure relative to an information state W is a
pair 〈P,≤〉, where P⊆℘(W ) and ≤ is a (weak) partial order on P.
We can now define a notion of consistency that is weaker than requiring that
all propositions in the preference structure be compatible:
Definition 2. A preference structure 〈P,≤〉 is consistent iff for any p,q ∈ P
such that p∩q = /0, either p < q or q < p.
Since preference structures are defined relative to an information state W , con-
sistency will require not only logically but also contextually incompatible propo-
sitions to be strictly ranked. For example, if W is Sven’s doxastic state, and he
knows that (12) and (13) are incompatible, for a bouletic preference structure
of his to be consistent it must strictly rank the two propositions.
In general, bouletic preference structures need not be consistent, and they
often will not be. We assume that the desires, preferences, and obligations of
various kinds of an agent A are represented by a set Pw(A) of preference struc-
tures, some of which may be inconsistent, internally or with each other.
A consistent preference structure will give rise to a partial order≺ among
worlds. There are various ways to define this partial order, but for the present
paper, we leave it open which definition is most appropriate. Nothing in what
follows hinges on the choice. The basic intuition is that ≺ should be ‘lexi-
cographic’: lower-ranked propositions in the preference structure should only
make a difference for the ranking of two worlds w and v if they are on equal
footing with respect to all the higher-ranked propositions.
Consolidated Preferences
Given the multitude of preference structures influencing an agent’s decisions,
if an agent wants to act, he has to integrate these structures into a global one,
resolving any conflict. Thus, a rational agent A in world w has a distinguished,
consistent preference structure
〈
Pw(A),≤Pw(A)
〉
. We call this A’s effective pref-
erence structure in w.
We require that Pw(A) ⊆ ⋃Pw(A) and also that if p,q ∈ Pw(A) such that
there is 〈P,≤P〉 ∈ Pw(A) and p<P q and there is no 〈P′,<P′〉 ∈ Pw(A) such that
q≤ p, then p <Pw(A) q, ensuring that no spurious goals are introduced into the
effective preference structure and rankings that are consistent are retained.
In w, A’s induced preference order Pw(A) will partially5determine the
agent’s behavior: If A has the choice between w1 and w2 (as continuations of w
differing in what action, if any, A performs), and w1 ≺ w2, then A will choose
5 Only partially, as an agent may be genuinely indifferent between two possible courses of affairs.
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w2. That is, the definition of  is a first step to defining a non-probabilistic
kind of Decision Theory,6 with preference structures corresponding to utility
functions in classical decision theory, while information states correspond to
subjective probability distributions.
We propose the following desiderata for a more developed version of such
a theory:7
Positive introspection for effective preferences If an agent a effectively
prefers p, he believes that he does.
Negative introspection for effective preferences If an agent a believes
that he effectively prefers p, he does effectively prefer p.
3 Commitments
The idea that a main effect of utterances is to modify the commitments of the
interlocutors is an old one, going back at least to Hamblin (1971). More re-
cently, it has been fruitfully developed by Gunlogson (2008) and Davis (2009),
who take utterances to update commitment states, typically modeled as sets of
propositions.
Commitments as Restricting Future States of the World
Hamblin and Gunlogson only model discourse commitments, that is, commit-
ments that constrain the linguistic actions of the interlocutors in the future of
the present discourse. This enables them to characterize commitments simply
as a set of ‘legal’ (Hamblin) or ‘expected’ (Gunlogson) future discourse states:
If the discourse ends up in a state that is not in this set, something is off.
While such a model may be sufficient for what these authors were after,
it is not quite enough in general. Commitments arising by linguistic means
also constrain non-linguistic actions and actions that are performed after the
discourse has ended. Promises and orders are particularly obvious examples.
In order to capture this more general notion of commitment, we can think
of the taking on of a commitment as excluding possible future states of the
world, thereby making certain future states of the world impossible. Given this
conception, we cannot just specify a set of ‘good’ futures (in which all com-
mitments are honored), for, of course, taking on a commitment does not ex-
clude the possibility of violating it. However, we can think of commitments as
excluding those futures in which the agent does not act according to the com-
6 By ‘decision theory,’ we mean any theory that models how agents choose actions on the basis
of their beliefs and preferences. We use the term ‘classical decision theory’ for what is called
‘decision theory’ in mathematics and economics.
7 It should be kept in mind that what we want to model are conscious preferences. Thus, these
desiderata are appropriate even though an agent may be influenced by factors he is not aware of.
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mitment, yet is not at fault. Before the commitment was taken on, this kind of
future was possible, afterwards it is impossible.
Consider the simple case of an agent committing himself to raise his hand
when prompted the next time. There are three kinds of possible futures:
(i) futures in which the agent is prompted and raises his hand
(ii) futures in which the commitment is voided, either by being rescinded be-
fore the agent is prompted, or because it becomes evident that the agent
will not be prompted
(iii) futures in which the agent is prompted and does not raise his hand, but
the commitment was not voided before he was prompted.
Taking on the commitment excludes those futures of type (iii) in which the
agent does not count as having violated a commitment.
Keeping a Commitment
In the (somewhat contrived) example above, it is clear what ‘acting in accor-
dance with the commitment’ amounts to (raising the hand when prompted),
and also at which time the commitment has to be voided so as to not count as
violated (before the prompting).
In general, matters are more complicated. If I promise to meet you at the
airport at noon tomorrow, what is required of me is not only to be at the airport
at noon. Rather, what is required is a complex ensemble of actions that result
in me being at the airport at noon. Suppose the trip to the airport takes an hour,
and I sleep in until 11:30. I am at fault, even if you call at 11:35 to tell me that
your flight has been delayed by several hours and so I do not have to meet you
at noon. You may never know that I violated my commitment, but I did violate
it. On this conception, there is not only a time when the commitment was kept,
there is also a time when the commitment was (first) violated: The (first) time I
fail to act in a way that would ensure my being at the airport at noon.
Commitments are always commitments to act. When we say ‘an agent is
committed to believing the proposition p’, this is short for ‘the agent is com-
mitted to act as though he believes p’. Similarly, ‘an agent is committed to an
(effective) preference for p’ is short for ‘an agent is committed to act as though
he (effectively) prefers p to be actualized.’ This is exactly the right notion of
commitment for promises and the like. In the example above, what I am com-
mitted to is to act as though I effectively prefer to be at the airport at noon.
Some of the required actions have to happen quite sometime before noon.
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So we can characterize the notion of ‘taking on a commitment’ as follows:
(14) If an agent a takes on a commitment, he thereby excludes possible
future states in which
a. the agent does not act according to the commitment AND
b. the commitment is not voided before the agent fails to act accord-
ing to the commitment AND
c. the commitment does not count as violated.
Construing commitments as commitments to act means that the features of the
decision theory from the last section get ‘lifted’ to the respective commitments:
Positive introspection for preference commitment If an agent is com-
mitted to an effective preference for p, he is also committed to act as though
he believes he is committed to an effective preference for p.
Doxastic reduction for preference commitment If an agent is commit-
ted to act as though he believes that he is committed to an effective preference
for p, he is also committed to act as though he effectively prefers p.
Positive introspection for doxastic commitment If an agent is commit-
ted to act as though he believes that he is committed to act as though he believes
that p, he is committed to act as though he believes that p.
We end this section by introducing the following bit of notation (omitting,
for simplicity, a necessary temporal parameter, introduced later):
Definition 3. We let
PEPa(p) :=
{
w ∈W
∣∣∣∣ p is a maximal element of a’s publiceffective preference structure in w
}
(Where p is a maximal element of a’s public effective preference structure iff a
is committed to act as though p is a maximal element of his effective preference
structure.)
Assertions and Public Commitments
We use a deliberately weak notion of assertion: All that it takes to assert is to
(sincerely) utter a declarative sentence. We characterize assertions in terms of
their minimal effect in the sense of Zeevat (2003). With Gunlogson (2003) and
Davis (2009), we take this effect to be the coming about of a doxastic commit-
ment on the part of the speaker. Additional properties of assertions can arguably
be explained as pragmatic inferences on the basis of this speaker commitment.8
8 A prominent example of such a secondary effect is that it becomes common ground that p. We
follow Gunlogson and Davis in assuming that an assertion becomes part of the common ground
Performative Verbs and Performative Acts 157
(15) An assertion of a declarative φ in context C adds JφKC to the public
beliefs of the speaker, thereby publicly committing the speaker to act
as though he believes JφKC.
Assertions are, of course, communicative events. Let the totality of the doxastic
commitments of a speaker S resulting from a communicative event u be desig-
nated as PBS[u] and PBtS stand for the set of beliefs of S that become publicly
manifest at time t. We do not identify PBS[u] strictly with the truth-conditional
content of u. Rather, the commitment can come about as a result of the meaning
of the utterance plus information available in the context in which it is made.9
Part of what it means to say that a commitment results from an event
is that the commitment comes about at the very end of the event. We hence
assume the following principle, where tu is the final instant of the runtime of u:
(16) p ∈ PBS[u]⇔ (p ∈ PBtuS ) ∈ PBS[u]
Analogously, we let PEPS[u] and PEPtS refer to the set of preferences resulting
from u and that become publicly manifest at t, respectively, and assume
(17) p ∈ PEPS[u]⇔ (p ∈ PEPtuS ) ∈ PBS[u]
4 Explicit Performatives as Self-Verifying Assertions
In this section, we present our assertoric analysis of explicit performatives us-
ing the three verbs claim, promise and order, which are representative, in
Searle’s (1975) classification, of ASSERTIVES, COMMISSIVES and DIREC-
TIVES, respectively. What performative verbs have in common is that they all
report communicative events. In the following, we conceive of these events as
concrete particulars, and hence take every communicative event u to be associ-
ated with a unique context c(u) whose speaker is the agent of u and whose time
is the runtime of u. The shape of the argument that the utterance ensures the
performative effect will be the same in all three cases, but the lexical seman-
tics for the verb will get progressively more complex. What we have to show
in each case is that an utterance of a sentence S with an explicit performative
verb is self-verifying, i.e., for any world w, if u is an utterance of S in w, then
w ∈ JSKc(u).
only as a secondary effect, after the hearer has accepted the assertion.
9 We leave it open here whether the commitments a speaker takes on with an utterance can be
identified with Gricean speaker meaning.
158 Condoravdi & Lauer
Commitment to a Belief: ‘I claim that p’
The problem posed by assertive performative verbs like claim and assert is
nicely illustrated by what has come to be known as Cohen’s problem (Lycan
(1999), based on Cohen (1964)). On the one hand, claim is ‘truth-conditionally
transparent’: the speaker of (18) cannot react to the continued absence of rain
by saying ‘Well, I only said I CLAIMED that it was going to rain’. On the other
hand, claim obviously contributes to truth conditions: For example, (18) entails
that somebody claims that it is going to rain.
(18) I claim that it is going to rain.
Cohen’s problem can be solved by analyzing claim as a performative verb. The
content of (18) is just a statement about what the speaker claims, but there is
also a performative effect, through which the speaker also becomes committed
to the complement of claim in the way we demonstrate below.
The Reportative Use
What has to be the case for (19) to be true?
(19) Peter claimed that it was going to rain.
There must have been a communicative event u from Peter (to someone). What
kind of sentence out of Peter’s mouth could verify (19)? (18) would do, but so
would any utterance that, in its context, commits the speaker to the belief that
it is going to rain.
(20) w  claim(u,a, p) iff
a. u is a communicative event from a: w  CEa(u)
b. in c(u), u commits a to the belief that p: w  p ∈ PBa[u].
(18) and the plain assertion of (21) will bring about the required commitment
in any context in which they are sincerely uttered.
(21) It is going to rain.
However, recall that the commitments resulting from an utterance can go be-
yond its truth-conditional content, hence, (19) can be supported by utterances
of sentences that have (21) as a contextual implication.
The Performative Use
The goal is to explain why, by virtue of uttering (18), a speaker is doxastically
committed to (21). Let u∗ be an utterance of (18) in context C∗ and world w∗.
The truth-conditional content of (18) is given in (22), where the identification
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of the run time τ of the two utterance events is contributed by the simple present
tense. Given the semantics of claim in (20), (22) is equivalent to (23).
(22) {w |w  ∃u : τ(u) = τ(u∗)∧ claim(u,S,Rain)},
where Rain = Jit is going to rainKC∗
(23) {w |w  ∃u : τ(u) = τ(u∗)∧CES(u)∧Rain ∈ PBS[u]}
u∗, as an assertion, commits the speaker to the belief in (22)/(23). The speaker
is therefore committed to the belief in the existence of a communicative event
that commits him to the belief that it is going to rain, i.e.
(24) w∗  (23) ∈ PBS[u∗]
Therefore, at the final instant t∗ of τ(u∗), we have:
(25) w∗ 
{
w
∣∣w  Rain ∈ PBt∗S } ∈ PBt∗S
Given positive introspection for doxastic commitment, (25) reduces to (26):
(26) w∗  Rain ∈ PBt∗S
(24) and (26) together imply (27), which by postulate (16) reduces to (28).
(27) w∗  (Rain ∈ PBt∗S ) ∈ PBS[u∗]
(28) w∗  Rain ∈ PBS[u∗]
This means that u∗ satisfies the conditions in (23) and hence w∗ ∈ (23), in other
words, an utterance of (18) is necessarily self-verifying.
Commitment to an Effective Preference: ‘I promise to p’
Moving to commissives, what has to be the case for (29) to be true?
(29) Peter promised (Mary) to get the tickets.
Once again, there has to have been a communicative event from Peter (to Mary)
that creates a particular kind of commitment. And again a number of sentences
could have been uttered in order to make (29) true:
(30) a. I promise you to get the tickets.
b. I will get the tickets.
c. You will have the tickets tomorrow.
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We propose the following semantics for promise:10
(31) w  promise(u,a,b, p) iff
a. u is a communicative event from a to b: w  CEa→b(u)
b. in c(u), u commits a to PEPa(p): w  p ∈ PEPS[u]
Thus, any utterance that verifies (29) publicly commits its speaker Peter (to
Mary) to effectively prefer to get the tickets. As before, (30b,c) will bring about
the requisite commitment only if the context is right, while the explicit perfor-
mative (30a) will create it in any context in which it is sincerely uttered.
The Performative Use
An utterance u∗ of (30a) to addressee A in context C∗ and world w∗ commits
the speaker S to acting as if he believes the proposition in (32):
(32) {w |w  ∃u : τ(u) = τ(u∗)∧CES→A(u)∧Tickets ∈ PEPS[u]},
where Tickets = JS will get the ticketsKC∗
The derivation of the performative effect is as follows:
(33) w∗  (32) ∈ PBS[u∗]
(34) w∗ 
{
w
∣∣w  Tickets ∈ PEPt∗S } ∈ PBt∗S
Given doxastic reduction for preference commitment, (34) reduces to (35):
(35) w∗  Tickets ∈ PEPt∗S
(33) and (35) together imply (36), which by postulate (17) reduces to (37).
(36) w∗  (Tickets ∈ PEPt∗S ) ∈ PBS[u∗]
(37) w∗  Tickets ∈ PEPS[u∗]
We have thus derived that the assertion of (30a) is a witness for its own truth—
and hence, an utterance of (30a) is necessarily self-verifying.
Commitment to an Effective Preference for an Effective Preference:
‘I order you to p’
Finally, what has to be the case for (38) to be true?
(38) Mary ordered Peter to sign the report immediately.
10 The semantics we give only spells out the truth-conditional part of the meaning of promise.
There is a presuppositional part, as well. The presupposition, roughly, is that a presumed that b has
a stake in p.
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As before, there must have been a certain kind of communicative event from
Mary to Peter. In the right context, an utterance of (7) or any of the sentences
in (8) will suffice.
(7) I order you to sign the report immediately!
(8) a. Sign the report immediately!
b. I want you to sign the report immediately!
c. You have to sign the report immediately!
In section 1, we said that order requires that the event commit the speaker to a
certain kind of preference. We can now refine this claim. The event in question
must commit the speaker to effectively prefer that the hearer commit himself
to effectively prefer that he signs the report immediately.11
(39) w  order(u,a,b, p) iff
a. u is a communicative event from a to b: w  CEa→b(u)
b. in c(u), u commits a to PEPa(PEPb(p)): w  Pb(p) ∈ PEPa[u],
where Pb(p) =
{
w
∣∣w  ∃t > τ(u) : p ∈ PEPtb}
The Performative Use
An utterance u∗ of (7) to addressee A in context C∗ and world w∗ commits the
speaker S to believe the proposition in (40):
(40) {w |w  ∃u : τ(u) = τ(u∗)∧order(u,S,A,Sign)},
where Sign = JA signs the report immediatelyKC∗
The derivation of the performative effect is like that for promise except that,
given the lexical semantics we propose for order, the equivalent of (33) is (42):
(41) {w |w  ∃u : τ(u) = τ(u∗)∧CES(u)∧PA(Sign) ∈ PEPS[u]}
(42) w∗  (41) ∈ PBS[u∗]
From this, we can derive
(43) w∗  PA(Sign) ∈ PEPS[u∗]
As before, this means that w∗ ∈ J(7)K, i.e. (7) is self-verifying.
11 Again, order also carries a presupposition, namely that a presumes to have authority over b with
respect to p, i.e. that b is socially or institutionally obligated to take on the commitment effectively
preferred by a.
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Features of the Analysis
Which verbs give rise to explicit performative utterances? Our analysis pre-
dicts that it is those verbs that denote communicative events and whose truth-
conditional content is fully specified in terms of speaker commitments. While
this is the case for verbs like claim, promise, or order, it is not the case for
verbs like insult, annoy, or frighten.
Our account, unlike some of its assertoric predecessors, derives the self-
verification of explicit performative utterances without assuming that they are
self-referential. They can be made self-referential, though, by the use of hereby,
which on the present analysis is best seen as an adverbial modifier that requires
the identification of the described event with the utterance event.
Another central issue about explicit performatives that our analysis can
explain is their interaction with the progressive. A well-known generalization
is that utterances in the progressive cannot (usually) be used performatively.
Our account plus the assumption that performative verbs are accomplishments
implies that the utterance of a performative progressive sentence does not com-
mit the speaker to the existence of a commitment. This is so because progres-
sive sentences describing accomplishments do not entail the culmination of the
described event.
Our proposal is similar in several respects to two recent, independently
developed accounts by Eckardt (2009) and Truckenbrodt (2009). We cannot
undertake a detailed comparison here but we note that it differs in (a) how it
derives the self-verifying property of performative utterances, (b) the lexical
meaning it assumes for assertives, commissives and directives, (c) in the ex-
planation of how performative utterances restrict possible future states of the
world.
5 Concluding Remarks
Searle’s argument against assertoric accounts relies on the assumption that an
intention is required for a speech act to happen. We circumvent the problem by
requiring only that the speaker be committed to having a belief or an intention
(in our terms, an effective preference). On our view, what matters for speech
acts, or at least the truth conditions of performative verbs, is public facts.
Our analysis can also readily meet a challenge brought up by Jary (2007).
He argues that explicit performatives cannot be assertions because their content
gets added to the common ground automatically, rather than being conditioned
on the acceptance of the addressee, as is the case for run-of-the-mill assertions.
However, as Jary himself notes, the fact that the assertion happened always
automatically enters the common ground. Our account then predicts Jary’s ob-
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servation. Since the utterance itself is a witness for its own truth, the content
of the assertion is entailed by the fact that the assertion happened, and so this
content will become part of the common ground automatically.
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Abstract. Previous studies of Chinese wh-conditionals leave several issues 
unresolved, including (i) definiteness effects; (ii) apparent violations of the 
novelty condition and (iii) accounting for the range of readings of Chinese wh-
conditionals. We attempt to resolve some of these issues by analysing wh-
indefinites as unique indefinites and wh-conditionals as special instances of 
topic-comment structures (i.e. wh-conditionals are topic-comment structures 
with an identity relation). Chinese wh-conditionals can refer to either a single 
situation or multiple situations, leading to either a definite interpretation or a 
generic interpretation respectively.  
 
1	   Introduction	  
For several decades, the semantics of wh-indefinites and wh-conditionals in 
Chinese has been a topic of debate for Chinese linguistics. In this study, we 
offer a somewhat novel analysis for wh-conditionals. A typical wh-
conditional always contains a pair of matching wh-phrases, one in the 
antecedent clause and the other in the consequent clause. The wh-phrases in 
the antecedent and consequent clauses must be identical in number, form and 
reference. We add one more observation: Chinese wh-conditionals sometimes 
have an additional flavour of definiteness, semantically akin to free relatives 
in English.  
Several accounts of Chinese wh-conditionals have been advanced in the 
literature. The most frequently cited account, by Cheng and Huang (1996), 
treats wh-indefinites as recurring indefinite expressions, but this appears to 
violate the novelty condition, which requires indefinites to introduce novel 
entities into the domain of discourse. To circumvent this problem, Chierchia 
(2000) proposes that wh-indefinites in Chinese are indefinite pronouns (i.e. 
pronominals), thus they can appear in the consequent of wh-conditionals 
without violating the novelty condition. However, Chierchia’s account does 
not explain why ordinary wh-indefinites display Principle C effects, a finding 
that seems to indicate that wh-indefinites are R-expressions rather than 
pronominals. We propose to reconcile the tension inherited from previous 
research by analyzing wh-conditionals as identity statements, which are not 
In Reich, Ingo et al. (eds.), Proceedings of Sinn & Bedeutung 15,  
pp. 165–179. Universaar – Saarland University Press: Saarbrücken, Germany, 2011. 	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subject to the novelty condition. On the present account, Chinese wh-con-
ditionals are ambiguous between being correlatives and conditionals. On one 
hand, when definiteness is added into the equation, wh-conditionals can be 
seen to share properties with free relatives in that they refer to a particular 
(unique) individual in a particular situation. When the context/antecedent 
establishes a plurality of situations, the unique individuals picked up by wh-
phrases get relativised to situations, and the identity of the referent is not 
known, or not relevant. This reading is semantically akin to–ever free re- 
latives in English. This reading involves universal quantification over 
situations. Therefore, the intuitive insight in Cheng & Huang (1996) is intact 
on the current account; wh-conditionals are donkey conditionals and have a 
generic interpretation.  
2	   Chinese	  wh-­‐Conditionals:	  Definiteness	  Effect	  
The seminal Cheng & Huang (1996) summarize the typical properties of wh-
conditionals as follows (Cheng & Huang 1996:132): 
(1)  Properties of wh-conditionals 
 a. The (donkey) anaphor must take the form of a wh-word 
 b. The (donkey) wh-word must be identical to the wh-word in the 
antecedent clause 
 c. There must be an element in the consequent clause referring back the 
wh-word in the antecedent clause 
What appears mysterious here is that unlike donkey conditionals in English, 
where the anaphors always take the form of a pronominal, Chinese wh-
conditionals take an identical wh-word as the donkey anaphor. This is the 
notorious ‘matching effect’: wh-phrases in the antecedent and consequent 
clauses of wh-conditionals must be identical in number, form and reference. 
Even minor variations are unacceptable. Example (2) below illustrates a 
typical wh-conditional in Chinese, while (3) illustrates the matching effect: 
(2) Shei xian lai,   shei  xian chi. 
       who  first  come  who first  eat 
      Lit.: ‘If X comes first, X eats first’  
(3) *Shei  xian lai,   shenme ren /tongyang de ren    xian chi. 
           who  first  come  what person the-same DE person first  eat 
Cheng & Huang analyse the wh-conditionals as a case of ‘unselective 
binding’ a la Heim (1982) and Kamp (1981). They treat wh-phrases in wh-
conditionals as indefinites (i.e. variables) that are unselectively bound by a 
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default universal necessity operator. The implicit operator provides universal 
quantificational force for wh-conditionals. Their semantic representation for 
(2) are provided as (4) below: 
(4) ∀x (x come first → x eats first)          (Cheng & Huang 1996:132) 
According to Cheng & Huang, (2) means everybody who comes first eats 
first. This semantics has a plurality commitment. It is committed to multiple 
comers and eaters. However, intuitively, (2) is true if for one particular 
situation, say, Ann’s birthday party tonight, there turns out to be exactly one 
individual who comes first and eats first. It is semantically odd to say 
everybody in the room studies the kangaroo if there is exactly one man in the 
room. If this is the case, it shows (2) has a unique reading in the sense of 
Kadmon (1990).  
The unique reading of wh-conditionals correlates with the definiteness 
effect of wh-conditionals, an observation missed in Cheng & Huang (1996). 
The definiteness effect of wh-conditionals can be illustrated by example (5), 
which shows that the wh-indefinite in the antecedent clause can be 
referentially linked to a partitive expression in the consequent clause: 
(5) Shenme ban  biaoxian hao,   
 what   class perform  well   
 shenme ban  de  sanfenzhiyi jiu  keyi dedao jiangli. 
 what   class DE  one third     then can  get   reward 
       ‘One third of whatever class that perform(s) well will get a reward’ 
Example (5) casts doubt on Cheng & Huang’s claim that wh-indefinites in 
Chinese wh-conditionals are genuine indefinites, because the wh-phrase is 
used as the complement of a partitive with the form ‘NP of wh-NP’. An 
ordinary indefinite cannot be used as the complement DP in a partitive. It is 
well-known that the partitives with the form ‘NP of DP’ are subject to the 
Partitive Constraint (Jackendoff 1972, Barwise & Cooper 1981).  
If we take a stand that wh-indefinites in wh-conditionals are definite 
description-like expressions, we may be able to capture both the uniqueness 
and the definiteness effect. 
3	   The	  Novelty	  Condition	  and	  Principle	  C	  
Cheng & Huang treat wh-indefinites as Heimian indefinites (e.g. a farmer, a 
donkey, etc.), but this runs into a problem with the novelty condition. 
Ordinary indefinites are subject to the novelty condition (cf. Heim 1982, 
365f):  
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(6) * If a mani comes first, a mani eats first.  
As example (6) indicates, ordinary indefinites are required to introduce novel 
entities into the discourse. If wh-phrases are like indefinites, they should each 
introduce a novel entity to the discourse. This prediction hasn’t been borne 
out, because in Chinese wh-conditionals, the wh-phrase in the antecedent and 
the one in the consequent are identical in reference. In other words, the wh-
phrase in the consequent of a conditional introduces a familiar referent rather 
than a novel one. As Chierchia (2000:17) puts, this represents a very bizarre 
picture: 
(7) a. wh-words must introduce a novel variable in the antecedent of a con-
ditional 
 b. wh-words must introduce a non-novel variable in the consequent of a 
conditional 
Chierchia has convincingly shown that if (7) is right, then we no longer have 
a predictive theory of indefinites. The question is why Chinese wh-
conditionals bluntly violate this novelty condition, which is supposed to be 
obeyed by indefinites generally. 
To solve this problem, Chierchia proposes that wh-indefinites in 
Chinese are indefinite pronouns (i.e. pronominals). This explains why wh-
indefinites can appear in the consequent clause of wh-conditionals without 
violating the novelty condition. A pronominal can be used as a discourse 
anaphor. A simple example would illustrate this idea: 
(8) If a mani comes first, hei eats first. 
At first glance, this seems to be a reasonable solution.  Some issues need to 
be addressed, however. First, if wh-phrases in Chinese are indeed indefinite 
pronouns (i.e. pronominals), we expect they should always introduce a 
familiar discourse referent in the antecedent of a conditional, as pronominals 
(and definite descriptions) always do. But a wh-phrase in the antecedent of a 
conditional, however, doesn’t require a linguistic antecedent. One might 
wonder why the familiarity condition doesn’t apply here. The second 
problem is more severe. On Chierchia’s account, wh-phrases are expected to 
be subject to Principle B (because they are pronominals) and pattern with 
ordinary pronouns. However, wh-phrases in Chinese display Principle C 
effect, a fact unexpected on Chierchia’s analysis. Consider the following 
examples: 
(9) a. Sheii shuo tai xihuan wo?  
        who said he like   me 
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         ‘Who said he likes me?’   
          {Johni said hei likes me, Peterj said hej like me, …} 
 b. *Tai shuo sheii xihuan  wo? 
              he  said who like    me 
          ‘Who did he say likes me?’  
          {hei said Johni likes me, hej said Peterj likes me, …} 
(9b) is a strong crossover case. The contrast between (9a) and (9b) indicates 
Chinese wh-phrases are not like pronominals but R-expressions.  The 
following examples adopted from Tran & Bruening (2006) constitute another 
supporting observation: 
 (10) a. *Tai shuo sheii xihuan  wo meimei? 
      he  said who like    my sister 
    ‘Who did he say like my sister?’ 
  b. Tai zongshi shuo *sheii / tai   xihuan  wo meimei. 
   he always said  who he/she like    my sister 
   ‘Hei (always) says *whoi/ hei likes my sister’ 
 c. Sheii (yaoshi)  shuo tai /*sheii xihuan  wo meimei, wo jiu  zou ta. 
  who  if      say  he   who like    my sister   I   then hit he 
  ‘If somebodyi says hei/*whoi likes my sister, I will hit him’ 
As all the examples under (10) clearly indicates, Chinese wh-phrases stand 
with R-expressions rather than pronouns. We face a paradoxical dilemma 
here. On one hand, if Chierchia’s proposal is indeed right, then we have to 
explain why wh-phrases display Principle C effect everywhere else. On the 
other hand, if wh-phrases are not pronominals, why can they appear in the 
consequent clause and remain anaphorically linked to the wh-phrase in the 
antecedent in wh-conditionals? 
4	   Indefinites	  and	  Uniqueness	  
The definite reading of wh-conditionals is most ready when a unique referent 
is being established. To consider: 
(11) A: (Zai zheci xuanju zhong), Zhang San bu  xihuan  shei? 
             (in this election,)        Zhang San NEG like    who 
            ‘Whom doesn’t Zhang San like (in this election)?’ 
 B: Shei  bu  tou  Wang Wu de  piao,              
             who  neg vote Wang Wu DE vote    
           Zhang San jiu  bu  xihuan  shei. 
           Zhang San then NEG like    who 
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          ‘Who doesn’t vote for Wang Wu, Zhang San then doesn’t like who.’ 
When uttered out of the blue (i.e. in a neutral context), (11B) can mean 
Zhang San hates whoever that doesn’t vote for Wang Wu. If there is more 
than one event involving voting for or against Wang Wu, then Zhang San 
would have correspondingly more than one (possibly different) persons to 
dislike. This reading is akin to general statement about Zhang San’s personal 
disposition. However, when the antecedent establishes some unique referent, 
like in (11A) above, (11B) is true in the situation that there is exactly one 
person, say, Li Si, who doesn’t vote for Wang Wu, and Zhang San dislikes Li 
Si. However, (11B) also allows a multiple-individual reading. Suppose there 
are three persons, Li Si, Ma Liu and Zhang Qi, who decide not to vote for 
Wang Wu, then (11B) is true only when Zhang San dislikes all the persons 
that don’t vote for Wang Wu (in this case, they are Li Si, Ma Liu and Zhang 
Qi).  
The exactly one reading is the uniqueness reading. But what is 
uniqueness? How can an indefinite generate a unique interpretation? In the 
literature, it has been reported that an indefinite under certain circumstances 
can have a unique reading (cf. Evans (1980), Kadmon (1990), Heim (1990), 
among others). There are multiple ways to encode the uniqueness into 
semantic representations. We follow Brasoveanu (2007, 2008), who adopts a 
Russellian treatment. The Russellian semantics of definites consists in 
existence, maximality and singleton presuppositions. This can be demon-
strated below: 
When the wh-phrase denotes a singleton: 
(12) Shei        xian         lai 
        ∃X [X≠∅ &   X= {y: person (y) & first_come (y)}   &  #X=1]               
        existence                           maximality                        singleton 
                                                                    uniqueness 
When the wh-phrase denotes a plurality: 
(13) Na-xie      ren    xian lai 
        which-cl (pl.) person  first  come 
        ∃X[X≠∅ &   X= {y: person (y) & first_come (y)}   &  #X>1]               
        existence                           maximality                           plural 
When the wh-phrases denote a plurality, we assume there is a maximality 
operation in the sense of Link (1983) and Grosu & Landman (1998) that turns 
the plurality into a maximalized individual. In lattice-theoretic terms, if a and 
b are individuals, then the sum of a and b (written as a ⊕ b) is also an 
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individual. The technical details of this lattice-theoretic approach to plurality 
are immaterial here. We entertain here the maximal individual of a poset <X, 
≤> is the least upper bound of X.  
The MAX operation always returns a plural individual. In this sense it is 
still singular, and the wh-phrases remain unique. Kadmon (1990) has another 
example that shows uniqueness is related to maximal collections. In the 
following (14), they /three of them refer to the maximal collection of the 
chairs that Leif owns. 
(14) Leif has four chairs. They / Three of them are in the kitchen. (ex. 24) 
This uniqueness-based account offers a straightforward explanation for the 
definiteness effect, for both the singular-individual reading and the multiple-
individual reading.  Our analysis predicts that the following sentence is 
ambiguous between distributive and collective interpretations: 
(15) Shenme  ban   biaoxian hao,              
         what    class  perform  well     
         shenme  ban   de  sanfenzhiyi jiu  keyi dedao jiangli. 
         what    class  DE one-third   then can  get   reward 
        ‘One third of whatever class(es) that perform well get(s) a reward’ 
The sentence allows both the distributive reading and collective reading. On 
the distributive reading, it means for each class that performs well, one third 
of its members will be rewarded. The other reading, i.e. collective reading is 
compatible with the situation that for some class, none of its members get 
rewarded, while for some other classes, all of the members get rewarded. 
While this ambiguity can be attributed to a lack of number specification in 
nominal quantification in Chinese, the definiteness/uniqueness plays an 
essential role here. 
5	   Wh-­‐Conditionals	  as	  Identity	  Statements	  
We have shown that the definiteness effect that remains elusive on the 
previous accounts can be captured by assuming wh-indefinites encode 
uniqueness. The uniqueness effect shows up when anaphora is attempted. 
However, there is a notable difficulty with this claim. While a unique 
indefinite is always referred back by a pronoun (e.g. Leif has a chair. It is in 
the kitchen), in wh-conditionals, the anaphor is an identical wh-phrase rather 
than a pronoun. How to account for this matching requirement in wh-
conditionals? 
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A straightforward solution to this problem is to treat wh-conditionals in 
Chinese as identity statements. If wh-conditionals are treated along with 
identity statement, we will also be able to reconcile the tension between the 
novelty condition and Principle C. It is well-known that overt identity 
statements are immune to the novelty condition: 
(16) A man who drinks alcopops is a man who gets a hangover.  
In (16), the indefinite a man doesn’t c-command the other one. However, the 
novelty condition doesn’t apply here, and the indefinite expressions are 
happy to remain identical in reference. We assume in identity statements like 
(20), the novelty condition is being overridden here. It is being overridden 
because there is an overt identity operation that forces the indefinite 
expressions to pick up the same referent. In another word, the novelty 
condition is an Elsewhere Condition (EC) which applies only when it can. If 
Chinese wh-conditionals are subject to a similar identity operation, then we 
find a way to reconcile the tension between the novelty condition and 
Principle C. But how could this be achieved? 
On the present account, wh-indefinites are subject to a σ-operation, 
where σ should be understood to stand for uniqueness: 
(17) Shei xian lai,   shei xian chi. 
 The antecedent: [[ shei xian lai ]]  = σx. person(x) & first_come (x) 
The issue here is how the wh-indefinite in the consequent clause is 
being interpreted. We assume there is a covert identity operation: 
(18) Shei xian lai, shei xian chi 
  [who first come]x λx [first eat  [σy [person (y) & y=x ]]] 
On this account, the antecedent wh-indefinite shei xian lai ‘who comes first’ 
binds the variables x by λ-abstraction. The wh-anaphor is interpreted as a 
definite description, introducing a variable that is identical to the one 
previously introduced, which is x in the antecedent.  
It is been proposed, since Cooper (1979), that donkey anaphors should 
be interpreted as generalized D-type pronouns (cf. also Heim & Kratzer 1998, 
Elbourne 2005, among others). The D-type pronouns contain both a definite 
description and a free relation variable R which helps fix the referent of the 
definite description. Cooper assumes R is provided by pragmatic saliency. 
This idea has been challenged by Heim (1990), who notices that donkey 
anaphora is subject to a condition which she dubs as Formal Link Condition, 
that is, the donkey anaphor requires an explicit linguistic antecedent (e.g. 
every man who has a wife is sitting next to her vs. */??every married man is 
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sitting next to her). Chinese wh-conditionals may constitute another 
supporting evidence for the D-type pronoun analysis for donkey anaphors. 
Instead of looking for any linguistic antecedent, the wh-anaphor looks for an 
identical antecedent to fix its referent. R in this case is always provided by an 
explicit linguistic antecedent. And ‘identity’ is to be understood in Leibniz’s 
way (i.e. ‘x =y’ is true iff for any predicate P, P(x) if and only if P(y)). This 
treatment yields the correct semantics for wh-conditionals: 
(19) a. the antecedent: [[ shei xian lai ]]  = σx. [person (x) & first_come (x)] 
 b. the wh-anaphor: [[ shei (xian chi) ]] = σy.[person (y) & y=x & R(y))] 
 c. R → λx. first_come (x) 
 d. the wh-anaphor: [[ shei (xian chi) ]] = σx. [person (x) & first_come 
(x)] 
 e. the consequent:λz. first_eat (z) (σx. [person (x) & first_come (x)]) 
                                   = first_eat (σx. (person (x) & first_come (x))) 
 g. [[ shei xian lai, shei xian chi]] =1  iff the individual who comes first is 
the individual who eats first. 
On this account, wh-conditionals are semantically akin to free relatives in 
English. Despite the structural differences, it is easy to see Chinese wh-
conditionals and English free relatives may share a common semantics, since 
all English free relatives can be translated as identity statements (cf. 
Moltmann (2010)):1 
(20) Whoever comes first eats first   
  = the first comer is the first eater 
 I don’t like whatever you bought 
  = the thing(s) you bought is(are) the thing(s) I don’t like 
The matching requirement provides another independent evidence for this 
analysis. We assume without the copula to mark identity in Chinese wh-
conditionals, identity of form is a prerequisite to identity of reference (see 
(3)). Not surprisingly, we find the same form-matching restriction is also 
operative in English identity statements. Consider the following examples: 
(21) */? A man who drinks alcopops is someone / the same person / the man  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The structural differences between Chinese wh-conditionals and English free relatives may turn 
out to be superficial. Citko (2001) proposes that in a simple free relative like John ate what Mary 
cooked, the single instance of what is an argument of both ate and cooked. However, due to 
Deletion under Identity, the lower copy what gets deleted at PF. The only difference between 
Chinese and English, viewed in this light, is unlike English, the two copies of the wh-indefinite 
must stay at PF in Chinese.  
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  who gets a hangover. 
To summarize, it is the identity relation that is responsible for the identity in 
reference between the wh-indefinites and the inapplicability of the novelty 
condition in wh-conditionals. This identity reading renders wh-conditionals 
semantically akin to identity statement.  
The above discussion results in a novel syntactic analysis for wh-
conditionals. That is, wh-conditionals are topic-comment structures like 
correlatives (cf. Bittner 2001, Dayal 1997, among others), in which the 
antecedent wh-indefinite is topical, which is commented by the consequent 
wh-clause. We believe this analysis is on the right track, for several reasons. 
First, to treat wh-conditionals as topic-comment structures, we can derive the 
identity in reference between the wh-indefinites effortlessly. All we need to 
do is to assume the relationship between the topic and comment is that of 
identity. Second, the analysis suggests a more motivated explanation for the 
matching requirement in wh-conditionals. On this analysis, the wh-indefinite 
antecedents are topics, and we cannot mark an indefinite as topical (by means 
of wh-morphology) and not comment about it: ‘the intuitive idea is that topic-
comment sequencing presupposes that the comment is about the topic. It 
requires … every topical discourse referent introduced in the topic updated to 
be picked up by an anaphoric element in the comment update’ (Bittner 2001). 
We believe this move (i.e. to treat wh-conditionals as topic-comment 
structures) is welcome. Recently, it has been frequently proposed that 
conditionals are topic-comment constructions (cf. Lewis 1973, Bittner 2001, 
Schlenker 2004, Ebert, Endriss & Hinterwimmer 2008, among others).  
6	   On	  the	  Generic	  Interpretation	  of	  wh-­‐Conditionals	  
In addition to the definite interpretation, wh-conditionals can also be used as 
general statements and are open to a generic interpretation. This 
interpretation has ignorance, indifference and free choice implications. 
6.1	   The	  Ignorance	  Implication	  
Wh-conditionals have some ignorance implications (i.e. the speaker/agent’s 
epistemic uncertainty about identity of the referent denoted by the wh-phrase, 
or more plainly, the speaker/agent doesn’t know who has the property P). So 
(22a) has some implication as (22b): 
(22) a. Shei xian lai,   shei  xian chi. 
  who first  come  who first  eat 
 b. The person who comes first eats first, but I don’t know who will be 
the one that comes first 
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6.2	   The	  Indifference	  Implication	  
Wh-conditionals also have indifference implications (i.e. the speaker/agent’s 
intentional or unintentional indiscriminateness with respect to the identity of 
the referent denoted by the wh-phrase, or more plainly, the speaker/agent 
doesn’t care who has the property P). (23a) has some implication as shown by 
(23b): 
(23) a. Shei zuihou  lai   wanhui, shei  xi   wan 
             who last    come party   who wash dish 
 b. the person who arrived last for the party washes the dishes 
           Counterfactual implication: it could be anyone else that washed the  
           dishes if he was the last person for the party 
6.3	   Free	  Choice	  Implication	  
Wh-conditionals also have some free choice implication under certain 
circumstance. To consider: 
Context: the university requires 50 credits for a bachelor’s degree, and 
Mary has already got 47 credits. To fulfill the university’s requirement, Mary 
has to get 3 more credits. There are three courses Mary can register for this 
purpose. Each course has 3 credits. The following sentence is felicitous: 
(24) Ni  xuan   na-men   kecheng, na-men  kecheng jiu  keyi  
 you choose  which-CL course   which-CL course   then  can   
 rang ni   biye.  
 let   you  graduate 
 ‘Whichever course you take can let you graduate’ 
6.4	   Deriving	  the	  Generic	  Interpretation	  
These observations bring wh-conditionals semantically closer to –ever FRs in 
English. Dayal (1997) argues that –ever FRs in English always involve some 
universal quantification over identity alternatives to the worlds of evaluation. 
Following Dayal, we assume the generic reading of Chinese wh-conditionals 
are derived in a similar way. The wh-conditionals contain a null adverbial 
quantifier GEN over world variables. And wh-phrases are concepts, i.e. from 
possible worlds to individuals: 
(25) [[  shei xian lai ]]  = λi. σx[first-come (x)](i) 
(26) GEN ⇒ λPλQ.∀i-Alt∈f(w)(s)){P(i),Q(i)}, where  
 (i) f(w)(s) is the set of worlds the speaker’s belief hold and  
 (ii) a world w’∈f(w)(s) is an i-alternative iff there exists some w’’ such  
             that σx[P(w’)(x)]≠σx[P(w’’)(x)] 
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This semantics captures the modal implications (i.e. the ignorance, 
indifference and free choice implications) by treating them as 
presuppositional content of wh-clauses and attributes the generic reading to a 
generic context.2 The unique referent denoted by the wh-phrase is being 
relativised to worlds, i.e. for each world, there is a unique individual involved 
in it. And quantification is over the worlds rather than individuals. We arrive 
at the following truth conditions for the generic reading:  
(27) a. [[ shei xian lai, shei xian chi]]  = 1 iff 
            ∀i∈f(w)(s)){first_eat (i) (σx (person (x) & first_come (x) (i))} 
        b. As far as the speaker’s belief is concerned, the first comer is the first 
eater 
7	   Are	  Chinese	  wh-­‐Conditionals	  Ambiguous?	  
The previous discussion unambiguously leads to an ambiguous end, namely, 
that Chinese wh-conditionals are ambiguous. Semantically, Chinese wh-
conditionals are akin to English FRs, which have two varieties: plain FRs and 
–ever FRs. English plain FRs are argued to have a prima facie definite/unique 
interpretation, while –ever FRs have some universal quantification 
interpretation (cf. Jacobson (1995), among others). Dayal (1997) proposes the 
universal quantificational force of –ever FRs is contributed by ever, which 
adds some modality to the semantic representation and renders FRs to be 
interpreted attributively.3 A plausible assumption extending to Chinese wh-
conditionals is that Chinese wh-conditionals conflate this distinction (between 
plain FRs and –ever FRs) and are always open to two interpretations. Chinese 
lacks a lexical item like ever for the generic interpretation, and sometimes 
only the context/pragmatics can tell which reading is the most salient one.  
At this moment, we should give some credit to Cheng & Huang (1996), 
who analyse wh-conditionals on a par with donkey conditionals in English. 
The ambiguity between definite and generic readings of wh-conditionals is 
also present in English donkey conditionals. Kadmon (1990) observes that 
donkey conditionals have both an absolute unique (definite) reading and a 
universal reading. She distinguishes one-case conditionals from multi-case 
conditionals (e.g. one-case conditionals: If there is a doctor in London and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For a slightly different version about the modal flavour of –ever FRs please see von Fintel 
(2000). Limit of space prohibits a fuller comparison and implementation of those ideas. 
3 Donnellan (1966) distinguishes two uses of definites: referential vs. attributive. According to 
Dayal, the primary semantic function of ever is to force the FRs to be read attributively. 
Otherwise, FRs always receive a referential /absolute unique reading.  
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he is Welsh, then we are all set vs. multi-case conditionals: If a semanticist 
hears of a good job, she applies for it). 
We propose the choice between the two interpretations is regulated by 
context in Chinese. When the context is unspecified about the fixation of the 
referent, it has a generic reading, whereas when the context imposes some 
absolute uniqueness requirement of the referent, it has a definite reading: 
(28) Wo wangji  ni  jie-le    ji-ben      shu  gei wo le  
 I  forget  you lend-ASP how-many-CL book to  me ASP 
 Danshi, ni  jie-le    shenme gei wo, wo jiu  huan-gei ni    
 But    you lend-ASP what   to  me I   then return-to  you  
 shenme le.  
 what   ASP 
 I don’t remember how many books you lent me, but 
 I’ve returned to you whatever books you lent me 
  I’ve returned to you the books you lent me 
  I’ve returned to you all the books you lent me 
In (28), when the antecedent specifies a particular case/situation (i.e. 
book-lending by you to me), the generic reading is no longer the preferred 
one. And the ignorance and indifference implications also disappear. (28) 
simply expresses the speaker has returned all the books the addressee lent to 
him. 
Semantically, the difference between the definite vs. universal readings 
of Chinese wh-conditionals boils down to a difference in granularity level of 
the quantification (see Brasoveanu 2007). The quantification can be coarse-
grained, i.e. we ‘collectively’ quantify over topical cases/situations, which 
boils down to quantifying over topical individuals – and the consequent 
clause is predicated about these individuals. This yields the definite /unique 
reading. Alternatively, the quantification can be fine-grained, i.e. we 
‘distributively’ quantify over the topical cases/situations introduced by the 
antecedent – and the consequent clause is predicated of each of such 
cases/situations. This yields the universal interpretation.  
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Abstract. This paper provides evidence for a structural difference between
two classes of antonym adjectives, namely, total and partial adjectives, for ex-
ample, clean and dirty (Yoon 1996; Rotstein & Winter 2004). Based on data
from morpho-phonological processes in Czech we argue that only total adjec-
tives have their standard value represented in the derivation. In contrast, the stan-
dard value of the partial adjectives is determined pragmatically. Furthermore, we
argue that antonym adjectives must be at least sometimes represented by over-
lapping scales. A consequence of the proposed analysis is that an empirically
adequate account of antonym adjectives must supply a part of the denotation
from lexical semantics and part from the context.
1 Introduction
Czech, West Slavic, has a productive system of a semantically driven morpho-
phonological reduplication (Marantz 1982; Inkelas & Zoll 2005). One such
example comes from the morphological marking of aspect. The imperfective
verbal morpheme -va- is often called habitual since it may encode iterativity
if reduplicated, as in (1). The effect of reduplication is indeed semantic and as
such has truth-conditional effects: the reduplicated form may be used in habit-
ual or generic sentences, as seen in (2a), but it is incompatible with episodic
sentences, as can be seen in (2b).
(1) a. praco-va-l
work-IMPERF-PP.M.SG.
‘he worked’ Imperfective/generic
b. praco-vá-va-l
work-IMPERF-IMPERF-PP.M.SG.
‘he used to work’ iterative
c. praco-vá-vá-va-l
work-IMPERF-IMPERF-IMPERF-PP.M.SG.
∗ We would like to thank Chris Kennedy, Henk Zeevat and the audiences at the Szklarska Poreba
2010 worhshop and the SuB conference. The authors are happy to acknowledge that MD was
financially supported by GACˇR (grant 405/09/0677).
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‘he used to work’ iterative (emphatic)
(2) a. Petr
Petr
každé
every
ráno
morning
cˇistí-vá-va-l
clean-IMPERF-IMPERF-PP.M.SG.
okno.
window
‘Peter used to clean the window every morning.’ Xhabitual/ge-
neric
b. *Petr
Petr
vcˇera
yesterday
ráno
morning
cˇistí-vá-va-l
clean-IMPERF-IMPERF-PP.M.SG.
okno.
window
‘Peter used to clean the window yesterday in the morning.’ *episo-
dic
This paper focuses on another type of semantically driven reduplication, na-
mely, reduplication in antonym adjectives. Czech gradable antonym adjectives
may contain a degree morpheme which meaning roughly corresponds to En-
glish very. If the degree morpheme undergoes a process of reduplication, the re-
sulting meaning of the adjective may be paraphrased as ‘very, very. . . (clean)’,
i.e., emphasizing the standard value of the adjective. Native speakers charac-
terize the resulting interpretation as that of reaching the absolute degree of
adjectiveness (for example, of cleanness).
The fact that interests us here is that not every gradable antonym adjective
may undergo the reduplication process. Even though any gradable antonym
adjective may contain a degree morpheme, the morpheme may be reduplicated
only in so-called total adjectives, never in their partial counterparts, following
the terminology of Yoon 1996. The contrast is shown in (3) and (4). Here,
the adjectives cˇistý ‘clean’ and zavrˇený ‘closed’ provide an example of total
adjectives and the adjectives špinavý ‘dirty’ and otevrˇený ‘open’ provide an
example of partial adjectives.
(3) cˇistý ‘clean’ vs. špinavý ‘dirty’
a. cˇistý→ cˇist’ounký→ cˇist’oulinký→ cˇist’oulilinký. . . Xredupli-
cation
b. špinavý→ špinavoulinký→ *špinavoulilinký. . . *reduplication
(4) zavrˇený ‘closed’ vs. otevrˇený ‘open’
a. zavrˇený→ zavrˇenˇoulinký→ zavrˇenˇoulilinký Xreduplication
b. otevrˇený→ otevrˇenˇoulinký→ *otevrˇenˇoulilinký. . . *reduplication
For presentational purposes we demonstrate the reduplication process in stages.
First, we observe that for the degree morpheme to be inserted the stem of the
adjective need to be modified. The change of the stem is independently moti-
vated by phonotactic constraints on this type of morphological formation and
does not directly concern us here. Once the morpheme – in our case, an in-
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fix -li-, meaning roughly ‘very’ – is inserted, the morpheme may be redupli-
cated without any further phonological or morphological change of the stem. In
contrast, as the (b) examples show, even though the partial adjectives špinavý
‘dirty’ and otevrˇený ‘open’ may be modified by the same degree morpheme,
reduplication of this morpheme is impossible. Further examples demonstrating
the contrast are given in (5).
(5) Some further examples (source: the Czech National Corpus):
cˇistý (clean) cˇist’oulilinký
zavrˇený (closed) zavrˇenˇoulilinký
zdravý (healthy) zdravoulilinký
rovný (straight) rovnˇoulilinký
tenký (thin) tenoulilinký
jemný (slight) jemnˇoulilinký
chabý (faint) chaboulilinký
krˇehký (fragile) krˇehoulilinký
špinavý (dirty) *špinavoulilinký
otevrˇený (open) *otevrˇenˇoulilinký
nemocný (ill) *nemocnˇoulilinký
zahnutý (bent) *zahnˇutoulilinký
tlustý (thick) *tlust’oulilinký
hrubý (rough) *hruboulilinký
pevný (solid) *pevnˇoulilinký
nerozbitný (unbreakable) ???
The observed restriction on reduplication is rather puzzling since it does not
hold for its semantically closest variant, i.e., adverbial modification by velmi
‘very’, as can be seen in (6). Similarly, the closest English paraphrase (the
repetition of ‘very’) is compatible with both total and partial adjectives as well,
as in (7).
(6) No restriction on adverbial modification:
a. velmi
very
cˇistý
clean
b. velmi
very
špinavý
dirty
(7) No restriction on English adverbial modification:
a. very very very clean
b. very very very dirty
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Crucially, the restriction on reduplication cannot be explained in phonologi-
cal or morphological terms either because neither semantic class of the ad-
jectives forms a phonological or morphological natural class. Furthermore, if
there were any phonotactic restrictions they should be equally resolved within
the morpho-phonological changes accompanying the primary modification by
the degree morpheme.
The rest of the paper provides evidence that the restriction on reduplica-
tion stems from distinct semantic properties of the two classes of adjectives.
Concretely, we will argue that the reduplication process refers to a meaning
component that is structurally present only in total adjectives. The correspond-
ing meaning component in partial adjectives is never present in the derivation.
Instead, it is supplied by the context. Consequently, it cannot serve as an anchor
for morpho-phonological processes. We will outline our semantic assumptions
and present the actual proposal in section 2. Section 3 investigates English
adverbial modification by almost and compares it with the Czech reduplica-
tion case. As we will see, there is a sharp contrast between English and Czech:
while the English type of modification is sensitive to the context, this pragmatic
strategy fails to rescue reduplication of Czech partial adjectives thus providing
further evidence for the present proposal. Section 4 concludes.
2 Proposal
We assume scalar semantics for adjectives, i.e., the positive form of an adjec-
tive denotes a subinterval of the scale SA where the subinterval depends on a
standard value dA in the scale and where the scale is ordered by a relation RA
defined with respect to the standard value dA ∈ SA (Cresswell 1977; von Ste-
chow 1984; Bierwisch 1989; Klein 1991). Furthermore, we assume that the
standard value variable dA is context dependent.1 The denotation of the posi-
tive form of an adjective can be formalized as in (8) (after Rotstein & Winter
2004: ex. (18)):2
(8) JAK de f= {x ∈ SA : RA(dA,x)}
The complete lexical semantics of the adjective like long can be then formal-
ized using λ -abstraction as follows:
(9) JlongK= λdAλx.long(x)≥ dA
1 For example, the standard value for big is set differently in a big house than in a big mouse.
2 Notice the denotation of an adjective in (8) must be mapped on the set of entities for the degree
of A-ness to be included in JAK otherwise the intersection interpretation of the AP within an NP
yields a type-mismatch.
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In the function talk – the denotation of an adjective like long is a function
from a context set degree dA and an individual x which yields truth value 1 if
and only if the degree of the length of the individual x exceeds the degree dA.3
Degree dA can be given explicitly (in most cases by a noun which is modified by
the adjective) or implicitly. The relation ≥ is supplied by an invisible operator
pos which operates on the adjective and assigns truth value 1 only to those
individuals (when the adjective is used predicatively) which exceed the average
degree for the comparison class. Von Stechow (1984: R6) defines pos in the
following way:
(10) Positive
Let A0 be any adjective meaning, C be any appropriate property, x be
any appropriate individual and w be any world. Then w ∈ JposK iff
(∃d) [d is an A0-degree & d > average [A0,C] & x has d in w & w ∈
C(x)].
A sentence like Ferda is a big cat is true in a world w iff Ferda has a degree of
bigness which exceeds the average degree of bigness for cats in the world of
evaluation.
Here we are concerned with two basic types of antonym adjectives: par-
tial and total adjectives.4 We semantically represent total and partial adjectives
by a scale and a standard value. A partial adjective indicates some amount of
the relevant property (moisture, dirt, sickness etc.), while a total adjective in-
dicates no amount of such property (e.g., a dirty object has some degree of
dirtiness, but it is not necessarily free of cleanliness; in contrast, a clean object
is free of dirtiness). As for their semantic denotation, we follow Rotstein &
Winter (2004) in formalizing total v. partial adjectives as overlapping scales,
schematized in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Total and Partial adjective scales
3 Notice that the type of the adjective is not a predicate, 〈e, t〉, but a function from degrees into a
function from individuals to truth values: 〈d,〈e, t〉〉.
4 We put aside so-called relative adjectives. In relative adjectives, no member of an antonym pair
has it standard value set independently of the context (Kennedy & McNally 2005; Kennedy 2007).
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In Figure 1, SP is a partial scale, without a fixed standard value (context-
dependent). ST is a total scale; its standard value is fixed as the lower bound
of its partial counterpart (a healthy man is a man that lacks any illness). Cru-
cially, ST and SP are ordered inversely and SP may partially overlap with ST .
What this means is that some amount of the relevant partial property does not
exclude some amount of the complementary total property. For instance, if a
coat is dirty it can mean that it is stained on sleeves but the rest of the coat is
clean.
Following von Stechow (2007); Heim (2008), among others, we represent
antonym adjectives as complements/negations of each other, the denotation of
adjectives like clean and dirty are related by the operation of being a com-
plement of each other’s respective scales. We thus follow a linguistic tradition
which treats antonyms as lexically related instead of being syntactically de-
composed in syntax.5
More formally, we define the relation between partial and total adjec-
tives with respect to the standard value of the total adjective represented as the
lower bound of its partial counterpart (following Rotstein & Winter 2004 contra
Kennedy & McNally 2005). Crucially, the scales may partially overlap and the
impression of their antonymous interpretation (not clean  dirty) comes from
an interaction of their interval boundaries and their standard values. As for the
denotation of partial adjectives, their standard value is determined contextu-
ally. Consequently, the standard value of a partial adjective has no structural
representation:
(11) dP ∈ SP; SP . . . closure of the partial scale
In contrast, the denotation of a total adjective defines the standard value of the
total member of an adjectival pair as the lower bound of its partial counterpart:
(12) dT = Pmin ∈ ST ; ST . . . closure of the total scale
With the formal semantics of antonym adjectives in place we can ap-
proach the question of the denotation of reduplication. The intuition is that
reduplication corresponds to semantic modification, i.e., adjectives with redu-
plicated morphemes denote some interval close to the standard value. Since
this is semantic modification, it depends on the type of the scale in the denota-
tion of the adjective with which it combines. More formally, we argue that the
denotation of reduplication corresponds to a limit function where the limit is
defined as the standard value of the total adjective. Thus, our first step to the
5 Heim (2008) provides an argument that antonyms are not decomposed in syntax contra Büring
(2007a,b).
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formalization can be captured as follows:
(13) J-li-li-K≈ dT
The resulting denotation corresponds to approaching the standard value of the
adjective. If we apply the denotation of the reduplication to a total adjective,
for example, to cˇistý ‘clean’, we get the following outcome:
(14) J cˇist’ou-li-li-. . . nký K= λx∃d[d ≈ dT ∧ clean(d)(x)]
The formalization captures the fact that the denotation of a total adjective is
not a function from degrees and individuals to truth values, but instead it is a
function from individuals to truth values. This stems from the fact that the de-
gree dA is not a context dependent variable,6 but instead the variable is existen-
tially closed and its value approaches the standard value of its total counterpart.
Consequently, the denotation of a reduplicated adjective is not dependent on a
context fixation of the standard value dA anymore.
After we further abstract over the adjective, we end up with the following
denotation:
(15) J -li-li-. . .K= λGλx∃d[d ≈ dT ∧G(d)(x)]
We speculate that the reduplication takes place instead of the invisible oper-
ator pos which can be found in relative adjectives. There are two differences
between pos and reduplication morpheme: First, since the reduplication mor-
pheme replaces pos, it does not need any comparison class from the linguistic
or extralinguistic context, consequently, a reduplicated adjective is not depen-
dent on the context. Second, the relation between the degree and an individual
is a limit function, instead of ≥.7 Even if both pos and the reduplication mor-
pheme existentially close the degree variable, they do it in a different way – the
operator pos makes the denotation of the adjective dependent on a comparison
class C but the reduplication is not dependent on any comparison class at all.8
The proposed formalization makes certain predictions about interactions
between different types of adjectives and reduplication. First of all, since redu-
6 As it is the case in the denotation of relative adjectives.
7 We put aside any relativization to possible worlds because we use a purely extensional framework
in this paper.
8 We assume that different speaker standards for total adjectives come from extralinguistic factors
and not from the semantics itself – e.g. if we consider the sentence The dishes are clean, which can
be true for one speaker and false for another one depending on their personal standard, one might
think that the interspeaker disagreement comes from a semantic context dependency. However, we
believe this type of difference in speakers judgements come solely from extralinguistic factors and
does not need to be represented in semantics proper.
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plication is a morpho-phonological process, it may only apply to a material
present in the derivation.9 What this means with respect to our data is that redu-
plication is possible only if the standard value is structurally represented. Con-
sequently, we predict that reduplication applies only to total adjectives since
only total adjectives have their standard value structurally represented as some
value in the closure of the total scale. In contrast, the standard value of a partial
adjective is determined contextually and may fall anywhere within the inter-
val. What this means is that there is no structural representation of the standard
value. Consequently, there is no material that could be used for reduplication.
Thus, we have successfully derived the contrast between partial and total ad-
jectives with respect to reduplication.
3 Further Evidence: Context and the Standard Value
Interestingly, English adverbial modification by almost shows similar proper-
ties to the Czech adjectival reduplication. As can be seen in (16), almost usually
combines with total adjectives but not with partial adjectives. This restriction
is parallel to the restriction observed for the Czech reduplication paradigm and
as such invites the question of whether we deal with the same phenomenon.
(16) (from Rotstein & Winter 2004: ex. (9))
a. The work is almost complete/*incomplete.
b. The patient is almost dead/*alive.
c. The explanation is almost clear/*unclear.
The basic observation about almost is that almost cross-categorically denotes
negation of the denotation of the constituent it modifies:
(17) a. John almost passed the exam John didn’t pass the exam
b. Almost every student passed the exam Not every student passed
the exam
c. John is almost healthy John isn’t healthy
In order to account for the semantics of English almost, Rotstein & Winter
(2004) proposed that the interval associated with the phrase almost A denotes
degrees that are adjacent to the standard value of A and are in the opposite
direction from the ordering of the scale associated with the adjective A. If we
apply this denotation to our semantics of total and partial adjectives, the in-
9 We believe this claim is fairly theory neutral. At least, we are not aware of any generative model
of morpho-phonology where this reasoning wouldn’t apply. In fact, this type of dependency can be
easily reformulated in representational terms as well, yielding the same result.
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compatibility of almost and partial adjectives can be derived in the following
way. First, recall that under our semantics for total and partial adjectives, if
the standard value of a partial adjective equals the standard value of a total
adjective (just on the opposite scale), then the adjectives are complementary.
Consequently, the partial adjective cannot be modified by almost because there
is no complement interval between dP and 0.
There is an interesting prediction stemming from this formalization. One
of the crucial distinctions between total and partial adjectives lies in the way
their standard value is represented. While the standard value of a total adjective
is structurally fixed as the lower bound of its partial counterpart, the standard
value of a partial adjective is not fixed in the structure but instead it is con-
textually dependent. What this amounts to is that in a neutral context English
speakers tend to fix the standard value of a partial adjective as the minimum.
However, this is not necessary. If we create an appropriate context, the standard
value can be shifted further up the scale. If this happen, we create a non-empty
interval between dP and 0. Such a shift is schematically shown in Figure 2. If
such an interval exists, then it should be able to feed into the denotation of al-
most. Consequently, if such modification is possible, a partial adjective should
become modifiable by almost. This prediction is indeed borne out as observed
by Kennedy (2007). Examples in (18) and (19) demonstrate the shift.
Figure 2: Modification by almost
(18) (from Kennedy 2007)
a. We need a rod that is bent in an angle of 90 degrees. Let’s pick
up that rod over there and bend it a little: it should be easy, as it’s
almost bent already.
b. We consider a glass dirty and wash it as soon as there are five
spots on it. This glass is now almost dirty – it has four spots on
it.
(19) (from Kennedy 2007)
a. We need a TALL basketball player – one whose height is at least
1.95 meters. But we cannot take John, who is 1.90 meters – he’s
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just almost tall.
b. The publisher considers a book long if it’s 300 pages or more.
This book is almost long – it’s 298 pages.
In the previous section we have proposed that the impossibility of reduplication
of partial adjectives is a direct consequence of their standard value not being
structurally present. We have argued that the restriction has nothing to do with
the actual position of the standard value on the scale but instead it results from
the lack of a structural material available for the morpho-phonological pro-
cess of reduplication. Could it be the case that in fact the denotation of the
process of reduplication should be stated in terms of a complement interval
exactly as the denotation of English almost? These two hypotheses make dis-
tinct predictions. If we follow the denotation for English almost, we predict
that exactly as in English, reduplication of partial adjectives should improve
in a context that pushes the standard value of a partial adjectives further away
from the minimum. In contrast, our structural hypothesis predicts that the dis-
tance between the standard value and the minimum should not make any dif-
ference: if reduplication depends on the standard value being structurally fixed,
it should not matter whether or not the standard value is distinct from the mini-
mum value. The reason is that the contextual fixation happens only later in the
derivation (in the semantics/pragmatics component) and as such it cannot affect
the morpho-phonological process that necessarily takes place before the prag-
matic component sets the standard value. Thus, the prediction of our proposal
is that even if we modify the context, reduplication of Czech partial adjectives
should still fail. Interestingly, this prediction is indeed borne out, as examples
in (20), modelled after Rotstein & Winter (2004), show. No matter how hard
we try to modify the context, what we see is that reduplication in Czech partial
adjectives, unlike almost-modification in English, cannot be improved.
(20) a. This glass is certainly not clean, since it has several big spots on
it and I am not willing to drink from it even if you insist. The
glass is simply. . .
*špinavoulilinká ‘very very dirty’
b. This glass is certainly not dirty, since it has absolutely no dirty
spots on it. The glass is simply. . .
Xcˇist’oulilinká ‘very very clean’
4 Conclusion
We have examined a surprising contrast between partial and total adjectives
that emerges in a semantically driven morpho-phonological process of redupli-
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cation in Czech. While total adjectives can be reduplicated, partial adjectives
cannot. This is unexpected because a formally distinct but semantically parallel
process of adverbial modification does not show any such restriction. We have
argued that the pattern can be explained if we adopt Yoon’s and Rotstein &
Winter’s account of total and partial adjectives. According to them, there is a
structural difference between partial and total adjectives: Only total adjectives
have their standard value represented in the derivation, the standard value of
partial adjectives is derived from the context. Furthermore, we have argued that
antonym adjectives cannot be represented by adjacent scales but instead they
must be allowed to partially overlap (in agreement with Rotstein & Winter 2004
and contra Kennedy & McNally 2005; Kennedy 2007). Crucially, we have ar-
gued that the semantics of antonym adjectives must be formalized as a com-
bination of grammatically encoded (semantics) and contextually-determined
(pragmatics) meanings. Thus, in our model, the proper formalization of these
two types of adjective must be represented in two components of the grammar.
As we have seen in our case study, the different representations are empirically
testable.
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Abstract. This paper contributes to the recent investigations of speech-
accompanying gestures under a formal semantic view. We show that gestures 
can serve to disambiguate a sentence with respect to its possible focus domains. 
We provide a statistical evaluation of data gained from a corpus annotated with 
gestures and information structure. The language under investigation is 
German. We argue that a sentence that, in isolation, is ambiguous concerning 
the extension of its focus domain is disambiguated via speech-accompanying 
gestures. Gesture thus is a means to mark information structure next to 
intonation and word order.  
 
1	   Introduction	  
It is widely known that gestures are temporally aligned with the speech 
signal, in particular it has often been claimed that the stroke, i.e. the main part 
of a gesture where the actual gesture movement takes place, falls together 
with the main accent of the gesture-accompanying sentence (McNeill 1992 
among many others). The relationship of complete gestures or gesture 
phrases and foci, however, has not been investigated systematically yet. We 
want to fill this gap by showing that the possible focus projection of a focus 
exponent is restricted by the point of time at which a speech-accompanying 
gesture starts. Gesture thus serves as a means to mark focus domains. 
Consider the following example for illustration (the main accent is indicated 
by capital letters): 
(1) I ate baNAnas. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* First and foremost, we would like to thank Hannes Rieser and Florian Hahn for giving us access 
to the gesturally annotated SAGA-corpus of the University of Bielefeld. This work would not 
have been possible without the possibility to access and make use of the accurate and fine-
grained gestural annotations of the SAGA-corpus. We would also like to thank Hannes Rieser 
and Florian Hahn for their constant help with technical and other questions of all sorts as well as 
for numerous valuable discussions about gestures and information structure. 
In Reich, Ingo et al. (eds.), Proceedings of Sinn & Bedeutung 15,  
pp. 193–208. Universaar – Saarland University Press: Saarbrücken, Germany, 2011. 	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The sentence in (1) with the given intonation pattern can be read as an answer 
to the two questions in (2), each inducing a different focus-background 
structure. 
(2) a. What did you do?     
 b. What did you eat?          
(2a) is a VP-focus invoking question, while (2b) requires narrow focus on the 
direct complement. Following (2a), (1) allows for the focus pattern in (3a);  if 
(1) follows (2b) on the other hand, the focus pattern is the one of (3b).  
(3) a. I [ate baNAnas]F. 
 b. I ate [baNAnas]F. 
In the following we will defend the hypothesis in (4). 
(4) Hypothesis (Focus-gesture alignment): 
How far a focus projects is determined by the onset of the ac-
companying gesture (if one exists). 
In other words, the onset of a speech-accompanying gesture indicates the left 
border of the focus phrase (independent of the type of gesture – be it a beat, a 
deictic or an iconic gesture or any other kind of gesture). A speech-
accompanying gesture can thus serve to disambiguate an information-
structural ambiguity in a sentence towards a certain focus-background 
pattern. Simplifying matters for now, we expect the patterns in (5). (|G marks 
the hypothesized onset of the speech-accompanying gesture.) 
(5) a. I |G[ate baNAnas]F. 
 b. I ate |G[baNAnas]F. 
Although (1) is ambiguous with respect to the underlying information 
structure, |G disambiguates the sentence towards one of the focus-background 
patterns in (3). 
In order to test the hypothesis in (4), we looked at the temporal occurrences 
of gestures and foci. We therefore annotated the multimodal Bielefeld 
Speech-And-Gesture-Alignment (SAGA) corpus with focus features – in 
addition to the existing gestural annotation – and marked the nuclear accents 
of certain intonation units. A subsequent statistical analysis confirmed our 
hypothesis that the onsets of focus and gesture align indeed – with a 
systematic shift, however: on average gestures start about 0.3 seconds earlier 
than the corresponding focus phrases. That is, there is a certain time lag 
between the onset of a gesture and its associated focus.  
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In this paper, we mostly present material that has also been discussed in 
Wilmes (2009). We re-evaluate some of the results of Wilmes (2009) and 
further elaborate on various aspects. The remainder of this paper is structured 
as follows: Section 2 sets the stage and discusses the relevant findings  from 
the gesture literature that will be needed in the remainder of the paper. 
Section 3 presents the methodology underlying our investigations. Here, we 
explain what the data set that our study is based on looks like, how we 
annotated these data and how we finally investigated the temporal 
interdependence of  gestures and foci. Section 4 then presents the results of a 
statistical investigation of the temporal occurrences of gestures and foci. In 
section 5, we evaluate and discuss these results. Section 6 discusses some 
controversial issues and loose ends. And finally, section 7 concludes the 
paper.  
2	   Speech-­‐Accompanying	  Gestures	  
It is a widely held view that gesture is a distinct mode of expression and that 
the study of gestures can tell us more about language than one might think at 
first sight (see e.g. Kendon 1972, 1980 and Loehr 2004 and references 
therein). We subscribe to this view and we will argue in particular that for a 
comprehensive view of focus phenomena it is inevitable to take speech-
accompanying gestures into account.  
To set the stage, we will have a look at some important findings 
concerning the interpretation of speech-accompanying gestures. First of all, 
one has to define what a gesture phrase is, i.e. where it starts and where it 
ends. In order to determine which movements can be considered to contribute 
to a particular gesture, Kendon (1972, 1980) identified a certain structure that 
can be found for gestures quite generally. The smallest unit of a gesture is its 
main element, i.e. the minimally required element for being reckoned as a 
proper gesture: the stroke. The stroke can be identified with the strongest 
movement within the gesture. A stroke is usually preceded by a preparation 
phase and followed by a retraction phase, for the hands must be brought into 
an appropriate position for the stroke to be executed and back into the resting 
position. Taken together, these three phases constitute the gesture phrase1. 
Preparation and retraction are optional, so a gesture phrase may consist of 
nothing but a stroke. Between preparation and stroke and stroke and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This notion of a gesture phrase cannot be applied to all kinds of gestures. So-called beats are 
only biphasal, i.e. they consist of two movement phases, constituting a repeated movement 
pattern, like up and down or in and out.  
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retraction holds may occur, which are termed pre- or postholds, respectively. 
These are considered to enhance timing between speech and gesture (cf. 
McNeill 1992, Lascarides and Stone 2009). 
Importantly, it has been argued  that gesture and speech can work 
together to convey one single thought (McNeill 1992, Kendon 1980) and 
hence that the semantic content of speech-accompanying gestures is 
intertwined with the semantic content of the speech signal. What is especially 
important for our purposes is that speech-accompanying gestures are known 
to be temporally aligned with the speech signal. It has been argued that 
speech and gesture synchronise in that the stroke of the gesture falls together 
with the main accent of the gesture-accompanying utterance (see among 
others: Pittenger, Hockett, & Daheny 1960; Kendon 1980; McNeill 1992; 
Loehr 2004; Jannedy & Mendoza-Denton 2005). The general claim is that the 
stroke occurs just before or at the same time as (but not later than) the nuclear 
accent. Although there are very few empirical studies that back this claim 
(see Loehr 2004 for a recent study), this is a fairly established finding in 
gesture theory.  
What has been far less investigated is the interaction of entire gesture 
phrases and speech. In the literature one can find only a few hints and claims 
concerning their interdependence and there seems to be no general 
agreement. Kendon (1972: 184) suggests that gesture phrases align with so-
called ‘tone units’ (i.e. ‘the smallest grouping of syllables over which a 
completed intonation tune occurs’, cf. Loehr 2004). Loehr (2004) on the 
other hand argues that gesture phrases and ‘intermediate phrases’ in the sense 
of Pierrehumbert (1980) align. We want to add to this list and argue that it is 
actually focus phrases that gesture phrases align with. Hence, while Loehr 
(2004) and Kendon (1972) argue that the temporal occurrence of gesture 
phrases is mainly triggered by intonational aspects, we think that gesture 
phrases rather synchronise with focus phrases, which means that their 
temporal appearance is determined by information structure. While there is, 
of course, a clear connection between intonation and focus, we still believe 
that the alleged interdependence between gesture phrases and whichever kind 
of intonationally motivated category is – at best – an epiphenomenon of the 
gesture-focus alignment for which we argue.   
3	   Methodology	  
To verify our hypothesis in (4) that (the onsets of) gesture phrases align with 
(the left border of) focus domains, we investigated the temporal 
interdependence of gesture phrases and focus domains. In addition, we also 
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looked at the timing of stroke and nuclear accent. Our study is one of the very 
few empirical studies about the interplay between gesture and intonation; to 
the best of our knowledge, it is the first empirical study of the interplay 
between gesture and focus. We analysed a 20-minute video sequence with 
275 gestures, which makes this study the most extensive empirical study on 
gesture and speech (cf. Loehr 2004: Condon & Ogston 1966: 5 sec; Kendon 
1972: 90 sec; McClave 1991: 125 gestures; Loehr 2004: 164 sec and 147 
gestures).  
3.1	   Data	  
For our study, we worked with one sequence of the Bielefeld SAGA-corpus 
(Lücking et al. 2010), which is a multimodal corpus (video and audio) that 
collects dialogues from an experiment where one subject (the router) gives 
directions to another subject (the follower) for navigation through a dynamic 
virtual world (see Lücking et. al 2010 for details). While talking, the 
movements of the subjects’ hands were recorded by sensors attached to the 
hands and fingers. Three video cameras recorded the scene from different 
angles. Sound was also recorded. 
From this corpus we selected a 20-minute sequence with two male 
participants. Gestures were already annotated, including gesture type (e.g. 
iconic or deictic) and duration of gesture phases (i.e. preparation, stroke, 
holds and retraction).  
3.2	   Annotation	  
For our purposes, it was necessary to add information-structural annotation 
(accent and focus) to the existing gestural annotation of the selected video.  
Our annotation was entirely based on the audio material, which had already 
been transcribed (but not annotated with parts of speech or other morpho-
syntactic information). The information-structural annotation was carried out 
without reference to the video and its gesture annotations in order to exclude 
a possible bias. We annotated nuclear accents and distinguished two types of 
foci: new-information and contrastive. All annotations were based on the 
recommendations of Dipper et al. (2007) (in particular Chapters Phonology 
and Intonation (Féry et al. 2007) and Information Structure (Götze et al. 
2007)). We treated as new-information focus those cases where information is 
provided which is new and/or carrying the discourse forward. Here, we 
predominantly found rather broad focus domains: whole sentences (all-focus 
sentences), e.g. if these sentences were text-initial or answers to polar 
questions, and VP-foci. However, our data also contain narrow foci such as 
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DP- or AdjP-foci. An expression was tagged as contrastive focus if it overtly 
contrasted with other elements in nearby utterances.  
We kept track of all pitch accents in the data, i.e. the points of highest or 
sometimes lowest pitch that make syllables intonationally salient (X* in the 
ToBI framework2) and filtered out the nuclear pitch accents among them. 
There was always one unique nuclear accent for each new-information focus 
domain. For reasons of space, we cannot go into the details of the annotation 
procedure and refer to (Wilmes 2009: 26-31) for further information.  
3.3	   Data	  Extraction 
To verify hypothesis (4), i.e. to show that gesture phrases and focus phrases 
align in fact, we investigated the temporal interdependence of focus phases 
(FocPs) and gesture phrases (GPs). This left us with the following task:  
(6) Verification Task (Focus-gesture alignment): 
For each gesture phrase, find the corresponding focus phrase and 
compare the temporal position of the two.  
For each gesture, we had a look at the associated speech (not the other way 
round).3 Making use of the result from the literature that nuclear accents and 
strokes align, we associated a gesture phrase with a focus phrase if the 
nuclear accent of the focus phrase overlapped with the gesture phrase’s stroke 
(see Figure 1 for an example). In the few cases where there was no main 
accent coinciding with the gestural stroke, we considered a focus phrase 
overlapping with at least the stroke phase to be associated with the gesture, 
unless the overlap was very small and a close investigation of the gesture-
focus pair made an association implausible (because there was another focus 
that was more likely to associate with the gesture). This was the case for only 
two gestures. Moreover, there were eight cases of strokes that did not overlap 
with any focus. In one case, an entire gesture did not coincide with any focus 
at all and for seven gestures, though they overlapped with a focus in some 
parts, it was not the stroke that overlapped with the focus. We excluded these 
ten gestures and strokes from our statistical evaluation.  
Figure 1 illustrates an example that shows how gesture time and focus 
time can be compared. Time differences are assessed by subtracting focus 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 TOBI stands for Tone and Break Indices. The system is based on work by Pierrehumbert 
(1980). In our study, we did not distinguish between different kinds of pitch accents like high 
(H*), low (L*) or rising (L+H*). 
3 Thus, if there is no gesture there is also no need to identify a focus to verify our hypothesis. 
However, in most cases we found a one-to-one mapping of focus phrase and gesture phrase. 
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times from gesture times (e.g. start difference = gesture start – focus start). 
The corresponding sentence from the corpus is given in (7):  
(7) Ja,   also  die  Busfahrt, die  hat  äh  fünf  Stationen,  die   auf  jeden  
 Yes so   the bus tour  RP  has eh  five  stops     that  on  every  
  Fall  angefahren   werden müssen.  
 case  approached  will    must 
‘Yes, so on the bus tour there are five stops that have to be approached 
in any case.’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The onset time of the focus phrase (StFoc) is subtracted  from the onset time 
of the associated gesture phrase (StGest), i.e. the onset of the preparation 
phase (or the stroke if there is none). The time when the focus phrase ends 
(EFoc) is subtracted from the time when the stroke ends (representing the end 
of the gesture phrase, hence EGest). We treat the end of the stroke and not the 
end of the retraction phase as the end of a gesture for two reasons: First, 
according to McNeill (1992: 29) the retraction phase is ‘semantically neutral’ 
and second, Loehr (2004) discusses the possibility to disregard retractions 
and post-holds in his statistical evaluation as well, because they seem to have 
a different status as the other phases of a gesture phrase.4   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Cf. Loehr (2004: 117): ‘Typically, an entire g-phrase [CE/SE/KW: gesture phrase] aligned with 
an intermediate phrase. Occasionally, however, it was clear that a g-phrase aligned with an 
intermediate phrase only when disregarding post-stroke holds, [or] retractions [...] within the g-
phrase. These internal components are included within g-phrases by definition, following 
Figure 1: Comparison of focus and gesture times 
StGest EGest 
StFoc EFoc 
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As a base for comparison, we also studied the temporal occurrences of 
nuclear accents (NAcc) and strokes in order to verify the by now well-
established claim from the literature that nuclear accents and strokes align (cf. 
section 2). For each stroke, we considered a nuclear accent that overlapped 
with the stroke as associated with the stroke. If there was no such accent, we 
took the nearest nuclear accent. Time differences were again calculated by 
subtracting accent time from stroke time (e.g. start difference = stroke start – 
accent start).  
4	   Results	  	  
In the following we present our results on the hypothesized gesture-focus 
alignment and our reassessment of the question whether stroke and main 
accent align, as has been claimed in the literature. Statistical analysis was 
carried out with the R environment for statistical computing (R Development 
Core Team 2005). 
4.1	   Alignment	  of	  Main	  Accent	  and	  Stroke	  	  
In total, we analysed 275 stroke-accent pairs. In the majority of cases (209 
pairs) the stroke began earlier than the main accent (versus 66 pairs where 
accent began earlier). Similarly the stroke ended later than the main accent 
for 183 pairs (versus 92 pairs where the accent ended later). In 124 cases, the 
stroke encompassed the main accent, in 100 cases stroke and main accent 
overlapped in some other way, and in 51 cases they did not overlap at all. 
Figure 2 shows a histogram for the time 
difference between the onsets of nuclear 
accents and the corresponding strokes.  
As can be seen, the distribution is ap-
proximately Gaussian (the solid line shows 
the empirical distribution, the dashed line a 
Gaussian approximation). On average, the 
stroke starts 0.36s earlier than the 
corresponding nuclear accent. The standard 
deviation is about 0.55s. We interpret this as 
a tendency for gestures to precede the 
corresponding accent (though there are a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Kendon’s hierarchical packaging. However, there may be some different quality about these 
post-stroke components. Occurring after the heart of the gesture, they may have a less important 
status in terms of timing with speech.’ 
Figure 2 
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considerable number of cases where the gesture starts later). 
 
For comparison, the offset differences have 
a mean of 0.53s (i.e. stroke usually ends 
later than the accent) and a standard 
deviation of 1.25s (Figure 3). It is obvious 
that the onsets align much better than the 
offsets: their standard deviation is 
considerably smaller. On the whole, we take 
our results to show that there is indeed an 
alignment between the beginning of the 
stroke and the beginning of the main accent, 
as claimed in the literature. 
4.2	   Alignment	  of	  Focus	  and	  Gesture	  
Having obtained experimental confirmation for the alignment of nuclear 
accents and strokes, we now turn to our hypothesis that gesture phrases and 
focus phrases are also synchronised. We found that contrastive foci and new-
information foci behave somewhat differently with respect to their 
accompanying gestures, so we evaluated the two types of foci separately. We 
analysed 260 new-information focus–gesture pairs and 56 contrastive focus-
gesture pairs. As pointed out above in Section 3.3, ten gestures were excluded 
from the analysis because no focus could be associated with them. 
4.2.1	   New-­‐Information	  Focus	  and	  Gesture	  
Figure 4 shows the distribution of the onset differences of gesture and new-
information focus (we refer to new-information focus simply as focus in the 
following), which corresponds almost perfectly to a Gaussian distribution.  
With 0.41s, the standard deviation is 
rather small. Again we find a systematic 
shift: gestures start on average about 
0.31s earlier than foci, and there are only 
few cases where focus precedes gesture. 
While there is thus a certain time lag, 
most gesture-focus pairs are within less 
than one second of each other and can be 
considered to be aligned. A one-sample t-
test shows that the time lag effect is 
genuine (t=12.41, df=259, p < .001; H0: 
mean time lag = 0). The corresponding Figure 4 
Figure 3 
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95%-confidence interval places the true mean time lag between gesture and 
focus in the range from 0.264s to 0.363s.  
We consider these results as a confirmation 
of our hypothesis (4) that gestures and foci 
align in their onsets. 
For the offsets, the situation is not as clear. 
Figure 5 shows the distribution of the time 
differences between the end of a gesture (i.e. 
the end of the stroke) and the end of the 
corresponding new-information focus. With 
a mean of –0.15s, there is no evidence for a 
systematic shift. The standard deviation of 
1.24s, however, is comparatively huge, and 
some gestures end several seconds after the corresponding focus phrase. On 
the basis of our data, offsets of gestures and foci thus do not seem to 
synchronise. 
4.2.2	   Contrastive	  Focus	  and	  Gesture	  
For contrastive foci and the accompanying 
gestures, the alignment was not as neat as for 
the new-information foci. Figure 6 shows a 
histogram of the onset differences between 
gestures and contrastive foci. With 0.70s the 
standard deviation is rather high. The mean is  
–0.77s, so gestures have a clear tendency to 
start earlier than the corresponding foci. We 
interpret these data to show that there is no 
tight alignment between the onsets of 
contrastive foci and those of the associated ges- 
tures. We also tested whether contrastive foci 
align with the stroke rather than the entire 
gesture. The histogram for the onset 
differences of contrastive foci and strokes is 
given in Figure 7.  
Again, the standard deviation is quite large 
(0.75s), but in this case there is no evidence of 
a systematic shift (mean lag = –0.11s). With 
such high variability, it is impossible to inter-
pret these results as evidence for an alignment 
of contrastive foci and strokes. 
Figure 5 
Figure 7 
Figure 6 
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To conclude, we have not found any focus-gesture or focus-stroke alignment 
effects for contrastive foci. One has to keep in mind, though, that our data set 
of contrastive foci is rather small. We therefore leave a detailed investigation 
of contrastive foci and their accompanying gestures for future research, 
which will need to build on larger amounts of empirical data in order to draw 
any reliable conclusions.  
5	   Discussion	  	  
In the following we will briefly discuss and evaluate the results that we 
presented in Section 4. Since our data set for contrastive foci is too small to 
draw reliable conclusions, we limit our discussion to the comparison of new-
information foci and gestures as well as nuclear accents and strokes.  
5.1	   Shift	  Effect	  
As indicated above, our observation that strokes usually start 0.36s earlier 
than the corresponding nuclear accents is entirely in line with the claims from 
the literature, where it has been noted that a stroke usually coincides with or 
starts earlier than its corresponding nuclear accent, but in general does not 
start later than the accent (Kendon 1980, McNeill 1992). We found the same 
type of shift for gesture phrases and focus phrases, too. Gestures usually start 
0.31s earlier than the corresponding focus domains. We believe that this 
significant time shift may have its roots in the fact that it allows the hearer to 
draw attention to the upcoming focus phrase, as its occurrence is made 
predictable by the preceding gesture. Moreover, it is plausible to assume that 
gesture production is faster than speech production and that the time lag 
between the onsets of speech and gesture is due to this difference in 
generation complexity (cf. also Loehr 2004: 29). 
5.2	   Alignment	  
We interpret our results above as support for hypothesis (4), i.e. they show 
that gesture phrases and (new-information) foci align (with a certain time 
lag). We still need to clarify what exactly counts as ‘alignment’, though. Our 
main arguments supporting the gesture-focus alignment hypothesis are as 
follows. First and foremost, we take the stroke-accent alignment, which is a 
well-established effect from the literature, as a point of reference. The onset 
differences between nuclear accents and strokes have a mean of –0.36s and a 
standard deviation of 0.55s. Our results show a considerably better gesture-
focus alignment, with a similar shift of –0.31s and smaller standard deviation 
(0.41s). Compare the corresponding histograms in Figures 2 and 4: the better 
alignment of gesture and focus is immediately obvious. 
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There is a second argument to support the interpretation of our results in 
favour of hypothesis (4). As to our knowledge, there is one empirical survey 
that our study can directly be compared with (Loehr 2004). When interpreting 
his results, Loehr (2004) was confronted with the same problem, i.e. to define 
what exactly can be considered as an alignment. He found that the so-called 
apex (the peak of a stroke) and the main accent coincide with a standard 
deviation of 0.27s (and without any significant shift). He interpreted this as 
showing that there is a tight alignment of apex and nuclear accent. 
Furthermore, he also suggested that there is an interdependence of 
Pierrehumbert’s (1980) intermediate phrases and gesture phrases. Similar to 
our results for gesture phrases and focus phrases, he found that gesture 
phrases usually start before the corresponding intermediate phrases. The 
standard deviation for the onset differences between intermediate phrases and 
gesture phrases was 0.55s. As Loehr (2004) interpreted his results as 
evidence for a genuine alignment, we think that our study (with standard 
deviation of only 0.41s) can safely be interpreted to show an alignment of 
gesture and focus, too. 
We did not find evidence for a corresponding alignment of the offsets of 
gestures and focus phrases. With 1.24s, the standard deviation was very large 
(recall that the end of a gesture is defined as the end of the stroke). Looking 
at the histogram in Figure 5, however, it seems that for some gestures there is 
a good alignment (the main peak of the histogram), while for others the 
stroke is held much longer (the long right-hand tail of the histogram). This 
suggests that there may be two different types of gestures – one that aligns 
well with the focus of the accompanying speech signal and another type that 
does not. We have not investigated this possibility in depth yet, but it would 
be worthwhile for future research to examine whether there are certain types 
of gestures (e.g. beats, deictics and iconic gestures) whose purpose it is to 
structure information and which thus align better with the speech signal than 
others (e.g. discourse gestures) that might serve a different purpose. 
Finally, let us briefly point out once again that we did not reach a 
conclusion with respect to contrastive foci. We would need more data in 
order to see how they relate to the accompanying gestures (see Section 4.2.2 
for a discussion) and we hope that future research will shed light on this 
question.   
6	   Further	  Issues	  
Some issues are still open for discussion and call for further research. In the 
following, we address some of these topics. In particular, we want to point 
Focus Marking via Gestures   205 
out that the alignment of focus phrases and gesture phrases is ‘real’ and not 
merely an epiphenomenon of some underlying alignment effect of a different 
nature.  
6.1	   A	  Qualitative	  Argument	  
It has been proposed in the literature that gesture phrases align with ‘tone 
groups’ (Kendon 1972) or ‘intermediate phrases’ (Loehr 2004), cf. section 2. 
We have now added another suggestion: gestures align with focus phrases. 
However, it is possible that none of these claims are true, and that gestures 
are simply synchronised with certain syntactic categories, e.g. entire 
sentences or VPs. As our corpus predominantly consists of all-foci sentences 
and VP-foci, this possibility cannot be excluded without further inspection. 
Unfortunately, the SAGA corpus is not syntactically annotated, so a 
quantitative evaluation of how well different kinds of syntactic categories 
align with gestures cannot easily be carried out without time-consuming 
manual work. However, we attempted a qualitative assessment of this 
question. We took a closer look at narrow foci and foci that begin a 
considerable time later than the corresponding utterance and checked how 
well they align with an accompanying gesture. We found that if a focus does 
not begin at the start of the utterance, the corresponding gesture also begins at 
some later point in nearly all cases. In (8) we give some examples in point:  
(8) a. genau  äh also [e|Grst Kreisverkehr]F  
  exactly eh  so   first  roundabout 
  ‘exactly, eh, first the roundabout’ 
 b. die   haben  beide |G[dieselben Türen und dieselben Fenster]F 
  they  have   both    the same  doors  and the same  windows 
  ‘they have both the same doors and the same windows’ 
 c. rechts von dieser Kap|Gelle [ist ein großer  Laubbaum]F 
  right  of   this   chapel    is  a  big     broadleaf tree 
  ‘to the right of this chapel there is a big broadleaf tree’ 
In all three example cases, the gesture starts near the start of the focus phrase 
and not at the beginning of the utterance. The gesture phrase thus seems to be 
aligned with the focus phrase and not with the entire utterance. Furthermore, 
we found no evidence for a general alignment of gesture phrases with any 
syntactic categories such as sentences or VPs (see Wilmes 2009 for details). 
6.2	   A	  Quantitative	  Argument	  
Here, we attempt to show that the alignment of gesture phrase and focus 
phrase cannot be a secondary effect of the well-known stroke-accent 
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alignment and the fact that the initial part of the focus phrase (up to the main 
accent) and the preparation phase have similar lengths. Note that the time 
difference ΔtF between onset of gesture and focus phrase is the sum of the 
time difference ΔtA between onset of nuclear accent and stroke and the length 
difference Δl between preparation phase of the gesture and focus phrase up to 
the main accent. Assuming that ΔtA and Δl are independent alignment effects, 
we would expect the standard deviation of the resulting gesture-focus 
alignment ΔtF to be greater than the standard deviations of ΔtA and Δl. This is 
not the case: the standard deviation of ΔtF was only 0.41s in our study, 
whereas the expected standard deviation would be 0.82s (see Wilmes 2009 
for details on this calculation). Moreover, we would then expect a strong 
correlation between the time differences ΔtF and ΔtA as well as ΔtF and Δl, 
while ΔtA and Δl themselves should be independent or weakly correlated. Our 
data show an opposite effect: there is only a weak correlation between ΔtF 
and ΔtA (Pearson’s r ≤ 0.219), but a very strong correlation between ΔtA and 
Δl (Pearson’s r = 0.759). From these results and the pairwise correlation plots 
(omitted for lack of space), we conclude that the length differences arise from 
two independent alignment effects for stroke and main accent, and for gesture 
and focus phrase. 
7	   Conclusion	  
In our study, we were able to verify claims from the literature that gestural 
strokes and nuclear accents align (albeit with a systematic shift). We also 
found a clear, but shifted alignment for the onsets of gesture phrases and 
(new-information) foci. We interpret these results to show that gestures are a 
means of marking information structure next to intonational and syntactic 
means, i.e. speech-accompanying gestures can indicate focus domains.  
Furthermore, we were able to show that gestures can serve to 
disambiguate. A sentence that is information-structurally ambiguous in iso-
lation can be disambiguated by its accompanying gestures. This is yet another 
observation suggesting that ambiguity might be less of a problem for natural 
language than was originally thought. While many sentences (e.g. simple 
SVO sentences with two quantifiers) that seem ambiguous at first sight are 
disambiguated via intonation in natural speech, we showed that sentences that 
seem ambiguous even when intonation is taken into account are in fact 
disambiguated by accompanying gestures. 
We hence support the view of Lascarides and Stone (2009) that a formal 
semantic model should represent not only the usual semantics of linguistic 
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expressions, but also take care of the semantic contribution of their 
accompanying gestures. 
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Abstract. Disjoint imperative sentences like (Nimm die) Hände hoch, oder ich 
schiesse!, literally (take your) hands up, or I’ll shoot! intuitively present the 
addressee with all her alternatives for action. The speaker informs that all 
future worlds, as far as the speaker can forsee, are such that the addressee raises 
her hands or gets killed. I propose a semantic/pragmatic analysis for sentences 
in the imperative mood that adopts this exhausitve description of future 
alternatives as a semantic backbone. Different contextual instantiations of alter-
natives capture a wide range of uses of sentences in imperative mood, as well 
as coordinations of imperative and declarative sentences, in a uniform way. 
 
1	   Some	  Observations	  about	  Imperatives	  
1.1	   Variety	  
It has frequently been noted that sentences in imperative mood (Simp) can 
express a wide variety of speech acts, some directive, some not. I will take 
my starting point from the following range of examples. 
(1) Leave my garden! (command/request) 
(2) Lend me your bike, please! (plea) 
(3) Take a cookie! (offer, invitation) 
(4) Take an umbrella with you! (advice) 
(5) Ok. Go kill yourself. Smoke! (concession, „giving in“) 
(6) Get well soon! (well-wish) 
(7) Come and take the ball (if you dare)! (dare) 
These are part of the agenda set by Condoravdi & Lauer (C&L, 2010a, b) in a 
recent series of talks, drawing on earlier literature (e.g. Schwager 2006a, 
In Reich, Ingo et al. (eds.), Proceedings of Sinn & Bedeutung 15,  
pp. 209–223. Universaar – Saarland University Press: Saarbrücken, Germany, 2011. 
l 	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2008, Donhauser 1986, Bybee, Pagliuca & Perkins 1994).1 It would be 
desirable to derive the different types of act compositionally from the literal 
content of the sentence, the semantics of mood, and knowledge in context 
that pertains to the interpretation of imperatives. Such an approach would 
certainly be preferable over stipulating a range of speech act operators and 
leave the choice of the correct operator subject to a holistic, 
noncompositional evaluation of the overall utterance situation (Searle 1969). 
An operator approach would, for instance, force us to postulate categorical 
distinctions between different act types where in practice, we find a gradual 
continuum between e.g. command and request, request and plea, request and 
advice and so on. Schwager (2006) and Portner (2007) have led the way in 
demonstrating how compositional semantics for imperative mood in speech 
acts can look like. 
1.2	   Conjoining	  Simp	  and	  Sdecl	  
Simp can be conjoined with sentences in declarative mood Sdecl. The result are 
speech acts of different natures, including anti-directive acts such as threats, 
like in (10). 
(8) Clean your room, and I will take you to the movies.  
 (request + incentive) 
(9) Open the newspaper, and you will find the king’s picture on page 2. 
 (conditional) 
(10) Touch this glass, and I will kill you. (threat + sanction) 
Sometimes, the speaker wants the addressee to act as required by the 
imperative (Do!) but sometimes he aims to avoid exactly that, practically 
intending to say Don’t! (Schwager 2006a, Russell 2007, van Rooij & Franke 
2010, Bolinger). A commonality of examples like (8) to (10) seems to be that 
they all can equivalently be expressed by a conditional (‘If you clean your 
room, then I will take you to the movies’ etc.). This is why scholars have 
proposed to class Simp as pseudo-imperatives here and propose a common 
conditional meaning for the construction. It would be attractive to have an 
analysis that relates the meaning of (8) to (10) to the interpretation of 
“normal” imperative sentences in a transparent manner. 
1.3	   Disjunctions	  Simp	  or	  Sdecl	  
Simp can likewise enter disjunctions with a “face the consequences” clause, 
like in the following example. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Two more types of act that they include, namely WISH and ILL-WISH, will only be touched later 
in this paper. 
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(11) Freeze! or I’ll shoot you. 
These intuitively present the addressee with all her alternatives for action. 
The speaker informs that all future worlds are such that the addressee raises 
her hands or gets killed. It is not possible to add a disjunct that describes 
more promising alternative prospects, in order to prohibit the addresse from 
acting as specified by Simp (Russell 2006, van Rooij & Franke 2010 a.o.). 
(12) Go on fighting, or you’ll get chocolate. 
 ≠ ‘If you stop fighting, you’ll get chocolate’ (ironically?) 
Whenever the speaker seriously attempts to motivate the addressee to act 
according to Simp, it is standardly possible to spell out his underlying in-
centives by an or-clause. Hence, while conjunctions like in 1.2 might be 
viewed as a deviant case, the use of disjunctions frequently just explicates the 
reasoning behind a typical directive uses of Simp.2 Again, it would be 
appealing to read that off directly from the semantics of imperative mood. 
2	   Modal	  Theories	  for	  Imperatives	  
2.1	   Earlier	  Theories	  
I agree with earlier authors on imperatives who assume that literal meaning 
and speech act should be captured in one integral overarching theory. This 
leads naturally to analyses of Simp that play on their semantic closeness to 
deontic necessity. A recent prominent example is Schwager (2006a, b and 
subsequent). We will generally assume that the sentential root [[ Simp ]] denotes 
a property which gets instantiated by the addressee A to yield [[ Simp ]] (A).  
 [[ Freeze! ]] Schwager = ∀w [ “BEST-WORLDS(w, wo)” → FREEZE(A, w)) ] 
I use BEST-WORLDS as a cover term for factors that determine the domain of 
quantification. These include the choice of a modal base (FUTURES which are 
CIRCUMSTANTIALLY POSSIBLE) and a partial ordering of the worlds which, 
among other criteria, refers to what ACCORDS.WITH.SPEAKERS.DESIRES(wo,w). 
Schwager proposes that this is further specified by context (“In what sense 
does the speaker want this to happen?”) which leads to different flavours of 
imperatives. The modal quantification is contributed by an imperative mood 
operator, and finally the scope of this quantification is contributed by the 
content Simp(A) (following Kratzer 1981, 1991). Schwager’s analysis is 
attractive because it shows tight fit with necessity modals, it can be naturally 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See Schwager 2006a, 2008 for a very lucid discussion of the relation between sentence mood 
and typical associated speech acts.   
212   Eckardt 
extended to conditionals, and it has a smooth semantics-speech act interface. 
The theory doesn’t need extra components or ontology like TO-DO-lists, 
plans, action schemes or the like.  
Another, more recent proposal in a similar line was issued by Condo-
ravdi and Lauer (C&L, 2010a, b). They suggest that Simp expresses the desire 
of the SPEAKER that the ADDRESSEE commits herself to act as if she (= A) 
preferred [[ Simp(A) ]] (Condoravdi & Lauer 2010a: 10). Like Schwager, they 
assume that the information content of imperatives alone is sufficient to 
predict its speech act qualities, and envisage a smooth semantics – speech act 
interface. Portner’s (2007) analysis will be disregarded here because it 
stipulates the use of an extra list of propositions called the TO-DO LIST.3 
2.2	   Coverage	  of	  Observations	  
Variety is accounted for by both approaches, where both fit more naturally 
for some cases than for others. Specifically, as both analyses rest on speaker 
desires, they will need to ascribe the speaker strangely desinterested and 
altruistic desires in some cases. Schwager captures flavours by different 
specific ACCORDS.WITH.SPEAKERS.DESIRES properties (capturing offer, 
warning, advice, wish, and several “deviant” uses). C & L (this volume) 
likewise attempt to derive known examples from their intricate mix of 
speaker and hearer preference, which I will discuss in section 4. 
The coordination cases can not be captured easily by a naive extension of 
the modal analyses (Schwager, 2006a); perhaps to the exception of the Simp 
and Sdecl,good cases. In view of the obvious problems that arise, Schwager 
(2006a) proposes very different, and much more sophisticated ways to 
interpret the respective conjunctions and disjunctions. The coordination Simp 
and Sdecl is simply interpreted as conditional. The imperative operator will 
contribute the modal quantification scheme: 
 ∀w [ FUTURE(wo,w)∧CIRC(wo,w)∧  …  P(w) …     → Q(w) ] 
In non-coordinate imperatives, the syntax-semantics interface instantiates 
P(w) with speaker-desire, and Q(w) is instantiated by Simp(A). In the 
conjunctive case, however, P(w) gets instantiated by the speaker’s desires 
plus the content of imperative (if you do Simp…) whereas Q(w) instantiated by 
and-clause (…then Sdecl will happen). The result is descriptively adequate, but 
the semantic derivation of dubitable legitimation. (It is claimed that a topical 
status of the imperative leads to its analysis in the restrictor of some 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 While the components of Portner might be reconstructed in terms of the other two competing 
theories, a full comparison is beyond the scope of the present paper.  
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quantifier; the topical status is attributed to the imperative on basis of 
prosodic cues that are inconclusive.) According to Schwager on Simp or Sdecl, 
the idea that ‘or’ could mean Boolean disjunction has to be radically denied. 
Her treatment of Simp or Sdecl rests on Geurts (2005) who proposes that ‘or’ 
denotes a conjunction of modal quantifications where background and 
propositional slots get instantiated by the sentence to be interpreted. Ci are 
contextually given sets of worlds; Mi ∈ {¸,¨} and Pi = disjuncts. 
(14)  C1 M1 P1 ∧ C2 M2 P2  
Schwager makes use of this scheme in a sophisticated way, assuming that C1 
= CG (common ground); M1 P1 = ¸Simp(A) ∧ [[  Simp ! ]] , second context C2 = 
CG \ Simp(A) and finally M2 P2 = ¨ [[  Sdecl ]]  . The result can be spelled out as 
“It is possible that Simp; and in all speaker-desirable worlds, Simp actually 
happens; and in all worlds where it does not happen, Sdecl will necessarily be 
true.” This leads to a descriptively adequate semantic representation. How-
ever, Geurts’ background theory and the cases at hand do not yet match 
perfectly. The first conjunct doesn’t unify well with Geurts’ scheme (14), 
likewise Geurts does not discuss changes between modal bases extensively 
(e.g. from epistemic to buletic to future-no-matter-what).4 Condoravdi & 
Lauer do not address coordinate constructions with imperatives. I will come 
back to their proposal and undertake a more detailed comparison once the 
Hands-Up theory has been presented. 
3	   Hands-­‐Up	  Theory	  for	  Imperatives	  
3.1	   The	  Backbone	  
I propose two kinds of imperative construction operators [ ! ] and [ ¡ ], each 
with syntactic requirements, denotation and presupposition. Given that I will 
not deal with conflicting desires or obligations explicitly, I will notate modal 
quantification in an entailment format. FUTURE, CIRC, DEONT etc. are 
intended to deliver the future, circumstantial etc. alternatives of wo and 
LEWIS-SIM is used to remind us of the fact that we want to exclude the more 
obscure of all logical possibilities sometimes. The notation should be 
reversible to one based on modal base and ordering source.  
[ ! ]:  Syntax:  
 one obligatory argument: finite sentence in imperative mood  Simp 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Schwager herself comments on the analysis in much the same spirit. It should be kept in mind 
that all simpler mappings from syntax to semantics were inevitably bound to yield wrong results, 
so this analysis constitutes true progress.   
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 one optional argument: or-phrase with or-P → ‘or’ Sdecl 
 Semantics:  
 λpλq∀w[FUTURE(wo,w)∧CIRC(wo,w)∧LEWIS-SIM(wo,w)  → p(w)∨q(w)] 
 Presupposition: 
 the speaker believes that the addressee, taking a choice in all life future 
 options 
  λw.Future(wo,w)∧Circ(wo,w)∧Lewis-Similar(wo,w) 
 prefers p-worlds to q-worlds. 
[ ¡ ]: Syntax: 
 first obligatory argument: finite sentence in imperative mood Simp 
 second obligatory argument: and-phrase with and-P → ‘and’ Sdecl 
 Semantics:  
 λpλq∀w [FUTURE(wo,w)∧CIRC(wo,w)∧LEWIS-SIM(wo,w) →  
 p(w); q(w) ∨  C(w)] 
 Pragmatics: 
 C propositional variable to be instantiated in context 
 C ⊆ ¬p and C ∩ ¬q ≠ Ø (hence C-worlds might avoid the consequences 
 presented in second conjunct5) 
The coordinations and and or do not enter semantic composition but are 
interpreted syncategorematically. Coordinating and is reflected as narrative 
sequencing; as in DRT. Usually, Simp and Sdecl are tightly linked anaphorically 
under conjunction. I will not go into the details of [[  Simp;Sdecl ]]   which would 
require dynamic lambda logic. The disjunction is strengthened to exclusive 
disjunction in most cases. I will in one case below refer to this strengthening. 
Finally note that the approach once again stipulates a semantic difference 
between and-coordinations and or-disjunctions. Unlike other analyses, the 
one defended here treats the two cases maximally parallel, differing only in 
how the same semantic parameters get instantiated in either case, and in the 
presence or absence of one presupposition.  
3.2	   Examples	  of	  [	  !	  ]-­‐Imperatives	  
I will now survey how the analysis can treat various kinds of uses of the 
imperative. Different types of propositional OR arguments yield different 
flavours of imperatives. I assume throughout that if the second argument of   
[ ! ] is not overtly realised, it will be instantiated in context. Let us start with 
Command, the most prototypical use of imperative mood. 
(16) Remove your car! 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Thanks to Sven Lauer who suggested this specific version of restriction. 
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The first argument of the [ ! ] operator λw[REMOVE(A, CAR-OF-A, w)] is 
provided by the imperative sentence. The hearer understands the 
presupposition that the speaker believes that the addressee will prefer 
REMOVE-CAR-worlds to q-worlds. Depending on the situation at hand, the 
hearer might guess that leaving the car will cause trouble with the police, e.g. 
she will get a ticket. Hence, the overall proposition conveyed is this: 
 ∀w[FUTURE(wo,w)∧CIRC(wo,w)∧LEWIS-SIM(wo,w)  
  → [REMOVE(A, CAR-OF-A, w) ] ∨ TICKET(w) ] 
The utterance presupposes that REMOVE-worlds are better than TICKET-
worlds. The “force” of the command derives from the threatening nature of 
the alternatives. The more likely the speaker holds the TICKET case, and the 
less she is inclined to loose money, the more likely will she comply to the 
command. — Next, consider Warning/Advice, like in (17).  
(17) Wear a raincoat! 
The speaker in (17) need not have a personal desire for the addressee to 
comply. (Theories that rephrase imperative sentences as reports about the 
speaker’s desires will find such examples worrisome.) The present analysis 
predicts that [ ! ] will take λw[WEAR(A, RAINCOAT, w)] as its first argument. 
The second derives from common knowledge about the current weather, the 
health state of the addressee; let us assume a simple q = ‘you will get wet’. 
The speaker conveys, and the hearer accepts the presupposition: RAINCOAT-
worlds are better for the hearer than WET-worlds. 
 ∀w[FUTURE(wo,w)∧CIRC(wo,w)∧LEWIS-SIM(wo,w)  
  → [WEAR( A, RAINCOAT, w)] ∨ WET(A, w)] 
In giving desinterested advice, the speaker points out certain facts and leaves 
it to A to act in the most reasonable way. We’d expect, however, that the 
speaker does not mind if A reacts in the indicated manner—or else, the 
speaker would not have pointed out these facts in the first place. We will 
come back to this fact.  
The analysis can nicely reflect speaker’s Authority and, more interestingly, 
the Lack of Authority. Consider the unspecific request in (18). 
(18) Be quiet! (or ... ?) 
 ∀w[FUTURE(wo,w)∧CIRC(wo,w)∧LEWIS-SIM(wo,w)  
  → [QUIET( A, w) ] ∨ PUNISHMENTS(A, w)  ] 
The hearer could draw on knowledge about speaker like “wow, this speaker 
is a fierce guy who could earlier think of nasty PUNISHMENTS”. The speaker 
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conveys the presupposition: “I, the speaker, believe that you’ll like the 
QUIET-worlds better than PUNISHMENT-worlds”. Drawing on earlier 
knowledge, the hearer will believe this presupposition and accordingly hold 
her mouth. Speakers with little authoritative force lead to a different kind of 
hearer knowledge, e.g. “this speaker’s PUNISHMENTS are not severe”. Again, 
the speaker conveys the presupposition that ‘he believes that the hearer finds 
QUIET-worlds are better than PUNISHMENT-worlds’. The addressee, however, 
might disagree with the speaker and therefore opt for the worlds where 
λw.¬[QUIET(A, w)]. We see that Authority can be based on the experience 
that S was able to think about drastic measures in the “or”-case on earlier 
occasions. I will next address Permissions like the cookie invitation. 
(19) Take a cookie! 
 λq∀w[FUTURE(wo,w)∧CIRC(wo,w)∧LEWIS-SIM(wo,w)→  
 [TAKE( A,  COOKIE, w) ] ∨ q(w) ] 
(19) suggests that—contrary to earlier belief of A—it is not forbidden to take 
a cookie. Why? The speaker conveys the presuppositions that the addressee 
will prefer COOKIE-worlds to NO-COOKIE-worlds. If the speaker can be 
trusted, this includes a commitment to not punish Addressee if she takes a 
cookie. (19) is typically understood as a permission in contexts where the 
only disadvantage of NO-COOKIE-worlds for A is that she does not get a 
cookie (which the speaker should believe a desirable thing to have). 
Consequently, the addressee can decide to decline this offer—for instance if 
she is on a diet or does not like cookies very much. Hence, permissions arise 
as one possible instantiation of q. — Let us finally look at Concessives. I will 
use an example in a naturally sounding prediscourse. 
(20) a. Don’t smoke (, or you’ll die young)! 
 b. (nag nag nag) — Well, then do smoke! Kill yourself! 
Intuitively, (20) shows that speaker and addressee disagree in certain 
respects. This is reflected in the presuppositional discourse record. (20a) 
entails that the Speaker believes that Addressee prefers NON-SMOKE-worlds 
(= LIVE-LONG-worlds) to DIE-YOUNG-worlds (= SMOKE-worlds). In (b), [ ! ] 
takes a first argument λw[SMOKE( A, w) ] with the second argument missing. 
With the presupposition conveyed in (b), the Speaker acknowledges that 
Addressee prefers SMOKE-worlds (= DIE-YOUNG-worlds) to NON-SMOKE-
worlds (= LIVE-LONG-worlds). As part of the discourse record, however, the 
speaker has made it clear that she does not share this preference and does not 
think it reasonable. This also leads to an ironic undertone. 
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I will leave the remaining cases to the reader. PLEAS are characterized by the 
moral pressure of the ‘or’-alternative. The speaker hopes that the addressee 
will prefer making her happy to making her miserable. WELL-WISHES 
straightforwardly acknowledge addressee’s preferences without that either 
addressee or speaker can do anything to drive the course of events towards 
such happier alternatives. DARE! cases, finally, convey an intricate 
conditional preference of the addressee: If A ‘dares’, i.e. overcomes her fear 
of bad consequences, then she will prefer worlds where she takes the ball (ex. 
7) to worlds where she doesn’t take it. ‘Daring’ is tantamount to ‘countering 
the situation with enough strength and energy so as to overcome the 
obviously threatening dangers’. We find a continuum of attitudes between the 
encouraging “come, take the ball if you dare” by the provocative coach and 
evident threats as Dare! (and you will see what happens). As the present 
analysis assumes that the flavour of imperatives derives from contextual 
instantiation of the ‘or’-cases, we’d expect such a continuum. 
3.3	   Examples	  of	  [	  ¡	  ]-­‐Imperatives	  
I will now turn to the conjunction Simp-and-Sdecl which are analysed with [ ¡ ]. 
Recall that the second argument is obligatorily instantiated (i.e. we overtly 
see the and clause) and there is no presupposition as to what is good or bad 
for the addressee. The content of the second argument alone determines 
whether the worlds where Simp(A) is true are better or worse for A. 
(21) Come in, and you will get coffee. 
[ ¡ ] = λpλq∀w[FUTURE(wo,w)∧CIRC(wo,w)∧LEWIS-SIM(wo,w)  → p(w);q(w) 
∨ C(w)] will apply to the first argument λz.COME-IN(A, z) and the second 
argument by dynamic update: λz.GET(A, COFFEE, z). Pragmatics requires that 
C is a proposition to be instantiated in context where C ⊆ [[ NOT Simp ]] = 
λz.¬ COME-IN(A, z) and moreover C ∩ [[ NOT Sdecl ]] = C ∩ λz.¬GET(H, 
COFFEE, z) ≠ Ø. The elsewhere-case C describes a missed occasion: Speaker 
believes that Addressee prefers COFFEE-worlds to NO-COFFEE-worlds.6 As in 
the cookie example, the “force” of the offer depends on the addressee’s 
eagerness not to miss an occasion to get coffee. Note that it is incoherent to 
combine motivational conjuncts and threatening disjuncts.  
(21) a. #Come in, and you will get coffee, or I won’t talk to you for days. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6  In a richer account, the not-getting coffee needs to be tied to a limited interval of time; the time 
that would correspond to the time after the non-occurring entry. 
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This is captured by the syntactic (raw) analysis. Given that the coordinate 
clause Simpand/orSdecl as a whole does not count as Simp, the structure is not 
recursive. More interestingly, perhaps, is what happens in the Threat case. 
(22)  Touch this cookie, and I will kill you. 
(22) a. first argument of [ ¡ ]: λz.TOUCH(A, COOKIE, z) 
  second argument of [ ¡ ], dynamic update: λz.KILL(S, A, z) 
  Psp. for alternatives C: (i) C ⊆ λz.¬TOUCH(A, COOKIE, z)  
  (ii.) C ∩ λz.¬KILL(S, A, z) ≠ Ø  
The speaker assumes that Addressee prefers not being killed to being killed. 
The imperative informs her that if she avoids touching the cookie there is a 
chance to stay alive. 
Earlier theories interpret Simp-and-Sdecl as conditionals. The present analysis 
treats Simp-and-Sdecl maximally similar to other imperative clauses but it 
predicts that Simp-and-Sdecl entail conditional statements. The example in (23) 
is a typical conditional case, but the reasoning holds for all examples.  
(23) Open the newspaper, and you’ll see the king on page 2. 
 first argument of [ ¡ ]: λz.∃x(NEWSPAPER(x) ∧ OPEN(A, x, z)) 
 second argument of [ ¡ ]: λz.SEE(A, KING, PAGETWOOF(x), z) 
 Presupposition: C in context,  
 (i) C ⊆ λz.¬∃x(NEWSPAPER(x) ∧ OPEN(A, x, z))  
 (ii.) C ∩ λz.¬∃x(NEWSPAPER(x)∧SEE(A, KING, PAGETWOOF(x), z)) ≠ Ø  
 i.e. there is a chance for A to see the photo of the king. 
The instantiation of C is restricted to sets of worlds where A doesn’t open a 
newspaper. The overall modal quantification states that all future courses 
where newspapers get opened by A are such that the king’s picture is on p.2. 
This entails the conditional “If you open the newspaper, you’ll see the king”. 
Admittedly, the entailment is again hard-wired in the interpretation of [ ¡ ] 
and maybe therefore no less stipulative than in competing analyses. However, 
the stipulation here echoes the strengthening of disjunction in the plain 
imperative case. [ ! ]-imperatives typically inform the addressee what 
happens if, and what happens if she does not engage in certain actions (e.g. 
freezes). In the simple case, this dichotomy can be modeled by exclusive 
disjunction. In the [ ¡ ] case, exclusive disjunction will not be sufficient to 
maintain this division of worlds into cases. The condition that C ⊆ ¬p 
therefore simply transfers exclusivity of cases to the [ ¡ ] denotation.  
This concludes the discussion of examples. What is missing so far are ill-
wishes like “Die!”, “Eat shit!”. These obviously rest exclusively on what is 
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desirable for the speaker. They do not fit into the basic version of the analysis 
and will be touched in section 4.2.  
4	   More	  Ties	  to	  Earlier	  Literature	  
4.1	   Van	  Rooij	  and	  Franke,	  2010	  
In making the assumption that there are two imperative operators [ ! ] and  
[ ¡ ], I stipulate a fundamental difference between and and or in imperatives. 
Of course, it would be desirable to derive the different behaviours from more 
basic facts about imperatives and coordination. In a recent paper, van Rooij & 
Franke propose that it can be predicted on a game theoretic basis. They 
address the fact that only and can be used to “reverse” the intention of an 
imperative, as illustrated again in (24). Only (24b) conveys a serious 
invitation to eat spinach.  
(24) a. *Don’t eat your spinach, or I will give you a dollar. 
 b. Leave your spinach, and I will beat you. 
R&F’s idea is simply this: Both imperatives in (24a) and (24b) state what the 
speaker wants not be done. Both erroneously prime the listener to not eat 
spinach. (24a) counteracts by promising a reward for the elsewhere case; 
(24b) counteracts by promising a punishment in the imp! case. Now the 
reward case competes with other ways to call out similar rewards, e.g. (25).  
(25) If you eat your spinach, I will give you a dollar. 
Van Rooij and Franke argue that the reward in (25) can be somewhat lower 
than the one in (24a) because in (25), it only needs to overcome the 
addressees reservations against spinach whereas (24a) has to overcome these 
plus the additional linguistic priming to not eat spinach, caused by the 
imperative. Therefore (25) systematically wins over (24a). 
In principle, the dual threat in (24b) faces a similar competition. The speaker 
likewise could decide to say ‘If you eat your spinach, I will not beat you.’ or 
such. And again, cheaper threats are required here because priming of the 
unwanted action has been avoided. However, van Rooij and Franke say, a 
costly punishment is not as binding a social commitment as a costly reward. 
Society will sanction those who promise big rewards and do not pay. In 
contrast, society rather rewards those who lower punishment. Therefore, false 
priming is not equally uneconomic when it only raises punishment costs: You 
can always lower your costs again by simply not punishing so badly.  
This argument would certainly be appealing, but there are parallel examples 
where speakers indeed offer promising vs. unpromising alternatives in those 
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costly ways that R&F want to exclude. This is possible both with disjoint 
declaratives and with disjoint imperatives. (26) demonstrates the strategy in a 
common parent-child interaction (the parent wants actually to get home).  
(26) You can either stay on the playground longer, or we’ll have time to have 
 an ice cream on our way home.7 
(27) is to be understood in a context which advertises cosmetic surgery. (Of 
course, I do not submit to the argument.) 
(27) It’s your decision: Remain an unremarkable average person for the rest 
 of your life, or make an appointment with Dr. Knock’s cosmetic surgery 
 clinics today! 
Such examples show that speakers are indeed willing to make suggestions in 
ways where priming has to be countered with higher rewards, even sugges-
tions that are worded in the imperative mood. The pattern is just conven-
tionally not available for the Simp or Sdecl coordination. I therefore conclude 
that the asymmetric behaviour of and/or coordination is a conventional part 
of the pragmatics of Simp coord Sdecl and needs to be coded in grammar. 
4.2	   Condoravdi	  and	  Lauer,	  again	  
C&L (2010a, b, 2011) argue in favour of a general model for speech acts in 
terms of public beliefs and commitments. Specifically, they propose that “the 
utterance of an imperative p! commits the speaker to act as if he had a 
preference for the hearer committing himself to act as if he preferred p” 
(C&L, 2010b). They assume that commitments are part of public beliefs in 
common ground update (Stalnaker, 2002). Public commitment to p will add p 
to a (public) list of the agent that reveals his preferences that drive his 
decisions for action. Preference lists feed modal quantification and offer a 
natural link to statements like ‘I must p’ that are entailed by imperatives. 
General public will watch whether the agent’s behaviour accords with his 
public commitments. If discrepancies get too large, the general public can 
decide on sanctions, thereby taking responsibility for the ‘elsewhere’ worlds 
that are part of the imperative’s meaning in the Hands Up! approach. 
C&L’s analysis is a sophisticated variant of a speaker-buletic modal. It 
is therefore ideally suited to analyse imperative uses for wishes, including ill-
wishes. These are hard for my own proposal, according to which the speaker 
basically asserts that it would be in the hearer’s own interest to take a certain 
action. Arguably, this does not fit the ‘drop dead’ example.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Thanks to Manfred Sailer who brought up this type of example. 
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(28) Please, be blond! (wish in absence of addressee) 
 Drop dead! (ill-wish) 
For the same reason, however, C&L’s analysis has problems with imperatives 
used for desinterested ADVISE, cookie INVITATIONS, CONCESSIVES and 
DARE! imperatives. They do not discuss the use of imperatives in threats of 
the Simp and Sdecl form, but given that the speaker will not have an interest for 
the listener to follow Simp! in these cases either, these coordinations should be 
extremely problematic in that approach. The appealing vision in C&L’s 
approach is that ordering sources in modal semantics can be reconciled with 
preference lists in action planning. In accepting an imperative p!, the 
addressee is assumed to rank p high on his list of preferences. The actual 
ranking of preferences will not be fully determined by the imperative 
utterance, because the hearer could have other aims that he pursues with even 
higher priority. This underspecification is certainly adequate. 
The Hands Up! analysis, in contrast, contributes in a more local, but 
also more explicit way to the facts that determine the addressees actions. 
Take the drastic initial Freeze, or I will kill you! Before hearing and believing 
the content of this imperative, the addressee A might have planned (= pre-
ferred with high priority) to not freeze but have a coffee. By learning that his 
next future options are either to freeze or to get killed, A does not simply 
demote his earlier plan ‘I will now have a coffee’ to a somewhat lower rank. 
What A indeed faces is a quite drastic belief revision: He learns that the 
coffee plan is not part of any possible future at all, and that his choice is a 
quite different one. 
4.3	   Ross’	  Paradox	  
Let me finally show how Ross’ paradox can be avoided. Ross (1944) is 
quoted as the first to observe that simple-minded modal analyses of 
imperatives carry the danger of falsely predicting that (29) entails (30). 
(29) Come! 
(30) Come, or stay! 
The problem arises due to the fact that any world that has property p also has 
the weaker property p∨q. The Hands-Up! analysis does not predict this false 
entailment: In the following, I will use the proposition SANCTIONS as a cover 
predicate for contextually given sanctions that the hearer could understand.  
(29’) [[ [ ! ] Come! ]] = [ ! ] (λw.COME(A,w)) (λw.SANCTIONS(A,w)) 
 = λz.∀w[FUTURE(z,w) ∧ CIRC(z,w) ∧ LEWIS-SIM(z,w)      
 →  Come(A,w) ∨ Sanctions(A,w) ] 
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Presupposition: Speaker believes that A will like worlds in λw.COME(A, w) 
better than worlds in λw.SANCTIONS(A, w). 
(30’) [[ [ ! ] Come, or stay! ]]  
 = [ ! ] (λw.COME(A, w) ∨ STAY(A, w)) (λw. SANCTIONS (A, w)) 
 = λz. ∀w(FUTURE(z, w) ∧ CIRC(z, w) ∧ LEWIS-SIM(z, w)  
 →  (Come(A, w) ∨ Stay(A, w)) ∨ Sanctions(A, w) ) 
Presupposition: Speaker believes that A will like worlds in λw[COME(A, w) ∨ 
STAY(A, w)] better than worlds in λw.SANCTIONS(A, w). 
There are two ways to avoid Ross’ paradox. The first way is to assume, as we 
did in earlier places, that the or which separates the sanction case from the 
Imp! cases is an exclusive or ∨e. With this assumption, (29’) no longer entails 
(30’): Assume that there is a world which is both a STAY(A)-world and a 
SANCTION-world. Then (29’) can be true but (30’) will be false. Hence, (30’) 
is not entailed by (29’). 
Exclusive disjunction: ( φ(x) ∨e ξ(x) ) –×→ ( (φ(x) ∨ ψ(x)) ∨ ξ(x) ) 
The second way to block the inference from (29) to (30) will leave us the 
option for inclusive ‘or’ in the representation of imperatives in the Hands Up! 
format. It argues via presuppositions. (29) presupposes that the speaker 
believes that the addressee prefers worlds in λw.COME(A, w) over worlds in 
λw.SANCTIONS(A, w). (30) presupposes that the speaker believes that the 
addressee prefers worlds in λw(COME(A, w) ∨ STAY(A, w)) over worlds in 
λw.SANCTIONS(A, w). We can model these preferences by universal 
statements of the following kind: All worlds in λw(COME(A, w) ∨ STAY(A, 
w)) are better than any world in λw.SANCTIONS(A, w). With this explication 
of preferences, the person who utters (29) will not be committed to the 
content of the presupposition of (30) because s/he believes that some STAY 
worlds are also SANCTION worlds and therefore not any better than other 
SANCTION worlds. The details of weighing worlds against worlds would need 
to be worked out in detail, but the approach opens up another way to avoid 
Ross’ paradox in the Hands Up! theory. 
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Abstract. This contribution tests whether focus has a determining influence
on the occurrence of Conditional Perfection. Two off-line experiments support
this hypothesis. Conditional Perfection occurs significantly more often if the an-
tecedent of the conditional is focused compared to the non-focused case. Ad-
ditionally, in contrast to the scalar implicature associated with or (Zondervan
2009), Conditional Perfection occurs only infrequent if the antecedent is not fo-
cused. The second experiment suggests that this distinct behavior is due to dif-
ferent properties of the scalar implicature and the implicature associated with
Conditional Perfection.
1 Introduction
Conditional Perfection (CP) describes the phenomenon that speakers interpret
conditional sentences, under certain conditions, as biconditionals. The phe-
nomenon was given its name by Geis & Zwicky (1971), who observed that
their students extended or “perfected” the meaning of conditionals. Consider
Geis & Zwicky’s original example:
(1) a. If you mow the lawn, I’ll give you five dollars.
b. If you don’t mow the lawn, I won’t give you five dollars.
c. Only if you mow the lawn, I’ll give you five dollars.
As McCawley (1993) points out, “Only if p, q” can be paraphrased as “If not
p, not q”. So examples (1b) and (1c) should be regarded equivalents. CP thus
described the inference from (1a) to (1b) or (1c). Geis & Zwicky note that per-
fection of conditionals is clearly wrong from a logical viewpoint. The utterance
of a sentence like (1a) does not exclude the possibility that the hearer gets a re-
ward for some other effort, for example, for cleaning the living room. Still they
affirm that many speakers interpret conditionals in exactly this way and that
CP is “highly regular” (Geis & Zwicky 1971: 564). This paper addresses the
conditions that influence the occurrence of CP.
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2 Conditional Perfection Is a Pragmatic Phenomenon
Standard approaches analyze conditionals within the framework of possible
worlds semantics, as in (2):
(2) “If p, q” is true in w if and only if:
∀ w′ such that w′ ∈ C(w) & p(w′) : q(w′)
with w being the actual world and C(w) being the set of possible worlds
accessible from w.
A conditional “If p, q” is considered to be true in w, if for all possible worlds
that are accessible from w and in which p is true q is also true. No information
is incorporated in the conditional meaning about what will be the case if p
does not hold. So if we want to keep the semantics for conditionals unchanged,
we must assume that CP is pragmatic. To affirm this claim, conditionals that
do not allow perfection offer convincing support. If CP was contingent upon
the semantics it must arise with all conditionals. Biscuit Conditionals, as the
standard example taken from Horn (2000), belong to this group:
(3) a. If you’re thirsty, there’s some beer in the fridge.
b. If you’re not thirsty, there’s no beer in the fridge.
The conditional in (3a) clearly does not invite the inferences in (3b). The rea-
son for this is that the two propositions are conditionally unrelated. Further
evidence in favor of a pragmatic analysis of CP provides the fact that the infer-
ence is usually cancelable. That is, it can be “taken back” by adding additional
information. The following example illustrates this (van Canegem-Ardijns &
van Belle 2008):
(4) If you mow the lawn, I’ll give you five dollars.
But also if you paint the garage.
Through adding the additional condition under which five dollars will be paid,
the CP inference that mowing the lawn is the only possible way to earn the
money is canceled.1 Another feature suggesting a pragmatic account of CP is
expressed by Boër & Lycan (1973). They support the idea that not all condi-
tionals, in all situations are perfected and give the following counterexample:
(5) If John quits, he will be replaced.
1 As discussed in van Canegem-Ardijns & van Belle (2008: 371 ff.), this cancels just the “Only
if p, q” inference. Canceling the “If not p, not q” inference is often not possible for speech acts
like promises, threats or warnings. This might indicate that the two inferences “If not p, not q” and
“Only if p, q” are indeed not equivalent. Still, we will stick to this assumption.
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Here, according to Boër & Lycan, CP does not arise, because common sense
inhibits the implication that if John does not quit his job, he won’t be replaced.
It is easily imaginable that John will be replaced, e.g. because his work lacks
quality or because he does not get along with his colleagues. This constitutes
the main argument of Boër & Lycan. CP does not arise because of the special
form or intrinsic features of conditionals but simply because of additional in-
formation like world or common-sense knowledge.
All this provides convincing evidence that CP is a pragmatic rather than a se-
mantic inference.
3 Conditional Perfection Is not a Scalar Implicature
Originally, Geis & Zwicky claimed that it is difficult to explain CP in terms of
implicatures (cf. Grice 1989) and that the inference is clearly not a conversa-
tional implicature. They argue that Grice, when characterizing conversational
implicatures
looks for general principles governing the effects that utterances have, principles
associated with the nature of the speech itself. CP is, in some sense, a principle
governing the effects that utterances have (...) but it is in no way that we can
see derivable from considerations having to do with the nature of the speech act.
(Geis & Zwicky 1971: 565)
Later in their squib, Geis & Zwicky relativize this claim and state that an ex-
planation of CP in terms of conversational implicatures is not easily establish-
able. Unfortunately they conclude without further elaboration or clarification.
Despite this rejection, it is the most popular assumption today to explain CP
with respect to conversational implicatures. One particularly favored approach
is to analyze CP in terms of Scalar Implicatures (SI). The general idea of a SI
is that an inference can be drawn based on the amount of information that is
expressed. As Grice’s first maxim of Quantity advises, speakers should make
their contribution as informative as required. Thus, very simplified, if we know
that more informative statements than the one actually made exist (and some
further assumptions hold (cf. e.g. Geurts 2010)) we can argue that the speaker
does not believe that the more informative statements are true. For this reason,
Horn Scales are created to order terms according to their information content.
In the following, three scales will be introduced that were suggested to account
for CP.
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3.1 Attempt 1: Atlas & Levinson (1981)
Atlas & Levinson (1981) discuss the following scale:
i f and only i f p, q
↑ i f p, q
There are two problems with this scale: First and most important, this scale
is inadequate to explain CP. As mentioned above, by uttering a weaker state-
ment the speaker expresses that he does not believe that the stronger statement
holds. Thus an effect opposing CP arises. Uttering a conditional would always
imply that p is only one among more conditions which will bring about q (Horn
2000). Atlas & Levinson assumed that this scale does not elicit SIs, hence they
did not see this problem. They argued that the scale is not well-formed because
the two terms are not lexicalized to the same degree. This is why the unwanted
SI does not arise. However, this restriction does not hold, as will be discussed
below. The second deficiency of the above scale is pointed out by van der Auw-
era (1997,b). The element at the top of the scale is just the literal meaning plus
the SI which is expected. It is clear that this combination will always be more
informative than the literal meaning on its own. Since a construction of this
type is excluded with respect to other scalar terms like <some, some but not
all>, it should also be excluded for CP. A related weakness is the complexity of
the statement at the top of the scale. A restriction which is often proposed for
potential alternatives is that they must not be considerably longer or more com-
plex than the statement made. In these cases, the speaker could just choose the
shorter statement in order to be brief. However, this restriction does indeed not
hold. As Matsumoto (1995) points out, more informative statements need to be
asserted if they contain relevant information and even if they are of a greater
complexity. Therefore, the above scale does elicit the unwanted SI. However,
the scale can be ruled out due to other reasons such as the above-mentioned
deficiencies and additional constraints on monotonicity.2
3.2 Attempt 2: van der Auwera (1997b)
Van der Auwera (1997; 1997b) assumes the following scale for his approach:
...
i f p, q and i f r, q and i f s, q
i f p, q and i f r, q
↑ i f p, q
If someone utters “If p, q” the comparably stronger statements such as, e.g., “If
p, q and If r, q” are automatically denied and hence the speaker expresses that p
2 Horn scales must not include items of different monotonicity behavior. (cf. e.g. Matsumoto 1995).
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is the only condition that will bring about q. The weakness of van der Auwera’s
scale is that he has to assume an infinitely large expression at the very top of
the scale that incorporates all possible antecedents. Only if the statement “If p,
q” negates for all other antecedents r that “If r, q” is true, CP arises. The prob-
lem of this account is the reference to particular antecedents. Someone who
hears a conditional like (1a) would have to reason for all possible antecedents
that they will not bring about q. This however, does not seem appropriate to
represent the reasoning involved in CP. It is implausible and probably impossi-
ble that someone who hears a conditional has an infinitely long list of possible
antecedents in mind (Horn 2000; von Fintel 2001).
3.3 Attempt 3: Horn (2000)
Horn (2000) suggests yet another approach. He believes that the CP effect is
due to pragmatic strengthening and suggests the following scale:
q /Whatever the case, q
↑ i f p, q
Unfortunately, a proposal like Horn’s is also not sufficient to derive CP, as
von Fintel (2001) notes. Uttering “If p, q”, and thereby negating the simple
statement q/whatever the case, q, does not mean that p is the only neces-
sary and sufficient condition under which q will occur. It only elicits the much
weaker implicature that q is not unconditionally true. Whether only one or sev-
eral conditions exist that render q true cannot be decided at that point. Thus
Horn’s account is missing an important step towards CP. Still, following Horn,
CP is derivable under his account (Horn 2000, 2004). Horn performs a reduc-
tion of Grice’s maxims which is motivated by the desire to be in accordance
with the idea of a dualistic functional model which guides conversation. This
model assumes that utterances are subject to two forces. All of Grice’s maxims
and submaxims, except for the maxim of Quality which remains unchanged,
can be reduced to express just these two forces. Horn ends up with the follow-
ing two principles (Horn 1993):
• Q Principle: Make your contribution sufficient. Say as much as you can,
given quality and the R Principle.
• R Principle: Make your contribution necessary. Say no more than you
must, given the Q Principle.
The Q Principle embodies the first maxim of Quantity and the first two sub-
maxims of Manner. It corresponds to a lower bound on information content.
Within the R Principle the maxim of Relation, the second maxim of Quantity
and the third and fourth submaxims of Manner are collected. This principle
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constitutes an upper limit on the form of the utterance.
Under these prerequisites uttering “If p, q” implies that the speaker does not
believe that q is unconditionally true. Given the R Principle, this contribution
must be more relevant to the conversation than uttering q alone. This is why CP
arises. As Horn puts it: “what could make such a condition [i.e. “If p”] more
relevant than its necessity?” (Horn 2000: 310). Thus, CP occurs naturally and
regularly due to systematic strengthening which is evoked by the R Principle.
A serious problem of Horn’s account is that it would never be relevant to claim
that p is just a sufficient condition. This is however, wrong. With mention-some
questions it is typically sufficient to provide only the most relevant out of sev-
eral conditions (cf. von Fintel 2001).
The attempts to explain CP as a SI have not been satisfactory. The next section
discusses the possibility to analyze CP still as a Quantity Implicature (QI) but
not as a SI.
4 Conditional Perfection as Quantity Implicature
The basic idea, following von Fintel (2001), is that CP is a QI3 which arises
as a by-product of an exhaustive interpretation. The following examples, taken
from von Fintel (2001) and Groenendijk & Stokhof (1984) illustrate exhaustive
interpretations.
(6) a. Q: Who left the party early?
A: Robin and Hilary left the party early.
b. Robin and Hilary but no one else left the party early.
(7) a. Q: Who walks?
A: John and Mary walk.
b. John and Mary but no one else walk.
If the answers in (6a) and (7a) are interpreted exhaustively, they corresponds
to (6b) and (7b). These inferences are thought to be QIs. However, they can-
not be derived by the “standard procedure” introduced for SIs, i.e. by negating
stronger statements. The problem is the set of relevant alternatives. In order
to infer “John and Mary but no one else walk” from “John and Mary walk”
an infinitely large set of more informative statements needed to be rejected, as
illustrated below:
• John, Mary and Peter walk.
3 Although QIs entail SIs, I use QI in the following to refer to all kinds of QIs except for SIs.
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• John, Mary, Ann and Peter walk.
• . . .
This is again very implausible.
Van Rooij & Schulz (2004) and Schulz & van Rooij (2006) provide an account
of exhaustive interpretation which overcomes these problems. Their theory of
exhaustification captures the intuition that exhaustive reasoning is based on
the closed world assumption. Details of their theory are not important for our
purpose; what is important is that they explain exhaustification with the use of
minimal models. An exhaustive interpretation corresponds to a minimal model.
Consider the following models for example (7a).
M1 M2
Individuals = Individuals =
{Robin, Ben, John, Mary} {Robin, Ben, John, Mary}JwalkKM1 ={Robin} JwalkKM2 ={Ben}
M3 M4
Individuals = Individuals =
{Robin, Ben, John, Mary} {Robin, Ben, John, Mary}JwalkKM3 ={John, Mary} JwalkKM4 ={John, Mary, Ben}
Table 1: The table presents four potential models for example (7a)
Exhaustification arises with a model that makes the answer true and in which
the extension of the predicate in question is minimal. From the above given
examples M3 is the model leading to an exhaustive interpretation. The others
either make the answer false (M1 and M2) or the extension of walk is not min-
imal (M4). An important feature of this account is that the focus-background
partitioning determines the predicate in question that gets minimalized. There-
fore, minimalization and hence exhaustification applies only to focused terms.
In this regard Rooth (1996) makes an interesting observation with respect to
focus and the nature of question-answer pairs. When we consider question-
answer pairs, the position of focus in the answer corresponds to the wh-constitu-
ent in the question. Examples (8a) and (8b) illustrate this.4
4 Boldness equals focus in this and further examples.
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(8) a. Q: Who walks?
A: John and Mary walk.
b. Q: What do John and Mary do?
A: John and Mary walk.
Due to the different focus-background partitioning, different models will be
minimal. For (8a) a model in which only John and Mary walk is minimal, but
for (8b) a model where John and Mary do nothing else but walk is minimal.
4.1 Predictions for Conditional Perfection
Based on what we have seen so far, CP can be explained in terms of exhaus-
tification which in turn can be explained by the selection of a minimal model.
Since exhaustification is sensitive to focus, the same conditional can be in-
terpreted exhaustively and non-exhaustively dependent on the question of the
contexts and the predicate it specifies. Consider the following examples:
(9) A: What happens if I sell an eel?
B: If you sell an eel, you get 2.50 euros.
(10) A: When/Under which conditions do I get 2.50 euros?
B: If you sell an eel, you get 2.50 euros.
Again, depending on the question different parts of the conditional are focused.
In the first case, where the consequent is focused, a minimal model is one in
which selling an eel results in nothing else than getting 2.50 euros. Hence, CP
is not expected. With focus on the antecedent, as in dialogue (10), a minimal
model is one where the only condition under which 2.50 euros are received is
if an eel is sold. CP is expected to arises.
5 Experimental Investigations
The purpose of the experimental investigations was to test whether the predic-
tions with respect to the influence of focus on CP are right. To investigate this
six minimal context pairs were created that differed only in the question asked.
The question was either of the type what-if-p or when-q. The answer to either
question was a conditional of the form “If p, q”. Thus, questions of the type
what-if-p put focus on the consequent of the conditional. Questions of the form
when-q on the contrary, put the antecedent in a focus position. An alternative
formulation for when-q would be under-which-conditions-q (cf. (10)). How-
ever, it was argued in the literature that questions with the Dutch equivalent
are necessarily understood to ask for an exhaustive answer (cf. van Canegem-
Ardijns & van Belle 2008: footnote 12). If this was also the case for the German
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counterpart (the experiment was conducted in German) the questions would be
useless to investigate the influence of focus. Thus we choose the when-q formu-
lation. It is also known that for when-sentences a difference between a condi-
tional and a temporal reading exists. In this study, we examined the conditional
reading. To promote a conditional reading, we did not include terms referring
to temporal aspects within the contexts of the test items. This was meant to en-
sure a conditional reading and with that bring about the effect that the answer
“If p, q” rather than “When p, q” was not surprising or unintuitive. The task of
the participants was then to judge in either case, whether the answer provided
by the conditional was sufficient. Hence, felicity judgements rather than truth
value judgements were collected. It is expected that a felicity judgement task
(FJT) is more adequate to investigate whether implicatures were calculated (cf.
Papafragou & Musolino 2003). The test items always specify two conditions
that lead to a particular consequent (cf. 2). Thus participants are expected to
rate the conditional answer as insufficient when CP occurred. If focus influ-
ences CP we expect that subjects rate the conditional answer more often as
insufficient in the when-q condition than in the what-if-p condition.
Monika sells seafood on the market. She gets 1 euro for a crab, 2.50 euros for
an eel, 15 euros for a lobster and 2.50 euros for a pike.
Kerstin, an employee of Monika, cannot remember the prices. Since she does
not want to ask Monika again, she asks Sahra, who also works for Monika.
Sahra knows the prices exactly.
what-if-p when-q
Kerstin: What happens if I sell an eel? Kerstin: When do I get 2.50 euros?
Sahra: If you sell an eel, you get 2,50 euros.
Did Sahra answer Kerstin’s question sufficiently? [Yes] [No]
Table 2: The table presents a sample item with both what-if-p and when-q ques-
tions.
For elicitation of the data a repeated-measures design was used with the ques-
tion type as independent variable. Thus subjects were confronted with both
types of questions, but never for the same context. The investigations were
conducted in paper-and-pencil form and the questionnaire consisted of six test
items and six fillers. Three out of the six test items contained what-if-p ques-
tions and the other three when-q questions. Each questionnaire contained three
fillers that tested whether participants were in general able to understand con-
ditionals as answers to questions. These conditional fillers were very similar
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to the test items, but they specified only one antecedent for each consequent.
Within a true conditional filler, the conditional answer corresponds to what
has been described in the context. False conditional fillers provide the wrong
antecedent for a consequence. Furthermore the questionnaires contained three
fillers which tested whether subjects were sensitive for exhaustification. Like
the test items, these fillers specified two conditions which will lead to the same
consequent. Contrary to the test items, the answer in the dialogue was not given
in conditional form, but was a simple statement starting with only. Answers of
true exhaustification fillers provided both conditions that were specified by the
context. The false exhaustification filler gave only one of these. Thus, if par-
ticipants are in fact sensitive to exhaustification they should rate the response
sufficient in the true condition and insufficient in the false condition. The par-
titioning was balanced over all six fillers, so that in total three were of the true
condition and three of the false condition. Two versions of the questionnaire
were used and items and fillers were presented in a pseudo-random order. No
more than two test items were presented in a row. The same was ensured for
the fillers. The second version of the questionnaire contained in each case the
other condition of items and fillers and in the inverse order as in version one.
5.1 Procedure
The experiment was conducted in German. Participants received a paper copy
of the questionnaire with written instructions on the first page. Before the ques-
tionnaires were handed out, participants also received oral instructions that
summarized the written ones. Within the questionnaire, three items or fillers
were printed on one page. At the end of the questionnaire participants were
asked to provide some information about their background knowledge of logic
and pragmatics. Additionally, space for comments was provided. The partici-
pants took about 15 minutes to fill out the questionnaire.
5.2 Participants
Participants were 50 students from an introductory linguistics class of the Uni-
versity of Frankfurt. Two subjects were excluded, prior to analysis, because
they did not provide correct answers to three or more fillers. Hence, the data of
48 participants was evaluated.
5.3 Results
Negative answers, signaling CP, occurred in 89.2 % of the when-q contexts
and in 16.3 % of the what-if-p contexts. An analysis of variance showed that
over items as well as over subjects there was a main effect of question type
(when-q vs. what-if-p) on the occurrence of CP, F(1,5) = 145.93, p < 0.001
and F(1,47)= 309.93, p < 0.001 respectively. Most participants also showed
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a consistent behaviour over all test items. 61 % of the subjects labeled the
answer as insufficient only with when-q and never with what-if-p questions.
33 % labeled the answers more often as insufficient in when-q contexts than
in what-if-p contexts. Only 3 participants said that the answers are equally
frequent insufficient in both question conditions. Moreover, nobody’s answers
signaled that CP occurred more often or even exclusively in what-if-p contexts.
5.4 Discussion
The results clearly indicate that focus has an effect on the occurrence of CP.
This effect was highly significant over subjects as well as over items. We found
that the percentage of no-answers, signaling CP, was high in when-q contexts
and comparably low in what-if-p contexts. These results indicate that von Fin-
tel’s theory, together with Schulz & van Rooij’s account on exhaustive inter-
pretation, is adequate to account for CP. Focus seems to be the decisive factor
for the occurrence of this inference.
However, the results are important in another respect. Zondervan (2009)
investigated the effect of focus on the SI associated with or (the inference from
“A or B” to “A or B but not both”). He also found more SIs when or was in
a focus-position but the effect, though significant, was much smaller than ex-
pected. Zondervan found that the SI occurred in 77 % of the focused cases,
versus 51 % of the non-focused cases. In contrast, the present study reflects
a partitioning closer to the expected one. The main problem of Zondervan’s
results was the high amount of implicatures in the non-focus condition. This
could be due to the fact that a different paradigm was used. As described, the
present study used a FJT while Zondervan used a truth-value judgement task
(TVJT) in his study. Within the TVJT, participants had to label the target sen-
tences true or false. The underlying assumption is that a sentence like “A or B”
is considered false in the case that the subjects calculated the SI (“A or B but not
both”) and indeed A and B holds. However, this appears to be rather a strong
claim. The statement is clearly inappropriate if the SI is calculated but does that
lead to falsehood? To judge this could be a problematic task for participants, so
that the responses might not reflect natural understanding. Judging whether an
answer is suitable or sufficient might be more natural. Additionally, labeling
an utterance as false does not automatically mean that an implicature arose.
As Zondervan (2006) discusses, a false answer can be interpreted in two ways:
Either the subject calculated the implicature and thus labels the target sentence
false in a situation where both A and B were the case. Or alternatively, the
subject did not calculate an implicature but noticed that in the situation where
both A and B are the case and would be more suitable than or and thus labels
the target sentence false. So in addition to the problem that labeling sentences
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true or false might be unnatural for participants, interpreting the results is dif-
ficult. Furthermore, the different results for the non-focus condition in this and
Zondervan’s study could be due to different properties of or and if. It could be
the case that for if the occurrence of QIs is more dependent on focus, while
or also elicits the inference regularly when not located in a focus position (for
whatever reason). To investigate which of these two factors was decisive for the
different results in Zondervan’s and the present study a follow-up experiment
was conducted.
6 Follow-up Experiment
The follow-up experiment replicated the first experiment with the exception
that a TVJT was used. If this experiment yields the same results as the first
experiment we can conclude that if and or behave differently when located in
focus. If however, Zondervan’s results are replicated we can conclude that the
different paradigm was responsible for the response pattern.
6.1 Material
Test and control items were the same as in the previous experiment, with the
only difference that the question “Did X answer Y’s question sufficiently?” was
changed to “Is the answer of X true?” This was done for test as well as control
items.
6.2 Procedure
The procedure, the instructions, oral and written, and the design were identical
to the first experiment.
6.3 Participants
36 students from an introductory linguistics class of the University of Frankfurt
participated in the experiment. Two participants were excluded prior to anal-
ysis, because they stated having substantial knowledge of implicature theory.
Additionally, one participant was excluded because she did not provide correct
answers to three or more fillers. Thus, the data of 33 participants was evaluated.
6.4 Results
Within when-q context negative answers, signaling CP, occurred in 56.6 % of
the cases and they occurred in 11.1 % of the what-if-p contexts. The effect was
again significant over subjects, F(1,32) = 58.175, p < 0.001, as well as over
items, F(1,5) = 50.845, p < 0.001. 52 % of the participants labeled the answer
only in when-q contexts as insufficient. One half of the remaining participants
labeled more answers insufficient in when-q contexts. The other half said that
the answers are equally often insufficient in when-q and what-if-p contexts.
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Nobody’s answers signaled that CP occurred more often or even exclusively in
what-if-p contexts.
6.5 Discussion
The results indicate once more that focus influences the emergence of CP and
furthermore that this is independent of the paradigm used. The amount of CP
was again significantly higher in the when-q condition than in the what-if-p
condition. This holds over subjects as well as over items. The percentage of
no-answers, indicating CP, is overall lower when a TVJT is used compared
to the FJT. This may either indicate that felicity judgements are indeed more
adequate to detect implicatures or that the FJT overestimates the amount of
implicatures. However, what is interesting with respect to Zondervan is that
using a TVJT also lowers the percentage of CP in the non-focus condition.
This signals that the high percentage of implicatures which Zondervan found
in the non-focus condition was due to properties of or rather than due to the
TVJT.
7 Conclusion
This contribution provides evidence that von Fintel’s (2001) theory together
with the account of Schulz & van Rooij makes right predictions for the occur-
rence of CP. The experiments showed that focus influences whether an answer
is interpreted exhaustively, i.e. whether CP arise. The amount of CP was sig-
nificantly higher when the antecendent was in a focus position. We also found
that the high amount of implicatures which Zondervan found in his study on
or in non-focus conditions was probably not due to using a TVJT rather than
a FJT. For the case of if the amount of CP was even lower in the non-focus
condition when a TVJT was used.
As mentioned in the literature, not all implicatures behave the same (cf.
Papafragou & Musolino (2003) on numerals and other scalar terms, Geurts
& Pouscoulous (2009) on different embeddings and Chemla (2009) on scalar
terms and free choice inferences). Geurts (2010: 122 ff.) makes an interest-
ing observation with respect to potential differences of SIs and QIs that seems
relevant for the different behavior of or and if. Even though Geurts proposes
one account to derive both inferences he clearly distinguishes between the two
types of implicatures. While we have a well-defined, closed set of potential al-
ternatives for SIs such as, e.g., all, most and many for the scalar term some, this
is not the case for QIs as those involved in exhaustive interpretation. For an an-
swer like “Robin and Hilary left the party early” (example (6a)) no such clearly
defined set of alternatives exists. We rather have to deal with an open-ended,
possibly infinitely large set of alternatives. This core difference seems to play
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an important role for the different experimental results found by Zondervan and
my study. Zondervan investigated the SI associated with or, so a well-defined
set of alternatives was present, namely and. Since CP as analyzed here is not a
SI but a QI, an open set of alternatives exists which cannot be clearly defined.
This difference appears to be crucial for the reasoning of the participants. As
Zondervan had argued, labeling a target sentence false might not mean that
the SI was calculated but only that the stronger lexical item would be more
adequate. So maybe the amount of SIs is overestimated in the non-focus con-
dition and possibly also in the focus condition. It is reasonable that with a finite
and reasonably small set of alternatives, participants think about whether one
of the alternative statements might have been more suitable. This could lead to
the high amount of false ratings in the non-focus conditions. Within the present
experiments on CP there are no concrete alternatives which could detract the
participants and lead to a large amount of no answers in the non-focus condi-
tion. So answering no seems to be more clearly traceable to the emergence of
the QI.
If this difference was indeed crucial for the different results for or and if, we
could conclude that for the case of or the SI is also not elicited regularly in
the non-focus condition. Rather the clear awareness of the better alternative
statement and interferes and leads the subjects to conclude that the sentence
is false. Furthermore, this predicts that items that are assumed to produce SIs
(e.g., some) reproduce Zondervan’s results, whereas items associated with QIs
(e.g., the exhaustive interpretation in (6a)) should reproduce the results of the
current study.
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Abstract. Motivated by particular restrictions on event-related modification
with German stative passives, this paper proposes that stative passives instantiate
a consequent state kind of an event kind. The participle in such constructions
has to be derived from a verb whose event structure contains a consequent state,
represented by an event-semantically interpreted BECOME component. Event-
related modifiers with BE-passives modify either the event kind argument or the
state itself, and are therefore semantically licensed.
1 Introduction
German morphologically distinguishes between so-called eventive (or verbal)
and stative (or adjectival) passives (Kratzer 1994, 2000; Rapp 1996; Maienborn
2007a: among others). In particular, a past passive participle combines with
werden ‘become’ in eventive passives (1a) and with sein ‘be’ in stative passives
(1b) (examples after Kratzer 2000).
(1) a. Die
the
Reifen
tires
werden
become
aufgepumpt.
up-pumped
‘The tires are (being) inflated.’
b. Die
the
Reifen
tires
sind
are
aufgepumpt.
up-pumped
‘The tires are inflated.’
The semantics of sentences like (1b) is the main topic of this paper, and through-
out, I will employ the descriptive labels BECOME- and BE-passives to distin-
guish between these two constructions in German.
According to the traditional view, going back to at least Wasow (1977),
stative passives are copula-adjective constructions, eventive passives periphras-
tic verb forms. Nevertheless, an underlying event is still accessible in BE-
∗ This paper benefitted greatly from comments at various stages and locations by many people,
in particular Sascha Alexejenko, Boban Arsenijevic´, Helga Gese, Claudia Maienborn, Louise Mc-
Nally, and Carla Umbach. All errors are mine. This work was supported by the grant HUM2007-
60599 from the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science and by an award from the Fundació
ICREA to Louise McNally.
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passives, given the (albeit restricted) availability of event-related modifiers (2).
(2) a. Der
the
Brief
letter
ist
is
mit
with
roter
red
Tinte
ink
geschrieben.
written
b. Das
the
Haar
hair
war
was
schlampig
sloppily
gekämmt.
combed
Kratzer (1994, 2000) and Rapp (1996) therefore propose that it is possible to
adjectivise not just verbs but also verb phrases (VPs). Schlücker (2005) and
Maienborn (2007a), in contrast, argue that such modifiers are merely pragmat-
ically licensed. In this paper, I will argue, contra the latter, that the particular
modifiers available with BE-passives are semantically licensed.1
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, I will outline the general
semantics associated with BE-passives, its input requirements, as well as the
more restricted availability of event-related modification with this construction.
Section 3 proposes a semantic account of BE-passives based on the difference
between event kinds and tokens. Section 4 addresses the availability of one type
of event-related modifier, by-phrases, and shows how the facts are accounted
for by the proposal. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 German BE-Passives
In the literature on German, the view prevails that the participle in BE-passives
is adjectival (Kratzer 1994, 2000; Rapp 1996; von Stechow 1998; Maienborn
2007a), and that it expresses the result or outcome of an event. If BE-passives
are copula-adjective constructions, their semantics has to be the one commonly
assumed for such constructions: A stative property is ascribed to an individual.
However, BE-passives co-exist with ‘true’ copula-adjective constructions
that employ primary adjectives (3) (examples from Maienborn 2009).
(3) a. Die
the
Schublade
drawer
ist
is
geöffnet
opened
/
/
offen.
open
b. Die
the
Schublade
drawer
ist
is
geleert
emptied
/
/
leer.
empty
This suggests that there has to be some difference between the two, and it is
natural to assume that the difference is to be found in the nature of the under-
lying verb in BE-passives. The following sections discuss the contribution of
1 For reasons of space, this paper will leave aside issues concerning the syntax-semantics inter-
face, including whether or not phrasal adjectivisation of VPs exists. It can also not provide a deep
comparison to existing approaches, but see Gehrke (to appear).
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the verb in BE-passives, their input requirements and semantic peculiarities, as
well as restrictions on the availability of event-related modification.
2.1 The Role of the Underlying Verb in BE-Passive Constructions
The stative property, as a rule, is ascribed to the internal (theme) argument of
the underlying verb. The external argument, on the other hand, is completely
absent, as illustrated by the unavailability of purpose clauses and depictives
(4).2
(4) a. ??? Der
the
Reifen
tire
war
was
aufgepumpt,
inflated
um
in order
die
the
Fahrt
journey
fortzusetzen.
to continue
b. ??? Das
the
Buch
book
war
was
mit
with
Absicht
purpose
/
/
betrunken
drunk
geschrieben.
written
A first attempt at stating the input requirements for a BE-passive is based on
the assumption that the stative property has to be recovered from the event
structure licensed by the underlying verb. This means that only verbs which
license an event structure with a stative component should be able to derive
BE-passives. This is basically the hypothesis defended in Rapp (1996).
Indeed, the data show that BE-passives are fully acceptable with transitive
verbs that have a lexically specified consequent state (in the sense of Moens &
Steedman 1988) ((1b), (5)), i.e. with accomplishments and achievements.
(5) a. Die
the
Tür
door
ist
is
geöffnet
opened
/
/
geschlossen.
closed
b. Der
the
Antrag
application
ist
is
eingereicht.
submitted
c. Die
the
Lampe
lamp
ist
is
repariert.
repaired
With other verbs, BE-passives are acceptable only in certain contexts ((6)-(8),
b. examples from Maienborn 2009) (see also Kratzer 2000). With activities
((6), (7)), this is to be expected: The event structure does not contain a state.
(6) a. #Die
the
Katze
cat
ist
is
gestreichelt.
petted
2 This contrasts with BECOME-passives, where the external argument is syntactically active, even
when it remains implicit (see also Gehrke & Grillo 2009: and literature cited therein).
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b. Anna
Anna
hat
has
ihre
her
Nachbarspflichten
neighbour-duties
erfüllt:
fulfilled
Der
the
Briefkasten
mail-box
ist
is
geleert,
emptied
die
the
Blumen
flowers
sind
are
gegossen,
watered
und
and
die
the
Katze
cat
ist
is
gestreichelt.
petted
‘Anna has done her neighbourly duties: the mailbox is emptied,
the flowers are watered and the cat is petted.’
The BE-passive of a semelfactive verb3 like streicheln ‘stroke’ in (6a) is rather
bad out of context. However, if we create a context under which someone
promised his or her neighbour to take care of things while the neighbour is
on holiday, and one of the chores is to stroke the cat, the construction becomes
acceptable (6b).
Similarly, the performative verb zitieren ‘cite’ out of context, as in (7a), is
not a good candidate for the construction because it does not license an event
structure with a stative component. In the right context, in this case adding the
by-phrase by Chomsky (7b)4, the sentence becomes acceptable again.
(7) a. #Das
the
Manuskript
manuscript
ist
is
zitiert.
cited
b. Das
the
Manuskript
manuscript
ist
is
von
by
Chomsky
Chomsky
zitiert.
cited
What is not expected if all we needed were a stative component to license the
construction, is the fact that there are also restrictions on deriving BE-passives
from some stative predicates ((8), though see (10), below).
(8) a. #Die
the
Antwort
answer
ist
is
gewusst.
known
b. Ist
is
die
the
Antwort
answer
gewusst
known
oder
or
geraten?
guessed
The BE-passive of wissen ‘know’ out of context is rather bad but gets better
when embedded under the question in (8b). It is important to note, however,
3 The terms activity, accomplishment, and achievement are used in the sense of Rothstein (2004).
It could be debated whether semelfactives (or performatives, as in (7b)) are activities, but there is
general agreement that semelfactives and performatives do not lexically specify a consequent state.
4 A German PP headed by von ‘of, from’ in these contexts is commonly translated into English with
a by-phrase. However, since it is generally claimed for English that by-phrases are not possible with
stative passives, it is not fully clear whether (a) this claim is simply wrong (exceptions for English
exist; German data are discussed in more detail in section 4); or (b) whether German von-phrases
are not fully equivalent to English by-phrases. Given the facts in (4) (which extend to combinations
with acceptable by-phrases), we have to assume that these by-phrases are still different from the
by-phrases with eventive passives, which introduce true external arguments.
Stative Passives and Event Kinds 245
that many speakers do not even accept (7b) and (8b), whereas (6b) is accepted
by everyone. A more restrictive hypothesis, then, is the one in (9).
(9) Only verbs that lexically specify a consequent state derive BE-passives.
It follows from (9) that accomplishment and achievement verbs, whose internal
argument undergoes a change of state and as a result is the bearer of a conse-
quent state, are the perfect candidates for this construction. In addition, state
verbs that allow an inchoative (re-?)interpretation (see also Gehrke & Grillo
2009) are also fine, as evidenced by the acceptable BE-passives of the psych
predicates in (10), in contrast to (8a).
(10) Marie
Marie
ist
is
genervt
annoyed
/
/
verärgert
angered
/
/
amüsiert.
amused
This hypothesis also makes sense of the fact that the subject is always the
theme argument of the underlying verb: Changes of state, as a rule, affect theme
arguments.
2.2 BE-Passives Involve Event Kinds
We saw in (2) and (7b) that the underlying event can be modified by event-
related modifiers, such as instrumentals, manner modifiers, and by-phrases.
However, it has often been observed that such modification is only possible
if it pertains to the consequent state; cf. the contrast between (11) and (12)
(examples after Rapp 1996).
(11) Der
the
Mülleimer
rubbish bin
ist
is
(* von
by
meiner
my
Nichte
niece
/
/
*langsam
slowly
) geleert.
emptied
(12) a. Das
the
Haus
house
ist
is
von
by
Studenten
students
bewohnt.
in-lived
b. Er
he
ist
is
von
by
der
the
Musik
music
beeindruckt.
impressed
The modifiers in (11) are out because they refer to an event participant or the
manner of the event that (could have) brought about the particular state de-
scribed by the sentence without having an impact on or being ‘visible’ during
the consequent state. In contrast, the event participants described by the by-
phrases in (12) clearly belong to the state described (see section 4).
Similarly, the modifiers in (13) have an impact on the underlying event
that is still visible during the consequent state.
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(13) a. Die
the
Zeichnung
drawing
ist
is
von
by
einem
a
Kind
child
angefertigt.
made
b. Der
the
Brief
letter
war
was
mit
with
einem
a
Bleistift
pencil
geschrieben.
written
c. Das
the
Haar
hair
war
was
ziemlich
rather
schlampig
slopp(il)y
gekämmt.
combed
In section 3, I will propose that BE-passives only allow modifiers that either
modify an event kind (as in (13)) or that modify the state directly (as in (12)).
Another important restriction on the modification of BE-passives is that
the underlying event cannot be temporally or spatially modified.5 For example,
a modifier like recently can only modify the state (14).
(14) Die
the
Tür
door
war
was
kürzlich
recently
geöffnet.
opened.
‘The door was in the opened state recently, but probably is no longer.’
(NOT: The door is in the opened state, the opening took place re-
cently.)
BE-passives are also incompatible with temporal frame adverbials (15) (exam-
ples from von Stechow 1998) (see also Rapp 1996, 1997).
(15) a. *Der
the
Computer
computer
ist
is
vor
before
drei
three
Tagen
days
repariert.
repaired
(‘The computer is repaired three days ago.’)
b. Der
the
Computer
computer
ist
is
seit
since
drei
three
Tagen
days
repariert.
repaired
This has to do with the fact that BE-passives with a present tense copula are
statements about the present (in contrast to present perfect BECOME-passives,
which - at least in German - are statements about the past6).
Furthermore, spatial modifiers that pick out the location of the event that
brought about the consequent state are also generally bad (16).
(16) a. ??? Die
the
Reifen
tires
sind
are
in
in
der
the
Garage
garage
aufgepumpt.
inflated
5 The incompatibility of spatial and temporal modifiers with (many or most) stative predicates is
discussed extensively in Maienborn (2007b) and literature cited therein.
6 See also Rapp (1996); Kratzer (2000); Maienborn (2007a) and literature cited therein for ar-
guments against treating BE-passives as an ellipsis of an eventive passive perfect construction.
(German werden ‘become’ forms the perfect with the auxiliary be.)
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b. ??? Das
the
Kind
child
war
was
im
in the
Badezimmer
bathroom
gekämmt.
combed
From these data I conclude that the event associated with the underlying verb
lacks spatiotemporal location. To capture this fact, the account outlined in the
next section crucially builds on the assumption that BE-passives involve event
kinds, not event tokens.
3 The Proposal
Based on the discussion in the previous section, I propose that a BE-passive
refers to the instantiation of a consequent state kind of an event kind (17).
(17) a. Die
the
Tür
door
ist
is
geschlossen.
closed
b. ∃ek,sk,s [BECOME(ek,sk) ∧ THEME(ek,door) ∧ closed(s)
∧ THEME(s,door) ∧ R(s,sk)]
R is Carlson’s (1977) realisation relation whereas BECOME should be under-
stood as an event semantic version of Dowty’s (1979) BECOME-operator, asso-
ciated with accomplishment and achievement predicates; e.g. (18).
(18) Informal event semantics of BECOME (von Stechow 1996)
[[BECOME]] (P)(e) = 1 iff e is the smallest event such that P is not true
of the prestate of e but P is true of the target state of e.
The use of BECOME is motivated by the hypothesis in (9).7
The idea that BE-passives involve event kinds, in turn, is motivated by
the restricted availability of event-related modifiers discussed in the previous
section.8 The unavailability of spatial and temporal modifiers shows that the
event in BE-passives has no spatiotemporal manifestation. Instrumental, man-
ner modifiers and by-phrases, on the other hand, are only available if they can
be interpreted as event kind modifiers, or if they modify the state (token) di-
rectly. Event kind modification will be discussed in this section, whereas state
7 Something like BECOME is also employed in Embick’s (2004) account of one type of stative
passive participles he identifies, namely the resultative one.
8 Event kinds are natural to expect if we assume that events form a subsort in our ontology of
(token) individuals (Davidson 1967), kinds form another subsort in that ontology (Carlson 1977),
and as a rule, any token in the ontology should be the realisation of some kind in that ontology.
Event kinds have an analog in e.g. the Situation Semantics notion of event type (Barwise & Perry
1983), though the formal details are quite different. Under a Neo-Davidsonian view (e.g. Parsons
1990), events can be decomposed into subevent, which motivates the additional assumption about
the existence of subevent kinds.
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modifiers are addressed in section 4.
Empirical arguments for event kinds as an ontological category have been
brought forward by e.g. Landman & Morzycki (2003); Ginzburg (2005); Gehr-
ke & McNally (to appear). For example, Landman & Morzycki (2003) propose
to model manner modification in terms of kinds. Since their line of argumen-
tation provides additional independent support for my analysis of BE-passives,
the following subsection will briefly recapitulate the relevant points.
3.1 Modeling Manner in Terms of Kinds (Landman & Morzycki 2003)
Landman & Morzycki observe semantic and syntactic parallels with so-anapho-
ra in the nominal and verbal domain across various languages. Their examples
from German are given in (19).
(19) a. so
so
ein
a
Hund
dog
(wie
(like
dieser)
this)
‘such a dog like this one’
b. Er
he
hat
has
so
so
getanzt
danced
(wie
(like
Maria).
Mary)
‘He danced like Mary.’
In (19) there is a direct semantic parallel in the adnominal and adverbial uses
of so, which refers back to a particular kind of entity (a kind of dog or a kind of
dancing event). There is furthermore a syntactic parallel in that both can occur
with an additional clause of comparison introduced by wie ‘like’.
Given that elements like so under the adnominal use (19a), in partic-
ular English such, are commonly treated as kind anaphors, following Carl-
son (1977), Landman & Morzycki (2003) treat adverbial so analogously, as
anaphor to event kinds. In particular, they propose that (adverbial) so denotes
a property of events that realise a (particular contextually supplied) kind (20).
(20) [[soi]] = λe.e realises ki
An additional argument that kinds are involved comes from the fact that tempo-
ral and locative adverbials generally cannot antecede adverbial so (21), unless
they can be seen as creating a new (or sub-)kind (22) (examples from Landman
& Morzycki 2003).
(21) a. *Maria
Mary
hat
has
am
on
Dienstag
Tuesday
getanzt,
danced
und
and
Jan
John
hat
has
auch
also
so
so
getanzt.
danced
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b. *Maria
Mary
hat
has
in
in
Minnesota
Minnesota
gegessen,
eaten
und
and
Jan
John
hat
has
auch
also
so
so
gegessen.
eaten
(22) Maria
Mary
schläft
sleeps
in
in
einem
a
Schlafsack,
sleeping bag
und
and
Jan
John
schläft
sleeps
auch
also
so.
so
‘Mary sleeps in a sleeping bag and John does so, too.’
For example, the locative modifier in (22) does not serve to specify the location
of a particular sleeping event, but rather serves to create a new sub-kind of
sleeping event, namely the kind of sleeping in sleeping bags. Hence, it is not a
proper spatial modifier but rather used as a kind of manner modifier.
Given facts like these, Landmann & Morzycki suggest to treat manner
modifiers as event kind modifiers in general.
3.2 Relevance for this Paper
Returning to the topic of this paper, it is striking to see that the same kind
of modifiers that are acceptable antecedents for so are also possible with BE-
passives, namely and foremost manner modifiers, which modify an event kind.
Spatial and temporal modifiers, on the other hand, modify an event token and
are neither good antecedents of so nor acceptable with BE-passives, as observed
in the previous section.
If manner modification is taken to be kind modification, one type of re-
striction on event-related modification with BE-passives is straightforwardly
accounted for under the current proposal (abstracting away from state mod-
ifiers for the time being). Since BE-passives involve event kinds, only kind-
related event modification is possible, including modifiers that serve to create
a new or a subkind. It should also be clear, then, that the particular modifiers
are semantically and not just pragmatically licensed, contra Maienborn (2007a,
2009).
To illustrate how the kind-based approach captures the restrictions on
event-related modification with BE-passives, let us come back to the contrast
between (11) and (13) (I will return to the stative examples in (12) in section
4). The example in (11) without the modifier describes the state the rubbish bin
is in as a result of an emptying event kind. Combining event-related modifiers
with the BE-passive should only be allowed either if these modify the (conse-
quent) state (token) or if they create a new subkind, by narrowing down the
event kind of emptying rubbish bins. The particular modifiers in (11), however,
do not do either, since they do not relate to the consequent state itself and since
there are also no common or established subkinds of rubbish-bin-emptying by
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my niece or slowly.9 The modifiers in (13), in turn, pick out particular subkinds
of the events in question, namely childish drawings, pencil-writings or sloppy
combings.
In the following section, I will take a closer look at restrictions on the
availability of by-phrases and show that some by-phrases modify a state whereas
others should be treated as event kind modifiers.
4 Different Types of by-Phrases with BE-Passives
Schlücker (2005) observes that there are two types of by-phrases that can com-
bine with BE-passives. She argues that one type constitutes VP-adjuncts (23),
which do not form a prosodic unit with the participle.
(23) a. weil
because
Peter
Peter
von
by
dem
the
GeJAmmer
lamentation
genervt
annoyed
ist
is CONTRASTIVE
b. weil
because
Peter
Peter
von
by
dem
the
GeJÁmmer
lamentation
geNÈRVT
annoyed
ist
is NEUTRAL
Neutral stress with these phrases is on the participle, secondary stress on the
modifier (the latter point is not noted in Schlücker, but see Hoekstra 1999;
Gehrke 2008 for similar facts from Dutch).
The second type of by-phrases is argued to be V-adjuncts, which form a
prosodic unit with the participle, with neutral stress on the modifier (24), (25).
(24) a. weil
because
die
the
Wände
walls
von
by
FEUer
fire
geschwärzt
blackened
sind
are NEUTRAL
b. weil
because
die
the
Wände
walls
von
by
Feuer
fire
geSCHWÄRZT
blackened
sind
are
CONTRASTIVE
(25) a. weil
because
seine
his
Töchter
daughters
von
by
der
the
SANGesmuse
muse of singing
geküsst
kissed
sind
are
NEUTRAL
b. weil
because
seine
his
Töchter
daughters
von
by
der
the
Sangesmuse
muse of singing
geKÜSST
kissed
sind
are
CONTRASTIVE
9 The question remains how to determine whether a subkind is common or established. Ultimately,
a pragmatic account should answer such questions, and this is where the current proposal meets
pragmatic accounts like Schlücker (2005) and Maienborn (2007a).
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Schlücker observes that the intonation facts with her ‘V-adjuncts’ match those
with other event-related modifiers that are allowed with BE-passives (26), (27).
(26) a. weil
because
die
the
Birnen
pears
in
in
ROTwein
red wine
gedünstet
steamed
sind
are NEUTRAL
b. weil
because
die
the
Birnen
pears
in
in
Rotwein
red wine
geDÜNStet
steamed
sind
are CONTRASTIVE
(27) a. weil
because
der
the
Brief
letter
mit
with
WACHS
wax
versiegelt
sealed
ist
is NEUTRAL
b. weil
because
der
the
Brief
letter
mit
with
Wachs
wax
verSIEgelt
sealed
ist
is CONTRASTIVE
She concludes that these latter event-related modifiers, as well as by-phrases
which behave like V-adjuncts, are pragmatically licensed in line with the ac-
count proposed by Maienborn, by forming a complex ad hoc property with the
stative property denoted by the verbal participle.10
In addition, Schlücker notes that the two types of by-phrases further dif-
fer with respect to the nature of their complements. With her VP-adjuncts, the
by-phrase is stated to denote the agent or direct cause of the underlying event.
Animate entities are commonly expressed by proper names or members of a
group denoted by a collective noun, e.g. Polizist ‘police-man’. Inanimate enti-
ties are referred to by definite uses of mass nouns, e.g. vom Feuer ‘by the fire’,
or by appellatives used definitely, e.g. von der Bombe ‘by the bomb’.
With her V-adjuncts, on the other hand, a by-phrase is argued to denote
the theme of the underlying event or an indirect cause. It is supposed to have
an instrumental character and to provide information about the manner or rea-
son of the event. Animate entities are referred to by collective nouns, e.g. von
der Polizei ‘by the police’, inanimate entities by generic uses of mass nouns
(von Feuer ‘by fire’) or indefinite uses of appellatives (von einer Bombe, von
Bomben ‘by a bomb, by bombs’).
In the following, I will make some qualifications with respect to the data
discussed in Schlücker and relate the facts to the current proposal.
4.1 Some Qualifications
A first observation is that the V-adjuncts discussed by Schlücker are parts of
fixed expressions and idioms. For example, there is no literal ‘verbal’ mean-
ing in (25), in the sense that the muse of singing actually kisses or kissed the
10 This is basically what I called a common or established subkind above. Her account of the syntax
of ‘VP-adjuncts’ remains unclear, given that she rejects the possibility of phrasal adjectivisation.
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daughters.11 A second type of by-phrases behaving like V-adjuncts is found
in examples already discussed in previous sections, such as (7b) and (13a),
repeated in (28) with the additional neutral stress pattern identifying them as
V-adjuncts.
(28) a. Das
the
Manuskript
manuscript
ist
is
von
by
CHOMsky
Chomsky
zitiert.
cited
b. Die
the
Zeichnung
drawing
ist
is
von
by
einem
a
KIND
child
angefertigt.
made
The ‘VP-adjuncts’ discussed by Schlücker, on the other hand, are fully accept-
able only with stative predicates. An example from previous sections, which
displays this intonation pattern, is the stative one in (12b), repeated in (29)
with the relevant intonation pattern.
(29) Er
he
ist
is
von
by
der
the
MuSÍK
music
beÈINdruckt.
impressed
For the other alleged ‘VP-adjuncts’, i.e. those that do not combine with stative
predicates, I do not find them very good and I do not share the judgments about
the intonation identifying them as VP-adjuncts. If acceptable at all, they rather
behave like V-adjuncts, e.g. there is no secondary stress ((30), Schlücker’s ex-
amples, my judgments about stress).12
(30) a. ?? weil
because
der
the
Saal
hall
von
by
der
the
Heinrich-BÖLL-Stiftung
Heinrich-Böll-foundation
gemietet
rented
ist.
is
NEUTRAL
b. ?? weil
because
der
the
Saal
hall
von
by
der
the
Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung
Heinrich-Böll-foundation
geMIEtet
rented
ist
is
CONTRASTIVE
11 Similarly, the combination ‘von Feuer geschwärzt’ in (24) appears rather fixed. A preliminary
google-search revealed very few instances of ‘geschwärzt’ in combination with a by-phrase. These
were limited to von Feuer, von Rauch ‘by smoke’, and von Ruß ‘by carbon black’.
12 Other native speakers agreed with my judgments. Further syntactic tests to distinguish between
V- and VP-adjuncts, mentioned by Schlücker (2005), such as the relative placement (with respect
to modifier and participle) of sentence negation, sentence adverbials and floating quantifiers, yield
the same results.
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I conclude from these facts, then, that by-phrases that behave like VP-adjuncts
are fully acceptable only with states.13 Given observations in previous sections,
this makes sense, since only with these predicates, the entity denoted by the by-
phrase modifies the state (which is interpreted as an inchoative state).
4.2 Rapp (1996)
A similar modification restriction to stative predicates with BE-passives is al-
ready observed in Rapp (1996). Rapp notes that by-phrases that relate to the
action or the process itself (as opposed to a stative component) are generally
incompatible with un-prefixation (31), while this combination is more accept-
able with stative verbs (32) (examples due to Lenz 1993).
(31) a. Die
the
Suppe
soup
ist
is
(*von
(*by
Maja)
Maja)
ungewürzt.
unseasoned
b. Der
the
Brief
letter
ist
is
(*von
(*by
Maja)
Maja)
ungeschrieben.
unwritten
(32) a. Die
the
Dresdner
Dresden-
Bürger
citizens
sind
are
von
by
solchen
such
Problemen
problems
unbeeindruckt.
unimpressed
‘The citizens of Dresden are not concerned with such problems.’
b. ... weil
because
sie
they
von
by
ihrer
their
Arbeit
work
unbefriedigt
unsatisfied
ist.
are
‘... because they are not satisfied by their work’
She concludes that the by-phrases with these verbs do not relate to an activity or
action but express arguments of the adjective (i.e. of the state): The construction
expresses the attitude of an experiencer with respect to his stimulus.
She furthermore observes that there are word order differences between
non-action-related by-phrases (33) and other event-related modifiers in the BE-
passive (34).
(33) a. Die
the
Dresdner
Dresden-
Bürger
citizens
sind
are
unbeeindruckt
unimpressed
von
by
solchen
such
Problemen.
problems
13 The marginal acceptability of such by-phrases with BE-passives could be explained along the
lines of Welke (2007), who assumes that there are a few instances where a BE-passive construction
has to be interpreted as an elliptical BECOME-passive perfect construction.
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b. ... weil
because
sie
they
unbefriedigt
unsatisfied
von
by
ihrer
their
Arbeit
work
sind.
are
(34) *... weil
because
der
the
Brief
letter
geschrieben
written
von
by
einem
an
Experten
expert
/
/
mit
with
roter
red
Tinte
ink
war.
was
Only the former can be extraposed, whereas the latter have to remain within the
VP (or the verbal cluster). From these facts she concludes that the modifiers in
(33) modify the adjective, while those in (34) modify a VP.14
4.3 Taking Stock: The Licensing of by-Phrases
To take stock, we have different kinds of by-phrases with BE-passives that are
licensed semantically (and possibly syntactically) in different ways. First, we
have by-phrases that behave like V-adjuncts, diagnosed by intonation and word
order possibilities. Such by-phrases are only possible with idioms or when
they serve to create a new (sub-)kind (e.g. (13a)). Furthermore, they behave
like other event-related modifiers of BE-passives with respect to intonation and
word order, as the data discussed by Rapp and Schlücker show.
In contrast, there are by-phrases that behave like VP-adjuncts with respect
to intonation and word order possibilities, and thus contrast with other event-
related modifiers with this construction. Such by-phrases are fully acceptable
only with stative predicates, in which case they modify a state token. It is possi-
ble that such phrases are really to be treated as arguments of the AP (along the
lines of Rapp), rather than arguments of the underlying VP. By-phrases with
stative predicates commonly do not refer to agents, i.e. they are not true ex-
ternal arguments. For example, with psych predicates, they rather refer to the
stimulus of the state expressed.
Schlücker’s observation, then, that the complements of V-adjunct by-phrases
have more of a generic character fits these conclusions and the overall pro-
posal. If the by-phrase modifies an event kind rather than an event token, the
potential agent of such a kind naturally has a more generic character. With the
VP-adjuncts, on the other hand, we have by-phrases modifying an actual state
token, so they are prone to be less generic.15
14 Rapp takes the latter facts as an argument in favour of phrasal adjectivisation (along the lines of
Kratzer 1994).
15 Recall that Schlücker notes that VP-adjunct by-phrases can also refer to agents or direct causers.
I assume that these must be the by-phrases in the non-stative examples, which are not very good to
begin with.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, I proposed an account of German stative passives (BE-passives),
which employed the concept of kinds in the domain of eventualities. On the
basis of the restricted availability of event-related modifiers, it was argued that
BE-passives instantiate a consequent state kind of an event kind. The input re-
quirements for this construction therefore involve a participle derived from a
verb whose event structure contains a consequent state, which was represented
by an event-semantically interpreted BECOME component. Event-related mod-
ifiers with BE-passives, in turn, were argued to be semantically licensed, since
they modify either the event kind argument or the state itself.
It was briefly noted that in some cases (for some speakers), BE-passives
can be derived from verbs which do not license an event structure with a con-
sequent state component, and it was suggested that these cases have to be
contextually (pragmatically) licensed. The precise mechanisms were not dis-
cussed, however (see Maienborn 2007a, 2009; Gese 2010: for issues concern-
ing the pragmatics of BE-passives); we could also assume that such cases in-
volve coercion of the underlying event type. Given that the event kind is not
spatiotemporally located, it might also be possible to interpret the scale under-
lying BECOME in a non-temporal way. This could explain different readings
ascribed to BE-passives that have been discussed in the literature under differ-
ent labels, such as consequent state vs. characterisation readings (Brandt 1982;
Rapp 1996), resultant state vs. target state readings (Kratzer 2000) or temporal
vs. qualitative readings (Maienborn 2009; Gese 2010).16 This remains to be
worked out in future research.
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Abstract. The paper presents a new analysis of the semantics of adjectival 
passives mainly concentrating on the status of the implicit event, its agent 
participant and the dependency relation between eventive base and derived 
property. On the basis of data from two questionnaire studies it proposes an 
adjectival ∅-affix, modifying Maienborn’s (2009) analysis in two respects: 
First, it does not involve existential quantification over an event particular but 
reference to an event kind. Second, the dependency relation between the event 
kind and the property denoted by the participle of an adjectival passive 
sentence is not a causal or temporal one. It is a relation of lexical supervenience 
in the sense of Kim (1990) which leaves room for the pragmatic character of 
adjectival passives, for their specific ‘surplus in meaning’. 
 
1	   Introduction	  
Adjectival passives such as (1) are combinations of a form of the copula to be 
plus an adjectivized past participle. In German, copula and auxiliary differ in 
form: Adjectival passives use the copula sein (‘to be’) whereas verbal 
passives are built with a form of werden (‘to become’). 
(1) Die Tür  ist      geschlossen. 
 The door is[COP]  closed 
 ‘The door is closed.’ 
(2) Die Tür  wird        geschlossen. 
 The door becomes[AUX] closed 
 ‘The door is closed.’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Work on this paper was supported by the German Science Foundation (DFG) as part of the 
project A1 “The semantics and pragmatics of combinatory meaning variation” within the 
collaborative research center SFB 833, Universität Tübingen, and by the Ministry of Science, 
Research and the Arts Baden-Württemberg and the European Social Fund (ESF) within the 
Schlieben-Lange-Programm. I would like to thank Claudia Maienborn, Sebastian Bücking and 
Berit Gehrke for helpful discussion and comments. I would especially like to thank Britta 
Stolterfoht for having shared with me her psycholinguistic expertise. 
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Semantically, copula adjective sentences are property ascriptions to their 
subject referent (Maienborn 2005). What is special in adjectival passives, in 
contrast to copula sentences with genuine adjectives, is that the ascribed 
property is a complex property which has to be derived from the verbal base 
of the participle. Most semantic accounts assume that the property causally 
results from the occurrence of the event denoted by the adjectival passive’s 
verbal base (cf., e.g., Maienborn 2009, Kratzer 2000; for an exception see 
Gehrke 2010). There are three problems with this assumption.  
 First, the possibility of schon immer (‘always’) modification, as in (3) 
and (4), and other non-event-based uses of adjectival passives, such as (5),1 
cast some doubt on whether we really have to deal with a causal relation 
between an event particular and its resulting state. 
(3) Die linke Bronchie war schon immer verengt. 
 ‘The left bronchial tube had always been[COP] constricted.’ 
(4) Der Bildhauer meißelt aus dem Stein Figuren hervor, die nach seinem 
Verständnis dort schon immer verborgen waren.  
 ‘The sculptor carves shapes out of blocks of granit that he believes have 
always been[COP] hidden inside of them.’ 
(5) Bei den Glattnasen sind die Lidspalten bei der Geburt noch geschlossen.  
 ‘The eye-lid slits of the vesper bat are[COP] still closed at birth.’  
Second, adjectival passives, contrary to verbal passives, do not regularly 
combine with agent modifiers (cf. (6) vs. (7)). The acceptability of agentive 
modification depends on whether or not it is relevant for the ascribed 
property (cf. Rapp 1997, Maienborn 2010, for more details on this). These 
restrictions cannot be easily accounted for if we assume that adjectival 
passives contain an event particular with agent participant as their base. 
(6) Der Brief wurde       von Gabi / von einem Experten geschrieben. 
 The letter became[AUX]  by  Gabi / by  an    expert   written 
 ‘The letter was written by Gabi / by an expert.’ 
(7) Der Brief ist      ???von Gabi / von einem Experten geschrieben. 
 The letter is[COP]  ???by  Gabi / by  an    expert   written 
 ‘The letter was written by Gabi / by an expert.’ 
Third, there is some evidence that the relation between the eventive base and 
the derived property cannot be a classical causal one. Typical causal relations 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The sentences (3) – (5) are adapted from real occurrences found in the world wide web. 
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(cf. Engelberg 2005, for more details on this) hold between events but not 
between states. Adjectival passives with stative base verbs such as (8) do not 
fit into this pattern. Moreover, causal relations normally correlate with tem-
poral succession. This doesn’t hold for adjectival passives like (9) in which 
the relation is one of simultaneity.  
(8) Das Haus  ist      von  Studenten bewohnt. 
 the  house is[COP]  by   students   occupied 
 ‘The house is occupied by students.’ 
(9) Die Gefangenen sind     streng   bewacht. 
 the  prisoners   are[COP]  strongly  guarded 
 ‘The prisoners are closely guarded.’ 
Examples like (3) to (9), schon immer (‘always’) modification, restrictions on 
agent modification and properties inconsistent with classical causal relations 
pose three questions that will be our starting point in this paper: (i) whether 
the occurrence of the event is in fact a necessary part of the truth conditions 
of adjectival passives, (ii) what role the agent plays and (iii) how event and 
ascribed property can be related, if not by a CAUSE or RESULT predicate. After 
a short presentation of the formal account which constitutes the background 
of the investigations and the analysis carried out in this paper, section three 
presents two questionnaire studies with a truth value judgment task (TVJT) 
which investigate the status of the event and its agent participant in adjectival 
passives. The results of these studies point towards an analysis relying not on 
event particulars but on event kinds. The remaining part of the paper 
concentrates on formalizing the relation between this event kind and the 
derived property. Borrowing a dependency relation widely used in the 
philosophy of mind, section four argues for analyzing the link between 
eventive base and derived property as a case of lexical supervenience. Super-
venience allows connecting the derived property to an event kind and 
captures the intuition that the derived property is ‘more’ than the result state 
of the eventive base. It leaves room for the specific role pragmatics plays in 
the formation of adjectival passive by capturing the rather subjective, 
pragmatic nature of the derived property. 
2	   Background	  
Maienborn’s (2009) account of the formal semantics of adjectival passives 
sets the frame for the investigations and modifications presented in this paper. 
Modeling the semantics of an adjectival passive sentence as the ascription of 
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an underspecified property to its subject referent, Maienborn (2009: 44) 
proposes the following adjectival affix: 
(10) Adjectival ∅-affix: λP λx λs ∃e [s: Q(x) & result (e,s) & P(e)]  
In (10) the underspecification of the ascribed property is rendered by using 
the free variable Q for which pragmatics has to provide a suitable value. The 
only restriction on Q is that it results from the event denoted by the verbal 
base of an adjectival passive. There are mainly three reasons which speak in 
favour of an underspecification account and against an account which 
identifies the ascribed property with the result state contained in the event 
structure of an adjectival passive’s eventive base. First, the formation of 
adjectival passives is not restricted to verbs with lexically given result states 
(which should be the case if their semantics relied on result states), cf. (11).2  
(11) Er war geschmeichelt, als der Personenkult um ihn schließlich groteske 
Formen annahm.  
‚He was flattered when the cult of personality surrounding him finally 
veered into the grotesque.’         (Der Spiegel 40/1994, 10/3/1994) 
Second, adjectival passives and genuine adjectives are not distributed in a 
complementary way, cf. (12) and (13). As „the output of a lexical rule may 
not be synonymous with an existing lexical item“ (Kiparski 1983: 15), 
blocking should occur if adjectival passives referred not to an underspecified 
property but to the lexically given result state. Third, some sentences show a 
clear meaning difference between derived property and lexically given result 
state. In (14) geöffnet (‘opened’) cannot be identified with its result state 
offen (‘open’). The value assigned to Q by the context is not ‘open’, it is the 
property of ‘not being in the original packaging state’. 
(12) Die Tür ist geöffnet.   
 ‘The door is opened.’ 
(13) Die Tür ist offen.  
 ‘The door is open.’ 
(14) Das Spiel ist geöffnet, aber unbespielt und absolut neuwertig.  
 ‘The game is opened but unplayed and in pristine condition.’     
                         (Maienborn 2010: 9, my translation) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 In general, these constructions with non-resultative base verbs need contextual support, cf. 
Gese, Stolterfoht & Maienborn (2009: 136), Kratzer (2000: 4), Rapp (1998: 243). 
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In Maienborn’s formulation of the ∅-affix involved in adjectival passive 
formation the only constraint on the ascribed property Q is that its value 
result from the occurrence of the base verb’s event referent. In (10), this is 
rendered by existential quantification over an event particular. Yet, as already 
suggested by the non-event-based uses of adjectival passives referred to in 
the introduction, there are some reasons for doubting that this formalization is 
on the right track.  
3	   Experiments	  on	  the	  Status	  of	  the	  Event	  
Experiment	  1:	  “Status	  of	  the	  Event“	  
To test whether the occurrence of the event denoted by the verbal base of an 
adjectival passive sentence is indeed a necessary ingredient of its truth 
conditions – as it is in the case of a verbal passive – a questionnaire study 
with a truth value judgment task (TVJT) was conducted (see, e.g. Crain and 
Thornton 1998, for more details on this method). The study tested how the 
judgments of verbal passives and adjectival passives can be affected by a 
context which excluded the occurrence of the events denoted by their base 
verbs. It compared adjectival passives, verbal passives and, in a control 
condition, copula sentences with genuine adjectives as utterances in two 
types of context: an eventive one and a purely stative one, in which any 
eventive component is excluded: 
Eventive context: 
(15) Pünktlich um 17 Uhr leert der Postbote den Briefkasten. Anna, die das 
vom Fenster aus beobachtet, freut sich, denn sie ist pleite und hat 
morgens einen Brief an ihren reichen Onkel eingeworfen. Zufrieden sagt 
sie zu Erwin: „Der Briefkasten ist geleert / wurde geleert / ist leer.“ 
 ‘At 5 p.m. right on schedule the mailman empties the mailbox. Anna, 
watching from her window, is glad to see this because she is broke and 
she had put in a letter addressed to her rich uncle that morning. She tells 
Erwin: “The mail box is[COP] emptied / is[AUX] emptied / is empty.”’ 
Stative context: 
(16) Soeben ist der fabrikneue Briefkasten an der Eugenstr. aufgestellt wor-
den. Der Bürgermeister darf feierlich den allerersten Brief einwerfen. 
Die Frage, ob er denn wirklich der erste sein wird, der einen Brief in 
diesen Kasten einwirft, bejaht der anwesende Postfilialleiter und sagt: 
„Der Briefkasten ist geleert / wurde geleert / ist leer.“ 
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 ‘A brand new mailbox has just been installed in Eugenstr. The mayor is 
expected to post the very first letter as part of a small ceremony. The 
manager of the post office who is in attendance confirms when asked 
whether the mayor will in fact be the first one to put a letter in this 
mailbox: “The mail box is[COP] emptied / is[AUX] emptied / is empty.”’  
Given the existence of adjectival passives with schon immer (‘always’) 
modification noted at the beginning of this paper the following hypotheses 
were formulated for Experiment 1: 
(H1) Adjectival passives should be less dependent on the occurrence of the 
events denoted by their base verbs than verbal passives. Compared to 
verbal passives, they should receive more TRUE ratings in purely stative 
contexts. 
(H2) (control condition) As the semantics of genuine adjectives does not con-
tain any eventive component there should be no difference between the 
two sorts of contexts in the ADJ condition. 
Method Fourty-two undergraduate students of Tübingen University parti-
cipated for course credits or monetary reimbursement. All participants were 
native speakers of German.  
 Materials consisted of thirty-six experimental sentences in six versions 
and thirty-six filler sentences. All experimental items began with a context in 
which the occurrence of an event is described in condition EVENT or denied in 
condition NoEVENT and ended with the utterance of an adjectival or verbal 
passive or with a copula sentence with a genuine adjective. The base verbs of 
the adjectival and verbal passive utterances matched the event used in the 
EVENT-context. The copula adjective sentences contained genuine adjectives 
which corresponded to the result state of this event (e.g. EVENT-context: X 
leert Y (‘X empties Y’), target-utterance: Y ist geleert / wurde geleert / ist leer 
(‘Y is[COP] emptied / is[AUX] emptied / is empty’)). The filler items presen-
ted different sorts of sentences in contexts: filler sentence plus context were 
either tautologous or contradictory, or the sentence was true but pragma-
tically odd in the context. 
 Six presentation lists were constructed in which the 36 experimental 
items were randomly mixed with the 36 filler items. The six lists were 
counterbalanced across items and conditions: Each participant saw only one 
version (AP / VP / ADJ) of each of the target utterance embedded in one type of 
context (EVENT or NoEVENT). The questionnaires were distributed in an 
introductory linguistics class. Participants had one week to complete the 
questionnaire. They were told to read the narratives carefully and to judge the 
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truth value of the sentence in the described situation (“Is the utterance in the 
described situation true?”; possible answers: yes / no). 
Results and Discussion The results of the questionnaire study are presented 
in Table 1. 
context type sentence type 
 
Event 
NoEvent 
AP 
84,1% 
20,6% 
VP 
86,1% 
  5,2%  
Adj 
83,3% 
80,6% 
Table 1. Percentage of TRUE responses to the TVJT 
A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of context 
type and sentence type and, more importantly, a significant interaction of the 
two factors (F1(2,82) = 161.89, p1 ≤ .001; F2(2,70) = 155.18, p2 ≤ .001). As 
predicted by (H2), for copula sentences with genuine adjectives (adj) there 
was no significant difference between the event and the NoEVENT contexts 
(all Fs < 1). For the two other conditions, the judgments differed significantly 
depending on sentence type in the NoEVENT contexts (F1(1,41) = 17.25, p1 ≤ 
.001; F2(1,35) = 21.83, p2 ≤ .001) but not in the event contexts (all Fs < 1). 
As predicted by (H1) adjectival passives were judged true more often than 
verbal passives in NoEVENT contexts (F1 (1,41) = 31.74, p1 ≤ .001; F2 (1,35) 
= 20.90, p2 ≤ .001). Even though, descriptively, the percentage of true judg-
ments for adjectival passives in purely stative contexts is not very high, the 
difference between adjectival and verbal passives is highly significant. 
Moreover, participants’ judgments of the filler items in contradictory context 
(which were judged true only in 8,7% of the cases) were clearly different 
from the judgments for adjectival passives in the NoEVENT condition but not 
from verbal passives. Even if event-occurrence is strongly preferred in 
adjectival passives, this difference from contradictory sentences calls the 
truth-conditional relevance of event-occurrence into question. 
Experiment	  2:	  “Status	  of	  the	  Agent“	  
The experiment reported in this section focuses on the agent participant. A 
first hint to the status of the agent in adjectival passives comes from the 
restrictions on agent modification alluded to in the introduction. As agent 
modification serves to make explicit the implicit agent argument, the question 
is whether the restrictions on agent modification point to the absence of 
implicit agents in the semantics of adjectival passives. 
In order to test this assumption another TVJT experiment was conducted. 
Participants judged conditional sentences such as (17) to (19) which 
contained in their consequent either an adjectival passive or a copula sentence 
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with a genuine adjective. The antecedent of the experimental sentences 
referred either to the whole event denoted by the base verb of the adjectival 
passive (17) or the participation of an agent was excluded (18). In a third 
condition which parallelled the NoEVENT-condition of Experiment 1 the 
antecedent referred to a non-event-based state (19). 
(17) Wenn Karla gerade alle Rollläden in ihrem Zimmer heruntergelassen 
hat, dann ist das Zimmer abgedunkelt / dunkel. 
 ‘If Karla just lowered all the blinds of her room, the room is[COP] 
darkened / dark.’ 
(18) Wenn es in einem Zimmer keine Beleuchtung gibt und nach Sonnen-
untergang kein Licht mehr von draußen reinscheint, dann ist das 
Zimmer abgedunkelt / dunkel. 
 ‘If there is no light source in the room and, after sunset, no light falls 
through the window from outside, the room is[COP] darkened / dark.’ 
(19) Wenn ein Kellerzimmer schon immer weder Fenster noch Beleuchtung 
hat, dann ist das Zimmer abgedunkelt / dunkel. 
 ‘If a basement room never had a window or any kind of indoor 
lightning, the room is[COP] darkened / dark.’ 
The hypotheses tested in Experiment 2 were based on the restriction on agen-
tive modification in adjectival passives and on the results of Experiment 1 
which call into question the truth-conditional relevance of event-occurrence 
and thus the necessity of identifying event participants: 
(H1) Adjectival passives should receive more TRUE judgments in non-
agentive contexts than in non-eventive contexts. 
(H2) (control condition) There should be no differences between the three 
sorts of contexts in the genuine adjective condition. 
Method Thirty-six undergraduate students of Tübingen University partici-
pated and received a monetary reimbursement. All participants were native 
speakers of German and none of them participated in Experiment 1. 
Materials consisted of 36 experimental sentences in six versions and 36 filler 
sentences. Filler as well as experimental sentences were of the type Wenn X, 
dann Y (‘If X than Y’) where Y was in condition AP an adjectival passive 
sentence and in condition ADJ a copula sentence with a genuine adjective. In 
condition EVENT X referred to the whole event denoted by the base verb of 
the adjectival or verbal passive, in condition NoAG the participation of an 
agent was excluded and in context NoEVENT the whole event was missing. 
Events in Adjectival Passives   267 
The base verbs of all adjectival passives were causative accomplishments 
such as abdunkeln (‘to darken’), zähmen (‘to tame’), kürzen (‘to shorten’), 
verschönern (‘to embellish’) or räumen (‘to evacuate’). In the control 
condition (ADJ), the adjective denoted the result state of the corresponding 
adjectival passive’s base verb (e.g. abdunkeln – dunkel (‘to darken’ – ‘dark’). 
Filler sentences were either tautologous or contradictory, or they were true 
but required, in their consequent part, the cancellation of an implicature 
which contradicted the antecedent of the sentence (e.g. If all students passed 
the exam some students passed it.). 
Design and Procedure Six presentation lists were constructed in which the 
36 test items were randomly mixed with the 36 fillers. The six lists were 
counterbalanced across items and conditions: Each list included only one 
version of each experimental sentence. Sentences were presented in a self-
paced fashion on a PC using E-Prime software (Psychology Software Tools, 
Inc.). After each sentence the participants were asked to judge its truth by 
answering the question “Stimmt das?” (‘Is it right?’) by yes or no. 
Data Analysis and Results Reading times and truth-value judgments 
were analyzed. Reading times for the adjectival passive sentences were 
significantly higher in the two non-standard context conditions NoAG and 
NoEVENT (EVENT 1125 ms., NoAG 1648 ms., NoEVENT 1595) whereas there 
were no significant differences in the ADJ condition. Due to space limitations 
and lack of theoretical relevance, I will not report the reading times in detail 
here. The results of the TVJT are presented in Table 2. 
context type sentence type 
 
Event 
NoAG 
NoEvent 
AP 
92,1% 
59,7% 
31,0% 
Adj 
88,9% 
87,0% 
86,6% 
Table 2. Percentage of TRUE responses to the TVJT 
For the TVJT, a repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant main 
effect of context type and of sentence type. More importantly, the interaction 
of context type and sentence type was highly significant (F1(2,70) = 47.68, 
p1 ≤  .001; F2(2,70) = 49.900, p2 ≤  .001). Whereas, as predicted by (H2), 
there were no significant differences in the genuine adjective condition (all Fs 
< 1), in the adjectival passive condition the judgments differed significantly 
depending on context (F1(2,70) = 75.47, p1 ≤  .001; F2(2,70) = 81.25, p2 ≤ 
.001): Adjectival passive sentences received more TRUE judgments in the 
EVENT condition than in the two other conditions and, as predicted by (H1), 
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they received more TRUE judgments in condition NoAG than in condition 
NoEVENT (F1(1,35) = 31.35, p1 ≤ .001; F2(1,35) = 35.51, p2 ≤ .001). 
Discussion In Experiment 1, participants gave more TRUE judgments for 
adjectival passives in NoEVENT contexts than for verbal passives in the same 
contexts (20,6% vs. 5,2%). In both experiments, there were clearly more 
TRUE judgments for adjectival passives in the NoEVENT condition than for 
contradictory filler sentences (Experiment 1: 20,6% vs. 8,7%; Experiment 2: 
31% vs. 5,2%). In Experiment 2, the percentage of TRUE judgments increased 
if not the whole event but only the agent component of the base verb’s event 
structure was excluded by context. Interestingly, adjectival passive sentences 
in such NoAG condition received even more TRUE judgments than the filler 
sentences which were true but contained a generalized implicature which 
contradicted the antecedent of the sentence (59,7% vs. 51,5%). 
 There are two major conclusions which can be drawn from the two 
experiments presented above. First, adjectival passives in event-occurrence 
excluding contexts are no clear cases of contradiction. In the light of existing 
formal accounts of the semantics of adjectival passives, this result is some-
what surprising: The adjectival affixes proposed in the literature (e.g., 
Maienborn 2009, Kratzer 2000) all involve existential quantification over an 
event particular, i.e. concrete instantiation of the event. If these analyses were 
correct, the occurrence of the base verb’s event would be a prerequisite for an 
adjectival passive sentence to be true. The results of Experiment 1 and 2 
show that this is not the case. Second, the agent is less important for the 
interpretation of an adjectival passive sentence than expected for a regular 
event participant. The agent contained in an event particular is accessible via 
the event argument. It should thus be equally important for the interpretation 
of a sentence as the event argument itself. The results of Experiment 2 
showed that the agent is less important for the interpretation of an adjectival 
passive sentence than the event itself. In view of these results, it seems 
plausible to assume that the semantics of an adjectival passive sentence does 
not contain an event particular and that concrete instantiation of the event and 
identification of its participants might just be pragmatic issues. This 
conclusion receives further support by the results of Experiment 2 where 
NoAG adjectival passives received descriptively even more TRUE judgments 
than true filler sentences which required the cancellation of a generalized 
implicature. 
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4	   Formal	  Analysis	  and	  Conclusion	  
We now turn to the consequences of these results for the formal semantics of 
adjectival passives. As already noted, event particulars necessarily have event 
participants and they are instantiated. On the other hand, reference to an event 
kind does not need identification of its participants as these are generically 
bound and it does not require the actual occurrence of the event. It is thus 
plausible to assume that the semantics of adjectival passives involves event 
kinds rather than event particulars.  
 Let us briefly return to the problem of schon immer (‘always’) 
modification mentioned at the beginning of this paper. Under an event kind 
analysis, the property denoted by the participle in an adjectival passive 
sentence depends on a generic evidentiality which does not contain 
information either about a possible instantiation or about specific agent 
participants.3 This provides a simple explanation for the acceptability of 
schon immer: the modification specifies that the event kind was not 
instantiated.4 
 In the remainder of the paper I will propose a formal analysis of 
adjectival passives that follows Maienborn’s (2009) underspecification 
account but modifies it by adding reference to event kinds and by choosing 
the appropriate link between event kind and derived property. 
 In Maienborn’s adjectival affix, repeated here in (20), the 
underspecified property Q an adjectival passive sentence ascribes to its 
subject referent is causally linked to an existentially bound event particular. 
(20) Adjectival ∅-affix: λP λx λs ∃e [s: Q(x) & result (e,s) & P(e)]  
                                   (Maienborn 2009: 44) 
To account for the reference to event kinds, a first idea might be to simply 
replace the event particular P(e) in (20) by the respective event kind ↑P5. 
There are two reasons why such a solution would be too simplistic. First, it is 
technically impossible for a property particular to directly result from an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 In sentences such as Kratzer’s (2000) The blood vessel was obstructed the fact that the event 
kind does not identify event participants leads to the possibility of referring either to an agentive 
or to a stative obstructing kind. 
4 Under this view, the question why adjectival passives are in fact often interpreted as referring to 
a concrete event instance has to be answered pragmatically. The explanation amounts to saying 
that event kinds pragmatically implicate their concrete instantiation under certain conditions (e.g. 
in post state contexts). The exact spellout of this pragmatically implicated instantiation will be 
the matter of another paper. 
5 This is Link’s (1995: 376) notation for an “up-arrow” operation converting predicates into kind-
denoting terms; “for instance if TIGER is a one-place predicate denoting the set of tigers ↑TIGER is 
a singular term that denotes the kind Tiger.” For a similar operator see, e.g., Chierchia 1998. 
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event kind.6 Second, as already noted in the introduction, typical properties of 
causal relations such as temporal precedence of cause and effect are not 
shared by all adjectival passives. In fact, one of the most important properties 
of causal relations is their denseness, i.e. their tendency to form causal chains. 
Typical causal sentences, such as (21a) can be, potentially infinitively, 
expanded to more fine grained causal chains like (21b).  
(21) a. Smoking causes an increase of blood pressure. 
 b. Smoking causes an increase of adrenalin level, this causes an 
increase of blood pressure.  
Adjectival passives do not function this way. In (22) the relation between the 
event kind Mowing the grass in (22a) and the derived property in (22b) 
cannot be paraphrased by a causal sentence such as (22c) as this would imply 
the possibility of expansion to a more fine grained causal chain. The deviance 
of (22d) shows that such an expansion is impossible: There simply is no 
intermediate cause X which could be inserted.  
(22) a. Mowing the grass 
 b. The grass is mown. 
 c. Mowing the grass causes the grass to be mown. 
 d. ???Mowing the grass causes X, this causes the grass to be mown. 
This lack of denseness in adjectival passive sentences leads to an explanatory 
gap which should not be present in causal relations: Causes fully determine 
their effects and effects are fully predictable on the basis of their causes. In 
adjectival passives, however, the property denoted by the participle is not 
fully determined by its eventive base. This was already demonstrated by (14), 
in which the property denoted by the participle geöffnet (‘opened’) cannot be 
identified with the lexically given result state ‘open’. The same holds for (4), 
repeated here as (23), in which the property is not only the result state of 
hiding, which would be ‘to be out of sight’. Rather, it is something like ‘to be 
inherently present‘. Similarly, in (24a) eingereicht (‘submitted’) has an 
additional meaning component, namely ‘to be of high value’ (compared to a 
contextually salient alternative, e.g. an article which is still in preparation). In 
(24b) the same participle denotes the property of being of low value. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Gehrke (to appear) chooses to solve this problem by an analysis not only referring to event 
kinds but also to state kinds which are instantiated via a realization operation. The problem with 
this solution is that there are no independent, non-technical reasons for assuming state kinds in 
adjectival passives. 
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(23) Der Bildhauer meißelt aus dem Stein Figuren hervor, die nach seinem 
Verständnis dort schon immer verborgen waren.  
‘The sculptor carves shapes out of blocks of granit that he believes have 
always been[COP] hidden inside of them.’ 
(24) a. Der Artikel ist nicht in Vorbereitung, er ist eingereicht. 
  ‘The article is not in preparation, it is submitted.’ 
 b. Der Artikel ist nicht akzeptiert, er ist eingereicht. 
  ‘The article is not accepted, it is submitted.’ 
As (23) to (24) show, there is a surplus in the meaning of the participle of an 
adjectival passive which is not fully determined by its eventive base. In 
Maienborn’s adjectival affix (20) above, this underdetermination is rendered 
by using a free variable Q for the property denoted by the participle in an 
adjectival passive sentence. There is an explanatory gap between Q and its 
underlying base, the event kind ↑P. Q is ‘more’ than (parts of the event 
structure of) its eventive base, therefore it is unpredictable from ↑P alone. 
A similar explanatory gap is known in philosophy as the mind-body problem. 
There are several formulations of this problem which all rely on the intuition 
that the mental is somehow determined by the physical but that it cannot be 
reduced to it. On the one hand, physical events such as firing of C-fibers are 
more basic than mental states such as pain feeling in the sense that mental 
states depend on physical events but not vice versa. On the other hand mental 
properties are unpredictable or unknowable from information concerning 
their physical base-level phenomena (cf. Jackson’s (1982) ‘knowledge argu-
ment’). This explanatory gap led philosophers such as Jaegwon Kim to reject 
a reductive explanation of mental properties by neurophysiological processes 
and to opt for a non-temporal, non-dense dependency relation which they 
called “supervenience” (cf., e.g., Kim 1990). The common core of all defini-
tions of supervenience can be captured by the slogan ‘A supervenes on B if 
there is no A-difference without a B-difference (everything else being 
equal)’. Applied to the mind-body problem this means that a mental property 
supervenes on a set of neurophysiological processes in the sense that one 
cannot imagine differences in mental properties without neurophysiological 
differences (everything else being equal). The advantage of supervenience 
over other dependency relations (e.g. classical CAUSE) is that it only partially 
determines the supervenient property. It thereby leaves room for the 
subjective, non-reducible character of supervenient properties which cannot 
be deduced from their underlying base-level phenomena. 
 This dependency leaving room for underdetemination, for an irreducible 
‘surplus in meaning’, is precisely what we need for the semantics of 
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adjectival passives. Borrowing a term from Engelberg (2005), we will call 
supervenience in the domain of the lexicon Lexical Supervenience. An 
informal definition is given under (25): 
(25) Lexical Supervenience  
For any state s and set of events e7, [[ LSV (s, e) ]]  = 1  iff there can be no 
change in s without a change in e (everything else being equal).  
In the case of adjectival passives the property denoted by the participle 
lexically supervenes on the event kind of the verbal base in the sense that if 
two adjectival passive sentences which are maximally similar, i.e. which 
share the same subject and the same context, refer to two different properties 
they also have to differ in their eventive base. On the other hand, lexical 
supervenience makes it possible to derive different properties from the same 
eventive base if the context differs too, cf. (24a) and (b). It thereby accounts 
for the subjective, pragmatic character of adjectival passives. 
Applying the LSV-relation to Maienborn’s adjectival affix (20) and replacing 
event particulars by event kinds finally yields our new version of the ∅-affix: 
(26)  Adjectival ∅-affix: λP λx λs [s: Q(x) & LSV (s, ↑P)] 
According to (26) the adjectival affix introduces an underspecified property 
Q which is ascribed to the subject referent x of the sentence. The assignment 
of a value to Q must be done by pragmatics with the only restriction that it 
lexically supervenes on the event kind derived from the verbal base. This 
means that Q depends on its eventive base ↑P, but that there is an explanatory 
gap between the two.8 Lexical supervenience accounts for this specific gap in 
the meaning derivation of adjectival passives. It leaves room for the role 
pragmatics plays in the interpretation of adjectival passives and for their 
characteristic ‘surplus in meaning’.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Supervenience is usually defined as holding between a property and a set of properties. As 
kinds can be roughly characterized as the set of all their instances (cf. Chierchia (1998)), this 
makes the above definition particularly suitable for the dependency relation between event kind 
and ascribed property in adjectival passives. 
8 Depending on the sort of base verb and the context of the sentence this gap may be smaller or 
bigger. If the meaning component which is supplied by the eventive base is informative enough 
in the given context pragmatics may choose to identify Q with it, but in other cases Q is a 
pragmatically derived complex property which contains a characteristic ‘surplus in meaning’ 
compared to its verbal base. 
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Abstract. This paper addresses optative constructions, constructions that ex-
press a wish or desire without a modal that means ‘wish’ or ‘want’. Focusing 
on German, I argue that “expressing a wish” is a possible use of a conditional 
antecedent that is freely available. The question is how certain elements, such 
as the contrastive particle doch (or the focus particle nur ‘only’), which are 
typical for optative constructions, interact with this wish. I argue that they 
interact with the wish indirectly; they have a meaning that is independent from 
optativity, but which can be used to bring out an already available wish 
reading. This is achieved by eliminating alternative readings. Discussing 
German doch as a case study, I show how this interaction can be made precise. 
 
1	   The	  Puzzle	  
Optative constructions (Scholz 1991, Rosengren 1993, Rifkin 2000, Asarina 
& Shklovsky 2008, Biezma 2010, Gärtner 2010) express a wish or desire 
without containing a modal that means wish or want. This is illustrated in (1); 
(1a) conveys a wish that appears equivalent to the wish described in (1b). 
(1) a. If only John had come to the party! 
 b. I wish John had come to the party. 
In many languages, optatives seem to have the shape of conditional 
antecedents that contain the particle only (Rifkin 2000). In some languages, 
other particles are prototypical markers of optative constructions; in German, 
(2a), the unstressed contrast particle doch (cf. Thurmair 1989) seems to 
support an optative reading; as shown in (2b), Dutch toch can do so as well.  	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(2) a. Wenn Hans doch einmal  auf  Maria  gehört  hätte!    German 
  if    Hans doch once   to   Maria  listened had 
  ‘If only Hans had listened to Maria once!’  
  b. Als  Jan toch eens naar Marie  had  geluistered!         Dutch 
  if   Jan toch once to   Marie  had  listened 
  ‘If only Jan had listened to Marie once!’  
A question at the core of research such as Rifkin (2000) is what such particles 
contribute to an optative clause, specifically whether they compositionally 
contribute optativity. The present paper analyzes German doch in optatives as 
a case study, based on the semantics of doch in declaratives (Abraham 1991, 
Doherty 1987, Grosz in press, Karagjosova 2001, 2004, Lindner 1991, 
Ormelius-Sandblom 1997). In declaratives, doch roughly marks the modified 
proposition p as an established fact (in the sense of Kratzer & Matthewson 
2009), which in the evaluation context is presupposed to contradict a salient 
alternative r, as shown in (3). 
(3) Hans kocht oder putzt  immer,  aber [¬[p∧r] nie    beides]. Also wissen  
 Hans cooks or   cleans always but        never both   thus know 
 wir, dass [¬r  Hans nicht gekocht hat], weil   [p er  doch geputzt hat]. 
 we  that    Hans not  cooked has  because he  doch cleaned has 
 ‘Hans always cooks or cleans, but never both. Therefore, we know that 
 Hans didn’t cook, because he [doch] cleaned.’  
 presuppositions triggered by “doch”:  
 It is an established fact that [p = Hans cleaned], and there is a salient 
 alternative proposition [r = Hans cooked], such that ¬[p∧r]. 
This paper addresses two questions. First, can we devise a uniform semantics 
of doch that covers both its optative use and its use in non-optative 
constructions? Second, how is doch linked to optativity? I answer the first 
question in the affirmative and present a generalized analysis of doch that 
covers its optative and its non-optative uses. The second question is answered 
as follows: The contribution of doch to optative constructions is indirect in 
the sense that it can block non-optative readings in out-of-the-blue contexts. 
2	   The	  Proposal	  
2.1	   A	  Uniform	  Analysis	  of	  doch	  
Before discussing optatives with the form of conditional antecedents, this 
section provides the general background for my analysis of doch in optative 
clauses. Consider first the difference in German between the root clause with 
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verb-second movement in (4a) and the unembedded dass-clause in (4b), 
Truckenbrodt (2006). By virtue of convention, a verb-second clause typically 
has the force of an assertion, (4a). In contrast, an unembedded dass-clause in 
German can be exclamative or have the optative force of a command or wish, 
(4b). I treat such conventional forces as reflecting different uses of the 
expressed proposition (i.e. as different speech acts, cf. Levinson 1983). 
(4)  a. Ich  hätte  Rom  noch  einmal  gesehen. 
  I    had   Rome still   once   seen 
  ‘I would have seen Rome once more.’ (assertion) 
 b.   Dass  ich  Rom  noch  einmal  gesehen  hätte! 
  that  I    Rome still   once   seen    had 
  ‘I wish I had seen Rome once more!’ (wish / #assertion) 
I will henceforth call utterances like (4a) declarative statements and cases 
like (4b) dass-optatives. Both utterance types allow for the presence of doch, 
(5). Again, the verb-second clause in (5a) is used as a (reinforcing) statement, 
whereas the dass-clause in (5b) expresses a wish. By virtue of doch, (5a) 
conveys that in a given set of circumstances, the speaker takes it to be granted 
that she would have seen Rome once more. The less transparent contribution 
of doch in (5b) is discussed further down. The core question is how to 
account for the presence of doch in both utterances in a uniform way. 
(5) a. Ich  hätte  Rom  doch  noch  einmal  gesehen. 
  I    had   Rome doch  still   once   seen 
  ‘(As we know,) I would have seen Rome once more.’ (statement) 
  b.   Dass  ich  Rom  doch  noch  einmal  gesehen  hätte! 
  that  I    Rome doch  still   once   seen    had 
  ‘I wish I had [doch] seen Rome once more!’ (wish) 
In order to posit a uniform analysis of doch, we need to relativize its meaning 
to the type of the utterance that it occurs in. To do so, I pursue the following 
strategy. First, I assume that there are at least two contextually given sets of 
propositions that are used to manage the discourse (which I will henceforth 
call context sets): The common ground is the set that contains propositions 
that are treated as mutual knowledge by the discourse participants (Stalnaker 
1974, 1978). The ideal list of a discourse participant i is the set that contains 
propositions that reflect i’s ideals (subsuming i’s wishes, i’s goals, and laws 
that i abides to). The ideal list replaces Han’s (1998) Plan Set and Portner’s 
(2005) To-Do List (which are reminiscent of Lewis’ 1979 sphere of 
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permissibility), which it is based on1. It serves to order possible worlds into 
better worlds and less optimal worlds and thus behaves like an ordering 
source (Kratzer 1981). Having assumed that discourse contexts involve both 
a common ground and different participants’ ideal lists, it is natural to assume 
that assertions (and statements in general), like (4a) and (5a), are speech acts 
that operate on the common ground, whereas wishes, like (4b) and (5b), are 
speech acts that operate on ideal lists. In other words, utterance types come 
with conventionalized instructions on where to assign the modified 
proposition. 
We also need to assume that apart from speech acts that add to the 
common ground or to an ideal list (like assertions or commands), there must 
be speech acts that reactivate propositions from a context set, to make them 
salient in the discourse (e.g. as a premise for something else), cf. (6). An 
assertion can be rejected as inappropriate if the expressed proposition is 
shared knowledge, (6a); in contrast, a reactivating statement, marked by the 
particle ja cannot be rejected in this way, (6b). (Cf. Repp 2009, in the spirit of 
Krifka’s 2007 common ground management.) 
(6) a. adding p to the common ground 
  A: Im März  1968 war  Thatcher noch nicht an  der  Macht. 
     in  March 1968 was  Thatcher yet  not  in  the  power  
      ‘In 1968, Thatcher wasn’t in power yet.’  
  B: Jaja, das weiß  ich eh! ‘Duh, I know that!’ 
 b. reactivating p from the common ground 
  A: Im März  1968 war  Thatcher ja  noch nicht an  der  Macht. 
     in  March 1968 was  Thatcher ja  yet  not  in  the  power  
      ‘As we all know, in 1968, Thatcher wasn’t in power yet.’  
  B: # Jaja, das weiß ich eh! ‘Duh, I know that!’ 
By virtue of the (unstressed variants of the) German particles doch and ja, an 
utterance can be marked as reactivating old information, rather than adding 
new information. This is illustrated in (7a) versus (7b). If the modified 
proposition is shared knowledge of the speaker and hearer, as in (7a), doch 
and ja are possible, and a declarative without such particles (the lack of 
which is symbolized by ‘Ø’) is pragmatically odd. In contrast, if the modified 
information is new information, as in (7b), unstressed doch and ja are odd. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The label (i’s) ideal list is chosen (as opposed to Plan Set or To-Do List) to reflect the fact that 
it can contain propositions that i has no control over, such as that it rains tomorrow. 
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(7) a. Context: H is well aware that she’s been to Paris and S wants to 
 make this shared fact salient in order to follow up on it. 
  Du  warst  ja / doch / #Ø  schon  in  Paris.  
  you  were  ja  doch  #Ø  already in  Paris 
  ‘You’ve (ja / doch / #Ø) already been to Paris.’  
 b. Context: H is an amnesiac and believes that she has never been to 
 Paris; S discovers an old flight ticket to Paris with H’s name on it. 
  Du  warst  #ja / #doch / Ø  schon  in  Paris.  
  you  were  #ja  #doch  Ø  already in  Paris 
  ‘You’ve (#ja / #doch / Ø) already been to Paris.’  
We can now give an analysis of doch, relativized to speech acts, cf. (8). The 
‘familiarity’ component discussed above is captured by (8a). Furthermore, 
(8b) captures the fact that doch differs from ja in that it presupposes that there 
is a salient alternative proposition r, which contradicts the modified 
proposition p in the utterance context (see Grosz in press for a recent 
discussion). I use the term indicates instead of ‘presupposes’ or ‘implicates’, 
as it is not clear how these terms apply at the speech act level. 
(8) Semantics of “doch” (simplified and generalized to speech acts) 
 For any proposition p used in a speech act φ, 
 a. doch p indicates that the speaker considers p to be established as part 
of the context set targeted by φ. 
 b. doch p indicates that there is a contextually salient proposition r,  
  such that the common ground entails ¬[p∧r].  
Having established a distinction between ideal list and common ground and a 
uniform analysis of doch, we can now provide an analysis for (5a+b), in (9), 
omitting the meaning component in (8b) for ease of exposition. 
(9)  a. Ich  hätte  Rom  doch  noch  einmal  gesehen. 
  I    had   Rome doch  still   once   seen 
  i. speech act: retrieve [(in certain salient circumstances) the speaker 
    would have seen Rome once more] from the common ground.  
  ii. doch ⇒ [(in such circumstances) the speaker would have seen 
 Rome once more] is an established part of the common ground. 
  b. Dass  ich  Rom  doch  noch  einmal  gesehen  hätte! 
  that  I    Rome doch  still   once   seen    had 
  i. speech act: retrieve [the speaker has seen Rome once more] from  
   the speaker’s ideal list. 
  ii. doch ⇒ [the speaker has seen Rome once more] is an established   
    part of the speaker’s ideal list. 
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Having shown the analysis at work, it is worth pointing out a further parallel 
between doch in optatives and doch in non-optative clauses. Grosz (in press) 
argues that doch interacts with focus, positing that the salient proposition r 
that conflicts with the modified proposition p (in (8b)) must be a focus 
alternative, illustrated in (10). 
(10) Context: Georg and Peter see a blue Peugeot parked in front of the pub. 
 Peter:  Schau, der Hans ist da! ‘Look, Hans is here!’ 
 Georg:  Nein, der  Hans  hat  doch  einen  [GRÜNEN]F Peugeot. 
      no    the  Hans  has  doch  a    green      Peugeot 
      ‘No, (as we both know) Hans has [doch] a GREEN Peugeot.’ 
 i. doch indicates that Georg considers [p Hans has a green Peugeot] to 
be an established part of the common ground (i.e. not under de-bate). 
 ii. doch indicates that there is a salient focus alternative r = [Hans has a 
   blue Peugeot], such that ¬[p?r] (given that Hans only has one car).  
While I have omitted this feature from (8b) as it is not at the core of the 
present discussion, such interaction with focus can also be observed in the 
case of optatives, illustrated in (11). Here, focus indicates which aspect of 
reality the speaker would like to change.2 This can be taken as further 
evidence for a uniform contribution of doch. 
(11) a. Dass  doch [OTTO]F die Nachtschicht mit  Anna  geteilt  hätte! 
  that   doch OTTO   the night.shift   with Anna  shared  had 
  ‘If only it had been OTTO who shared the night shift with Anna!’ 
 b. Dass Otto doch [die NACHTschicht]F mit Anna geteilt hätte! 
  ‘If only it had been the NIGHT shift that Otto shared with Anna!’  
 c. Dass Otto die Nachtschicht doch [mit ANNA]F geteilt hätte! 
  ‘If only it had been ANNA that Otto shared the night shift with!’  
Having posited a uniform analysis of doch, section 2.2 considers conditional 
antecedents with doch. The remainder of this paper argues that a uniform 
approach to doch extends to optative and non-optative if-clauses and sheds 
light on why doch in an if-clause prefers an optative reading.  
2.2	   Doch	  in	  Conditional	  Antecedents	  
This section discusses what doch adds to conditional antecedents, covering 
both non-optative and optative cases. (12a) is a baseline example of a non-
counterfactual conditional clause, (12b) is a counterfactual conditional clause. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Replacing dass ‘that’ by wenn ‘if’ in (11) does not change the judgments, as counterfactual 
dass-optatives and counterfactual wenn-optatives are roughly equivalent (cf. Scholz 1991). 
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(12) a. Wenn  Karl  gewinnt, (dann) wird gefeiert!       
  if     Karl  wins    then  it.is  celebrated 
  ‘If Karl wins, we celebrate.’ 
 b. Wenn  Karl  gewonnen hätte, (dann) hätten  wir gefeiert!  
  if     Karl  won     had   then  had    we celebrated 
  ‘If Karl had won, we would have celebrated.’ 
Adding doch to a conditional antecedent can have two effects. The first effect 
is illustrated in (13). Here, by means of using unstressed doch (typically in 
indicative conditional antecedents) the speaker conveys that the truth of the 
antecedent proposition is established (cf. also Iatridou 1991 on factual 
conditionals and since-clauses). For now, I assume that the antecedent is used 
in a secondary speech act (as an embedded root clause, cf. Hooper & 
Thompson 1973, Haegeman 2003), by means of which the antecedent 
proposition is reactivated from the common ground. 
(13) a. Wenn  Karl  doch  gewinnt, dann  wird gefeiert.    
  if     Karl  doch  wins    then  it.is  celebrated 
  ‘Since Karl is obviously going to win, we will celebrate.’  
 b. primary speech act:  assert [if Karl wins, we celebrate]  
 c. secondary s.a.:   reactivate [Karl will win] from the common ground 
The second effect of doch in conditional antecedents is shown in (14), 
(glossing over possible prosodic differences between (13) and (14)). Here, by 
virtue of unstressed doch (typically in counterfactual conditional antecedents) 
the speaker conveys a wish for the truth of the antecedent proposition3. 
(14) a. Wenn Karl  doch  gewonnen hätte, dann hätten wir  gefeiert! 
  if    Karl  doch  won    had   then had   we celebrated 
  ‘If only Karl had won, then we would have celebrated!’  
 b. primary s.a.:  assert [if Karl had won, we would have celebrated]  
 c. secondary s.a.:   reactivate [Karl won] from the speaker’s ideal list   
The analysis presented in (8) derives the following. Assume that the sec-
ondary speech act is retrieval in both (13) and (14); in (13) it operates on the 
common ground, in (14) it operates on the speaker’s ideal list. It follows that 
in (13) doch conveys that the antecedent proposition is an established part of 
the common ground. By analogy, in (14) doch indicates that the antecedent 
proposition is an established part of the speaker’s ideal list. In both cases, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 It is beyond the scope of this paper why optative if-clauses can occur without a consequent, as 
in (2a) above, whereas non-optative if-clauses require a consequent. 
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doch supports (or even triggers) retrieval of this proposition from some 
context set. I now provide evidence for such a contribution of doch. 
(15) and (16) show that doch in a non-optative conditional antecedent 
indicates that the truth of the antecedent has been established (i.e. made part 
of the common ground). Therefore, doch can be placed into the antecedent in 
(15), where it has already been established that the antecedent is true. 
(15) A: Es regnet!    –  B:  Und?  
  ‘It is raining!’       ‘So?’ 
 A: (Na,) wenn  es  doch  regnet,  müssen wir die Party  absagen. 
  well  if    it  doch  rains   must   we the party  cancel 
  ‘(Well,) since it’s [doch] raining, we have to cancel the party.’  
In contrast, doch cannot be used in the conditional antecedent in (16), where 
it is still under debate whether the antecedent is true. 
(16) A: Regnet es?    –  B:  Ich weiß nicht.  Warum? 
  ‘Is it raining?’        ‘I don’t know. Why?’  
 A: (Na,) wenn  es  (# doch) regnet,  müssen wir die Party  absagen. 
  well  if    it   doch  rains   must   we the party  cancel 
  ‘(Well,) if / #Since it’s (#doch) raining, we have to cancel the party.’ 
This shows that doch can only be used in conditional antecedents if the truth 
of the antecedent is established. For doch in optative antecedents, an 
analogous point can be made. In example (17b), the doch-marked optative 
antecedent is ill-formed (as opposed to the straight imperative in (17a)). This 
follows if doch requires the hearer, Stefan, to accommodate that the modified 
proposition is already on the speaker’s ideal list. While hearers will often 
accommodate for such information (explaining that optatives are usually 
good in out-of-the-blue contexts, cf. Scholz 1991), Stefan has good reasons 
(e.g. social norms) to refuse to accommodate in (17b). This example thus 
feels inappropriate, as it conveys that Stefan should have known all along. 
(17) Context: Stefan is at Thomas’s place and Thomas has made no 
 suggestion whatsoever that he doesn’t want Stefan to stay for longer.  
  Stefan:  Stört es dich, wenn ich mir noch ein Bier nehme? 
         ‘Does it bother you if I have another beer?’  
 a. Thomas: Ach, Stefan, geh  jetzt bitte.   Mir wird    es zu  spät. 
         oh   Stefan  leave now please me becomes it too late 
         ‘Oh Stefan, please leave now. It’s getting too late for me.’  
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 b. Thomas:  # Ach, Stefan, wenn  du  doch  jetzt gehen würdest. 
           oh   Stefan  if    you doch  now leave  would 
          # ‘Oh Stefan, if only you’d leave now.’ 
Contrast (17) with (18); in (18), Thomas’s initial suggestion plausibly adds 
the proposition that Stefan leaves to Thomas’s ideal list. Therefore, it is felic-
itous in (18) to reactivate this proposition in the subsequent optative. 
(18) Context: Thomas is sick. Stefan is looking after him even though there 
 is a great party on for tonight.  
 Thomas: Stefan, geh ruhig auf die Party. Das stört mich nicht. 
       ‘Stefan, please do go to the party. That doesn’t bother me.’  
 Stefan:   Nein, nein, ich bleibe bei dir. 
       ‘No, no, I’ll stay here with you.’  
 Thomas:  Ach, Stefan, wenn du  doch  jetzt gehen würdest. 
       oh   Stefan if   you doch  now leave  would 
        ‘Oh Stefan, if only you’d leave now.’  
       Du hättest so viel Spaß!  
       ‘You would have so much fun!’ 
2.3	   Why	  Does	  doch	  Seem	  to	  Cause	  Optativity?	  
At this point, we can return to the question of what doch contributes to an 
optative conditional. Specifically, why does doch trigger optativity in (19a), 
in the sense that (19a) is typically understood as an optative and a non-
optative reading is not even considered, even though it is possible, cf. (19b) .  
(19) a. Wenn Hans  doch  geblieben  wäre … 
  if    Hans  doch  stayed    were 
  ‘If only Hans had stayed!’  
 b. Wenn Hans doch geblieben wäre, wäre Fürchterliches  passiert. 
  if    Hans doch stayed    were were horrible.things  happened 
  ‘Since (under certain circumstances) Hans would have stayed,  
  horrible things would have happened.’ 
To account for this pattern, I propose that the contribution of doch in con-
ditional antecedents makes an optative reading more accessible whenever the 
context does not explicitly favor a non-optative reading. To see this approach 
at work, we need to consider minimally contrasting pairs of utterances. So 
far, we have only considered indicative cases of doch in non-optative con-
ditional antecedents, as in (20a). Crucially, such constructions are possible in 
the subjunctive, as shown in (20b) (and also in (19b) above). 
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(20) a. Wenn  Karl  doch  gewinnt, dann  wird gefeiert.     
  if     Karl  doch  wins    then  it.is  celebrated 
  ‘Since Karl is obviously going to win, we will celebrate.’  
 b. Wenn  Karl  doch  gewonnen hätte, hätten  wir gefeiert. 
  if     Karl  doch  won     had   had    we celebrated 
  ‘Since Karl would have won, we would have celebrated.’ 
Evidently, (20b) cannot be counterfactual, as doch requires the truth of the 
antecedent to be established whereas counterfactual antecedents are implied 
to be false. A context for (20b) is given in (21); as indicated, the antecedent 
in (20b) and (21) must be implicitly conditionalized. The implicit conditional 
is made overt (in parentheses) in (21). 
(21) Berti: I’m so annoyed that the race was canceled. – Susi: But why? 
 – Berti: Because Karl would have won. – Susi: So? Why do you care?  
 You don’t even like Karl. – Berti: But I like to celebrate and … 
   … wenn  Karl (, wäre das Rennen nicht abgesagt worden,) doch  
     if    Karl   were the race   not  canceled been    doch 
     gewonnen hätte, hätten  wir gefeiert.  
     won     had   had    we celebrated 
     ‘Since(, had the race not been canceled,) Karl would have won, 
     we would have celebrated.’  
We can now construct an example that allows for both an optative reading 
and a non-optative reading, given in (22), (23) and (24).  
(22) Wenn Karl  doch gewonnen hätte … dann hätten wir gefeiert! 
 if    Karl  doch won     had    then had   we celebrated 
 ‘If Karl doch had won … then we would have celebrated.’  
What (22) conveys on its non-optative reading is given in (23). 
(23)  Non-optative reading of (22): 
  If Karl had won, we would have celebrated.  
  Karl didn’t win (or lose) because the race was canceled.  
  We didn’t celebrate.  
  doch ⇒ I reactivate from the common ground that [Karl would have 
  won if the race had not been canceled]. 
Contrast this with the optative reading of (22), given in (24). 
(24)  Optative reading of (22):  
  If Karl had won, we would have celebrated.  
  Karl didn’t win. 
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  We didn’t celebrate.  
  doch ⇒ I reactivate from my ideal list that [Karl did win]. 
The fact that doch in such ambiguous conditional antecedents typically gives 
rise to an optative reading can now be derived as follows. Under an optative 
use, (24), doch triggers a presupposition/implicature with respect to the 
speaker’s ideal list. Given that the speaker is the highest authority with 
respect to her own ideal list, this will by default be self-fulfilling, i.e. the 
hearer will accommodate unless there are good reasons to refuse to 
accommodate (cf. Stefan in (17b)). In contrast, in non-optative cases, e.g. 
(23), doch triggers a presupposition/implicature with respect to the common 
ground, i.e. with respect to shared knowledge between speaker and hearer. 
This will fail in all contexts in which no such shared knowledge persists and 
cannot be easily accommodated. Furthermore, given that optatives with doch 
are typically in the subjunctive, a further asymmetry arises. Non-optative 
subjunctive antecedents that contain doch must be implicitly conditionalized, 
as in (21) and (23), whereas optative antecedents do not have such a 
requirement. It follows that non-optative readings, like (23), are further 
restricted to contexts in which the implicit conditionalization of the con-
ditional antecedent can be successfully resolved. Therefore, by virtue of 
placing the particle doch in a conditional antecedent, as in (22), non-optative 
readings are restricted to very specific contexts and blocked in all other 
contexts. In contrast, doch in an optative conditional antecedent imposes 
restrictions that are typically self-fulfilling (in the sense that a hearer will 
accommodate a presupposition with respect to what the speaker wishes for). 
This makes doch acceptable in an optative conditional antecedent even when 
uttered out of the blue, deriving the fact that doch biases an optative reading.  
2.4	   Against	  a	  Strictly	  Compositional	  Approach	  
I have argued that doch has a uniform semantics that is sensitive to the type 
of utterance it occurs in. The meaning of doch is thus in some sense 
independent from optativity, which predicts that typical optative features such 
as the particle doch are neither sufficient nor necessary conditions of 
optativity. We have already seen that particles like doch do not automatically 
give rise to an optative reading when placed into a subjunctive if-clause, (25).  
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(25) Wenn du   doch  so  einfach  aufhören  könntest zu  rauchen, 
 if    you  doch  so  easily   stop     could   to  smoke 
 warum  machst du’s  dann  nicht? 
 why    make   you’it then  not 
 ‘If, as we’ve established, you could stop smoking that easily, then why  
 don’t you do it?’ (slightly sarcastic) 
Similarly, my analysis predicts that optativity should be possible in the 
absence of any particle. This prediction also seems to be correct, as the bare 
conditional antecedent in (26)4 can be understood as expressing a wish. 
(26) Rico schaute die Blumen an und dachte: 
 ‘Rico looked at the flowers and thought:’  
 Wenn Stineli  diese sehen könnte! 
 if    Stineli  these see   could 
 ‘If Stineli could see these!’  
 und stand lange unbeweglich am Zaun.  
 ‘and stood at the fence for a long time without moving.’  
2.5	   Why	  Optatives	  without	  any	  Cues	  Fail	  
In sum, I have argued for a particular view of doch in conditional antecedents 
that can be summarized as in (27), where doch is viewed as an optativity cue. 
(27)  Summary – Cue for a wish 
 An optativity cue is an element that cues a wish reading for a 
 conditional antecedent as follows:  
 i. Its semantic contribution is independent from optativity.  
 ii. Its meaning is compatible with a conditional antecedent that   
  expresses a wish in a non-specific (or even out-of-the-blue) context. 
 iii. Its semantic contribution to a non-optative conditional antecedent  
  requires a very specific context (which cannot be out-of-the-blue).  
 iv. Therefore, if the context does not determine whether a wish speech  
  act is intended or not, the optativity cue conveys that a wish speech  
  act is intended by blocking alternative readings, due to (iii). 
An interesting aspect of optative constructions is that optatives without any 
cue are typically somewhat marked, (28), making the presence of particles 
seem obligatory (but see Rosengren 1993, cf. also (26) above). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 From Johanna Spyri (1878): Heimatlos. Geschichten für Kinder und auch für solche, welche die 
Kinder lieb haben. Acceptability in modern-day German verified with native speakers. 
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(28)  in an out-of-the-blue context: 
 Wenn ich ??(doch)  reich  wäre!  
 if    I    doch   rich   were  
 ‘If ??(doch) I were rich!’ 
While (26) suggests that optatives without particles are not always ill-formed, 
the question arises why optatives without any particles are dispreferred. I 
propose that this follows from treating such particles as optativity cues, if we 
make standard assumptions on rational discourse participants (cf. Lewis’s 
1969 signaling games). If a speaker has to decide whether to use optativity 
cues and the hearer has to decide how to interpret conditional antecedents 
without such cues, the most successful strategies are typically those where 
speakers always use cues and hearers always interpret antecedents without 
cues as true conditionals. It follows that hearers will typically understand (28) 
without doch as a (fragmentary) non-optative conditional, unless the context 
overrides this preference. In cases like (26), an optative intention can be 
inferred from other information (such as the inferred friendship between Rico 
and Stineli, the description of the context, the verb that is used, etc.). 
3	   Conclusion	  
I addressed the meaning and role of particles such as German doch in 
optative constructions. I argued that conditional antecedents can express a 
wish by virtue of a secondary speech act; particles do not encode this wish, 
but act as cues that bring out a possible wish reading (i.e. optative reading) by 
eliminating competing non-optative readings. I showed that this analysis 
correctly predicts that such particles are neither necessary nor sufficient 
conditions of optativity. Finally, I showed that this analysis can explain that 
unmarked conditional antecedents are typically understood as non-optative 
fragments. This follows, as rational discourse participants will usually pursue 
strategies where optative cues are used when optativity is intended and 
conditional antecedents without such cues are understood as non-optative.  
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Abstract. The paper discusses association with focus in Ngamo (West Chadic,
Afro-Asiatic). We present evidence from this non-Indoeuropean language in
favour of Beaver & Clark (2008)’s claim that different kinds of focus-sensitive el-
ements interact with the meaning of focus in different ways, namely conventional
association with focus vs free association. We show that exclusive particles (only)
in Ngamo, as in English, conventionally associate with focus. (Scalar-) Additive
particles (also, even), by contrast, do not pattern like their English counterparts:
Same as Q-adverbials, they are more free in their association behaviour, and can
also associate with non-focused elements under certain conditions.
1 Association with Focus
Focus-sensitive elements depend on the grammatical placement of focus for
their interpretation. This semantic dependency is often referred to as associ-
ation with focus and can be seen clearly in sentences containing the focus-
sensitive particle only (cf. (1)): only is an exclusive particle, it leads to an ex-
clusion of the alternatives induced by focus. In (1a), because focus is on Bill,
it is excluded that John likes other people, whereas in (1b), because focus is on
likes, it is excluded that John loves or admires Bill. In the case of only, associ-
ation with focus actually makes a truth-conditional difference: (1a) is false in
the given context, whereas (1b) is true.
(1) (Context: John likes Mary and Bill, but he loves Sue.)
a. # John only likes [BILL]F .
(excluded alternatives: {John likes Mary, John likes Sue})
b. John only [LIkes]F Bill.
(excluded alternative: {John loves Bill})
∗ This research was conducted as part of project A5 “Focus realization, focus interpretation and fo-
cus use from a cross-linguistic perspective” of the Collaborative Research Center 632 “Information
Structure”, funded by the German Science Association (DFG). We would like to thank the German
Science Association, as well as our Ngamo informants Jibir Audu Janga Dole, Zakar Yusuf Baba
Shitte and Hadiza Abdullahi.
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Analogous, but non-truth-conditional effects can be seen with the focus-sensi-
tive particles also and even. Also is an additive particle, which includes alter-
natives to the focused element. (2a) says that John sent a letter to somebody
besides Bill, whereas (2b) expresses that John sent something besides a letter
to Bill.
(2) a. John also sent a letter to [BILL]F .
(included alternative e.g. {John sent a letter to Sue})
b. John also sent a [LETTer]F to Bill.
(included alternative e.g. {John sent a package to Bill})
Even also has this additive meaning component, e.g. that John sent a letter to
someone else in (3a). In addition, it has a scalar meaning component (Karttunen
& Peters 1979): the presence of even expresses that on a scale of expectability,
Bill is less likely to receive a letter by John than any of the implied (focus)
alternatives to Bill.
(3) a. John even sent a letter to [BILL]F .
(included alternative e.g. {John sent a letter to his mother})
b. John even sent a [LETTer]F to Bill.
(included alternative e.g. {John sent an email to Bill})
Again, the alternatives that are added and the corresponding scale shift when
the focus is shifted: in (3b), what is added is that John sent something else
to Bill – e.g. an email, and that sending this other object is more expected
than sending a letter. Each of these particles thus associates with focus in an
intuitive sense. The main question of this paper is whether the particles only,
also and even associate with focus in the same way, intra- as well as cross-
linguistically. Chapter 2 describes two unified approaches to this association
process, conventional and free association, and presents the mixed approach of
Beaver & Clark (2008), whose general framework and terminology we adopt
in this paper. Their main argument is that in English, different focus-sensitive
elements associate with focus in different ways. The focus particles only, also
and even all conventionally associate with focus, whereas other focus-sensitive
elements like the q-adverbial always freely associate with focus. In section
3, we present some data from the West Chadic language Ngamo that show
that, as proposed by Beaver & Clark for English, there are also different kinds
of association with focus in Ngamo. The data also suggests, however, that,
unlike in English, additive(-scalar) particles associate only freely with focus
in Ngamo. Section 4 presents the formal semantic analysis of focus-sensitive
particles in Ngamo. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Conventional and Free Association with Focus
There are two kinds of unified approaches to the association process: Conven-
tional association accounts and free association accounts. Conventional and
free association are the terms used by Beaver & Clark (2008), and correspond
to Rooth’s (1992) weak and strong association, respectively.
In conventional association accounts (Rooth 1985; Jacobs 1983), focus-sensi-
tive elements relate directly to the alternatives introduced by focus. This rela-
tion is semantic, i.e. the dependency on focus is coded directly into their lexical
meaning, as shown for only in (4a). In free association (Rooth 1992; von Fintel
1994), on the other hand, focus-sensitive elements quantify over an implicit
free variable C, the reference of which is fixed by the context (4b).
(4) a. JonlyKw = λq ∀p ∈ JqK f : p(w)→ p = JqK0
b. JonlyCKg,w = λq ∀p ∈ g(JCK) : p(w)→ p = q
C usually resolves to the focus alternatives, since these are contextually salient,
so the difference is mainly one of empirical elegance: According to Rooth
(1992), a free account is stronger because it does not tie the semantic effects
of focus to the meaning of specific lexical items. Moreover, the free associa-
tion account makes a prediction that the conventional account does not make:
(apparent) association with non-focused elements should be possible if the con-
text provides a value for C that differs from the focus alternatives. As Beaver
& Clark (2008) point out, this prediction is borne out for some focus-sensitive
elements, but not for others. While only can never associate with grammati-
cally non-focused constituents, always can occur in contexts in which it seems
to associate with non-focused material. This can be seen in example (5) from
Beaver & Clark (2008: 193), which tests for association with weak, unstress-
able, and hence inherently unfocused pronouns. The test sentence enforces a
reading in which the focus-sensitive element associates with the weak DO-
pronoun, because other possible readings (association with the verb or VP) are
excluded by the context. This reading is not accepted for a sentence with only,
but it is fine for the parallel sentence with always.
(5) a. ??People who grow rice only eat it. # ‘People who grow rice eat
nothing but rice’
b. People who grow rice always eat it. ‘Whenever people who grow
rice eat, they eat rice’
Based on the different behaviour of always and only, Beaver & Clark (2008)
propose that different focus-sensitive elements associate with focus in different
ways, with some elements conventionally associating with focus (e.g.only), and
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others freely associating with focus (e.g. always). According to them, the class
of conventionally associating elements in English contains the focus-sensitive
particles only, also and even discussed above, whereas the class of freely asso-
ciating expressions contains, for example, quantificational adverbs like always,
generics, counterfactuals, and modals.
Another candidate for a freely associating element is the stressed additive par-
ticle AUCH (“also”) in German, which appears to associate with the preceding
contrastive topic (Krifka 1999).
(6) (I know that Pia visited the exhibition. But what did Peter do?)
Peter hat die Ausstellung AUCH besucht. ‘Peter visited the exhibition,
too.’
In these cases, the contrastive topic introduces the alternatives that are rele-
vant for the resolution of the free variable C. This is another instance in which
a “focus-sensitive” element can associate with a prosodically weak or even
empty element. In example (7a), the associate of the stressed additive particle
can be elided, because it is given in the preceding context question. This is
not possible for prefocal unstressed auch, which must associate with an overt
focus-accented element (7b).
(7) (You did the dishes. And the garbage?)
a. Hab
have
ich
I
AUCH
AUCH
erledigt.
done
b. Auch
auch
*(DAS)
that
hab
have
ich
I
erledigt.
done
‘I took care (of it) too.’
The next section presents data from Ngamo (West Chadic) that support Beaver
& Clark’s claim that there are different kinds of focus-sensitive elements. More-
over, the Ngamo data provide further evidence that additive particles, at least
in some languages, do not belong in the same class as exclusives. This is not
fully unexpected given the behaviour of German additives mentioned above.
3 Focus & Focus-Sensitive Particles in Ngamo
This section gives an overview of grammatical focus marking and focus-sen-
sitive particles in Ngamo. Ngamo is a West Chadic language of the ‘A’ sub-
branch spoken in NE Nigeria by about 60’000 speakers (Gordon 2005). It has
two major dialects, Yaya Ngamo and Gudi Ngamo (Schuh 2005). The data in
this paper come from the Gudi dialect.
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3.1 Focus in Ngamo
As in many other African languages (Fiedler et al. 2010), overt focus mar-
king in Ngamo is asymmetric: Focused subjects must be syntactically marked,
whereas focused non-subjects need not be explicitly marked for focus. The
canonical word order is SVO, but when a subject is questioned or focused, the
subject is inverted to the right edge of vP. The subject cannot occur between
the verb and the object (8a), but its word order is free with respect to other con-
stituents following the direct object (cf. (8b)). Non-subject focus is preferably
realized in-situ (9a), but ex-situ test sentences are also accepted (9b).
(8) a. *Salko
build-PFV
-i
BM
lo
who
bano
house
a
in
Nigeria
Nigeria
mano?
last.year
b. Sàlko
build-PFV
bànò
house
(-ì
BM
lo)
who
à
in
Nìgerià
Nigeria
(-ì
BM
lo)
who
mànò
last.year
(-i
BM
lô)
who
?
‘Who built a house in Nigeria last year?’
(9) a. Shuwa
Shuwa
èsha
call.PFV
lò
who
yâm?
loudly
‘Who did Shuwa call loudly?’
b. Èsha
call.PFV
yâm
loudly
yè
BM
Jajêi.
Jajei
‘(she) called JAJEI loudly.’
We suggest that the reason behind the subject inversion to the right edge of vP
is an interface requirement that forces the focused element to be right-aligned
with a phonological phrase boundary projected by the right edge of vP (Samek-
Lodovici 2005; Truckenbrodt 1999; Zimmermann 2006). Since objects and ad-
juncts are canonically realized at the right edge of vP anyway, it follows that
they can remain in-situ when focused.
Inverted subjects are obligatorily preceded by a morphological marker
i/ye (10a), which is again optional with focused non-subjects (10b). Schuh
(2005: 27) suggests that i/ye is not a focus marker, but a background marker,
which is historically derived from the definite determiner ye’e. This suggestion
is supported by the fact that it can occur twice in an utterance, thus marking
backgrounded material following the focused constituent (10c).
(10) a. [Context: Hasha called Yura]
O’ò,
No,
eshà
call.PFV
Yùrà
Yura
*(-ì)
BM
Kulè
Kule
‘No, KULE called Yura.’
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b. [Context: Who did Shuwa call?]
Shùwa
Shuwa
èshà
call.PFV
(-ì)
BM
Jàjêi.
Jajei
‘Shuwa called JAJEI.’
c. Sàlko
build-PFV
bànò
house
-ì
BM
lo
who
à
in
Nìgerià
Nigeria
mànò
last-year
yê?
BM
‘Who built a house in Nigeria last year?’
A standard test for exhaustivity in (11) shows that answers with i/ye are inter-
preted as exhaustive, or maximal, in contrast to answers without i/ye: In the
question context in (11), the complete answer A entails the partial answer A1
without i/ye, but it does not entail the partial answer A2 with i/ye, which signals
maximality, making A2 infelicitous in the given context.
(11) [Context: Who did Kule call?] A: Kule called Shuwa and Dimza.
→ A1:Kule
Kule
èsha
call.PFV
Dìmzà
Dimza
‘There was an event of Kule calling Dimza.’
9 A2:#Kule
Kule
èshà
call.PFV
-ì
BM
Dimzâ
Dimza
‘The maximal calling event by Kule involves Dimza as a callee.’
We suggest that i/ye is a definiteness marker on events (Larson 2003; Hole
submitted) that introduces a presupposition that there is a maximal contextually
salient event exemplifying the vP-denotation (excluding the focus denotation)
as in (Kratzer 2007), cf. answer A2 in (11):
(12) J-i/yeK = λ f<v,t>: there is a maximal salient event e, s.t. f(e) = 1. f
This analysis of the maximality effect is supported by the fact that it is can-
cellable in cases in which we talk about separate events (13).
(13) Sàlko
build-PFV
bànò
house
-ì
BM
Dimzà,
Dimza
Umàr
Umar
kè
also
sàlko
build-PFV
bànò.
house
‘(lit.) DIMZA did the house-building, and Umar built a(nother) house.’
To sum up, subject focus in Ngamo is obligatorily marked by inversion to the
right edge of vP, with background marking of the backgrounded part preceding
the focused subject. Non-subject focus is only optionally marked. The back-
ground marker is a definiteness marker on events which introduces a maximal-
ity presupposition on the backgrounded vP-denotation.
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3.2 Focus-Sensitive Particles in Ngamo
This section presents the distribution and the association behaviour of three
focus-sensitive particles in Ngamo: the additive ke (‘also’), the additive-scalar
har (‘even’), and the exclusive particle yak (‘only’).
When associating with non-subjects, the three particles behave alike. All three
focus-sensitive particles can occur sentence-initially, in immediately preverbal
position and after the VP, but not between the verb and the direct object.
(14) (Har)
even
Baba
Baba
(har)
even
bo’ytak
sell-PFV
bano-s(’e)
house
(har’i).
even
‘Baba even SOLD the house.’
(15) (Ke)
also
Dìmzà
Dimza
(ke)
also
ònko
give-PFV
àgogo
watch
(ke)
also
ki
to
Abù
Abu
(kè’ê).
also
‘Dimza also gave a watch TO ABU.’
(16) (Yak)
only
te
she
(yak)
only
esha
call.PFV
si
him
(yak)
only
nzono
yesterday
(yak’i).
only
‘She only called him YESTERDAY.’
These examples show that the particles can precede or follow their associate,
without a change in meaning. In addition, they have a pre-focal (e.g. har) and a
post-focal form (e.g. har’i), the distribution of which appears to be conditioned
by prosodic factors, such as the presence of a subsequent prosodic boundary.
The examples also show that there is no adjacency requirement: all three parti-
cles can associate from an adjacent or distant position. Non-adjacent preverbal
and post-VP particles are illustrated in (17).
(17) [Context: Kule built a house.]
a. si
he
ke
also
sàlko
build-PFV
makarantâ.
school
‘He also built a SCHOOL.’
b. Kule
Kule
bo’ytak
sell-PFV
bano-s
house=DET
ke’e.
also
‘Kule also SOLD the house’
We propose that focus particles in Ngamo typically denote adverbial operators
that are adjoined to the extended vP-projection, but there appear to be adnom-
inal counterparts as well (e.g. the third yak in (16)).
Crucially, the three particles however behave differently when it comes
to association with subjects. Recall that in cases of conventional association
with focus, the associate of the focus-sensitive particle is obligatorily focus-
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marked, whereas in free association with focus this is not necessarily the case.
Since focused subjects are marked by inversion, we therefore predict that con-
ventionally associating focus-sensitive elements will only be able to associate
with inverted – and, thus, focus-marked – subjects! This expectation is borne
out for exclusive yak, which can only associate with inverted subjects.
(18) a. Sàlko
build-PFV
bànò
house
-ì
BM
yak
only
Kulè
Kule
‘Only KULE built a house.’
b. #Yak
only
Shuwa
Shuwa
yak
only
sàlko
build-PFV
bànò
house
yàk’i.
only
(intended:) ‘Only SHUWA built a house.’
In contrast, ke/har cannot associate with inverted subjects. We suggest that this
is due to a clash of the maximality presupposition of the background marker
with the additive presupposition of the particles. In (19), background marking
introduces the presupposition that there is a salient maximal event of build-
ing a house involving Kule (and nobody else), whereas the additive particle
ke (‘also’) presupposes that someone else took part in the contextually salient
event of house-building, in violation of maximality. According to one con-
sultant, this structure is only permitted in a context in which the (maximal)
house-building event is juxtaposed to a (maximal) event of a different type.
(19) [Context: Hawwa built a house]
a. #Salko
build-PFV
bano
house
-i
BM
ke
also
Kule.
Kule
(intended) ‘KULE also built a house.’
(Consultant comment: ‘Where there is ‘salko bano-i’, this means
that the other person did something else.’)
b. *Salko
build-PFV
bano
house
-i
BM
har
even
Kule
Kule
(intended): ‘Even KULE built a house.’
Instead, the only way of expressing what looks like association with subjects
with these particles is to leave the subject in its canonical preverbal position.
(20) a. Kè/Har
also/even
Kulè
Kule
sàlko
build-PFV
bànò
house
b. Kulè
Kule
kè/har
also/even
sàlko
build-PFV
bànò.
house
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c. Kulè
Kule
sàlko
build-PFV
bànò
house
kè’ê/hàr’î.
also/even
‘KULE built a house, too.’
Since focused subjects are banned from this position (see above), we are led to
conclude that the particles ke and har do not operate directly on the focus value
of the subject in such cases, but interact with the subject denotation in a more
indirect way. In short, we capture the difference between the additive particles
and the exclusive particle by suggesting that the former freely associate with
focus, whereas the latter conventionally associates with focus.
Further evidence for this proposal comes from the association of the dif-
ferent types of particles with weak and strong pronouns. In Ngamo, indirect
object pronouns are usually incorporated into the verb. When the pronoun is
focused, it must occur in its strong form, which is headed by the preposition
ki (‘to’). Crucially, additive ke can associate with the weak, incorporated, and
thus non-focused form of the pronoun (21), whereas yak can only associate
with strong, and hence focused pronouns (22).
(21) [Context: Whom did Kule give a watch?]
‘Onko
give-PFV
agoggo
watch
-i
BM
ki
to
Dimzà,
Dimza
ke
also
ono
give-1SG
agoggô.
watch
‘He gave a watch to Dimza, and also gave a watch to me.’
(22) [Context: Did Kule give a watch to all of them?]
a. #O’o,
No
Kule
Kule
onto
give-3SG.F
agoggo
watch
yak’i.
only
(intended:) ‘No, Kule only gave a watch to HER.’
b. O’o,
No
Kule
Kule
onko
give-PFV
agoggo
watch
-i
BM
ki
to
te
3SG.F
yak’i.
only
‘No, Kule only gave a watch to HER.’
Moreover, ke can freely associate with zero subjects, an option excluded for
the exclusive particle, as is shown for the contrastive topic context in (23),
which is modeled after an example from (Krifka 1999). Here, an answer with
a contrastive topic subject is enforced by explicitly giving a partial answer to a
superquestion of the form “Who did what?”, which is followed by a request for
information concerning a second individual, functioning as a contrastive topic
in this context. As the subject is given, it can be dropped from the answer,
although the additive particle ke seemingly associates with it. This is another
instance in which the additive particle associates with unfocused material, and
thus evidence in favour of free, and not conventional, association with focus.
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(23) a. Nè
I
mànoti
know.PRS
Kulè
Kule
sàlko
build-PFV
bànò,
house
Shùwa
Shuwa
me
but
jô?
what.about
‘I know that Kule built a house, but what about Shuwa?’
b. Kè
also
salkô
build-PFV
(bànò).
house
‘(He) also built a house.’
Summing up, additive(-scalar) particles show a different association behaviour
with subject focus when compared to the exclusive particle: While yak (‘only’)
must associate with focus-marked (inverted) subjects, ke (‘also’) and har (‘e-
ven’) cannot associate with such inverted subjects. Instead, they appear to as-
sociate with preverbal subjects, which are never focused. This leads us to con-
clude that yak conventionally associates with focus, while ke and har freely
associate with focus.
4 Analysis & Discussion
This section presents the formal analysis of the focus-sensitive particles in-
troduced in the previous section. First, the framework used for the analysis
is presented in section (4.1), then the exclusive particle yak will be discussed
(4.2), then the additive(-scalar) particles ke and har (4.3).
4.1 A QUD Approach to Information Structure
In a QUD-approach (e.g. Roberts 1996, Büring 2003), the idea that the goal
of discourse is to share previously unshared information is captured by mod-
eling discourse as driven by implicit (hearer-) questions: The goal of each
new conversation is to cooperatively answer the super-question “What is the
way things are?”. This question is tackled by splitting it up into subquestions,
which each ask for a partial answer to the superquestion. Each new declarative
utterance answers the lowest question in the tree – the Current Question. In
this model, information structural categories like focus and topic are used for
discourse-management. They indicate what the implicit questions under dis-
cussion are. This is done through question-answer congruence: According to
Roberts (1996), the focus alternative set (cf. Rooth 1985; 1992) of the utterance
is congruent to the set of possible answers indicated by the Current Question,
e.g. (24) for answer A1 in (25a).1
(24) JCQK0 = JA1KF = {John likes Bill, John likes Mary, John likes Sue}
1 For weaker constraints on question-answer congruence, see Büring (2003: 517) and Beaver &
Clark (2008: 47).
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(25) (a) What is the way things are?
...
CQ. Whom does John like?
A1. [John likes [Bill]F
(b) What is the way things are?
...
Who likes whom?
CQ. Whom does John like?
A2. [John]CT likes [Bill]F
Contrastive topics indicate the presence of alternatives raised by questions
above the Current Question (Büring 2003). So in (25b), the focus on Bill in
A2 indicates that Bill must be replaced by a wh-element in the Current Ques-
tion CQ, but the contrastive topic accent on John indicates that there is an
additional relevant question immediately above the Current Question, in which
the subject John is also replaced by a wh-element. Büring (2003) proposes that
utterances like this do not only have a normal and a focus value, but also a CT
value, which marks them as partial answers to this higher question.
4.2 The Exclusive Particle yak
In order to account for the conventional association behaviour of the exclusive
particle yak ‘only’ in Ngamo, we follow suggestions by Beaver & Clark (2008)
on the semantic function of exclusives. According to these authors, the main
function of exclusive particles is not to exclude alternatives, but to indicate that
the proposition modified by the exclusive particle in an answer to an explicit or
implicit CQ indicated by the focus structure is less strong (on a salient scale)
than expected by the hearer. By uttering (26A) in response to the explicit CQ
in (26Q), for instance, the speaker signals that he takes the hearer to expect
a stronger alternative out of the question denotation to be true, e.g. that John
invited Mary, Sue, Bill and John, among others.
(26) Q. Whom did he invite?
A. He invited only MaryF .
Technically, this effect can be modelled by assigning yak the lexical entry in
(27), which can be conceived of as a variant of the lexical entry for only in
Beaver & Clark (2008):
(27) JyakKw(p) = 1 iff ¬ ∃ q ∈ CQyak: p ≤ q ∧ q(w);
defined iff ∀q ∈ CQyak p ≤ q; where ‘≤’ stands for ‘weaker on a
contextually salient scale’.
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According to (27), the semantic effects of yak are twofold. First, the presence
of yak imposes a restriction - in form of a presupposition - of the original CQ
indicated by grammatical focus marking. According to the presupposition in
(27), the new CQyak contains only propositional alternatives that are at least
as strong (on a contextually salient scale) as the proposition expressed by the
utterance containing yak. Restricting the original CQ to CQyak in this way cap-
tures the intuition that the hearer expects stronger alternatives to p to be true. At
the same time, the presupposition excludes alternatives of equal strength (e.g.,
Bill and John in the case of (26)) as it requires all the alternatives in CQyak to be
either identical to p, or stronger than p on a relevant scale. The second effect of
yak takes place at the truth-conditional level by specifying that p is indeed the
strongest true alternative in the yak-modified CQyak. Importantly, this analysis
continues to treat yak as conventionally associating with focus, as yak makes
direct reference to an – albeit modified – CQ as indicated by grammatical focus
marking in its lexical entry.
4.3 The Additive(-Scalar) Particles ke and har
The additive(-scalar) particles ke and har do not refer to the focus alternatives
directly. Their central semantic constribution consists in presupposing the ex-
istence of another contextually salient situation, in which an alternative propo-
sition out of a contextually bound variable C holds.
(28) J keCKg,w(p)(s) = p(s)(w);
defined iff ∃ s’ in w, s’ 6= s : ∃ q ∈ g(JCK), q 6= p: [q(s’)(w)]
Har additionally presupposes that its complement is relatively unlikely.
(29) J harCKg,w(p)(s) = p(s)(w), defined iff
i. ∃ s’ in w, s’ 6= s : ∃ q ∈ g(JCK), q 6= p: [q(s’)(w)]
ii. p is (relatively) unexpected compared to other elements in g(JCK).
Since the Current Question is typically salient in a given context, the context
variable C is usually resolved to it; e.g. in (30), C is resolved to the Current
Question “What did Kule build?”, giving rise to the meaning in (31).
(30) [CQ: What did Kule build? Kule built a school, and...]
Kule
Kule
ke
also
salko
build-PFV
bano.
house.
‘Kule also built a HOUSE.’
(31) J keCKg,w(J Kule built a school K)(s) = 1 iff Kule built a school in s in
w, defined iff ∃ s’ in w, s’ 6= s : ∃ q ∈ {Kule built a school, Kule built
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a house, Kule built a shed, ...}, q 6= p: [q(s’)(w)]
As seen in connection with example (19), in the case of focus-marked (in-
verted) subjects (32), we see that if C is contextually resolved to the Current
Question: “Who built a house?”, this will normally lead to a clash between the
presuppositions of ke and the background marker (33) (but see below).
(32) [CQ: Who built a house? Hawwa built a house, and...]
#salko
build-PFV
bano
house
-i
BM
ke
also
Kule.
Kule
(intended:) ‘KULE also built a house.’
(33) J keCKg,w(J Kule built a houseK)(s) = 1 iff Kule built a house in s in w,
defined iff ∃ s’ in w, s’ 6= s : ∃ q ∈ {Hawwa built a house, Kule built a
house, Shuwa built a house, ...}, q 6= p: [q(s’)(w)]
Presupposition of i-marking: There is a maximal salient house-building
event whose agent is Kule.
Instead, as argued above, any association of a (scalar-) additive particle with
a subject is indirect in nature, constituting an instance of free association with
focus. There are at least two ways for such free associations with non-focused
subjects to arise. First, the Current Question can be resolved to wide-scope
questions of the form “What happened?” (34) in contexts in which the VP
is given, as illustrated in (35). Notice that the nuclear accent in the English
paraphrase falls on the subject because the VP is given.
(34) [What happened? Hawwa built a house, and...]
Kule
Kule
ke
also
salko
build-PFV
bano.
house
‘KULE also built a house.’
(35) J keCKg,w(J Kule built a houseK)(s) = 1 iff Kule built a house in s in w,
defined iff ∃ s’ in w, s’ 6= s : ∃ q ∈ {Hawwa built a house, Hawwa
bought a car, Kule built a house, ...}, q 6= p: [q(s’)(w)]
The second strategy involves apparent association with a (contrastive) topic,
which is possible since the canonical preverbal position of subjects is the de-
fault topic position. In this case, the ke-sentence with topical subject relates to
the super-question “Who did what?”, which splits up into VP-subquestions as
in (36), leading to (37).
(36) [(What did Hawwa do?) Hawwa built a house, and... (CQ: What did
Kule do?)]
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Kule
Kule
ke
also
salko
build-PFV
bano.
house
‘KULE built a house, too.’
(37) J keCKg,w(J Kule built a houseK)(s) = 1 iff Kule built a house in s in w,
defined iff ∃ s’ in w, s’ 6= s : ∃ q ∈ {Hawwa built a house, Hawwa
bought a car, Kule built a house, ...}, q 6= p: [q(s’)(w)]
Additional evidence for this second option comes from marked discourse-
contexts in which ke actually does occur together with a focus-marked subject
(38). In such cases, the focus/background marking suggests that the meaning of
the i/ye-marked VP ‘building a house’ forms the (contrastive) topic event. The
antecedent super-question is again “Who did what?”, but this time it is split up
into subject questions ranging over contextually given events (38). The result
is shown in (39).
(38) [(Who bought a car?) Hawwa bought a car, and... (CQ: Who built a
house?)]
Salko
build-PFV
bano
house
-i
BM
ke
also
Kule.
Kule
‘Kule (also) built a house.’
(39) J keCKg,w(J Kule built a houseK)(s) = 1 iff Kule built a house in s in w,
defined iff ∃ s’ in w, s’ 6= s : ∃ q ∈ {Hawwa built a house, Hawwa
bought a car, Kule built a house, ...}, q 6= p: [q(s’)(w)]
Presupposition of i-marking: There is a maximal salient house-building
event whose agent is Kule.
In sum, we have shown that the proposed analysis of ke and har with the de-
notations in (28) and (29) can account for the behaviour of these particles ob-
served in section 3.2.
5 Conclusion
The Ngamo data presented suggest that there are different kinds of association
with focus, similar to what was found for English by Beaver & Clark (2008).
However, in contrast to English also and even, Ngamo additive particles do not
conventionally associate with focus. This corresponds to findings from other
languages, e.g. Bura (Hartmann & Zimmermann 2008) and Thompson Salish
(Koch & Zimmermann 2010). What remains to be seen is whether the analysis
of additive particles in Ngamo can be extended to provide a unified account of
stressed and unstressed additive particles in German.
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The Concept of Semantic Phase and the Different Readings of
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Abstract. The paper offers a new kind of approach to the semantic contrast
between repetitive and restitutive again. The heart of the theory is the new con-
cept of Semantic Phase. It parallels the syntactic concept and is motivated as
an instance of the Principle of Hierarchical Abstraction. The concept refers to
a switch from imperfective to perfective view of a situation at the level of vP.
Applying the modifier before or after phase transition derives the two readings
without stipulation of lexical ambiguity. The framework used is Finite-state Tem-
poral Semantics of Fernando. The syntactic background is an Orphan analysis of
right-peripheral adverbials. Syntactic underspecification is resolved by the use
of pragmatic information reflected locally by the prosody of the utterance.
1 Introduction
1.1 The Basic Data
The paper is concerned with the ambiguity that can arise in connection with
the interpretation of the adverb again (or German ‘wieder’). While in connec-
tion with atelic states and activities again expresses plain repetition, applied
to a telic accomplishment or achievement, the adverb either expresses repeti-
tion of the entire event (repetitive reading) or repetition of its result state only
(restitutive reading). Consider the following telic standard example.
(1) John opened the door again. (rep./rest.)
The restitutive interpretation presupposes that the door has been open some-
time before, but it does not require that is has been opened by John or anybody
else. For the repetitive interpretation to be true, the door must have been opened
by John at some point of time in the past.
The surface position of the adverb seems to have influence on the avail-
ability of the possible interpretations. On the one hand there is the ambiguous
sentences in (1) where we find the adverb in sentence final position, on the
other hand the second sentence in (2) with sentence initial adverb for which
only the repetitive interpretation is available.
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(2) Again, John opened the door. (rep.)
For the ambiguous first construction intonation can be used as a disambigua-
tion device. While unmarked intonation goes with the restitutive reading, main
accent on the adverb forces the repetitive interpretation.
(3) a. John opened the DOOR again. (rest.)
b. John opened the door AGAIN. (rep.)
1.2 Some Existing Approaches
The repetitive/restitutive duality of again/‘wieder’ is probably the most thor-
oughly discussed example of the syntactic-semantic flexibility that is charac-
teristic of adverbial adjuncts in general. Against this background, the outcome
of the several approaches was not purely descriptive, but was at the same time
aiming at giving us some deeper and more general insights into the syntax and
semantics of verb phrases and into the constitution of interfaces. Therefore, the
analysis of again/‘wieder’ has always been like a measure of what has been
achieved in the linguistic theory of adjuncts. Up to now the issues are far from
being settled. The controversy primarily concerns the question of where to lo-
cate the source of the ambiguity: in semantics, syntax or pragmatics.
The classical treatment of Dowty (1979) presupposes decomposition in
a conceptual semantic language. In the representations of the two readings of
the ambiguous sentence, the adverb occupies the same structural position. The
interpretational contrast arises from two different semantic representations that
belong to different syntactic categories: a sentence modifier and verb phrase
modifier. A meaning postulate accounts for the semantic relationship between
the two. Although the semantic contrast derives correctly in this framework,
no explanation can be given for the influence of syntax or prosody, and the
solution is based on stipulation of lexical ambiguity .
Later approaches that include the concept of lexical ambiguity (with or
without meaning postulates) are, for instance, Fabricius-Hansen (2001), Reyle,
Rossdeutscher & Kamp (2008), Jaeger & Blutner (2003).
The most principled alternative, that tries to do without theoretically costly
stipulations on the lexical semantic side, is the theory of von Stechow (1996).
It is based on the following kind of data for German ‘wieder’.
(4) a. (weil) Fritz wieder das Fenster öffnete (rep.)
b. (weil) Fritz das Fenster wieder öffnete (rest./rep.)
Assuming a single lexical semantic entry, von Stechow claims that the ambigu-
ity can be resolved entirely in terms of syntactic scope. Decomposition in the
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style of Generative Semantics is located in the syntax. The theory is based on a
rather complex and abstract syntactic theory and uses movement of arguments
to Case positions. The leading idea is, that a structural accusative position has
wide scope with respect to the agent relation expressed by the head of the Voice
Phrase. If ‘wieder’ precedes an accusative object, a repetitive reading is oblig-
atory, if it follows the accusative object, two readings are available due to two
possible positions of the adverbial. Since the arguments have moved to their
Case positions outside the Voice Phrase, the D-position of the adverb is no
longer uniquely identifiable from the surface, hence the ambiguity.
Another scope-based account was given by Pittner (2003). On the base of
a single lexical entry for the adverb, the different readings are determined by
the syntactic entity the modifier is related to. Although this assumption seems
very natural and promising, it is not a trivial matter from a theoretical point of
view. If one accepts that an adjunct that is assigned one and only one semantic
representation can modify different types of entities, one would have to account
for the interaction between the semantic contribution of the adjunct and the
semantic properties of the modified entity in a principled way.
Pointing to German word-order effects in connection with indefinite ob-
jects as well as to the disambiguating effects of intonation, Jaeger & Blutner
(2003) offer an alternative approach to the syntactically based theories, that
uses the framework of Optimality Theory. Disambiguation is the result of a
process of pragmatic strengthening, which selects optimal candidates from a
highly underspecified relation between form and meaning. The word-order ef-
fects involve scrambling of definite noun phrases. Optional from the point of
view of syntax, scrambling of nominal arguments plays an important role in
the information structural partition of an utterance into background and focus.
Semantic material that is known or in some sense anaphoric relative to the con-
text is moved out of the focus domain. On this basis it can be explained why
the semantics of example (5) below, with the adverbial preceding an indefinite
object, is similar to the one given before where the adverbial follows a definite
object (4b).
(5) (weil) Fritz wieder ein Fenster öffnete (rest./rep.)
Furthermore, considering the connection between pragmatic and prosody, it
can be stated that de-accented constituents are given. Accordingly, de-accenting
a verb phrase in a syntactically ambiguous ‘wieder’-construction triggers a
repetitive interpretation; in this case the sentence accent ends up on the ad-
verbial. Unmarked intonation, on the other hand, places the main accent on the
object if it is verb adjacent and on the verb otherwise, and causes a restitutive
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interpretation. As was shown at the beginning (3), for the English examples
there are similar disambiguation effects arising from the presence or absence
of an accent on the adverbial.
(6) a. (weil) Fritz das Fenster WIEDER öffnete (rep.)
b. (weil) Fritz das Fenster wieder ÖFFNETE (rest.)
Although the approach does justice to the influence of context and intonation,
the different interpretations need to be based on different lexical entries again,
and there is no compositional semantics available in the theory.
1.3 The Aims of the Paper
In this paper we are going to present a new type of approach that tries to com-
bine the virtues of the existing theories while avoiding their drawbacks.
It uses a concept of semantic decomposition that is less abstract than the
one introduced by Dowty. There is no assumption of lexical ambiguity. It is a
scopal approach but it can do with a much simpler structure and without the
concept of syntactic decomposition. Furthermore, scope is not syntactically
but pragmatically determined, and mediated by the assignment of constituents
to the information structure domains of focus and background. This kind of
context-sensitive scope resolution gets formally implemented using prosodic
information that is locally available on the constituents of the utterance. The
different readings of the adverbial are determined with respect to the same
situation seen from different aspectual viewpoints. The idea of systematically
changing the view of a situation follows from an independently motivated and
general cognitive principle: the Principle of Hierarchical Abstraction.
The proposal is part of a more general approach to left/right contrasts
in the interpretation of English temporal adverbials that was offered in Grün-
der (2009). Accordingly, the focus of the investigation is on finding a theo-
retically well-motivated and general analysis for the standard cases of repet-
itive/restitutive ambiguity for again. Technical solutions for special cases or
exceptions, that are known in the literature, will have to be part of a more de-
tailed future work. We take the fact that the general strategy motivated in the
paper can also be used to derive several other contrasts in adverbial modifica-
tion as giving further weight to the proposal made here.
2 Semantic Phase Theory
2.1 Hierarchical Abstraction
The Principle of Hierarchical Abstraction is seen as one of the most fundamen-
tal and general cognitive principles to reduce complexity of problem-solving
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tasks. It is a means to reduce details and condense information through step-
wise merge of several elements in the problem space into one.
In modern linguistic theory, language too is described as a ‘system of dis-
crete infinity, consisting of hierarchically organized objects’ (Chomsky 2008:
137). Additionally, the Principle of Hierarchical Abstraction is included in
form of Syntactic Phases (Chomsky 2001, 2008).
Phases mark points in the derivation where syntactic material is trans-
ferred to the phonological component of the language system. At the level of
CP and vP (or VP if one does without assumption of the v-head), only material
in the head and the specifier is kept available for further syntactic processing;
the information contained in the complement is spelled out respectively. In con-
sequence, complexity of syntactic processing is reduced by minimizing search
space and unloading working memory.
Interestingly, pragmatics assumes a similar transition point too. In infor-
mation structure theory, the verbal domain is often considered the new infor-
mation focus domain of the utterance. This view rests on the assumption that
the syntactic tree undergoes partition into areas which are treated differently in
semantics (for instance, Diesing (1992)).
Now the idea is to integrate this pragmatic differentiation into semantics
and make vP a relevant transition point for semantic composition too. The con-
cept of Semantic Phase, that is proposed in this paper is considered an instance
of the general Principle of Hierarchical abstraction. Taking into account the
parallel to the syntactic as well as the pragmatic concept, phase abstraction
would become a candidate for a general interface principle.
2.2 Perfective vs. Imperfective Viewpoint
In case of the semantic phase concept, phase transition is supposed to consist
in a change of the temporal granularity of the model when leaving vP. More
precisely, while at a point of semantic processing inside vP, the situation ap-
pears to be internally structured into different temporal phases, outside vP it is
seen as an unstructured single whole.
These two different views of a situation can be considered a structural
realization of the concepts of imperfective and perfective aspect. According to
Comrie (1976), aspectual categories are different ways of viewing the internal
constituency of a situation. ‘Perfectivity indicates the view of the situation as
a single whole, without distinction of the various separate phases that make
up that situation; while the imperfective pays essential attention to the internal
structure of the situation’ (ibid.).
Obviously, changing from imperfective to perfective view at the level of
vP is a way of hierarchically abstracting from details and reducing complexity
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of the model and of the representation.
2.3 The Proposal in a Nutshell
In the context of the paper, the capacity to describe the world at different levels
of granularity is considered a symptom of the context-sensitivity of natural lan-
guage. It is explained as a means to reduce complexity of semantic processing
by applying the Principle of Hierarchical Abstraction.
Granularity shifts proceed via underspecifying situations and situational
descriptions with respect to certain temporal aspects of their interpretation.
Conceptual details concerning the internal temporal constituency of a situation
are only available during local processing inside the new information focus of
an utterance. They are abstracted away as soon as processing reaches the back-
ground domain of the utterance, where the information needs to be globally
handled and brought into relation to the overall semantic context.
To have available two different conceptual views of a situation makes
natural language a very flexible descriptive means that can be very precise and
very effective at the same time.
In connection with the problem of ambiguities in temporal adverbial mod-
ification the idea is the following. The puzzling flexibility in the semantics of
temporal adverbials is due to the granularity of temporal meaning. The im-
perfective or perfective view of a situation is chosen as an attaching point for
the adverbial depending on the context of its use inside or outside the new in-
formation focus of an utterance. Applying the identical adverbial to the same
situation represented at different levels of granularity causes the entire group
of characteristic interpretational contrasts.
3 The Semantic Framework
3.1 Situations as Regular Languages
What is needed to formally analyze the semantic contrast for the adverb again
in the way sketched above is a semantic framework that is decompositional. A
situation has to be represented not just as an indivisible atom, but its different
temporal parts need to be taken into account and made accessible by the for-
malism. Additionally, there should be the possibility to implement the idea of
different levels of granularity. Thereby, internal structure of a situation can be
included or abstracted away by decision.
A modern approach to event semantics that could serve well as a basis for
formal implementation is Finite-state Temporal Semantics of Fernando (2003,
2004, 2006) Fernando (2003, 2004, 2006). In Fernando‘s theory, a situational
concept is formalized as a Regular Language.
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Given a finite set Φ of formulas, a symbol σ of such language consists of
a non-contradictory subset of Φ , which non-exhaustively describes what holds
true at some single point in time. The symbols are combined via the basic
regular operations concatenation σ1σ2, alternation σ1 +σ2 and iteration σ∗1 (or
σ+1 for non-empty iteration) to form regular expressions which define a regular
language as a set of strings. Negation of symbols is defined in the style of De
Morgan as: ¬ = Φ ; ¬ φ1,...,φn = ¬φ1 + ... + ¬φn .
A simple example (by Fernando) is given below. Take the symbols to be
snapshots of a camera; then each string can be viewed as a temporal sequence
of such snapshots. With respect to the given example ‘rain from dawn to dusk’
this means, that the formalization of the situational concept starts with a picture
on the left, on which there can be seen rain and dawn, followed by a finite
number of pictures in the middle on which there is rain, and ended by one on
the right that shows rain and dusk.
(7) Λ (rain from dawn to dusk) = rain, dawn rain ∗ rain, dusk
Therefore, a situation is represented not just as an atom, but its internal states
are taken into account as well. No abstract BECOME-operator needs to be
used, since the concept just directly mirrors the temporal path of the event.
The model of such a language is given by a Kripke Frame with partial
valuations. More precisely, the interpretational basis consists of a set of states
that are partial valuations over a set of variables A, the carrier of a first-order
structure.
Additionally, Fernando includes time variables in language and grounds
them in the model by the help of δ -points. That means, instead of the contin-
uum of the real numbers, moments in time get modeled by non-open intervals
(r- δ2 , r+
δ
2 ). This strategy is motivated by the intuition that the precision of ac-
tual observations always is finite. The choice of the extension of the δ -points
determines a certain temporal granularity of the model.
3.2 Situational Classes
Fernando‘s central idea for a definition of aspectual features is to formally
base it on the symbols α(L) and ω(L) that start and finish a given language,
respectively. They serve to encode the property of a situational type of being
initially or finally bounded or unbounded. If the condition α(L) is immediately
switched after the first stage an initial boundary is marked; if α(L) is preserved
the concept is initially unbounded. In the same way ω(L) can be used to mark
a final boundary, reading the string from right to left in that case. Aspectual
features, according to Fernando, then just enumerate all the possibilities for a
corresponding concept to be bounded or unbounded in that sense.
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Definition 1. Aspectual Features:
telic (L) = ¬ω(L)+
iter (L) = ω(L)+
prog (L) = ¬α(L)+
reten (L) = α(L)+
Let us assume a situational concept has a minimal length of three sym-
bols, in other words, every situation consists of a beginning, a middle part, and
an end. On this perspective, the four classical aspectual classes are derivable as
the set of logically possible cross-combinations of the four aspectual features
as defined above.
Below, the corresponding properties of being initially or finally bounded,
are marked by using a short binary code, with the first digit referring to the
beginning, the second to the ending, and 1 and 0 indicating the presence or
absence of a boundary, respectively. If we let a and o refer to the two boundary
marking propositions inside the symbols α(L) and ω(L) we get the abstract
characterizations on the very right.
Definition 2. Aspectual Classes:
state: reten, iter (0 0) a a, o + o
activity: prog, iter (1 0) a ¬a, o + ¬a, o
achievement: reten, telic (0 1) a, ¬o a, ¬o + o
accomplishment: prog, telic (1 1) a ¬a, ¬o + ¬a, o
The following translations, which give formalizations within the frame-
work of some concrete examples, may serve as an illustration. (For the sake of
abbreviation, ¬a is suppressed in presence of o on the basis of obvious entail-
ment relations.)
(8) a. Λ (be silly) = be silly(x) be silly(x) + be silly(x)
b. Λ (swim) = ¬∃y 6= /0 (swim(y)) ∃y 6= /0 (swim(y)) + ∃y 6= /0 (swim(y))
c. Λ (reach the summit) = ¬(be at summ.(x)) ¬(be at summ.(x)) + be at summ.(x)
d. Λ (build a tower) = ¬∃y ≤ t (build(y)) ∃y ≤ t (build(y)), ¬build(t) + build(t)
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In example (8a) the relevant proposition - being a and o at the same time
- refers to a state of mind of the subject. The valuation of the proposition re-
mains unchanged for finitely many states, and so no boundaries are marked
for the state-concept. In the representation of the activity concept in (8b) the
variable is referring to parts of a spatial path the subject is taking. Here, an ini-
tial boundary exists due to the change of the truth value of the a/o-proposition
from the first to the second state. Since after this immediate switch the valu-
ation of the proposition then remains unchanged for finitely many states, no
final boundary is marked, and the situational concept therefore is an iterative
or atelic one. In (8c) the spatial position of the subject is what matter for a
characterization of the phases of the achievement. The change in truth value
of the o-proposition from the second last to the last state marks a final bound-
ary, and therefore makes the situational concept telic. But there exists no initial
boundary. Finally, in (8d) the constant t is referring to the tower, the values of
the variable y are the parts of the tower that were already constructed. Condi-
tion α (¬∃y ≤ t (build(y))) changes its truth value right after start; condition
o (build(t)) just before the end. Accordingly, the accomplishment-concept is
initially as well as finally bounded.1
4 The Semantic Analysis
4.1 The Basic Concepts
The possibility within the framework to change the granularity of the model
allows a direct formal implementation of the concept of semantic phase, that
was proposed in Section 2. For a representation of the imperfective view of
a situation, that takes into account its internal temporal structure, the repre-
sentation mainly looks like the formula presented in the previous section, just
with the subject included. Below there is the imperfective version of the con-
cept ‘John open the door’ (infinitive) from the initial examples (o refers to the
opening-angle of the door, j the subject).
(9) ¬∃x ≤ o (open (j, x)) ∃x ≤ o (open (j, x)), ¬open (o) + open (o)
1 In order to differentiate result states that are reversible (‘open the door’) from those that are
not, Fernando marks a set of inertial formula, that hold until a force is applied to stop them holding
(‘build a tower’) or cannot be stopped at all (‘write an article’). For Fernando this concept of inertia
is relevant in connection with the definition of the perfect, but it also plays a role for temporal
adverbial modification. For instance, application of again should be blocked in cases where a
result is strictly inertial. In what follows this problem will be of minor interest though. The main
focus of the formalization of the initial examples will be on the contrast between telic and atelic
concepts with respect to the interpretational effects they show in connection with the adverb again.
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In order to get a perfective view of the same situation, that abstracts away
from its internal structure, one has to increase granularity of the model until
the entire situation just falls into one state. Metaphorically, the snapshot taken
by our camera has an increased duration of exposure such that the entire event
can be taken by a single picture. Accordingly, after of phase transition at the
level of vP, the above representation in (9) gets changed and condensed in the
following way.
(10) * j open the door
For an analysis of the meaning of the adverb again I assume the following
single representation. The formula refers to the last symbol ω(L) of the regular
expression that represents the situational concept the adverb is supposed to
modify.
(11) Λ (again) = ω(L) *
The adverbial concept will get combined with the situational concept by simple
concatenation. By just writing the two respective string one after the other in
that way, the temporal presuppositional character of the meaning of again is
captured directly.
4.2 Again and Telic Situational Concepts
Now let us see how the contrast between the repetitive and restitutive reading,
which again shows when applied to a telic situational concept, derives on that
basis.
In case of the restitutive reading, the adverb gets interpreted before phase
transition and with respect to the imperfective view of the situation. In this con-
stellation, the symbol ω(L), that is used by the modifier, is just the result state
of the event. Consequently, after modification the concept mirrors a temporal
course where the result of the event held already at an earlier point in time. Be-
low this is spelled out for the initial example ‘John open the door again’. Here,
an accomplishment is chosen, but for an achievement the mechanism would
obviously work quite parallel.2
(12) open (o) * ¬∃x ≤ o (open (j, x)) ∃x ≤ o (open (j, x)), ¬open (o) + open (o)
In contrast, the repetitive reading follows from applying the adverb after phase
transition. Now, the situation is represented from a perfective point of view. In
result, the relevant symbol ω(L), that it taken by the adverbial, comprises the
2 Tempus is not included in this article, but can easily be following the formalization available in
Finite-state Temporal Semantics.
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description of the full situation, that was condensed into a single state of the
model. Accordingly, the regular expression that comes up after modification
describes a temporal course where the entire event with the identical subject
already took place at some previous point in time.
(13) j open the door * j open the door
This means, the identical semantic representation for the adverb again can be
used to derive both possible readings. Note, that since the imperfective and the
perfective view of the a situation are both just regular expressions, no problems
of type-shift arise in the formalism used here.
4.3 Again and Atelic Situational Concepts
As was said at the beginning, in connection with atelic situational concepts
no similar semantic contrast appears, but again just always expresses plain
repetition. Let us check whether this empirical fact can be accounted for by the
proposed theory.
In the case of atelic states and activities, the last symbol of the imperfec-
tive concept does not mark a final boundary. This means that no result state is
described but just a continuation of the state or activity phase that characterizes
the situation, respectively. Consequently, it does not make a real difference in
interpretation whether the adverbial gets applied to the imperfective or perfec-
tive view of an atelic situation. Below both readings are spelled out for a stative
concept ‘John be silly again’ and an activity concept ‘John swim again’.
(14)
a. be silly(x) * be silly(x) be silly(x) + be silly(x)
b. j silly * j silly
(15)
a. ∃y 6= /0 (swim(j, y)) * ¬∃y 6= /0 (swim(j, y)) ∃y 6= /0 (swim(j, y)) + ∃y 6= /0 (swim(j, y))
b. j swim * j swim
5 Syntax (Informal Sketch)
5.1 General Background
For reasons of space, the syntactic part of the theory can not be presented in
formal detail, but we will have to restrict ourselves to giving some general
ideas and informal explanations. For a full formal analysis we refer the reader
to Gründer (2009) or other material to appear. The framework used there is
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an adapted and extended version of Dynamic Syntax of Kempson, Meyer-Viol
and Gabbay (2001).
To supplement this semantic approach by a fitting syntactic theory, the
right-peripheral adverbials in question are assumed to be orphans. Orphans
are constituents that are independent of their host sentence in syntax. Prosodic
information, reflecting the contextual status of the constituents, is mediating
between underspecified syntactic and specified semantic structure. Since the
relevant information is read off locally on the constituents of the utterance,
contextual principles can be put at work without having to implement heavy
mechanisms on discourse level.
This idea is methodologically challenging, since in the standard gram-
matical systems, following the example of Chomsky, semantic interpretation is
fully determined syntactically. Pragmatic considerations take place outside the
real grammar formalism and after semantic processing only. And there is, for
principle reason, no interaction between the different components of the gram-
mar in a way that phonetics would mirror pragmatics and would interact with
syntax in order to determine semantics. But following the considerations from
the beginning of the paper, this kind of interaction is just what is needed for an
analysis of the meaning of adverbial modifiers, for instance again.
5.2 Dynamic Scope Resolution by Prosody
In the formalism of Dynamic Syntax, that is used in Gründer (2009) as a formal
basis, syntactic processing is seen as progressive and goal-driven enrichment
of some partial, underspecified structure through stepwise parse of a string of
words. Information is built up on a left-to-right basis relative to some con-
text against which choices may be made as the construction process proceeds.
Words are the processing units of the parser, and they include their syntactic
information in form of a simple program that effects changes in a tree-structure
that is growing top-down. For the placement of the elements in the tree, tree-
addresses are used. A number of processing rules govern the integration and
further processing of information.
Among the several adaptions and extensions we made to the original sys-
tem of Dynamic Syntax, the most relevant one is the inclusion of prosodic
information into the parsing process. This means that the input of words comes
marked with respect to accent, and accent marks have influence on the process-
ing and placement of the information inside the tree structure.
In case of right-peripheral again the disambiguation process intuitively
works like this. At the point where scanning of the modifier is triggered, it
does not actually get integrated by the syntactic rule, but its structural posi-
tion remains underspecified. Now, depending on the prosodic marking of the
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adverbial as plus or minus accented, the semantic information carried by the
word is placed at different position inside the tree. Lower, at the level of vP, if
there is no accent, or higher, at sentence level, if there is an accent on again.
Consequently, the adverbial gets involved into the semantic form at the right
place relative to the phase transition point, and therefore applies to either the
imperfective or perfective view of the situation.
6 Conclusion
The paper offered an explanation of the semantic flexibility of the adverb again
on the basis of the concept of granularity. Temporal granularity of meaning
refers to changes in the degree of conceptual detail for time-related aspects
of interpretation. Application of the non-ambiguous modifier to either the im-
perfective or perfective view of the same situation can cause the two different
readings. The choice between both interpretations is not syntactically deter-
mined, but it is made relative to the semantic context that is reflected locally by
the prosody of the utterance.
If one considers the results of the paper from a more general theoretical
perspective, then the investigation of adverbial modifiers was shown to have
theoretical depth as well as the capacity to illuminate systematic processes at
the interfaces between syntax, semantics and pragmatics. Additionally, it could
give a clear and concrete example for the relationship between linguistic theory
and general principles of cognition.
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Abstract. In this paper, we investigate the semantics of the adjectival suffix     
-ovat in Russian. We argue that this suffix constitutes a morphological degree 
modifier and propose for it a formal analysis formulated within the framework 
of degree semantics. The suffix specifies that the degree to which a property 
holds of an object is slightly higher than the standard of comparison. A detailed 
consideration of different types of adjectives and standards of comparison 
available for these adjectives, in combination with the proposed analysis, 
allows us to account for the distribution of the suffix and for the range of 
arising interpretations. 
 
1	   Introduction:	  Data	  
In this paper, we investigate the semantics of the adjectival suffix -ovat in 
Russian as in the following examples where it is applied to the adjectives 
dorogoj ‘expensive’ and vysokij ‘high’: 
(1) a. Etot restoran     okazalsja    dlja nas  dorog-ovat-ym. 
  this  restaurant turned_out  for  us   expensive-ovat-M.INSTR 
  ‘This restaurant turned out to be somewhat expensive for us.’ 
 b. Takije kabluki dlja menja vysok-ovat-y. 
  such    heels     for  me      high-ovat-PL.NOM 
  ‘Such heels are somewhat too high for me.’ 
Intuitively, the interpretation associated with -ovat comes close to “a little bit 
too”: The prices in the restaurant in (1a) slightly exceeded the speaker’s 
expectations or average prices for restaurants of that type, but were still not 
simply too expensive such that the speaker was not able to pay them. 
Similarly, the heels in (1b) are somewhat too high for the speaker as to be 
absolutely comfortable or to look completely appropriate, however, they are 
only somewhat too high rather than just too high. 
However, it seems that -ovat can make different contributions with 
different adjectives. While with dorogoj ‘expensive’ and vysokij ‘high’ in (1) 
In Reich, Ingo et al. (eds.), Proceedings of Sinn & Bedeutung 15,  
pp. 321–335. Universaar – Saarland University Press: Saarbrücken, Germany, 2011. 	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its meaning is comparable to that of the English slightly too, this is not the 
case with adjectives like sladkij ‘sweet’ or vlažnyj ‘wet’ as below: 
(2) a. Po utram    on  pjot     proxladnyj sladk-ovat-yj         čaj. 
  at  mornings he  drinks cool       sweet-ovat-M.ACC tea 
  ‘In the mornings, he drinks cool sweetish tea.’ 
 b. Lena protjorla  mebel’  vlažn-ovat-oj        trjapkoj. 
  Lena wiped      furniture wet-ovat-F.INSTR  duster 
  ‘Lena wiped the furniture with a wettish duster.’ 
In examples in (2), -ovat implies that the property lexicalized by the stem 
holds of the argument to an intuitively low degree, e.g., the tea in (2a) is not 
really sweet, rather it is only somewhat sweetish. In other words, ‘sweet +      
-ovat’ does not entail ‘sweet’. The same holds for vlažnovatyj in (2b), which 
implies that objects, of which it is true, are not properly wet, but are not really 
dry either. Again, this means the lack of entailment to the meaning of the 
unmodified positive form vlažnyj ‘wet’. 
Another interesting fact concerning the distribution of -ovat is that it can 
be attached to some adjectives but not to others: 
(a) it is incompatible with non-gradable adjectives, such as žyvoj ‘alive’, 
mjortvyj ‘dead’, or čjotnyj ‘even’; thus, *žyvovatyj, *mertvovatyj, and 
*čjotnovatyj are not acceptable forms; 
(b)  in many pairs of positive and negative adjectives that lexicalize scales 
with the same dimension, the suffix can be attached to one member of 
the pair only, namely, to the one that conventionally has a negative 
connotation, e.g. grjaznovatyj (dirty+ -ovat) / *čistovatyj (clean+ -ovat); 
ploxovatyj (bad+ -ovat) / *xoroševatyj (good+ -ovat); dorogovatyj 
(expensive+ -ovat) / *deše(vo)vatyj (cheap+ -ovat); slabovatyj (weak +  
-ovat) / *sil’novatyj (strong + -ovat); 
(c) in some other pairs, by contrast, both the positive and the negative 
member can combine with the suffix, e.g. dlinnovatyj (long+ -ovat) / 
korotkovatyj (short+ -ovat); šyrokovatyj (broad + -ovat) / uzkovatyj 
(narrow + -ovat); tjaželovatyj (heavy + -ovat) / legkovatyj (light +           
-ovat). 
Finally, we assume that in some cases the suffix cannot attach to a root due to 
purely morpho-phonological factors, such as, e.g., the length of the word or 
euphony, cf. *interesnovatyj ‘interesting + -ovat’, *agressivnovatyj 
‘aggressive + -ovat’, *prostodušnovatyj ‘simple-minded + -ovat’. For in-
stance, the suffix is unlikely to combine with a stem that consists of more 
than two syllables. However, in what follows we will ignore such cases and 
concentrate on the semantic-pragmatic nature of the suffix. 
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The core idea of our analysis is that the suffix -ovat functions as a degree 
modifier, similarly to comparative morphemes. We argue that it imposes a 
relation between two degrees on the scale lexicalized by the adjectival root. 
One of them is the maximal degree to which the property holds of the 
individual argument of the adjective. It is entailed to slightly exceed the other 
one, namely, the standard of comparison. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we briefly discuss the 
necessary theoretic considerations about scales, degrees, and standards of 
comparison, mainly based on work by Kennedy & McNally (2005) and Heim 
(2000). In Section 3, we set forth our analysis that accounts for the data from 
Section 1. We systematically discuss different types of adjectives, both non-
gradable adjectives and various sub-classes of gradable adjectives, and 
different types of standards of comparison, which -ovat can apply to. Finally, 
Section 4 concludes the discussion. 
2	   Scales	  and	  Standards	  
2.1	   Types	  of	  Scales	  
Following a number of studies on the semantics of gradable adjectives (Cruse 
1980, Winter & Rotstein 2004, Kennedy & McNally 2005, Kennedy & Levin 
2007, among many others), we assume that the meanings of gradable 
adjectives can be characterized in terms of scales and degrees, defining a 
scale as a set of degrees totally ordered along some dimension. Depending on 
the structure of the scale, the following subtypes of scales have usually been 
distinguished: 
(a) totally open scales: such scales do not have minimal or maximal 
points, and, therefore, adjectives that map their arguments along 
such scales are not compatible with degree modifiers that pick out 
end points, e.g., absolutely and completely for the maximal degree, 
slightly and partially for the minimal degree: 
- tall, expensive, deep, glad, heavy, etc. 
(b) upper-bound closed scales: the property has a maximal possible 
degree, which constitutes the upper bound of the scale; the 
corresponding adjectives can be modified by absolutely and 
completely: 
- clean, dry, flat, straight, etc. 
324   Kagan & Alexeyenko 
(c) lower-bound closed scales1: the property is instantiated to at least a 
smallest value, which follows the zero degree at the lower bound of 
the scale; adjectives with underlying scales of this type can be 
modified by slightly and partially: 
- dirty2, wet, bumpy, dangerous, etc. 
Applying this distinction to Russian adjectives, we can see that adjectives like 
dorogoj ‘expensive’ / dešovyj ‘cheap’ and vysokij ‘high’ / nizkij ‘low’ 
lexicalize totally open scales lacking both a minimal and a maximal degree, 
since neither soveršenno ‘absolutely’ nor slegka ‘slightly’ is compatible with 
either of them: 
(3) a. #soveršenno vysokij / #slegka vysokij 
  #absolutely high       / #slightly high 
 b. #soveršenno nizkij / #slegka nizkij 
  #absolutely low     / #slightly low 
 c.                            à highness 
       nizkij              vysokij 
 d.                             à lowness 
       vysokij     nizkij 
Adjective pairs like grjaznyj ‘dirty’ / čistyj ‘clean’ and sladkij ‘sweet’ / 
nesladkij ‘not sweet’ lexicalize partially closed scales. More precisely, 
‘clean’ and ‘not sweet’ map their arguments along upper-bound closed scales 
(with the maximal degree at the upper bound), while ‘dirty’ and ‘sweet’ map 
their arguments along lower-bound closed scales (with the minimal degree at 
the lower bound): 
(4) a. soveršenno čistyj / #slegka čistyj 
  absolutely   clean / #slightly clean 
 b. #soveršenno grjaznyj / slegka   grjaznyj 
  #absolutely   dirty    / slightly  dirty 
 c.                            à cleanness (max) 
         grjaznyj           čistyj 
 d.                             à dirtiness (min) 
  čistyj         grjaznyj 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Yoon (1996) and Rotstein & Winter (2004) alternatively use the terms “total” and “partial” for 
antonymous adjectives lexicalizing upper- and lower-bound closed scales respectively. 
2 Antonymous members in pairs of gradable adjectives (such as clean and dirty) map their 
arguments onto scales with the same dimension and the same degrees. However, their scales are 
different, since the respective orderings are inverse (but see Kennedy 2001 and Kennedy & 
McNally 2005 for an alternative view, on which such antonyms lexicalize the same scale but 
involve positive versus negative degrees). 
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An important implication that Kennedy & McNally (2005) draw from the fact 
of differences in the scale structure concerns the nature of the standard of 
comparison. 
Gradable adjectives, which map their arguments along totally open 
scales, are claimed to have a context-dependent standard of comparison, 
therefore they are called relative gradable adjectives. This type of standard of 
comparison, called distributional standard throughout the paper, is 
determined with respect to the domain of the adjective, i.e., based on the 
distribution in the class of objects, which constitute the comparison set in the 
respective context. The objects, which the positive form is true of, “stand 
out” with respect to the property that the adjective encodes. 
By contrast, gradable adjectives, which map their arguments onto 
degrees on scales closed from at least one end, are supposed to have a 
context-independent absolute standard of comparison that corresponds to the 
minimal or maximal degree on the scale. These adjectives have been dubbed 
absolute gradable adjectives. The standard of adjectives with upper-bound 
closed scales corresponds to the maximal degree, i.e., they require their 
arguments to possess a maximal amount of property they describe (e.g. čistyj 
‘clean’ and nesladkij ‘not sweet’). Adjectives with lower-bound closed scales 
have their standard at the minimal degree on the scale, i.e., they require their 
arguments to possess some minimal degree of the relevant property (e.g. 
grjaznyj ‘dirty’ and sladkij ‘sweet’). 
In addition, we assume the existence of a functional standard for all 
types of gradable adjectives, which is determined relative to some purpose 
relevant in the context of utterance.  
2.2	   Functional	  Standard	  
The functional standard is the maximal degree on the interval consisting of 
degrees that are compatible with the requirements of the situation. The most 
typical case when this standard is invoked is the modification by the degree 
modifier too (Heim 2000, Meier 2003). A sentence of the form x is too P 
means, roughly, that x is characterized by the property P to a degree that is 
higher “than is compatible with certain (contextually given) goals or desires” 
(Heim 2000: 19). These goals or desires can be provided explicitly, as in (5) 
and (6), or need be inferred from the context, as in (7): 
(5) Our truck is too tall to go through this tunnel. 
(6) This concert is too long to burn to a single CD. 
(7) These heels are too high. 
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The contextually relevant goals for the sentences in (5)-(6) are packed in a to-
phrase: to go through a certain tunnel in (5) and to burn a concert to a CD in 
(6). The corresponding functional standards in these contexts, i.e., the 
maximal degrees of height and length that are compatible with the respective 
goals, although not provided explicitly, are recoverable from the situation. 
For the sentence in (5), this degree corresponds to the height of the tunnel; for 
the sentence in (6), it corresponds to the volume of the CD. 
By contrast, the contextually relevant goal/desire for the sentence in (7) 
remains implicit and can vary from context to context. It may be the desire 
that shoes should be comfortable or the goal to look appropriate in a society, 
or, essentially, any other contextual requirement. 
Heim (2000) captures the meaning component contributed by too by 
assigning this item a modal semantics (see also Meier 2003 for a similar 
modal analysis). The analysis she proposes is provided in (8): 
(8) [[ too ]] w = λP<s,dt> . max(P(w)) > max{d: Ǝw' ∈ Acc(w): P(w')(d) = 1} 
The construction x is too P implies that the maximal degree to which P holds 
of x in the reference world w is higher than the maximal degree to which P 
holds of x in any possible world that stands in a particular accessibility 
relation to w. The accessibility relation Acc maps a world w to a set of worlds 
in which the contextually specified purposes or desires are achieved or 
satisfied, and which are similar to w in other relevant respects. As de-
monstrated above, the nature of the accessibility relation varies from context 
to context. 
What has been called the functional standard throughout this paper is 
represented in Heim’s analysis in (8) as max{d: Ǝw' ∈ Acc(w): P(w')(d) = 1}, 
i.e., it is the maximal degree that is compatible with the situation re-
quirements. For the sake of simplicity, below we will abbreviate this formula 
simply as C to refer to the functional standard, following Nakanishi (2004). 
3	   A	  Unified	  Analysis	  of	  -­‐ovat	  
We propose that the suffix -ovat is a morphological degree modifier. It 
provides information regarding the degree to which the argument possesses 
the property lexicalized by the stem. The suffix imposes a relation between 
this degree and the standard of comparison. The semantics of -ovat is 
provided in (9): 
(9) λP<d,et>λd’dλxe . max{d: P(d)(x)} > d’ ˄ (max{d: P(d)(x)} – d’ < dc) 
The Russian Suffix -ovat as Degree Modifier   327 
In prose, the suffix specifies that the maximal degree d to which a property P 
holds of an individual x is higher than another degree d’, i.e., the standard of 
comparison, whose source will be discussed below. It further specifies that 
the difference between the two degrees is relatively low, i.e., lower than dc, 
which represents a contextually provided expectation value. Thus, the suffix 
fulfills the double function of (i) imposing a relation between two degrees on 
a scale and (ii) vaguely measuring the difference between these degrees. 
Below, we argue that -ovat consistently contributes the semantics in (9). 
The different sub-meanings of the suffix, discussed in Section 1, arise by 
virtue of the fact that the suffix can apply to different types of standards of 
comparison. In what follows, we systematically discuss the application of      
-ovat to adjectives with underlying scales of different types and different 
standards of comparison. 
3.1	   Non-­‐Gradable	  Adjectives	  
The analysis predicts correctly that -ovat cannot attach to non-gradable 
adjectives. Degree modifiers require their adjectival argument to be gradable 
(Kennedy & McNally 2005). If it is not gradable, a type mismatch occurs. 
The adjectives *žyvoj ‘alive’, mjortvyj ‘dead’, and čjotnyj ‘even’ are not 
gradable and, therefore, they are of type <e,t> (the property type). But the 
suffix requires an argument of type <d,<e,t>>. Hence the unacceptability of 
such forms as *žyvovatyj, *mjortvovatyj, and *čjotnovatyj.3 On a more 
intuitive level, the adjectival stems do not provide a degree which could then 
be compared to the standard of comparison. 
3.2	   Gradable	  Adjectives:	  Absolute	  Standard	  
3.2.1	   Lower-­‐Bound	  Closed	  Scales	  
If the scale lexicalized by the stem is lower closed and, thus, has a minimal 
value, it is to this value that the suffix applies. Thus, the lowest degree on the 
scale functions as the standard of comparison. 
Let’s illustrate the application of -ovat to an adjective with an 
underlying lower-bound closed scale, such as, for instance, sladkij ‘sweet’. 
The compatibility with slegka ‘slightly’ but not with soveršenno ‘absolutely’ 
indicates that this adjective lexicalizes a lower-bound closed scale, which has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Note that the unacceptability of *žyvovatyj and *mjortvovatyj cannot be explained 
phonologically by the fact that the stem ends in the consonant -v-. This is shown by the 
acceptability of such adjectives as krivovatyj and čerstvovatyj, whose stems end in -v- as well. 
Further, the same kind of phonological explanation could not apply to the non-existence of such 
adjectives as *čjotnovatyj. 
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a minimal value and no maximal value (an entity can be absolutely not sweet, 
but not absolutely sweet): 
(10) Čaj   slegka    / #soveršenno  sladkij. 
 tea    slightly  /   absolutely   sweet 
 ‘The tea is slightly / #absolutely sweet.’ 
The adjective sladkovatyj denotes the property of being slightly sweet, e.g. 
sladkovatyj čaj is tea that contains a small amount of sugar. The argument of 
sladkovatyj is entailed to possess sweetness to a degree that is slightly higher 
than the minimum. This meaning is derived in the following way: 
(a) The semantics of sweet is provided in (11a). 
(b) The result of application of -ovat to the stem sladk- reveals the 
representation in (11b). The maximal degree to which the argument of 
the resulting adjective is sweet slightly exceeds the standard of 
comparison, i.e., the minimal degree on the scale. 
(c) The resulting function applies to the standard of comparison associated 
with the stem, and we get the meaning in (11c). 
(11) a. λdλx . sweet(d)(x) 
 b. λd’λx . max{d: sweet(d)(x)} > d’ ˄ (max{d: sweet(d)(x)} – d’ < dc) 
 c. λx . max{d: sweet(d)(x)} > min(Ssweet) ˄ (max{d: sweet(d)(x)} – 
min(Ssweet) < dc) 
 d.                       à sweetness  
 
      nesladkij       sladkij  
  sladkovatyj 
 
The figure in (11d) graphically represents the relations between the 
denotations of nesladkij ‘not sweet’, sladkij ‘sweet’, and sladkovatyj. We 
assume that the lower boundary on the scale of sweetness represents zero 
sweetness, i.e., corresponds to the absence of the property. In order for an 
object to fall under the denotation of sladkij ‘sweet’, it has to reach a 
particular degree of sweetness. Finally, an object counts as sladkovatyj if the 
degree of its sweetness is higher than the minimal point on the scale, but not 
considerably higher than this point.4 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 That is, we assume that sladkovatyj is outside of the denotation of sladkij. For further 
discussion of this issue, see Kagan & Alexeyenko (2010), Section 4.2. 
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A further example that illustrates the application of -ovat to an adjective with 
a lower-bound closed scale is grjaznyj ‘dirty’. The scale of dirtiness has a 
minimal value (corresponding to zero dirtiness, or absolute cleanliness) but 
no maximal value (there is no limit to how dirty one can get). The suffix        
-ovat applies to the minimal value on the underlying scale of this adjective, so 
that the resulting adjective, grijaznovatyj, denotes the property of being 
slightly dirty, i.e., slightly dirtier than an absolutely clean entity. 
(12) [[  grijaznovatyj ]]  = λx . max{d: dirty(d)(x)} > min(Sdirty) ˄ (max{d: 
dirty(d)(x)} – min(Sdirty) < dc) 
Several additional examples of adjectives that lexicalize a scale with a lower 
boundary and can be modified by the suffix -ovat are provided below: 
(13) vlažnovatyj (wet-ovat) ‘slightly wet’, gor’kovatyj (bitter-ovat) ‘slightly 
bitter’, ostrovatyj (spicy-ovat) ‘slightly spicy’, krivovatyj (crooked-ovat) 
‘slightly crooked’, strannovatyj (strange-ovat) ‘somewhat strange’, 
grustnovatyj (sad-ovat) ‘a little bit sad’, etc. 
3.2.2	   Upper-­‐Bound	  Closed	  Scales	  
When a scale has a maximal value, its upper boundary constitutes another 
potential standard of comparison for the application of -ovat. However, it 
turns out that -ovat fails to apply to this standard. Recall that the suffix en-
sures that the property holds of an argument to a degree that is higher than 
the standard of comparison. Trivially, no degree can be higher than the 
maximal element on the scale. 
An example of an adjective that lexicalizes an upper-bound closed scale 
is čistyj ‘clean’, which lacks a minimal value and whose maximal value 
corresponds to absolute cleanliness. This scale is almost identical to the one 
lexicalized by the antonymous adjective grjaznyj ‘dirty’ discussed in Section 
3.2.1 above, except for the fact that the two scales are characterized by 
inverse ordering relations. Roughly, the higher an object is on the scale of 
cleanliness (i.e., the cleaner it is), the lower it is on the scale of dirtiness. We 
noted above that the scale of dirtiness has a minimal value but no maximal 
one. Correspondingly, the scale of cleanliness has a maximal but not a 
minimal value. 
The adjective *čistovatyj does not exist. Formally, the unacceptability of 
this form can be explained as follows. The standard of the adjective čistyj 
‘clean’ is the upper scale boundary. Thus, the application of the suffix -ovat 
to this adjective would render the semantics in (14a): 
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(14) a. λx . max{d: clean(d)(x)} > max(Sclean) ˄ (max{d: clean(d)(x)} –  
  max(Sclean) < dc) 
 b.                       à cleanness 
 
       grjaznyj                čistyj  
                   čistovatyj 
Since no degree on the scale of cleanliness can be higher than max(Sclean), the 
requirement max{d: clean(d)(x)} > max(Sclean) cannot be satisfied. Therefore, 
-ovat cannot be felicitously applied. 
We now have an explanation of the contrast between the existing 
grijaznovatyj and the non-existing *čistovatyj. The adjectives grjaznyj and 
čistyj are antonyms that lexicalize scales with the same dimension. The scales 
come with one and the same standard (absolute cleanliness), which cor-
responds to the minimal value on Sdirty and the maximal value on Sclean. For 
both adjectives, this standard is a potential candidate for -ovat to apply to. 
Given the ordering that characterizes each scale, we get the following result. 
With grjaznyj, the application of the suffix produces the meaning ‘slightly 
dirtier than the minimum’, or ‘slightly dirtier than an absolutely clean entity’. 
This is an acceptable interpretation, and the adjective grjaznovatyj exists. 
With čistyj, the resulting meaning would be ‘slightly cleaner than the maxi-
mum’, or ‘slightly cleaner than an absolutely clean entity’. This interpretation 
is ruled out, and so the adjective *čistovatyj does not exist. 
Additional upper-bound closed adjectives that cannot combine with       
-ovat are provided below: 
(15) *rovnovatyj (straight-ovat)5, *ploskovatyj (flat-ovat)6, *sveževatyj 
(fresh-ovat)7, etc. 
It should be pointed out, however, that some upper-bound closed adjectives 
(such as e.g. suxoj ‘dry’) can combine with -ovat. We argue that this is 
possible because in such cases, the suffix applies to a different type of 
standard, namely, to the functional standard. This issue will be addressed in 
Section 3.3.2 below. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Compare to the acceptable krivovatyj (crooked-ovat). 
6 The adjective exists under a different, idiomatic meaning. 
7 The intended meaning here is one of being a fresh product; presumably, under this meaning, the 
adjective lexicalizes an upper closed scale, as it is possible to say Jeda absolutno svežaja ‘The 
food is absolutely fresh’. 
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3.3	   Gradable	  Adjectives:	  Functional	  Standard	  
In Sections 2.1 and 2.2, we demonstrated that both relative gradable 
adjectives and absolute gradable adjectives have a standard of comparison 
other than the absolute and the distributional one respectively. This standard 
is not computed relative to the distribution in the class, nor does it constitute 
a (minimal or maximal) boundary on the underlying scale. Rather, it is 
determined relative to some contextually relevant goal or desire. In this 
section, we consider cases in which -ovat applies to the functional standard. 
3.3.1	   Open	  Scales	  
Relative adjectives lexicalize scales that lack both a minimal and a maximal 
value. Thus, no absolute standard is available. Still the suffix -ovat is com-
patible with adjectives of this kind. With such adjectives, -ovat applies to the 
functional standard. In particular, it specifies that the degree to which the 
property holds of an argument is slightly too high to be compatible with the 
requirements of the situation.8 
The adjective velikovatyj ‘big/great-ovat’ illustrates our point. This 
adjective lexicalizes an open scale and denotes a property of being slightly 
too big for the present purpose. 
(16) a. [[ velikovatyj ]]  = λx . max{d: big(d)(x)} > C ˄ (max{d: big(d)(x)} –   
  C< dc) 
 b.                  à bigness 
 
    f  
    velikovatyj 
For instance, this adjective can be used to describe shoes that are too big for a 
given individual, or a piece of furniture that is too big to fit in a particular 
room. At the same time, the argument of velikovatyj is only en-tailed to be 
slightly too big for the current purposes. Therefore, if this prop-erty 
characterizes the shoes that one is trying for size, this may not yet be a reason 
not to buy them: insoles or socks could solve the problem. 
Along with velikovatyj, -ovat applies to the functional standard with 
numerous relative adjectives, including the following: 
(17) vysokovatyj (tall-ovat) ‘slightly too tall’, nizkovatyj (short/low-ovat) 
‘slightly too short/low’, šyrokovatyj (wide-ovat) ‘slightly too wide’, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Interestingly, -ovat cannot apply to a distributional standard. In Kagan and Alexeyenko (2010) 
(cf. Section 4.1), we suggest that this is a result of the inherently vague nature of this standard. 
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dlinnovatyj (long-ovat) ‘slightly too long’, dorogovatyj (expensive-ovat) 
‘a little bit too expensive’,  starovatyj (old-ovat) ‘somewhat too old’...  
The negative connotation sometimes associated with -ovat comes from the 
cases when it applies to the functional standard. An excess and the resulting 
incompatibility with the requirements of the situation create the negative 
flavour. 
3.3.2	   (Partially)	  Closed	  Scales	  
The suffix -ovat can also apply to the functional standard with some 
adjectives that lexicalize scales with a boundary. For instance, the adjective 
suxoj ‘dry’ lexicalizes an upper-bound close scale (an entity can be absolutely 
dry, but not absolutely wet). -ovat cannot take the maximal value as the 
standard, for reasons discussed in Section 3.2.2. An object cannot be drier 
than absolutely dry. However, -ovat can attach to this adjective applying to 
the functional standard. The resulting adjective denotes a property of being 
slightly too dry for the present purposes (for instance, a duster may be too dry 
for an efficient cleaning). The adjective suxovatyj thus receives the semantics 
in (18)9: 
(18) a. [[ suxovatyj ]]  = λx . max{d: dry(d)(x)} > C ˄ (max{d: dry(d)(x)} – C  
  <dc) 
 b.                  à dryness 
 
    f           suxoj (abs. stnd.) 
    suxovatyj 
Turning to adjectives that lexicalize a lower-bound scale, they, too, appear to 
allow the application of -ovat to the functional standard. For instance, it has 
been mentioned above that the adjective ostrovatyj (spicy-ovat) can mean 
‘slightly spicy’. However, it may also mean ‘somewhat spicier than desirable 
in the given context’, as illustrated in (19): 
(19) Etot sup   dlja menja neskol’ko ostrovat. 
 this  soup for  me      somewhat spicy-ovat 
 ‘This soup is somewhat too spicy for me.’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Of course, this raises the question of why such adjectives as *čistovatyj do not exist. We have 
seen why the suffix cannot take the maximal value on the scale as the standard, but why can it 
not apply to a functional standard, triggering an entailment that the argument is too clean for 
some purpose? This issue is addressed in Section 3.3.3. 
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We therefore propose that ostrovatyj is ambiguous between the following two 
readings, which differ in terms of the standard selected by the suffix: 
(20) a. [[  ostrovatyj1 ]] = λx . max{d: spicy(d)(x)} > min(Sspicy) ˄ (max{d:  
  spicy(d)(x)} – min(Sspicy) < dc) 
 b. [[  ostrovatyj2 ]] = λx . max{d: spicy(d)(x)} > C ˄ (max{d: spicy(d)(x)} 
– C < dc) 
Under (20a), the adjective denotes the property of being just a little bit spicy. 
Objects that are included in its denotation do not lack the property of 
spiciness but have it to a low degree. In turn, (20b) represents the property of 
being slightly exceeding the functional standard for spiciness, i.e., being 
slightly more spicy than desirable in the given context. 
3.3.3	   Conventionalized	  Gaps:	  Adjectives	  with	  a	  	  Positive	  Connotation	  
If -ovat can apply to the functional standard with absolute adjectives, as 
demonstrated in Section 3.3.2, why do the words *čistovatyj (clean-ovat) or 
*rovnovatyj (straight-ovat) not exist? Further, why do we get the asymmetry 
with such relative antonyms as the following: ploxovatyj (bad-ovat) - 
*xoroševatyj (good-ovat), slabovatyj (weak-ovat) - *sil’novatyj (strong-ovat), 
glupovatyj (stupid-ovat) - *umnovatyj (clever-ovat)? 
Note that in these pairs the stems consistently denote properties one of 
which is conventionally viewed as positive and the other one, as negative. 
That is, by default, it is good to be clever but not to be stupid, and being 
strong is judged to be preferable over being weak. Analogously, clean is 
better than dirty. Once such a conventional opposition is present, -ovat is 
typically compatible only with the member of the pair that carries a negative 
connotation. Apparently, with these pairs of adjectives, the attachment of the 
suffix and the resulting interpretation is governed not only by contextual but 
also by conventional considerations. It is conventionally determined for 
certain dimensions an excess in what direction is likely to be undesirable. 
Roughly, ‘worse than desirable’ is much more likely than ‘better than 
desirable’, ‘weaker than desirable’ is more likely than ‘stronger than 
desirable’, etc. Conventionally, by default, a high degree of cleanliness, 
cleverness, goodness, etc. is judged as a good thing, which makes these 
adjectives less easily compatible with the negative flavour of “a higher 
degree than desirable”, which is contributed by -ovat. 
Of course, in an appropriate context, it is possible to conceptualize of an 
individual being “too good”, “too strong”, and even “too clever”. Therefore, 
the degree modifier too is perfectly compatible with such adjectives. 
However, due to the fact that -ovat is a derivational morpheme, which com-
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bines with the stem in the course of word formation, it is more sensitive to 
lexical and conventional restrictions. Therefore, it does not easily apply to 
properties whose degree is unlikely to be higher than desirable. In contrast, 
too, which is an independent lexical item that combines with an adjective at a 
much higher level of the derivation, can override the conventionalized 
preferences of the stem in an appropriate context. 
Interestingly, if a polysemous adjective is inherently likely to receive a 
negative connotation under only one of its sub-meanings, this sub-meaning 
will be compatible with -ovat.  For instance, the adjective prostovatyj 
(simple-ovat) sounds strange when modifying a problem or a question. Here, 
we have the positive/negative contrast *prostovatyj/složnovatyj (simple-ovat 
/strong-ovat) of the kind discussed above. But the adjective prostoj may also 
be used to modify one’s personality, in which case it receives the meaning 
‘simple-minded’. This sub-meaning inherently receives a negative conno-
tation, and the word prostovatyj is perfectly acceptable if used in this sense.10 
4	   Conclusion	  
To sum up, in this paper we have investigated the semantics of the adjectival 
suffix -ovat in Russian. We argued that this suffix constitutes a morpho-
logical degree modifier and proposed for it a formal analysis formulated 
within the framework of degree semantics. The suffix specifies that the 
degree to which a property holds of an object is slightly higher than the stand-
ard of comparison. A detailed consideration of different types of adjectives 
and standards of comparison available for these adjectives, in combination 
with the proposed analysis, allows us to account for the distribution of the 
suffix and for the range of arising interpretations. 
References	  
Cruse, David. 1986. Lexical semantics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Heim, Irene. 2000. Degree Operators and Scope. In Proceedings of SALT 10, 
40–64. Ithaca: CLC Publications. 
Kagan, Olga & Sascha Alexeyenko. 2010. Degree Modification in Russian 
Morphology: The Case of the Suffix -ovat. In Proceedings of IATL 26. 
Kennedy, Chris. 2001. Polar Opposition and the Ontology of ‘Degrees’. 
Linguistics and Philosophy 24. 33–70. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Similarly, mjagkij ‘gentle’ used with respect to people generally has a positive connotation. By 
contrast, mjagkovatyj (gentle-ovat) refers to someone who is too gentle, getting spineless. 
The Russian Suffix -ovat as Degree Modifier   335 
Kennedy, Chris & Beth Levin. 2007. Measure of change: The adjectival core 
of degree achievements. In L. McNally and C. Kennedy (Eds.), 
Adjectives and adverbs: Syntax, semantics and discourse. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Kennedy, Chris & Louise McNally. 2005. Scale Structure, Degree Mod-
ification, and the Semantics of Gradable Predicates. Language 81(2). 
345–381. 
Meier, Cécile. 2003. The Meaning of too, enough and so… that. Natural 
Language Semantics 11. 69–107. 
Nakanishi, Kimiko. 2004. On Comparative Quantification in the Verbal 
Domain. In Proceedings of SALT 14, 179–196. Ithaca: CLC 
Publications.  
Rappaport Hovav, Malka. 2009. Scalar Roots and Their Results. Handout of 
a talk given at Roots Workshop at Stuttgart, June 2009. 
Rotstein, Carmen & Yoad Winter. 2004. Total adjectives vs. partial 
adjectives: Scale structure and higher-order modifiers. Natural 
Language Semantics 12. 259–288. 
Yoon, Youngeun. 1996. Total and partial predicates and the weak and strong 
interpretations. Natural Language Semantics 4. 217–236. 

 	  
	  On	  the	  Relation	  between	  Coherence	  Relations	  and	  Anaphoric	  
Demonstratives	  in	  German*	  
 
Elsi Kaiser 
University of Southern California 
emkaiser@usc.edu 
 
Abstract. Recent research suggests that pronoun interpretation is guided by the 
semantic coherence relations between clauses. However, it is not yet well-
understood whether coherence effects extend to other anaphoric expressions 
beyond pronouns. We report an experiment on German, a language in which 
human antecedents can be referred to both with personal and demonstrative 
pronouns. How do anaphoric demonstratives – whose referential properties 
have been argued to be complementary to pronouns – fit into coherence-based 
views? Our results suggest that although coherence does not modulate the 
antecedent choice of anaphoric demonstratives to the same extent that it in-
fluences pronoun interpretation, demonstratives interact with coherence-related 
processing by guiding comprehenders’ expectations of coherence relations. 
 
1	   Introduction	  
One of the most-researched challenges of language comprehension has to do 
with the interpretation of pronouns and other ‘underspecified’ referring 
expressions. An expression such she, it or this is semantically under-
informative: on its own, it does not provide sufficient information to identify 
the intended referent. However, we encounter these kinds of forms very 
frequently in both written and spoken language and are able to interpret them 
without difficulties. In this paper, I report a psycholinguistic experiment that 
aims to shed light on the processes involved in reference resolution by 
investigating the referential properties of two kinds of underspecified forms 
in German, namely personal pronouns (er, sie ‘s/he’) and demonstrative 
pronouns (der, die). The results show that to understand the referential 
properties of these forms, we need to take into account the semantic 
coherence relations between sentences, but that pronouns and demonstratives 
interact with coherence-related processing in different ways. 	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Various approaches to anaphor resolution have been proposed. In this section, 
I review some key approaches and summarize recent evidence regarding the 
importance of inter-sentential semantic relations. According to attention-
based approaches, the interpretation of pronouns and other forms is guided 
by a correlation between referring expressions and the salience/accessibility 
of the antecedent (e.g., Givón 1983,  Ariel 1990, Gundel et al. 1993): The 
most reduced referring expressions (e.g. unstressed pronouns) refer to the 
most salient/accessible entities, and demonstrative pronouns and other fuller 
forms refer to less salient entities. Salience is often regarded as being 
influenced by grammatical role, with subjects more salient than objects, or 
topicality, with topics more salient than non-topics. However, there are 
empirical complications for the subjecthood=salience view. In particular, 
Smyth (1994) and Chambers & Smyth (1998) found structural parallelism 
effects: pronouns prefer referents in parallel syntactic positions. 
Recent evidence suggests that neither attention-based nor parallelism-
oriented approaches are sufficient, and argues for coherence-based ap-
proaches. According to coherence accounts, the use and interpretation of 
pronouns depends on the semantic relation between the pronoun-containing 
clause and the antecedent-containing clause. These approaches view anaphor 
resolution as a by-product of general inferencing/reasoning about relations 
between clauses (Hobbs 1979, Kehler  2002, Kehler, Kertz, Rohde & Elman 
2008). To see how coherence relations influence pronoun interpretation, con-
sider ex.(1). In principle, ‘him’ could refer to Phil or to Stanley. However, if 
the relation between the sentences is semantically parallel ex.(1a), people 
tend to interpret ‘him’ as referring to the parallel argument, Stanley (Kertz, 
Kehler & Elman 2006): Comprehenders construe the two events as similar, 
i.e., Stanley was tickled and was poked. In contrast, if the relation between 
the two clauses is a result relation ex.(1b), people are more likely to interpret 
‘him’ as referring to the subject Phil (Kertz et al. 2006). 
(1) a. Phil tickled Stanley, and (similarly) Liz poked him.      
  Parallel relation: him => bias to object (Stanley) 
 b. Phil tickled Stanley, and (as a result) Liz poked him.    
  Result relation: him => bias to subject (Phil) 
As shown in ex.(2), subject pronouns are also sensitive to coherence. When 
the relation between the two clauses is result/cause-effect, as in (2a), subject-
position pronouns prefer the preceding object (Kertz et al. 2006). In contrast, 
when the relation between the two clauses is a temporal narrative relation 
(one event preceded the other but did not cause it), Kehler (2002) notes that 
we may observe a subject bias ex.(2b), see also Kertz et al. (2006). 
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(2) a. Phil tickled Stanley, and as a result he laughed uncontrollably.    
  Result relation: he => bias to object (Stanley) 
 b.  Phil tickled Stanley, and then he laughed at Mark’s joke.      
  Narrative relation: he => bias to subject (Phil) 
It is important to note that particular coherence relations do not always push 
pronouns to antecedents with certain grammatical roles. What matters is the 
semantics of the clauses and their relation. E.g., a subject pronoun in a result 
relation does not have to refer to the preceding object: Both (3a) and (3b) 
involve a result relation but he can refer to the preceding subject or object: 
(3) a. Peter snapped at Ethan, and he sulked the rest of the afternoon.  
  Result relation: he => bias to object           (Kertz et al. 2006) 
 b. Peter snapped at Ethan, and he felt guilty the rest of the afternoon.  
  Result relation: he => bias to subject          (Kertz et al. 2006) 
As a whole, a number of studies indicate that a successful account of pronoun 
interpretation needs to take into account the semantic coherence relations that 
hold between clauses (e.g. Wolf, Gibson & Desmet 2004, Kertz et al. 2006, 
Kehler et al. 2008, Rohde & Kehler 2008, Kaiser 2009). 
2	   What	  about	  Other	  Anaphoric	  Forms?	  	  
Existing work on coherence effects has focused primarily on the behavior of 
overt pronouns. However, other referential forms are also used to refer to 
previously-mentioned entities, including null pronouns, demonstratives and 
definite NPs. This brings up the question of whether coherence sensitivity 
also extends to other referring expressions. Are coherence effects a core 
property of all kinds of  reference tracking, regardless of form, or are they a 
specific phenomenon that only occurs with certain anaphoric forms? In 
particular, could it be the case that only the default anaphoric form in a 
particular language exhibits sensitivity to coherence relations, and that other 
forms are governed by factors such as grammatical role?  
On a general level, existing work suggests that referring expressions can 
indeed differ in how sensitive they are to different kinds of information. For 
example, although Kaiser & Trueswell (2008) did not look specifically at 
coherence, they found that Finnish personal pronouns and demonstratives 
differ in how much they ‘care’ about a potential antecedent’s grammatical 
role vs. its linear position/discourse-status (see also Kaiser (in press) on 
Dutch). Recently, Ueno & Kehler (2010) found that Japanese null pronouns 
are primarily sensitive to grammatical role whereas overt pronouns are more 
sensitive to verb aspect (see also Rohde & Kehler 2008).  
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Thus, as a whole, existing research indicates that referring expressions can be 
asymmetrical in terms of what kind of information they are sensitive to. In 
the present paper, to test whether referring expressions differ in how sensitive 
they are to coherence information, I compared the behavior of personal 
pronouns and demonstrative pronouns in German. Although this research is 
on German, it is potentially relevant to other languages as well, since 
demonstrative pronouns are used to refer anaphorically to human antecedents 
in many languages (e.g. Kibrik 1996 on Russian, Comrie 1997 on Dutch, 
Kaiser & Vihman 2010 on Estonian, Himmelmann 1996).  
2.1	   Existing	  Work	  on	  Pronouns	  and	  Demonstratives	  
In German, both personal pronouns and demonstrative pronouns can be used 
to refer back to human antecedents1, but their referential biases are different: 
Pronouns are described as preferring an antecedent in subject position, while 
demonstratives prefer non-subject antedecents, as shown in (4a,b). 
(4) a. Paul1 wollte mit Peter2 Tennis spielen. 
  Paul1 wanted to play tennis with Peter2. 
 b. Doch {er1/der2} war krank. 
  But {he1/DEM2} was sick.              (Bosch & Umbach 2007) 
Personal pronouns can be regarded as more default/less marked than 
demonstratives, based on relative frequency (Bosch, Rozario & Zhao 2003).2 
Before investigating the referential properties of these forms, let us consider 
some background facts. Demonstratives often look like definite determiners 
(e.g. der Mann ‘the man’), but differ in certain cases/numbers (see Bosch, 
Katz & Umbach 2007). Although demonstratives are sometimes felt to have a 
pejorative tone and are more common in informal registers, they also occur in 
written text (Bosch et al. 2007) and are not consistently felt to be pejorative.  
Let us now take a look at the referential properties of pronouns and 
(short) demonstratives. Given that both forms can refer to human antecedents, 
what guides the division of labor between them? Based on the NEGRA 
corpus of written German, Bosch, Rozario and Zhao (2003) found that when 
the antecedent is in the immediately preceding sentence, pronouns refer to a 
nominative element in 86.7% of the cases, whereas demonstratives refer to a 
nominative element in only 23.6% of the cases. (Nominative is the default 
subject case). Based on these findings, Bosch et al. put forth the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Following Bosch et al (2003, 2007), I refer to anaphoric der and die as demonstrative pronouns,  
2 German also has longer demonstrative pronouns (e.g., diese(r), jene(r)), which Bosch et al. 
(2007) describe as less frequent than the short forms (see Abraham 2006 for further discussion of 
diese(r)). I do not discuss these forms here, but regard them as an important area for future work. 
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Complementarity Hypothesis: “Anaphoric personal pronouns prefer referents 
that are established as discourse topics, while demonstratives prefer non-
topical referents.” They regard nominative case (subjecthood) as signaling 
topicality, so the Complementarity Hypothesis treats pronouns and 
demonstratives as having complementarity grammatical-role and infor-
mation-structural preferences. However, psycholinguistic experiments by 
Bosch, Katz & Umbach (2007) found that although demonstratives prefer 
object antecedents, pronouns do not exhibit a clear subject preference. 
Consequently, Bosch & Umbach (2007) argue that pronouns prefer discourse 
topics and demonstratives avoid topics. Topicality is also mentioned by 
Zifoun et al. (1997, vol.1: 558), who suggest pronouns are used for referents 
already established as topics, and demonstratives for referents that are new 
information or contrastive. Abraham (2006) also analyzes pronouns as 
involving topic continuation, and demonstratives as markers of topic shift. 
3	   How	  Do	  Anaphoric	  Demonstratives	  Fit	  into	  Coherence-­‐
Based	  Views?	  
Let us now consider how demonstrative pronouns could fit into coherence-
based views of reference resolution. As we saw in Section 1, a growing body 
of work on English points to a close relation between the interpretation of 
pronouns and the coherence relations that hold between the pronoun-
containing clause and the antecedent-containing clause.  
One of the key aims of the experiment reported in this paper is to test 
whether German personal pronouns show the coherence sensitivity observed 
in English. In addition to providing evidence of crosslinguistic replicability, 
this question is of interest given that German has a particular anaphoric form 
specialized for object reference, i.e., the demonstrative pronoun. English has 
no comparable expression.3 Thus, perhaps English subject-position pronouns 
can be pushed towards object interpretations by result relations (see ex.2) 
because there exists no dedicated object-referring anaphor? Continuing with 
this reasoning, one might expect that the existence of a special object-
referring form in German, the demonstrative, means that personal pronouns 
cannot be pushed to refer to an object antecedent. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 A possible candidate for English, former/latter, is rare and highly marked. The distinction 
between stressed/unstressed pronouns is sometimes mentioned as being similar to the pronoun/ 
demonstrative distinction (see Bosch et al. 2003). However, existing work on English stressed 
pronouns led to conflicting claims: Some (e.g. Kameyama 1999) argue for a salience-based 
approach, but others claim use of stressed pronouns is driven by contrast (e.g. de Hoop 2003).  
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Furthermore, we wanted to investigate how referential dependencies 
influence comprehenders’ assumptions about coherence. More specifically, 
even if the interpretation of anaphoric demonstratives is strongly object-
biased and perhaps not influenced by coherence, can demonstratives 
nevertheless influence comprehenders’ expectations about coherence? If a 
connective is ambiguous between a result relation and a narrative relation, 
can com-prehenders’ assumptions about which relation to activate be 
influenced by the referential biases of the anaphor? I discuss this below. 
3.1	   Inferring	  Coherence	  Relations	  from	  Anaphoric	  Dependencies	  
The question of whether particular referential dependencies can shape 
comprehenders’ expectations about coherence relations relates to work by 
Rohde (2008) and Rohde & Kehler (2008). They noted that, if different 
coherence relations are associated with different referential dependencies, we 
might expect that encountering a particular referential pattern will lead people 
to expect a particular coherence relation. In other words, we might find that 
not only do coherence relations influence the interpretation of pronouns, as 
argued by Kehler (2002) and Kehler et al. (2008), but that the interpretation 
of pronouns also influences the construal of coherence relations. Indeed, in a 
series of  sentence continuation studies, Rohde and Kehler showed this to be 
the case, and thus argued for a bidirectional relation between pronoun 
interpretation and coherence establishment.  
Because the logic of their experiments is relevant for my work, let us 
take a closer look at one of their studies. In Rohde (2008)’s sentence-
completion study, participants read short fragments consisting of a sentence 
and the first word of the next sentence (ex.5a,b), and wrote continuations. 
The verbs in the first clause were NP1 implicit causality verbs (Garvey & 
Caramazza 1974). Prior work has shown that when a sentence with an NP1 
implicit causality verb is followed by an ‘explanation’ continuation (ex.5a), 
the continuation is likely to start with reference to the first noun in the initial 
clause (the subject). Given this well-known pattern, Rohde hypothesized: 
If comprehenders use cues about who has been mentioned next to determine 
which coherence relation is likely to be operative, then an NP1-referring 
pronoun is predicted to shift comprehenders’ expectations in favor of NP1-
biased coherence relations, whereas an NP2-referring pronoun is predicted to 
shift expectations in favor of NP2-biased coherence relations. (Rohde 2008:87) 
(5)  a. John infuriated Mary. He… cheated at Scrabble.  
 b.  John infuriated Mary. She… told him to take a hike.  
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The results showed that (i) when the gender of the pronoun signalled a 
subject antecedent, participants were more likely to provide a continuation 
that constituted an explanation relation (ex.5a), and (ii) when the gender of 
the pronoun signalled an object antecedent, participants wrote more result 
continuations (ex.5b). Rohde (2008) concludes that “comprehenders use 
information about which referent has been mentioned next to update their 
expectations about the operative coherence relation” (p.97). 
As a class of referential forms, pronouns are known to be rather flexible; 
a pronoun can be used to refer to a preceding subject or preceding object. 
Thus, one could argue that a pronoun that refers clearly to the preceding 
subject (or preceding object) provides information about the coherence 
relation, because the form could also have referred to the other potential 
antecedent. In contrast, demonstrative pronouns are ‘pickier’ and more rigid 
in that they have a strong preference for the object antecedent. Thus, I wanted 
to find out  how rigid demonstratives actually are and whether a rigidly 
object-referring form could also influence participants’ inferences about what 
coherence relation is operative. 
4	   Experiment	  	  
To look at the scope of coherence effects in German, I used a sentence 
completion task where participants read a sentence followed by a prompt 
word (e.g. X tickled Y and then he…) and provided a continuation sentence. 
In critical items, the prompt word was a pronoun or a demonstrative. This 
task is a combination of comprehension and production: Participants need to 
interpret the prompt anaphor before they can provide a continuation. 
4.1	   Methods,	  Design	  
Twenty native German speakers (mostly students at the University of 
Potsdam, Germany) participated in a sentence-completion task with 16 
targets and 32 fillers. Targets consisted of an initial transitive clause followed 
by a connective and either a personal pronoun or a demonstrative pronoun: 
(6)  Die  Schauspielerin hat die Schneiderin gekitzelt und dann hat  
 The actress       has the seamstress  tickled   and then has  
 {sie/die} 
{pronoun/demonstrative}… 
 ‘The actress tickled the seamstress and then {PRO/DEM}…’ 
Participants were asked to provide natural-sounding continuations. All target 
sentences mentioned two same-gender characters in the first clause (e.g. der 
Bauer ‘the farmer’, der Feuerwehrmann ‘the fireman’, die Kellnerin ‘the 
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waitress’, die Friseurin ‘the hairdresser (f.)’). The verbs were action/ agent-
patient verbs (as defined by Stevenson, Crawley & Kleinman, 1994).4 As 
shown in (6), targets contained the connective dann ‘then’ which – like 
English ‘then’ – is ambiguous between a narrative interpretation and a result 
interpretation. Use of a connective that is ambiguous between these two 
readings is crucial, as it allows us to see whether participants’ interpretation 
of the connective is influenced by the nature of the anaphoric form. 
In addition to using the ambiguous connective dann ‘then’, I tested a 
clearly causal connective, demzufolge ‘therefore, as a result’. However, some 
native speakers find this connective to be unnatural/odd-sounding with 
certain types of causal sequences. In some respects, this connective is perhaps 
akin to English ‘thus’ or ‘hence.’ Thus, while I will briefly mention the 
results with demzufolge, I focus mostly on dann. More generally, the ways in 
which German resultative connectives (demzufolge, folglich, deswegen, 
infolgedessen, etc.) map to different kinds of causal relations is an interesting 
question (see also Pander Maat & Sanders 2001 on Dutch). 
4.2	   Research	  Questions	  	  
First, to test whether German pronouns show the coherence sensitivity 
exhibited by pronouns in English, I wanted to see whether result relations 
would be associated with an increased proportion of object interpretations. 
When faced with a pronoun prompt, if a comprehender chooses to treat two 
clauses as being connected by a result relation (recall that the connective 
dann ‘then’ is ambiguous), does this push the pronoun away from the 
preceding subject – presumbaly prominent both due to its syntactic position 
and due to structural parallelism– and boost the rate of object interpretations? 
To investigate this, I analyzed the antecedents of pronouns depending on 
whether the relation between the clauses was a result or non-result relation. 
Second, I wanted to find out whether the strong object bias that had 
been previously observed with German demonstrative pronouns would 
persist regardless of coherence relation and whether it would influence 
participants’ inferences about coherence relations. More specifically, in light 
of the behavior of English subject-position pronouns – namely that result 
relations tend to be associated with object reference (see Rohde 2008) and 
narrative relations tend to be associated with subject reference (suggested by 
Kehler 2002) – I wanted to see whether in German, demonstratives push 
comprehenders to expect a result relation. This is shown schematically in (7): 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The perfect tense (aux + past participle) allowed us to include a verb + anaphor sequence in the 
second clause (German is verb-second) without constraining participants’ continuation options. 
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(7) a. X verbed Y and then pronoun… =>  then/next (narrative) 
 b. X verbed Y and then demonstrative… =>  result 
Thus, the prediction is that subject-preferring pronouns may trigger the ex-
pectation that we are dealing with a narrative ‘next’ relation, and object-
referring demonstratives may trigger an expectation of a result relation.  
In addition to shedding light on the referential properties of German 
pronouns and demonstratives, the issues investigated here can contribute to 
our understanding of whether and how coherence effects relate to 
grammatical roles. Recall that work by Rohde (2008) and Rohde & Kehler 
(2008) suggests that encountering a particular grammatical-role-based ref-
erential pattern (e.g. mention of preceding object) leads people to expect a 
particular coherence relation (e.g. result). However, as discussed with respect 
to ex.(3), a particular coherence relation does not force a pronoun to ‘point 
to’ a certain grammatical role: Following a cause-effect relation, a subject-
position pronoun can refer to a preceding subject or object. This flexibility 
raises questions regarding the nature and robustness of the associations 
between certain kinds of referential dependencies and certain coherence 
relations. My experiment on German allows us to contribute to these issues 
by investigating how robustly a particular referential pattern leads people to 
expect a particular coherence relation – especially when the cue is in the form 
of a rather rigidly object-referring demonstrative pronoun.  
4.3	   Data	  Analysis	  
Participants’ continuations were analyzed independently by two native 
German speakers blind to the aims of the experiment. A third blind coder’s 
analyses were used to resolve any disagreements. The continuations were 
analyzed for (i) whether the anaphoric expression (the prompt word) referred 
to the preceding subject, preceding object, or whether the antecedent was 
unclear. Coders also noted (ii) whether the demonstrative was used anaphor-
ically or as a definite article, since the demonstrative prompts are ambiguous 
between these two construals. Furthermore, since the connective dann ‘then’ 
is ambiguous (ex.8a, b), coders analyzed each dann token individually to see 
(iii) whether it involved a result or non-result relation. 
(8) a. The actress tickled the seamstress and then she  
sat down and learned her lines. [non-result, narrative 
relation] 
 b. The actress tickled the seamstress and then she  
laughed really hard for 10 minutes. [result relation] 
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5	   Results	  and	  Discussion	  
In this section, we first consider the results for the pronoun conditions 
(Section 5.1) and then the results for the demonstrative conditions (Section 
5.2). At the end of this section, we consider the occasions on which 
participants used the demonstrative prompt as a definite article (Section 5.3), 
which occurred frequently, on 75.6% of all demonstrative trials. 
5.1	   Pronouns	  
Overall, when dann is followed by a pronoun, there are more subject 
continuations (73.4%) than object continuations (26.6%). The proportion of 
subject continuations is significantly higher than chance (one-sample t-test, 
hypothesized mean 0.5 (50%), t1(18)=4.9, p<.001, t2(15)=2.699, p<.02).5 
Now, taking a closer look at the data, Figure 1 (next page) shows the 
percentage of trials on which participants used the pronoun to refer to the 
preceding subject or object, grouped by whether the relation between the 
clauses was result or  non-result. (20% of dann+pronoun trials were coded as 
‘unclear antecedent’; they are excluded from analysis.)  
Figure 1 reveals a clear relationship between coherence and choice of 
antecedent: When participants use the pronoun to refer to the preceding 
subject, we find mostly non-result relations (4.7% result relations, 68.8% 
non-result relations). However, when participants use the pronoun to refer to 
the preceding object, result relations are more frequent (23.4% result re-
lations, 3.1% non-result relations). Looking separately at subject and object 
continuations, we find that the distribution of result vs. non-result relations 
differs significantly from chance for both kinds of continuations (p’s<.02). 
5.2	   Demonstratives	  Used	  Anaphorically	  
Figure 2 (next page) shows the behavior of demonstrative pronouns when 
they are preceded by dann ‘then’ and used anaphorically. (Five percent of 
dann+anaphoric demonstrative trials had an unclear antecedent; they are 
excluded from these analyses.) Now, contrary to what we saw with pronouns, 
there are more object continuations than subject continuations: the gray bar is 
taller than the black bar (88.88% object continuations vs 11.11% subject 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Some degrees of freedom vary due to empty cells. Also, recall that I also tested the more 
marked, specifically causal connective demzufolge ‘therefore’; these results are not shown in 
Figure 1. When pronouns are preceded by this connective, there is no subject advantage: There 
are 49.33% subject continuations and 50.66% object continuations. This asymmetry between the 
ambiguous dann ‘then’ and the causal demzufolge ‘therefore’ already suggests that result 
relations are associated with a boost in object interpretations. 
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continuations). The proportion of object continuations is significantly higher 
than a hypothesized chance level of 50% (p’s<.01). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Personal pronouns preceded by dann ‘then’: How often did 
participants interpret the pronoun as referring to the preceding subject vs. 
object, as a function of what the relation between the clauses was.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Demonstrative pronouns preceded by dann ‘then’: How often did 
participants interpret the demonstrative as referring to the preceding subject vs. 
object, as a function of what the relation between the clauses was. 
Furthermore, it is quite striking that all of the object continuations involve 
result relations, and all subject continuations involve non-result relations.  
Thus, with demonstratives we see a very clear connection between referential 
dependency and coherence relation. Even when the coherence relation is 
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ambiguous, people tend to interpret demonstratives as referring to the 
preceding object and the coherence relation as being result.6 
5.3	   Demonstratives	  Used	  as	  Definite	  Articles	  
Figure 3 shows the behavior of demonstratives in dann conditions when they 
were used as definite articles. As with demonstratives, we find that – overall, 
collapsing result and non-result relations – when participants opted to pro-
duce a full noun, they were more likely to refer to the preceding object (79%) 
than the preceding subject (8.6%). The overall proportion of object contin-
uations is significantly higher than chance (p’s<.01). Furthermore, echoing 
the findings with demonstrative anaphors, we find that object continuations 
are more likely to involve a result relation (65.5%) than a non-result relation 
(13.8%).The distribution of result vs. non-result relations in object contin-
uations differs significantly from chance (p’s<.01.).7 The small number of 
subject continuations (8.6%) all involve non-result relations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Demonstratives used as definite articles (in dann ‘then’ conditions): 
When participants used the demonstrative as a definite article, how often did 
the resulting noun refer to to preceding subject, object, or some other entity, as 
a function of what the relation between the clauses was.  
Thus, it is not the case that demonstratives are specifically associated with 
result relations (as Figure 2 might suggest), but rather that any kind of 
reference to the object – at least with agent-patient verbs, where the object is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The link between object reference and result relations also emerges with causal demzufolge ‘as 
a result, therefore’. Demonstratives followed by demzufolge triggered 93% object continuations. 
7 For one-sample t-tests, references to ‚other‘ were excluded as a hypothesized mean of 0.5 was 
used. On a side note: Not surprisingly, demzufolge resulted in mostly object continuations (88%).  
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the patient – is associated with result relations. We see this with pronouns in 
Figure 1, demonstratives in Figure 2 and full nouns in Figure 3.  
6	   Conclusions	  
Our results shed light on the extent and nature of coherence-sensitivity in 
reference resolution. Our findings for German show that pronouns are more 
flexible in their referential behavior than demonstratives, supporting ob-
servations by Bosch et al. (2007). With regard to coherence, we found that 
pronoun interpretation is influenced by coherence relations even in a 
language where more specific forms for object reference are available.  
In addition, regarding the interpretation of demonstratives, our findings 
show that although coherence does not modulate the antecedent choice of 
anaphoric demonstratives to the same extent that it influences pronoun 
interpretation (demonstratives have a clear object preference in all contexts 
that we tested), demonstratives nevertheless interact with coherence-related 
processing by guiding comprehenders’ expectations of coherence relations. In 
particular, we find that object-biased expressions8 trigger an expectation of a 
result relation (see also Rohde 2008, Rohde & Kehler 2008 on English 
pronouns). In fact, the connection between demonstratives and result 
relations, combined with prior claims that demonstratives disprefer topics, 
brings up interesting questions for future work regarding the relation between 
information-structural representations and coherence representations. 
In addition, these findings contribute to our understanding of the role 
that grammatical and thematic roles play in reference resolution. On the one 
hand, one of the defining traits of the coherence approach is the view that 
anaphor resolution cannot be explained simply in terms of grammatical role. 
Interestingly, at the same time, we find that grammatical roles/thematic roles 
(not differentiated in this study) cannot be fully ignored – in particular, there 
seems to be a persistent connection between result relations and reference to 
the object/patient. Future work will play an important role in disentangling 
the effects of grammatical and thematic role.  
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Abstract. This paper shows that the pragmatically derived interpretations of 
the numerals such as ‘at least N’ or ‘at most N’ and the lexical counterparts are 
mutually exclusive with respect to language acquisition. Hence, children do not 
infer the meanings of the pragmatically derived meanings of the numerals 
based on the lexical counterparts and vice versa. 
 
1	   Introduction	  
In the linguistics literature, researchers have been discussing the mechanisms 
regarding the interpretations of numerals. That is, while ‘two’ means ‘exactly 
two’, it could mean ‘at least two’ or ‘at most two’ if appropriate contexts are 
provided (pragmatically derived meanings of the numerals) (Carston 1998, 
Horn 1972, 1992, Kadmon 2001, and Koenig 1991, among others). In de-
velopmental studies, researchers have been concerned with children’s 
developmental processes of numerals; however, they assume that ‘two’ 
means ‘exactly two’. The current study will show at what age children come 
to know the pragmatically derived meanings of the numerals. Based on the 
results of our experiments and comparing ours with Musolino (2004), we will 
conclude that acquisition processes of lexical ones and pragmatic ones are 
mutually exclusive. Thus, knowledge of the lexical ones does not entail 
acquisition of the pragmatic ones automatically, and vice versa. This paper is 
organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the previous research on the 
acquisition of numerals and the theoretical background behind them. Section 
3 shows the design of our experiments and their results. Section 4 presents a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* We would like to express our gratitude to the families and staff at Takachiho Kindergarten and 
the students and faculty members at Takachiho University in Tokyo. We also thank Hitomi 
Hirabayashi, Akina Kuroha, and Menami Tsukamoto for help in collecting child and adult data.  
We thank Patricia Hironymous and Fred Savarese for their comments on our draft. This paper is 
supported by JSPS Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (Grant # 20520523. PI is Akemi 
Matsuya). The name of authors is alphabetical order. 
 
In Reich, Ingo et al. (eds.), Proceedings of Sinn & Bedeutung 15,  
pp. 353–364. Universaar – Saarland University Press: Saarbrücken, Germany, 2011. 	  	  
354   Kamiya & Matsuya 
general discussion based on the data from the experiments.  Section 5 con-
tains concluding remarks. 
2	   Previous	  Studies	  
There are primarily two streams of thought with respect to the acquisition of 
the numerals. On the one hand, although a great deal of controversy has 
ensued over whether a counting set (see Gelman and Gallistel 1978) precedes  
acquisition of the meaning of number words or not (see Gelman and Gallistel 
1978, Gallistel and Gelman 1992, Briars and Siegler 1984, and Fuson 1988, 
among others), developmental psychologists investigate how children acquire 
numerals, uniformly assuming that number words semantically refers to 
‘exactly N’ and claim that children have acquired the meanings of the 
numerals around 3 or 4 years of age (see Sarnecka and Gelman 2004). For 
example, as far as the acquisition of Japanese number words is concerned, 
based on the results of experiments concerning the children’s comprehension 
of quantifiers, numerals, and classifiers1, Barner et al. (2009b) concludes that 
Japanese children are delayed in numeral comprehension due to the usage of 
classifiers compared to that of English speaking children:  a significant delay 
of the acquisition of numerals is observed in Japanese-speaking children at 2 
years of age (Japanese = 0.44 and English = 1.14 in ANOVA analysis).  Once 
they reach 3 years of age, this difference between English-speaking and 
Japanese-speaking children disappears (3 years and 4 years Japanese = 2.62 
and 3.89, and 3 years and 4 years English = 2.25 and 3.38, respectively). 
On the other hand, in the linguistics literature (see Carston 1998, Horn 
1972; 1992, Kadmon 2001, and Koenig 1991, among others), researchers 
have been concerned with pragmatically derived meanings of numerals, as in 
the following examples cited from Musolino (2004: 3): while (1) means 
‘exactly N,’ (2) and (3) signify ‘at least N’ and ‘at most N,’ respectively. 
(1) A: How many mistakes did you make? 
 B: I made three mistakes. 
(2) You need to make three mistakes to be allowed to take the test again. 
(3) You can make three mistakes and still pass this test. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Barner et al. (2009b) employs (i) the Give-Quantifier task, (ii) the Give-Number task, and (iii) 
the Classifier Match task, which were revised versions of the tasks in Barner at al.  (2009a).  In 
(i) and (ii), the experimenter showed the subjects a red circle and asked them to put a quantity 
/certain number of a specific kind of fruit into it using a quantifier, e.g. ‘zenbu (= all),’/ a number 
word, e.g. ‘rokko (= six).’ 
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The theoretical background behind these studies is briefly summarized as 
follows.  Under Grice’s maxims restricting the quantity of information in ut-
terances (4), scalar implicatures are said to be derived from conversational 
implicatures: ‘Some of my friends passed the entrance examination’ implies 
‘Not all of my friends passed the entrance examination.’ This traditional 
Gricean approach also claims that the propositions of stronger (= more 
informative) terms are true in a narrower set of circumstances than those of 
weaker (= less informative) ones: ‘All of my classmates caught a cold’ asym-
metrically entails ‘some of my classmates caught a cold.’ 
(4) Maxim of Quantity 
 a. Make your contribution as informative as required (for the current 
purposes of the exchange). 
 b. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. 
                                          (Grice 1989) 
Horn (1972; 1989) attempted to apply the Gricean account to numerals. He 
suggests that like quantifier cases, ‘Linda has three daughters’ asym-
metrically entails ‘Linda has three/two/one daughters’ (= ‘at least N’ 
interpretation): semantically, numerals are lower-bounded. Adding an upward 
bounding implicature to this lower bounded semantics, ‘Linda has three 
daughters’ will be able to imply ‘Linda has exactly three daughters.’ 
Pointing out two problems with the traditional and neo-Gricean 
approaches on numerals, Carston (1998) raised an objection to them: one is 
that an ‘at most N’ interpretation was not dealt with and that the so-called 
‘scale reversal’ effect (5) could not be accounted for by these strategies. The 
other is that the three interpretations (6b - d) to (6a), which are set as the 
conditions of the bet between two people, are conveyed in the utterance and 
that these interpretations display the truth conditional content of the con-
versation. Consequently, numerically quantified NPs are taken to be seman-
tically underspecified and to be pragmatically yielded (Carston 1985, Horn 
1992 etc.).2 
(5) a. That golfer is capable of a round of 100 (and maybe even 90/*110). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Carston (1985) assumes the semantic representation of numerals to be the following. 
  
 (i) [X [N]] 
  X= a variable instantiated by pragmatic enrichment 
  N = a number word 
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 b. She can counter most of the arguments (and maybe even *some/all).   
                                      Sadock (1984:143) 
(6) a. There will be 20 people there. 
 b. There will be at most 20 people there. 
 c. There will be exactly 20 people there. 
 d. There will be at least 20 people there.             Harnish (1976) 
Musolino (2004) and Papafragou and Musolino (2003) attempted to capture 
how children acquire ‘at least N’ and ‘at most N’, which contain a range of 
entailments and pragmatic effects, as well as ‘exactly N.’ Papafragou and 
Musolino’s (2003) work concludes that young children treat numeral scales 
(e.g. ‘two’ and ‘three’) differently from quantificational scales (e.g. ‘some’ 
and ‘all’) and aspectual scales (e.g. ‘start’ and ‘finish’) unlike adults: the rate 
of correct responses of numeral scales was lower than that of others. 
Considering the implications of Papafragou and Musolino’s (2003) results, in 
order to see whether children and adults have the same representation of 
numerals and whether children’s interpretations switch from ‘exactly N’ to 
‘non-exactly N (= ‘at least/at most N) at some point, Musolino (2004) 
conducted the Truth Value Judgment Task3 concerning pragmatically derived 
‘at least/at most N’, overt  (= lexical) ‘at least/at most N’, overt ‘more than N’ 
and ‘exactly N’ on English-speaking young children. Musolino (2004) claims 
that preschoolers acquire the knowledge of ‘non-exact’ interpretations, i.e. 
pragmatically derived ‘at least/at most N’ interpretations, although there were 
some difficulties with implementation of the experiments, especially with 
setting up of proper contexts.4  As for the interpretations of overt numerals, 
children behave similarly to adults with respect to ‘exactly N’ and ‘more than 
N’. Their performance in ‘overt at least/at most N’ differs from that of adults. 
Summing up Musolino (2004), English-speaking children tend to acquire 
pragmatically derived ‘at least/at most N’ earlier than lexical ‘at least/at most 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 In the experiments with respect to pragmatically derived ‘at least/at most N’, the first ex-
perimenter performs short stories in front of the subjects and then the second experimenter, who 
has a puppet, states what he thinks happens in the scenario and asks the subject to answer 
whether his statement is correct or wrong.  In the experiments concerning the overt quantified N, 
exactly N, and more than N, children are presented cards with zero-to- five smiley faces or stars.  
Then they are asked to answer whether a card meets the puppet’s request or not, for example, he 
likes a card with ‘exactly two stars’ 
4 According to Musolino (2004), the percentages of correct responses concerning pragmatically 
derived ‘at least N’ and ‘at most N,’ are 35% and 82.5%, respectively. But the percentage of 
correct responses of the former rose up to 80% under the improved context. 
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N’. Additionally, the semantic representation of the quantified numerals is the 
same among children and adults. 
In the following section, we designed some experiments in order to explore 
cross-linguistic differences in the acquisition of overt and covert quantified 
numeral expressions between Japanese-speaking and English speaking 
preschoolers. 
3	   Experiments	  
3.1	   Experimental	  Design	  	  
The purpose of this experiment is to find out (i) whether or not adult speakers 
of Japanese are able to assign non-exact semantics of numerals (i.e., ‘at least 
N’ or ‘at most N’); and (ii) 5-6 year-old speakers of Japanese can assign non-
exact semantics of numerals. In addition, we would like to investigate 
whether 5-6 year-olds can understand the meanings of the overt counterparts 
such as sukunakutomo ‘at least’ and seizei ‘at most’. To achieve this ex-
periment, we had to create contexts in which numerals could be naturally 
understood ‘at least N’ or ‘at most N’ interpretations. For example, it is 
plausible to interpret nuta-tu ‘two’ as ‘at least two’ in the context where a 
child would be given an ice cream if s/he ate two pieces of broccoli. In this 
situation, s/he ate two pieces of broccoli can be naturally interpreted as ‘at 
least two pieces of broccoli.’ Example (7a) is the Japanese counterpart of this 
example. On the other hand, huta-tu ‘two’ can be understood ‘at most two’ in 
the context where a child can eat two pieces of broccoli if s/he is able to. In 
this example, two pieces of broccoli should be most plausibly interpreted as 
‘at most three’. Example (7b) is the Japanese counterpart.    
(7) a. Burokkorii-o huta-tu tabe-tara, 
  broccoli-ACC two-CL  eat-if        
    aisukuriimu-o   ageru. 
      ice-cream-ACC  give 
    ‘I can give you an ice-cream if you eat (at least) two pieces of    
     broccoli.’ 
      b. Boku-wa  tabe-rare-temo  
  I-TOP    eat-can-even  if   
    (burokkori-wa) huta-tu danaa.    
  broccoli-TOP   two-CL  probably is 
  ‘I can eat (at most) two pieces of broccoli even if I can eat it.’ 
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3.2	   Participants,	  Method	  and	  Procedure	  
We tested 32 Japanese-speaking children (16 boys and 16 girls) between the 
ages of 5.10 and 6.11 (mean 6.3 year-olds). We chose children of this age 
group based on Barner et al. (2009a), which reports that by this age, children 
have already acquired numerals.5 These children were recruited at Takachiho 
Kindergarten in Tokyo. As a control group, we tested 31 adults who are 
students and faculty members at Takachiho University. To investigate 
Japanese children’s interpretations of non-exact semantics of numerals, we 
used the Truth Value Judgment Task (TVJT, Crain and Thornton 1998). In 
the TVJT, two experimenters are generally required; one tells the story of 
each experiment with dolls or visual aids and the other plays the role of a 
puppet that listens to the story with the participant. By the end of each story, 
the puppet gives a statement of each story to the participant and the role of 
the participant is to say ‘true’ or ‘false’ to the statement of the puppet. As a 
follow-up, the participants are questioned to verify their answers by ac-
counting for why they think that the puppet is right or wrong.6 To test 
Japanese participants, we created stories and made the relevant PowerPoint 
visual aids so that children could understand the situation and the relevant 
meanings of numerals. Two experimenters told stories and the third 
experimenter acted as the puppet.   
Before conducting individual tests, we started with a group test as a pre-test.  
The pre-test is made of three control stories. If children could answer these 
tests appropriately, then they could hear 12 more stories including ‘at least N’ 
or ‘at most N’ numerals. The order of the ‘true’ or ‘false’ answers is 
randomized so that children cannot predict answers. For adult speakers, we 
used a videotaped version of the stories, which were the same ones used with 
the children. They provided answers on a score sheet after watching each 
story. 
3.3	   Materials	  
Our experiments had four conditions: two of them were designed for non-
exact semantics (‘at least N’ and ‘at most N’) that are pragmatically derived. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 We also chose this age group to compare with that of English-speaking counterparts (Musolino 
2004). Musolino conducts the same experiments to find out whether or not English-speaking 
children are able to understand non-exact semantics of numerals.   
6 It is reported that multilingual children do not have trouble understanding the procedures of the 
TVJT (English children – Crain and Thornton 1998, Musolino 2004, Musolino, Crain and 
Thornton 2000; Greek children – Papafragou and Musolino 2003; Kananda (Dravidian) – Lidz 
and Musolino 2002, among others).    
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The other two experiments were to investigate whether or not Japanese 
children could understand the overt counterparts of the pragmatically derived 
‘at least N’ or ‘at most N’; sukunakutomo ‘at least’ and seizei ‘at most’. In 
our stories, Pikachu and Potyama (both are characters from Pocket Monster) 
talk about something. A puppet, Wanwan, who is a character of a popular TV 
program for Japanese kids, gives a statement to the subject. Below are repre-
sentative examples of pragmatically derived ‘at least N’ in (8) and the overt 
counterparts in (9):  
(8)  Pragmatically derived ‘at least N’     
 Pikachu: Boku-wa  burokkori-ga  kirai. 
       I-TOP      broccoli-NOM  don’t-like 
      ‘I don't like broccoli.’ 
 Potyama: Demo, tabe-nakya  dame  dayo.   
       but      eat-must       bad     it is 
       Huta-tu tabe-tara, aisukuriimu-o     ageru. 
       two-CL  eat-if        ice cream cone-ACC give 
       ‘But you have to eat them.’ ‘If you eat two pieces of   
       broccoli, I will give you an ice cream cone.’ 
 Then, Pikachu eats three pieces of broccoli.   
 Puppet: Pikachu-wa aisukuriimu-ga          moraeru kana? 
      pikachu-TOP ice cream cone-NOM  get-can  wonder 
     ‘Can Pikachu get an ice cream cone?’ 
(9) Overt word seizei ‘at least’    
 Pikachu: Boku-wa burokkori-ga  kirai 
       I-TOP       broccoli-NOM  don’t-like 
      ‘I don't like broccoli.’ 
      Potyama: Demo, tabe-nakya  dame  dayo.   
       but      eat-must      bad    it is  
       ‘But you have to eat them.’  
       Sukunakutomo huta-tu  tabe- 
       at least              two-CL  eat-if  
       tara, aisukuriimu-o     ageru. 
       if     ice cream cone-ACC give 
       ‘If you eat at least two pieces of broccoli,  
       I will give you an ice cream cone.’ 
 Then, Pikachu eats three pieces of broccoli.   
      Puppet:  Pikachu-wa   aisukuriimu-ga     moraeru kana? 
      pikachu-TOP  ice cream cone-NOM  get-can  wonder 
      ‘Can Pikachu get an ice cream cone?’ 
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Note that the minimum difference between (8) and (9) is the existence of the 
overt sukunakutomo ‘at least’.7 
3.4	   Results	  
The interpretations of the pragmatically derived numerals by adults were 
96.7%. Hence, adults had no problem with interpreting a sentence such as (8). 
The adults’ interpretations of the overt seizei ‘at most’ and sukunakutomo ‘at 
least’ were 100%. On the other hand, the children’s interpretations were 
different from those of the adults. In the analysis below, we show whether the 
true proportion of students getting the pragmatically derived ‘at least N’ or ‘at 
most N’ correct is equal to the true proportion of students getting overt coun-
terparts (sukunakutomo ‘at least’ and seizei ‘at most’) correct. The alternative 
hypothesis is that the true proportion of students getting pragmatically 
derived ‘at least N’ and ‘at most N’ correct is less than that of those getting 
the overt counterparts correct. Based on the difference in a proportion z-test, 
we found that the proportion of children correctly interpreting pragmatically 
derived ‘at least N’ or ‘at most N’ is significantly less than the proportion of 
students correctly interpreting overt, with a p-value less than .001. Therefore, 
our study indicates that Japanese 5-6 year-olds children seem to understand 
the meanings of sukunakutomo ‘at least’ and seizei ‘at most’, while they 
appear not to have acquired the pragmatically derived ‘at least’ and ‘at most’ 
interpretations of numerals. 
4	   Discussion:	  Cross-­‐Linguistic	  Differences	  and	  Implications	  
of	  Acquisition	  Processes	  
The current study reveals a striking difference between English- and 
Japanese-speaking children with respect to the acquisition processes of prag-
matically derived ‘at least N’ and ‘at most N’ of numerals. Musolino (2004) 
conducts experiments to find out whether or not 5-6 year-old children whose 
native language is English are able to interpret pragmatically derived ‘at least 
N’ and ‘at most N’ meanings of the numerals. The experimental method is 
TVJT. The relevant example is as follows: 
(10) Goofy said that the Troll had to put two hoops on the pole in order to 
win the coin. Does the Troll win the coin?        (Musolino 2004: 16) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The example of seizei ‘at most’ is given at Appendix.  
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It turns out that these children in Musolino’s study can understand the 
pragmatically derived meanings of the numerals. To determine whether those 
children could infer the pragmatically derived meanings of the numerals from 
the explicit counterparts (i.e., ‘at least’ and ‘at most’), Musolino conducted 
experiments to find out whether or not children understood the explicit ‘at 
least’ and ‘at most’. The results were that these children did not know the 
explicit meanings of ‘at least’ and ‘at most’. Hence, Musolino assumes that 
the knowledge of the pragmatically derived ‘at most’ and ‘at least’ is not 
available in the environment: 
(11) Goofy said that the Troll had to put at least two hoops on the pole in 
order to win the coin. Does the Troll win the coin? 
One of the claims that Musolino makes is that children and adults have the 
same semantic representation for the numerals. Furthermore, Musolino as-
sumes that children do not learn these implicit meanings of the numerals from 
the environment, but that the knowledge of the implicit meanings of the 
numerals is innately specified. However, Musolino’s study does not show 
what would happen if children already know overt ‘at least’ or ‘at most’ 
vocabulary. Would they still interpret pragmatically derived meanings of ‘at 
least’ or ‘at most’ of the numerals as well as the explicit counterparts? Our 
study reveals that children who have already acquired ‘at least’ or ‘at most’ 
vocabulary seem to push back the acquisition of pragmatically derived 
meanings of the numerals. In other words, knowing the explicit vocabulary 
such as sukunakutomo ‘at least’ or seizei ‘at most’ does not guarantee or 
entail that children know the pragmatically derived meanings of the numerals.  
The difference of the acquisition processes of pragmatically derived 
meanings may not be surprising given the fact that the acquisition of the 
numerals is delayed in Japanese-speaking children due to the existence of the 
numeral classifier (Barner et al. 2009a). We do not know what causes the 
acquisition processes of the pragmatically derived meanings of the numerals 
to differ among languages. However, we do know that the learning processes 
of both pragmatically derived meanings of the numerals and the explicit ones 
are distinct and are not mutually helpful to each other. In other words, 
although the conceptual meanings are similar, they are independent of each 
other. Hence, our results support Musolino’s experiments: acquiring the prag-
matically derived meanings of the numerals has nothing to do with knowing 
the lexical counterparts. In the same line of thinking, our results show that 
knowing the explicit lexical words such as sukunakutoko ‘at least’ and seizei 
‘at most’ has no effect on acquiring the pragmatic counterparts. We do not 
know what causes one language (such as Japanese) to delay the acquisition of 
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the pragmatic meanings of the numerals and vice versa in English. This 
implies the autonomy of semantics and pragmatics in our language system. 
4	   Conclusions	  
In this study, we argued that children do not infer the lexical meanings of ‘at 
least’ or ‘at most’ based on the pragmatic counterparts, and vice versa. Hence, 
it is implied that the domains of semantics and pragmatics are independent in 
the children’s mind at this age. We are not sure why Japanese-speaking 
children cannot get access to the pragmatically derived meanings of the 
numerals at an early age, while the accessibility of the pragmatically derived 
ones is easier for English-speaking children. We also do not know what the 
situation is with children of other languages. We will reserve the study of this 
topic for our future research. 
Appendix:	  	  
Pragmatically derived seizei ‘at most’ 
Pochama: Burokkori-o    tabe-nakya dame. 
 broccoli-ACCj eat-must not good 
 ‘You must eat broccoli.’ 
 
 Burokkori-o   tabe-tara, keeki-o   ageru. 
 broccoli-ACC eat-if       cake-ACC be-given 
 ‘If you eat broccolis, you will have a piece of cake.’ 
 
Picachu:  Tabe-rare-temo huta-tu da naa. 
 eat-can-even if two-CL  is wonder 
 ‘I can eat at most three if I am able to.’ 
 
Pochama: Sorezyaa dame. 
 If so        not good 
 ‘If so, I will not give you a piece of cake.’ 
 
Picachu eats two pieces of broccoli. Can he eat a cake?  
 
Overt seizei ‘at most’ 
Pochama: Burokkori-o  tabe-nakya dame. 
 broccoli-ACCj eat-must not good 
 ‘You must eat broccolis.’ 
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 Burokkori-o  tabe-tara, keeki-o    ageru. 
 broccoli-ACC eat-if       cake-ACC be-given 
 ‘If you eat broccoli, you will have a piece of cake.’ 
 
Picachu:  Tabe-rare-temo seizei huta-tu  da naa. 
 eat-can-even if at most two-CL is wonder 
 ‘I can eat at most three if I am able to.’ 
 
Pochama: Sorezyaa dame. 
 If so        not good 
 ‘If so, I will not give you a piece of cake.’ 
 
Picachu eats two pieces of broccoli. Can he eat a cake? 
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Optional and Obligatory Modal Subordination∗
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Abstract. This paper raises the empirical point that modal subordination is not
always obligatory, and that moreover, this is a point of lexical variation. Some
modals, like will, which I call definite modals, undergo modal subordination obli-
gatorily, and some, like gonna, which I call nondefinite modals, do so optionally.
I propose a dynamic framework in which, following from Frank (1997), infor-
mation states are possible discourse referents. I also propose that these referents
are potentially subject to familiarity presuppositions, whose presence makes a
modal definite, and whose absence makes a modal nondefinite.
1 Introduction
This paper presents novel data concerning the optionality (or lack thereof) of
implicit conditional readings in various contexts, and proposes to account for
these by adopting a dynamic semantic theory of modal subordination which
crucially involves lexically variable familiarity presuppositions. The central
contrast, first partially observed and discussed by Binnick (1971).
(1) a. Don’t go near that bomb! It’ll explode!
b. Don’t go near that bomb! It’s going to explode!
As Binnick noted, the second sentence in (1a) must be understood as mean-
ing “If you go near it, it’ll explode”, i.e., it is an implicit conditional. Binnick
also claimed that the corresponding sentence in (1b) cannot have such a condi-
tional reading, but this is not true; indeed, (1b) can have an implicit conditional
meaning; the difference is that it does not have to, while will does. To drive this
empirical point home, consider (2), a context in which only the implicit condi-
tional meaning is sensible.
(2) a. Don’t drink that coffee. You’ll burn your mouth.
∗ Thanks especially to Itamar Francez and Chris Kennedy, as well as M. Ryan Bochnak, Cleo
Condoravdi, Kai von Fintel, Klaus von Heusinger, Joe Jalbert, Stefan Kaufmann, Greg Kobele,
Marcin Morzycki, Alan Munn, Craige Roberts, Jerry Sadock, Kjell Johan Sæbø, Cristina Schmitt,
E. Allyn Smith, Matt Teichmann, and Malte Willer for extensive discussion and feedback; any
failures are despite their best efforts.
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b. Don’t drink that coffee. You’re gonna burn your mouth.
Clearly, if gonna was incompatible with the implicit conditional meaning, (2b)
would be infelicitous; but a conditional reading is found. Observe also the re-
verse case, one where the context demands the non-conditional reading, demon-
strates that will indeed cannot support such a reading.
(3) a. Go check the incubators. # The eggs’ll hatch.
b. Go check the incubators. The eggs are gonna hatch.
Despite the oddness of the conditional reading, that the eggs will hatch if you
check them, the non-conditional reading cannot be forced in the case of will;
the data here robustly shows will cannot support a non-conditional reading.
This paper provides an analysis of these facts, which have never been
considered in the formal literature. I follow Roberts (1989), Geurts (1995), and
Frank (1997) in analyzing these implicit conditional readings, which Roberts
terms modal subordination, as cases of implicit domain restriction on modal
expressions, but with the added feature of familiarity presuppositions (Heim
1982) whose presence gives rise to obligatory modal subordination, and whose
absence allows for optionality.
Importantly, this distinction is not only relevant to will and gonna; rather,
it is a distinction that pervades the entire class of modals. Modals generally can
be divided into two subclasses: those that obligatorily undergo modal subordi-
nation, which I will call definite modals and those that do so optionally, which
I will call nondefinite modals. Below are some examples.
(4) Definite modals: modal subordination obligatory
a. Don’t go near that bomb! It would explode.
b. Don’t go near that bomb! It could explode.
(5) Nondefinite modals: modal subordination optional
a. Don’t go near that bomb! It’s bound to explode.
b. Don’t go near that bomb! It might explode.
This paper focuses on will and gonna as exemplars of these two classes, partic-
ularly because they form a minimal pair – besides their dynamic behavior, they
are identical in meaning (observe that there is no truth-conditional difference
between (1a) and the conditional reading of (1b)). The contrast in dynamic be-
havior therefore cannot be ascribed to any quality of the expressions other than
simple lexical idiosyncrasy.
In section 2 I summarize arguments from the literature which show that
will and gonna are modals and do undergo modal subordination, which is a
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crucial point for the analysis. In section 3 I provide the formal analysis of op-
tional and obligatory modal subordination and show that it predicts the relevant
data. In section 4 I consider previous analyses. In section 5 I conclude.
2 Establishing Modality
Kratzer (1986) argues that conditionals simply consist of modals (which in-
volve quantification over worlds) whose quantificational domain is restricted
to the set of worlds denoted by the if -clause. The proposal by Roberts (1989)
to consider implicit conditional readings like in (6b) as involving implicit do-
main restriction goes hand-in-hand with this account.
(6) a. You should eat a bagel.
b. It would fill you up. (Roberts 1989)
Roberts’s original account does not treat will as a modal, however; rather it
assumes it to be a simple tense (as is often the case in the literature, gonna is not
discussed). The basic analysis of modal subordination developed by Roberts
therefore cannot be sensibly applied to will. Instead she proposes an alternate
strategy to account for cases like (7).
(7) a. If Edna forgets to fill the birdfeeder, she will feel bad.
b. The birds will get hungry. (Roberts 1989)
In the case of (7b), she proposes that will has a temporal-anaphoric relation
with (7a). According to Roberts, there is a time salient in the discourse, namely
the time associated with the hypothetical feeling-bad event in (7a); will in
(7b) then picks up on this time, and the time of the getting-hungry event is
taken to be after that of feeling-bad event, by the usual mechanism of tem-
poral anaphora. However, in order to make sense of this, the getting-hungry
event must occur in the same worlds as the feeling-bad event; (7b) is therefore
accommodated as being under the scope of the modal in (7a).
Moreover, the claim that will is a tense is a fairly common one in the
literature on modal subordination; for example, Asher & McCready (2007)
claim that will indeed cannot have implicit conditional readings (apparently
contrary to Roberts) due to its status as a tense1, on the basis of (8) below.
(8) a. A wolfi might walk in. Iti would eat you.
b. A wolfi might walk in. # Iti will eat you.
1 This is by no means a central argument for Asher & McCready, but it is worth clearing the air on
this empirical point.
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However, as seen above, will is clearly compatible with implicit conditional
readings. The problem with (8a) is that the possibility is too implausible to be
picked up by will, whereas would gives rise to an inference of unlikelihood
when used in cases like (8a) (Iatridou 2000). Observe the following contrast:
(9) a. You can’t go outside. You’ll freeze.
b. You can’t go outside. You’d freeze.
Both of these sentences are felicitous, but (9a) indicates that the hearer’s going
outside is relatively likely (and is accompanied well by a worried tone of voice)
whereas the latter gives rise to an inference of unlikelihood (and goes well with
a dismissive tone.)
Given the relative unlikelihood of wolves entering in any given context,
would is highly appropriate in (8), and will may be degraded in this context
due to scalar implicature. By fixing the context to include a more reasonable
possibility, will (and gonna) can certainly have implicit conditional readings,
along with a cross-sentence anaphoric dependency.
(10) Don’t leave your journal out on the table. Someonei could read it!
a. Theyi’ll discover your secrets!
b. Theyi’re gonna discover your secrets!
The singular gender-neutral pronoun they is linked to someone, mirroring (8).
While (10) can be explained by Roberts (1989), there are many reasons to
take will (and gonna) to be modals, as discussed in Klecha (2009). One that is
particularly relevant is the fact itself that they undergo modal subordination. If
will and gonna are taken to be modals, all cases of implicit conditional readings
can be unified as cases of implicit domain restriction of a modal. Moreover,
while Roberts’s approach accounts for will, it is predicted to extend to past and
present tenses as well; any simple tense which undergoes temporal anaphora
should be able to trigger accommodation of the type proposed by Roberts for
(10b). However, this prediction is not borne out.
(11) a. If Martina went to New York, she bought lots.
b. #She had fun.
c. If she went to New York and bought lots, she had fun.
(11b) cannot have the same meaning as (11c), contrary to Roberts’s prediction.
Rather, as argued in Klecha (2009), the fact that will (and gonna) undergo
modal subordination and tenses do not is a strong argument for treating these
expressions as modals, not tenses. See Klecha (2009) for further arguments for
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a modal treatment of will and gonna as well as refutation of Kissine’s (2008)
arguments against a modal treatment.
Going forward I will therefore assume will and gonna to be modals, par-
ticularly necessity modals whose modal base is contextually variable (à la
Kratzer 1977), but under the future reading at issue is a metaphysical modal
base (e.g., Kaufmann 2005). In order to simplify the semantics, I will assume,
contra Kaufmann (2005), that there is no ordering source.
3 Familiarity and Modality
I adopt a dynamic theory of implicit arguments along the lines of that developed
by Condoravdi & Gawron (1996), (which in turn follows from Heim (1982))
but which also adapts proposals from Frank (1997). In this theory utterances are
taken to update the information state. An information state is a representation
of the information in a discourse that is shared and mutually updated by the
conversational participants; both information about the world and information
about the discourse itself, particularly the discourse referents.
Definite descriptions refer to familiar or salient objects in the discourse
which are presupposed to already be present in the information state. Indefi-
nite descriptions introduce novel objects into the information state, which are
presupposed to have not already been present in the previous information state.
Below I lay out a dynamic semantic framework which formalizes this.
3.1 The Basic Dynamic Framework
First, some basic definitions.
Definition 1: Basic Ontology W is the domain of worlds; E is the domain of
individuals; {1, 0} is the domain of truth values; F is the domain of
assignment functions, functions from variables to objects of any type.
Definition 2: Information States S is the set of information states such that
S := {σ ∈ Pow(W ×F) | ∀〈w, f 〉 ∈ σ . ∀〈u,g〉 ∈ σ . Dom( f ) =Dom(g)}
Definition 2 above says that information states (ISs) are sets of world-
assignment function pairs, and moreover that every assignment function in a
given IS has the same domain.
Definition 3: Sentences If X is a sentence, JXK = φ : S 7→ S
Objects within double brackets J.K are taken to be sentences. Definition 3 above
says that sentences are interpreted as update conditions, or functions from ISs
to ISs. Usual function-argument notation is eschewed in favor of the more
iconic σ + φ = σ ′, where σ is the old IS, φ is a sentence meaning, and σ ′
is the new IS.
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Definition 4: Relating Assignment Functions ∀ f ,g ∈ F:
1. f < g iff Dom( f )⊂ Dom(g) and ∀v ∈ Dom( f ). f (v) = g(v)
2. f ≤ g iff f < g or f = g
3. f <x g iff f < g and Dom(g) = Dom( f )∪{x}
4. f x/a = ιg.g(x) = a & ∀v ∈ Dom( f ).v 6= x→ f (v) = g(v) & ∀v ∈
Dom(g).v 6= x→ f (v) = g(v)
Definition 4.1 above says that an assignment function g is an extension of f
if its domain is a proper superset of f ’s and for all the variables they have in
common, they map to same objects. Definition 4.2 defines non-proper exten-
sion. Definition 4.3 says that g extends f by x if g is an extension of f and the
only thing f has in its domain which g does not is x. Definition 4.4 says that
f x/a defines the function which is just like f , except that it maps x to a; this
neither presupposes that f (x) is defined nor that f (x) is not a.
For a simple example of (in)definiteness in this framework, consider (12).
(12) a. A dogx walked in.
b. σ0+ Ja dogx walked inK = σ1 =
{〈w, f 〉 | ∃〈w,g〉 ∈σ0 : g<x f & dog( f (x))(w)& walked-in( f (x))
(w)}
if ∀〈w, f 〉 ∈ σ0 : x /∈ Dom( f ), else undefined.
In (12), the IS is changed from one which previously did not include an assign-
ment for x, σ0, to one which does, σ1; moreover any worlds where a dog did
not walk in are eliminated. This IS can then serve as the context for an utter-
ance with a definite DP with index x. Note that this update only proceeds if x
was not defined in σ0; i.e., it bears a novelty presupposition.
(13) a. Itx sat down.
b. σ1+ Jitx sat downK = σ2 =
{〈w, f 〉 ∈ σ1 | sat-down(( f (x))(w)}
if ∀〈w, f 〉 ∈ σ1 : x ∈ Dom( f ), else undefined.
The definiteness of the DP it is represented by a familiarity condition, as in
Heim (1982), i.e., a requirement that the variable associated with the DP (above,
x), be in the domain of every assignment function in σ1; this condition is satis-
fied because x was introduced into σ1 by a dog in (12).
3.2 Information States as Referents
I analyze modal subordination as involving reference to ISs, or modal bases,
following Frank (1997). A modal base is a subordinated IS; i.e., an IS which
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serves not as the input to a matrix sentence, but as the conversational back-
ground of a modal expression, along the lines of Kratzer (1977, 1981).
Top-level ISs, i.e., those that serve as the input to a matrix sentence, may
include assignment functions which map variables to ISs (i.e., modal bases).
An expression may therefore carry an index which maps to a modal base. By
default, however, there are no such mappings in an IS; they must be introduced.
Some expressions, like will, require that some IS be familiar in the con-
text. Others, like gonna, allow for reference to a familiar IS, but in the absence
of one, can introduce an IS into the context. In order to handle this, I introduce
the default notation below.
Definition 5: Default Information States ∀ f ∈F . ∀x ∈VARS . f [x] =
[ιg.[x ∈Dom( f ) & g = f ] ∨ [x /∈Dom( f ) & g = f x/{〈w,h〉∈W×F :h= f}]](x)
Definition 5 says that f [x] is defined for two conditions. If x is defined in f ,
f [x] = f (x). If x is not defined in f , f [x] returns the minimal IS, one which
includes all worlds, and for which the assignment function is simply f . This is
the default IS because it entails no information and introduces no new referents.
As also discussed in Kratzer (1977), modal expressions may be lexically
specified for which categories of modal base they may take, e.g., deontic, meta-
physical, epistemic, etc. I will limit my discussion mainly to metaphysical
modals to avoid any discussion of ordering sources, which will complicate the
picture. Moreover, the discussion will be limited to metaphysical modality, the
modality of the predictive readings of expressions like will, gonna, might, etc.
(Condoravdi 2002, Kaufmann 2005).
Definition 6: Accessible Information States MET(w,f) = {〈u,g〉 | u branches
from w at utterance time & ∀v ∈ Dom( f ) : f (v) /∈ S . v ∈ Dom(g) &
f (v) = g(v) & ¬∃v′ . g(v′) ∈ S}
As defined above, MET is an accessibility relation which takes a world-assignment
pair and gives back the IS that is metaphysically accessible from it. What this
entails is that i) the worlds in the accessible IS branch from the input world
at utterance time2, meaning they are identical up to utterance time but may
diverge beyond that; ii) the assignments are identical to the input assignment,
except that they may not themselves include mappings to ISs. This prevents
any multiply-sudordinated ISs.3 In order to show how the modal base restricts
the domain of a modal, I introduce the operator ↑.
2 I will avoid any discussion of times beyond this for simplicity.
3 This move is for simplicity. Whether or not this is desirable is an empirical question.
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Definition 7: Restricted Information States ∀σ ,σ ′ ∈S
σ ↑ σ ′ = {〈w, f 〉 ∈ σ ′ | ∃〈u,g〉 ∈ σ . w = u & f ≥ g}
Definition 7 allows for the definition of complex ISs. It says roughly that the
worlds in σ ↑ σ ′ are in both σ and σ ′, and the assignments in σ ↑ σ ′ are those
in σ ′ which are equal to or extensions of those in σ .
3.3 The Core Analysis
The necessary formalisms now being in place, the relevant denotations can be
given. First, I give the denotation for will, which obligatorily undergoes modal
subordination. I will assume that all relevant modal expressions combine with
a vP, which denotes an update, and carry an index.4
will If JvPK = φ , then σ+ Jwillm vPK =
{〈w, f 〉 | ∃〈u,g〉 ∈ σ . w = u & f = gm/g[m]+φ &
∀〈v,h〉 ∈MET(u,g) ↑ g[m] . ∃h′.{〈v,h〉}+φ = {〈v,h′〉}}
if ∀〈u,g〉 ∈ σ . m ∈ Dom(g), else undefined.
The denotation says that willm combines with a vP denoting φ to return a func-
tion from σ to σ ′ such that, for every 〈w, f 〉 in σ ′, there is some 〈u,g〉 in σ
such that i) u is w; ii) f is just like g except that f (m) is the result of updating
g[m] with φ ; iii) for every metaphysically accessible 〈v,h〉 in g[m], v survives
update with φ . Moreover, m is required to be familiar in σ .
This means that will basically does two things. The first is that it updates
the subordinated ISs with φ ; any novel discourse referents in φ are added to
the assignment functions of each subordinated IS.5 This is the main dynamic
of effect of will, and every other modal; it updates the subordinated IS with its
sister vP, potentially introducing modally subordinated discourse referents.
The second thing will does is to say that every metaphysically accessible
world in the subordinated IS survives update with φ . In other words, any 〈w, f 〉
in the old IS such that all the worlds in MET(w,f) are not φ worlds will be
eliminated. This is the core meaning of will – it requires that φ is true in all the
4 This denotation is actually simplified in at least one way: it suggests that the modal base of
will is lexically determined to be the metaphysical modal base; however, like most modals, it is
compatible with at least one other category of modal base, not just metaphysically accessible ones.
Thus the third line of the denotation should read as in (i), such that all the modal bases will can
take are enumerated.
(i) ACC = MET(u,g)∨ ACC = X(u,g)∨ ... & ∀〈v,h〉 ∈ ACC ↑ g[m]...
5 It also causes any worlds in which φ is not true to be removed from the subordinated ISs, although
this is not relevant for necessity modals since they require that φ be true in all worlds of the
subordinated IS.
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salient accessible worlds.
As an example, consider (1a), repeated as (14). Without delving into the
semantics of the imperative (or for that matter, negation), I will assume a de-
notation for the first sentence which does the minimal work necessary: making
a certain set of worlds salient.
(14) a. Don’t go near that bomb. It’ll explode.
b. Jyou go near that bombK = φ
σ0+ Jdon’tm go near that bombK = σ1 =
{〈u,g〉 | ∃〈w, f 〉 ∈ σ0 ... g = f m/λ+φ ... }
c. Jit explodesK = ψ
σ1+ Jit willm explodeK = σ2 =
{〈w, f 〉 | ∃〈u,g〉 ∈ σ . w = u & f = gm/g[m]+ψ &
∀〈v,h〉 ∈MET(u,g) ↑ g[m] . ∃h′.{〈v,h〉}+ψ = {〈v,h′〉}}
if ∀〈u,g〉 ∈ σ . m ∈ Dom(g), else undefined.
In (14b), the imperative constrains the context so that for every world-assign-
ment pair, the assignment maps m to the set of worlds where the addressee
goes near some previously established bomb. In (14c), will updates each as-
signment of m with ψ . It then requires that every metaphysically accessible
world-assignment pair in which you go near the bomb is a world-assignment
pair in which the bomb explodes. Its presupposition – that m be defined in all
assignments in σ1 – is met, since the imperative made sure that m was defined.6
Notice that will does not require that all worlds in f (m) be metaphysically
accessible (though some have to be); in other words, the IS that serves as its
domain of quantification is not the same IS as the one which it makes salient.
This is a crucial property of all modals, since modal subordination can take
place across modal base types.
(15) a. I might get a dogx. But I have to walk itx every day.
b. You have to wear a tie. But you won’t like it.
Notice that the second sentence of (15b) means “If you wear a tie, you won’t
like it” not “If you wear a tie, you won’t have to like it” or anything along
those lines. In other words, the IS made salient by have to is not restricted to
just deontically accessible worlds.
Now consider gonna; it is exactly like will except that it does not have a
familiarity presupposition.7
6 Whether it introduced m or presupposed it is beyond the scope of this paper.
7 As with will, gonna’s modal base variability is glossed over.
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gonna If JvPK = φ , then σ+ Jgonnam vPK =
{〈w, f 〉 | ∃〈u,g〉 ∈ σ . w = u & f = gm/g[m]+φ &
∀〈v,h〉 ∈MET(u,g) ↑ g[m] . ∃h′.{〈v,h〉}+φ = {〈v,h′〉}}
Note that if will is replaced with gonna in (15), the exact same update will pro-
ceed. This is desired since gonna can have the same reading will does. How-
ever, consider the same situation, but where gonna carries a different index
from that carried by the imperative.
(16) a. Don’t go near that bomb. It’s gonna explode.
b. Jyou go near that bombK = φ
σ0+ Jdon’tm go near that bombK = σ1 =
{〈u,g〉 | ∃〈w, f 〉 ∈ σ0 ... g = f m/λ+φ ... }
c. Jit explodesK = ψ
σ1+ Jit is gonnan explodeK = σ2 =
{〈w, f 〉 | ∃〈u,g〉 ∈ σ . w = u & f = gn/g[n]+ψ &
∀〈v,h〉 ∈MET(u,g) ↑ g[n] . ∃h′.{〈v,h〉}+ψ = {〈v,h′〉}}
Since n is not in the domain of the assignments in σ1, g[n] denotes the mini-
mal IS. This means that gonna quantifies over the whole set of metaphysically
accessible worlds rather than some subset of them. Thus the non-conditional
reading is achieved. However, if will were to replace gonna in (16), it would
fail to update, as n is not defined in the assignments in σ1.
(17) a. Don’tm go near that bomb. It’s gonnam,n explode.
b. Don’tm go near that bomb. It’llm,∗n explode.
This is the desired result. Modal subordination is thus analyzed as fully analo-
gous to reference in the individual domain, in line with Frank (1997). It is me-
diated by assignment function and potentially restricted by presuppositions on
the context, as determined by lexical idiosyncrasy. It is this second fact that is
new here, and which lends further support to Frank’s hypothesis; the usual ma-
chinery of assignment functions and familiarity presuppositions is completely
adequate to predict the data.
Notice that the treatment of modal subordination as analagous to individ-
ual reference makes a prediction: definite modals like will should be bad in
discourse initial contexts, just like other definite descriptions which carry fa-
miliarity presuppositions. This prediction is borne out; as observed by Binnick
(1971), will is much worse than gonna discourse-initially.8
8 Register matters greatly here. In more formal and literary registers will behaves much more like
gonna, which is absent these registers. (i) would be felicitous in a newspaper setting, as read by a
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(18) Max walks into a room and says...
a. #I’ll fail my exam.
b. I’m gonna fail my exam.
Notice that this is not because will is temporally anaphoric; unlike the progres-
sive, a temporal adverbial like tonight does not improve will discourse initially.
(19) Jasmin walks into a room and says...
a. #I’ll watch a lot of TV (tonight).
b. I’m gonna watch a lot of TV (tonight).
c. I was watching a lot of TV #(last night).
Crucially, while will has a familiarity presupposition and is thus analagous
to a definite DP, gonna does not bear a novelty presupposition and so is not
analagous to an indefinite DP. Rather, it is unspecified for definiteness; there is
no constraint on the novelty/familiarity of its index.
There is, however, a constraint on what it introduces if its index is novel;
it introduces the minimal IS (and then updates it with its prejacent). This be-
havior, referring either to a familiar referent or to a default, is not unique to
nondefinite modals. Consider the contrast between near there and nearby, as
discussed by Condoravdi & Gawron (1996).
(20) Graham walks into a room and says...
a. #There’s an ice cream truck near there!
b. There’s an ice cream truck nearby!
(21) a. I hate going to the gymx. Anna is always hanging out near therex.
b. I hate going to the gymx. Anna is always hanging out nearbyx.
This pattern is identical to that displayed by will and gonna; nearby can refer to
a salient location or simply the speaker’s location, but near there cannot have
this default reference.
This account does not predict that will always have a conditional meaning.
Haegeman (1989) observes that will can be used after a use of gonna.
news anchor, and many other formal contexts.
(i) The president will send 20,000 more troops to Afghanistan.
Crucially, the same sentence uttered in a casual context is infelicitous discourse initially. This
paper thus constitutes a study of the grammar of colloquial Standard American English in casual
registers.
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(22) It’s gonna rain. The roads’ll be wet.
Here the roads’ll be wet looks like a simple prediction, but my account predicts
this. will picks up on the worlds where it rains, as made familiar by gonna, but
since all the metaphysically accessible worlds are worlds where it rains (as
required by gonna), will ends up not looking conditional. Any other expres-
sion that introduces a superset of the metaphysically accessible worlds as the
subordinated IS will thus allow will to have a nonconditional reading.
4 Previous Analyses
4.1 Modal Subordination
The only other work to address the fact that some modals are better than others
in discourse initial contexts is Asher & McCready (2007, henceforth A&M),
although it is not the focus of their paper. In their account, ISs are sets of 4-
tuples 〈w, f ,G,F〉 where G is the set of global possibilities and F is the set of
local possibilities, akin to the subordinated IS in my framework.
For A&M, in the default state, F = G. This is crucially different from
the analysis presented here, wherein by default no indices are mapped to ISs,
which accounts for definite modals’ inability to appear discourse intially. They
do, however, note that would is “not as good” in (23) as the reverse case.
(23) A wolf would walk in. It might eat you first.
A&M claim that their “account explains this because in an out of the blue
context, both the local and global possibilities are initially set to a very large set
of epistemic possibilities, and it seems implausible that all of those possibilities
contain a wolf that walks in. But that is what would have to happen in order for
the would statement in (23) to go through” (Asher & McCready 2007: 114).
This isn’t a satisfying explanation, however. Consider (24).
(24) A wolf is about to walk in.
In most contexts, this is an absurd statement. It depicts a highly unlikely event
and is almost certainly false, for example, at the time and place of the writing
of this paper. However, it is not infelicitous; it is perfectly meaningful and un-
derstandable. That is not the issue with (23); the first sentence is utterly mean-
ingless, and would still be even if it were uttered in a context where a wolf
walking in is a real possibility. Moreover, this strategy for explaining discourse
initial infelicity is unlikely to account for the will/gonna distinction, since they
are a minimal pair, taking the same modal base/ordering source. The only ade-
quate analysis is one which says that these lexical items simply place different
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presuppositions on the context of utterance.
4.2 Futures
Besides establishing a parameter of variation among all modal lexical items,
i.e., whether or not they have a familiarity presupposition, this paper also ad-
dresses a long-standing debate on the difference between will and gonna. A
recent and noteworthy account of the will/gonna contrast is in Copley (2002).
Her account is centered around the following contrast:
(25) Carissa: Can anyone help set up for the reception?
a. Jackson: I will.
b. Jackson: I’m going to.
Copley’s observation is that (25a) is a good offer, while (25b) is not. (25b) is fe-
licitous, but only as a prediction. (25b) sounds presumptive and inconsiderate,
(25a) sounds polite. Copley’s account is that while will is a simple metaphys-
ical necessity modal (very much like the character I ascribe to gonna), gonna
is a metaphysical necessity modal scoped over by an imperfective operator; it
thus quantifies over worlds which branch from the evaluation world during an
interval containing now. The effect of this is that gonna φ entails that φ has
been settled for a little while, whereas will φ only entails that it is settled now.
This is intended to capture the inference in (25b) Jackson was already
planning to help set up for colloquium. According to Copley, a felicity condi-
tion on offers says that for an utterance to be an offer, it must mean (roughly) “if
you want p, then p”. The denotation given to gonna rules this out, since Jack-
son is entailed to have already decided. However, this account makes wrong
predictions; notice that it is not entailed by (25b) that Jackson has already de-
cided; it is also true in a context where Jackson has decided on the spot to help
set up (but is still being rude about it). Furthermore, Copley does not make the
right predictions regarding the data discussed in Section 3.
However, there is still the issue of the offer data to be discussed. I ar-
gue that there are two wills: one which has the meaning I have argued for,
and the other being a dedicated offering expression. First of all, consider that
in Spanish, the simple present is used to make offers, not the future, as seen
in (26). This suggests that the expression used for offers in a given language
can’t be derived from some principle behind the meaning of offers, rather, each
language has some arbitrary lexicalized form for expressing offers.
(26) Ya abro la ventana yo.
“I’ll open the window.”
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Moreover, there is also a performative aspect to offer-will not present in the
other will, in (27), which is explainable if they are simply separate lexical items.
(27) a. Alice: I’ll make coffee. Ryan: # That’s not true!
b. Alice: Don’t go near that! It’ll blow up! Ryan: That’s not true!
I therefore exclude offer-will from the analysis.
5 Conclusion
This paper raises the empirical point that modal subordination is sometimes
obligatory and sometimes optional, and moreover that this is a point of lexi-
cal variation. Modals can be divided into at least two classes: definite modals,
which must have some antecedent in the discourse, and which include at least
will, would, and could; and nondefinite modals, which include gonna, might,
may, bound to, have to, should, and possibly many others. An analysis is then
put forward which provides a distributive, eliminative semantics for modal sub-
ordination, one which makes use of familiarity presuppositions (Heim 1982) to
derive the crucial contrasts.
The upshot of this proposal is that modal subordination is really nothing
special; it is simply a case of contextual domain restriction, which is itself a
special case of anaphora. It is simply a property of the lexical entailments and
presuppositions of the expressions in a given sentence, and is thus subject to
lexical variation. This lexical variability suggests that we might find a third
category of modals, in fact, which complete the paradigm and never undergo
modal subordination. One such modal may be must.
(28) a. Julia: Someonex might be waiting for me.
Rebekah: # Theyx must know you’re not there.
b. Tim: There might be blood in there.
Ezra: He must be the killer.
Ezra’s utterance in (28b) cannot mean “If there’s blood in there, he must be the
killer”. The existence of such a modal comes as no surprise in the framework
I have laid out, since it allows for lexical variability on this front. Moreover,
there is nothing special about modals – any semantic category of expressions
can in principle display these basic properties.
(29) Past Habituals
a. My family used to go to Albion. We would drive through Ontario.
b. #My family would go to Albion. We used to drive through Ontario.
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(29) shows that used to can introduce some kind of habitual timeframe, which
would can then pick up on anaphorically. Discourse initially, however, would
is infelicitous. The abundance of anaphoric relations across categories make it
no surprise that modals display this behavior as well.
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Abstract. We present a calculus in which the variables occurring in semantic
representations are associated with morphosyntactic information, and the seman-
tic composition of two representations consists in the identification of variables
with matching morphosyntactic information. Importantly, shared morphological
information can lead to the identification of variables irrespective of the order of
composition. This flexibility, we argue, is an important advantage in analysing
the syntax-semantics interface of languages like Plains Cree, where the person
and number properties of the arguments as well as the assignment of semantic
roles to arguments is almost exclusively determined by the complex morpholog-
ical properties of the verb.
1 Introduction
In type-driven semantics, semantic role assignment depends on the order of
composition. If the denotation of see is [[see]] = λy.λx.see’(x,y) with see’(a,b)
iff a sees b, then the first argument to which the function applies will be as-
signed the semantic role of entity being seen, and the next argument will be as-
signed the semantic role of person seeing, so that [[see]]([[Paul]])([[Marc]]) =
see’(marc’,paul’) holds if Marc sees Paul. This order-dependent assignment of
semantic roles works well if argument linking in a language is determined ex-
clusively by word order. But what, if instead the assignment of semantic roles is
determined by the morphosyntactic information associated with predicate and
argument? To illustrate, assume for simplicity that an argument is assigned the
patient-like semantic role if it is accusative, and the agent-like semantic role if
nominative, as in Videt Marcus Paulum. (‘Marc sees Paul.’). Two strategies can
be pursued. First, one could assume that the role of the case morphology is to
restrict the hierarchical position in which an NP can occur at the deep structure:
if it is marked with accusative it can only occur as a sister of a transitive verb, if
it is marked as nominative, it can only occur as a sister of a verb phrase. So de-
spite the various possible surface orders, the deep structure is always [Marcus
[videt Paulum]]. Alternatively, one can assume that the accusative morpheme
denotes a function acc, which when applied to an NP-denotation n and a func-
tion v yields acc(n)(v) = v(n), and that the nominative morpheme denotes a
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function:
nom(n)(v) =
{
v(n), if v is unary function
λx.(v(x)(n)), if v is binary function
In the first alternative, case is interpreted as a syntactic filter on permissible
constituent structure (trees), so that an accusative NP is guaranteed to be the
first argument of the predicate. In the second alternative, case is interpreted as
a function which essentially makes sure that the argument it applies to, i.e. the
NP denotation, occurs in the appropriate position in the λ-term. So despite the
fact that (word) order plays no role in the descriptive generalization underlying
semantic role assignment, both strategies use the morphological information
to restrict the order of application, which in turn determines the assignment of
semantic roles.
The idea we shall develop in this paper is that morphosyntactic (in partic-
ular inflectional) information can determine the assignment of semantic roles
directly and irrespective of the order of composition. Semantic composition
consists in identifying variables with matching morphosyntactic information.
Assuming that [[videt]] := see’(x,y), and that the denotation of Paulum is z =
paul’, and assuming further that the morphosyntactic information associated
with the variable y of videt matches the information associated with z of Paulum,
we shall provide a calculus which identifies the variable y of [[videt]] with the
variable z of [[Paulum]], and thus assigns the semantic role of entity seen to
paul’.
As a case study we have chosen the direction and obviation system in
Plains Cree, since in this language the person and number properties of the
arguments as well as the assignment of semantic roles to arguments is almost
exclusively determined by the complex morphological properties of the verb,
and not by word order. In section 2 we sketch the direction and obviation sys-
tem in Plains Cree, in 3 we introduce the theory of referent systems, in section 4
we provide the analysis of direction and obviation in terms of referent systems,
and in section 5 we conclude.
2 Direction and Obviation in Plains Cree
Plains Cree is one of four dialects of Modern Cree, an Algonquian language
spoken by around 60.000 people in Canada. It has a basically agglutinative
structure, with a comparatively simple nominal inflection, but a formidably
complex verbal inflectional system.1 Zúñiga (2006), Dahlstrom (1986) and oth-
1 The categories involved in the nominal system are possession, number, gender and obviation (no
case), cf. Zúñiga (2006).
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ers distinguish no less than nine affix positions in the verbal template of Plains
Cree. Three of them (the fourth, sixth and eighth suffix) express tense, aspect
and mood, whereas the others are related to the direction and obviation system,
a fragment of which we present below.
The rich inflectional system of the verb is instrumental in expressing (i)
the person and number properties of the verbal arguments, as well as (ii) the
linking between verbal arguments and the semantic roles of the predicate. The
argument linking in Plains Cree can be characterized by three basic features.
First, some of the affixes (the prefix and the fifth suffix) impose restrictions
on the person and number features of the verbal arguments irrespective of the
particular semantic role of the argument or the number of arguments of a verb.
Secondly, the link between semantic roles and arguments is established by the
direction suffix (the second suffix) which adds the person and number infor-
mation about the agent-like and patient-like arguments. When the predicate in-
volves third person arguments, the direction suffix also adds information about
which of the arguments is proximative (and which obviative). Finally, overtly
realized third person noun phrases are morphologically marked as proximative
or obviative, so that the semantic composition of noun phrase and verb is de-
termined not by word order or position in hierarchical structure, but by sharing
the same morphological feature.
To begin with, consider the following minimal pair:23
(1) a. Ki-pimipahta¯-n.
2-run-sap.sg
‘You (sg) run.’
b. Ni-pimipahta¯-n.
1-run-sap.sg
‘I run.’
The prefix indicates whether the participants in the relation denoted by the
predicate include a speech act participant, according to the following general-
ization:
(2) First Prefix Generalization (based on Zúñiga (2006: 73)):
a. ki- is used whenever the addressee or a group containing the ad-
dressee is an argument; else:
b. ni- is used whenever the speaker or a group containing the speaker
is argument; else
2 All examples are quoted from Zúñiga (2006).
3 Glossing: 1, 2, 3: first, second, third person; sap: speech act participant; sg, pl: singular, plural;
excl, incl: exclusive, inclusive; dir, inv: direct, inverse; prox, obv: proximative, obviative.
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c. ∅-, i.e. if no SAP is an argument
The final affix -n also encodes information about the person and number of the
participants, as illustrated by the following examples:
(3) a. Ni-pimipahta¯-na¯n.
1-run-sap.pl.excl
‘We (excluding addressee) run.’
b. Ni-pimipahta¯-n.
1-run-sap.sg
‘I run.’
The fifth suffix in the verbal template adds information about person and num-
ber of the participants according to the following generalization:
(4) Fifth Suffix Generalization (based on Zúñiga (2006: 78)):
a. if one participant is 1 exclusive plural, then -na¯n; else
b. if one participant is 1 inclusive plural, then -na¯naw; else
c. if one participant is 2 plural, then -na¯wa¯w; else
d. if one participant is 3, then -w; else
e. (if 1SG or 2SG, then) -n
We briefly mention four important aspects of these two generalizations. First,
they have an if-then-else structure, or put differently, they involve hierarchies,
and secondly, the hierarchies involved differ from one another (and can there-
fore not be reduced to one hierarchy).
(5) Hierarchies involved:
Slot Description relevant hierarchy
prefix highest participant 2 > 1 > 3
2. suffix direction SAP > 3prox > 3obv > 3f.obv
5. suffix person/number 1p > 12/2p > 3anim > sSAP >
3inan
Thirdly, these two generalizations are insensitive to the number of arguments a
predicate has. To see this note that the transitive verb pe¯htaw (‘hear’) in (6):
(6) Ki-
2-
pe¯htaw
hear
-i
-dir(2→1)
-n.
-sap.sg
‘Yousg hear me.’
and the intransitive verb pimipahta¯ (‘run’) in (1a) are both prefixed by ki- and
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suffixed by -n. And fourthly, the generalizations do not make any reference to
(specific or generalized) semantic roles, so that first prefix and fifth suffix are
fixed by the person and number properties of the arguments irrespective of their
semantic roles, which can be illustrated by the following minimal pair:
(7) a. Ki-
2-
pe¯htaw
hear
-i
-dir(2→1)
-n.
-sap.sg
‘Yousg hear me.’
b. Ki-
2-
pe¯htaw
hear
-iti
-inv(1→2)
-n.
-sap.sg
‘I hear yousg.’
The link between arguments and semantic roles is established by the so-called
direction suffix (the second suffix). The only morphosyntactic difference bet-
ween these sentence pairs is the so-called direction suffix -i in (7a) and iti in
(7b), which correlates with the difference in semantic role assignment. In (7a)
the addressee is the person hearing, and the speaker the person heard, whereas
in (7b) the semantic role assignment is reversed.
Together, the three affixes impose restrictions on the person and num-
ber of the arguments, but only the direction suffix provides information about
the link between arguments and semantic roles. Different participant configu-
rations call for different direction suffixes. The local configuration, illustrated
above, involves only speech act participants (or groups containing speech act
participants). In the mixed configuration, in which one argument is a SAP and
another one is not, the respective direction suffixes are -a¯ and -ikw.
(8) a. Ki-
2-
se¯kih
frighten
-a¯
-dir(2→ 3)
-w
-3
‘You (sg) frighten him/her.’
b. Ki-
2-
se¯kih
frighten
-ikw
-dir(3→ 2)
-w
-3
‘He/she frightens you (sg).’
And finally, in the non-local configuration, where neither argument is a SAP,
the direction suffixes are -e¯/-a¯ and -ikw.
(9) a. ∅-
3-
se¯kih
frighten
-e¯
-dir(3.prox→ 3.obv)
-w
-3
‘He (prox) frightens him/her/them (obv).’
b. ∅-
3-
se¯kih
frighten
-ikw
-dir(3.obv→ 3.prox)
-w
-3
‘He/she/they (obv) frighten(s) him/her (prox).’
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The direction suffixes for the different participant configurations are summed
up below:
(10) The direction.suffixes (for transitive verbs with animate objects):
local mixed non-local
dir -i 2→1 -a¯ SAP→3 -e¯ 3PROX→3OBV
inv -iti 1→2 -ikw 3→SAP -ikw 3OBV→3PROX
The proximative-obviative distinction is realized not only in the verbal system
but also in the nominal system. If a third person argument is overtly realized
as a noun phrase, then it is morphologically marked either as proximative or as
obviative.
(11) O-
3poss-
wi¯ce¯wa¯kan
companion
-a
-obv
∅-
3-
miskaw
find
-e¯
-dir
-w
-3
awa
dem:prox
ne¯hiyaw.
Cree
‘The Creeprox found his comrades.’
(12) Ta¯pwe¯
truly
awa
dem:pro
iskwe¯w
woman
∅-pakamahw-e¯-w
3-strike-dir-3
e¯sa
rep
o¯hi
dem:obv
wi¯htiko-wa.
windigo-obv
‘Truly the woman struck down that windigo.’
For space reasons we introduced only a fragment of the actual direction and ob-
viation system in Plains Cree. First, we focused on only three out of six affixes
relevant for direction and obviation. And secondly, we ignored a number of
other morphosyntactic categories which are known to be relevant for direction
marking on the verb in Plains Cree. To mention only two, the affixes encoding
direction in Plains Cree depend further on (i) the type of clause,4 and (ii) the
animacy of the patient-like argument. If the argument is inanimate, as in (13a),
then the direction suffix -e¯ must be used instead of -a¯, which in turn must be
used in (13b), since the argument is animate.
(13) a. Ni-
1-
wa¯paht
see
-e¯
-dir(sap→3.inan)
-na¯n.
-1pl.excl
‘We (excl.) see it.’
b. Ni-
1-
se¯kih
frighten
-a¯
-dir(sap→3.anim)
-na¯n.
-1pl.excl
‘We (excl.) frighten him/her.’
The linking of arguments and semantic roles by means of the direction and ob-
4 The forms introduced here are basically restricted to independent clauses (belonging to the inde-
pendent paradigm), whereas dependent clauses require forms from a different so-called conjunct
paradigm.
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viation system poses an important challenge to the theory of semantic composi-
tion, in particular to type-drive composition, because the assignment of the se-
mantic roles to arguments is not determined by the order of composition but by
shared morphological information, namely agreement in proximative/obviative
features.5 If the direction suffix is dir(3.obv→3.prox), then a proximate noun
phrase denotation will be assigned the patient-like argument, if the direction
suffix is dir(3.prox→3.obv), then it will be assigned the agent-like argument.
The analysis of the contribution of first prefix and fifth affix poses an additional
challenge, since these affixes impose (semantic) restrictions on the person and
number of the arguments of a predicate, but they do this irrespective of the se-
mantic role of the arguments. In section 4 we provide an analysis which meets
both these challenges in terms of referent systems, which we introduce in sec-
tion 3.
3 The Theory of Referent Systems
3.1 Semantic Composition by Renaming of Variables
The semantic structure of lexical items will be analyzed in terms of pairs 〈U,C〉
consisting of a set of referents U and a set of conditions C, i.e. by means of
discourse representation structures (DRSs).6 Returning to our example (11),
we want the composition of the DRSs for the noun phrase o-wi¯ce¯wa¯kan-a (‘his
comradesobv’) and the verb miskawe¯w (‘find’) to result in:
/o-wi¯ce¯wa¯kan-a/
x
comrades′(x)
•
/∅-miskaw-e¯-w/
e
find′(e)
p.finding′(e)  x
e.found′(e)  y
=
/o-wi¯ce¯wa¯kan-a ∅-miskaw-e¯-w/
e,y
find′(e)
p.finding′(e)  x
e.found′(e)  y
comrades′(y)
Where the referent x of the NP DRS is identified with the referent y of the verb
DRS, which gets assigned the role of entity being found.7 This result can be
achieved by (i) renaming the variable x of the first DRS into x1, (ii) renaming
the variables e,x,y in the second DRS into e2,x2,x1 respectively, and (iii) by
conjoining the sets of renamed referents and renamed conditions respectively.
Put in a nutshell, the semantic composition of two DRSs consists in conjunc-
5 This is not to say that it is impossible to provide an analysis of semantic role assignment in Plains
Cree within a type-driven approach to semantic composition.
6 Thus, we adopt an algebraic approach to DRT, cf. Zeevat (1989), as opposed to the procedural
approach of Kamp & Reyle (1993).
7 We want these two referents to be identified irrespective of the actual variable name chosen for
the NP referent, in order to account for the fact that the choice of variable name for the NP referent
is actually immaterial.
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tion relative to a renaming R of variables
/o-wi¯ce¯wa¯kan-a/
x
comrades′(x)
•R
/∅-miskaw-e¯-w/
e
find′(e)
p.finding′(e)  x
e.found′(e)  y
=
/o-wi¯ce¯wa¯kan-a ∅-miskaw-e¯-w/
e2,x1
find′(e2)
p.finding′(e2)  x2
e.found′(e2)  x1
comrades′(x1)
where R = 〈{〈x,x1〉}, {〈e,e2〉, 〈x,x2〉, 〈y,x1〉}〉. So the renaming of variables iden-
tifies some variables (irrespective of their actual names), and keeps all other
variables distinct (even if they have the same names) in order to avoid acciden-
tal identification of referents.
Definition 3.1 A referent xaσ consists of the variable symbol x followed by a
sequence σ ∈ {1,2}∗. Let R be the set of such referents.
Convention 3.1 To ease readability we use also the symbols e, f ,g,h, x,y,z,u,v,
w, . . . standing for referents.
Definition 3.2 A renaming r ⊂ R2 is an injective function which suffixes its
argument either with a 1 or with a 2. r is a renaming of a referent system α =
[µ1, . . . ,µn] iff the domain D ⊂ R of r is the set of referents {ref(µi) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
Definition 3.3 Let ∆1 = 〈U1,C1〉, and ∆2 = 〈U2,C2〉 be two DRSs, where ∆1
contains the variables x1, . . . , xm and ∆2 contains the variables y1, . . . ,yn. Then
•(∆1,∆2, 〈r1,r2〉) is defined iff (i) the domain of r1 is the set of variables in ∆1,
and (ii) the domain of r2 is the set of variables in ∆2. In this case
•(〈U1,C1〉, 〈U2,C2〉, 〈r1,r2〉) = 〈r1[U1]∪ r2[U2],r1[C1]∪ r2[C2]〉, where
(i) r1[U1] = {r1(xi) : i ≤ m},r2[U2] = {r2(x j) : j ≤ n}
(ii) r1[C1] = {φi[r1] : φi ∈C1},r2[C2] = {φ j[r2] : φ j ∈C2}
(iii) φ[r] is the result of replacing every variable x in φ by r(x)
The renaming of variables is determined by the morphosyntactic information
associated with each variable, to be presented in the next subsection.
3.2 Morphosyntactic Structure
The basic idea of the calculus of referent systems, first introduced in Vermeulen
(1995) and then extended in Kracht (1999), is that the way in which variables
are to be renamed is decided by the morphosyntactic information associated
with each variable, and stored in so-called referent systems. Since semantic
composition of two DRSs proceeds relative to the renaming dictated by the
morphosyntax, the renaming of variables provides the interface between mor-
phosyntax and semantic composition.
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Every variable in a DRS is associated with morphosyntactic information rel-
evant for the identification of this variable. There are three types of informa-
tion relevant for the identification of variables, namely hierarchical, linear and
categorial information. Hierarchical information is encoded by the following
vertical diacritics: (i) O (the referent is a functor with respect to merge) (ii)
M (the referent is an argument with respect to merge), (iii) ♦ (the referent is
an adjunct), and (iv) − (the referent cannot identify any further). The linear
information is encoded by the following horizontal diacritics: (i) S (referent
expects argument to the right), (ii) R (referent expects argument to the left),
(iii)  (referent expects argument either to the left or to the right), and (iv) 
(no expectations). The categorial information is encoded by a finite number of
simple names (which are essentially feature values over a certain namespace)
or transformer names (which transform the value of a feature):
[
per : 3
num : sg
case : −
] [
per : 3
num : sg
case : −→ acc
]
Definition 3.4 A vertical diacritic vd is a subset of {M,O}. A horizontal dia-
critic hd is a subset of {R,S}.
Convention 3.2 For ease of readability, we use the following conventions for
representing vertical and horizontal diacritics:
definition convention
vd ∅ −
{M} M
{O} O
{M,O} ♦
definition convention
hd ∅ 
{S} S
{R} R
{R,S} 
Definition 3.5 A diacritic d is a pair 〈vd,hd〉 consisting of a vertical diacritic
vd and a horizontal diacritic hd. A diacritic 〈vd,hd〉 is a legal diacritic iff
(O ∈ vd∨H ∈ vd)↔ hd , ∅. The diacritic 〈∅,∅〉 is called trivial.
The categorial information will be represented by so called names.
Definition 3.6 A name space N is a triple 〈A,V, f 〉, where A is a finite non-
empty set of attributes, V is a finite non-empty set of values disjoint from A, and
f : A→ ℘(V) is a valuation function assigning every attribute in A a subset of
V.
Definition 3.7 A simple name N (over a name space N = 〈A,V, f 〉) is a feature
structure over N. A transformer name N is a pair 〈N,N′〉 of simple names.
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We shall use the more compact notation:
 cat : vpre : −
suff : −→ +
 for 〈
 cat : vpre : −
suff : −
 ,
 cat : vpre : −
suff : +
〉
Let n.a be the value of the simple name n for the feature a. The unification
n1 u n2 is defined if for all attributes a ∈ A it holds that n1.a∩ n2.a , ∅. Then
n1un2 = {[a : v1u v2] : [a : v1] ∈ n1∧ [a : v2] ∈ n2}.
We can now put together the information relevant for the identification of
a referent, by defining so-called argument identification statements:
Definition 3.8 A triple α = 〈x, 〈vd,hd〉,n〉 is an argument identification state-
ment (AIS) iff (i) x is a referent, 〈vd,hd〉 a legal diacritic with |vd| < 2, and
n a simple name (over a name space N), or (ii) x is a referent, 〈vd,hd〉 a le-
gal diacritic with vd = {M,O}, and n a transformer name. Further, let ref(α) =
x,vd(α) = vd,hd(α) = hd,n(α) = n.
Definition 3.9 A list of argument identification statements [µ1, . . . ,µm],m ≥ 1,
is called a referent system.
Before providing the definition for the merge of referent systems, we illus-
trate this operation by discussing the merge of the referent system of miskaw-e¯
(‘find’) with the referent system of the fifth suffix -w:
/miskaw-e¯/
e : 4 :
 cat : trvpre : −
suf : −

x : 4 :
[
per : 3
prox : +
]
y : 4 :
[
per : 3
prox : −
]
•
/-w/
f : ♦ R:
 cat : trvpre : −
suf : −→ +

u : ♦ R:
[
per : 3
]
v : ♦ R:
[
per:3
]
unionsq
[
per :1
num:sg
]
unionsq
[
per :2
num:sg
] =
/miskaw-e¯-w/
e1 : 4 :
 cat : trvpre : −
suf : +

x1 : 4 :
[
per : 3
prox : +
]
y1 : 4 :
[
per : 3
prox : −
]
First, leftward merge α •l β of two referent systems α and β is defined if (i) α
is saturated (i.e. with O < vd(α) for all AISs in α) and (ii) at least one leftward
merge of AISs is defined. A leftward merge µ/ν of two AISs µ and ν is defined
if (i) the horizontal diacritic of ν contains R, (ii) the vertical diacritic of µ is
M or ♦, (iii) the vertical diacritic of ν is O or ♦, and (iv) the names of µ and ν
can be unified. In our example, the leftward merge of the AISs of the referents
e and f is defined, since (i) the horizontal diacritic of f is R, (ii) the vertical
diacritic of e is M , (iii) the vertical diacritic of f is ♦, and (iv) the first name of
the transformer name of f matches (i.e. can be unified with) the simple name of
e. Further, the AIS with referent u can be leftward-merged with the AIS with
referent x, and the same holds for the two AISs with referents v and y.
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Definition 3.10 The leftward merge of two AISs µ/ν is defined iff (i) R∈ hd(ν),
(ii) M∈ vd(µ), (iii) O ∈ vd(ν), and (iv) n(µ) ·n(ν) is defined. If defined, then:
µ/ν = 〈ref(µ)a1, 〈vd(µ)∩vd(ν),hd(µ)〉,n(µ) ·n(ν)〉
where the resulting name m ·n is:
n(µ) ·n(ν) =

n(µ)un(ν), if n(µ),n(ν) are unifiable simple names
B, if n(µ) = 〈A,B〉,n(ν) = C, and A unifies with C
C, if n(µ) = A,n(ν) = 〈C,D〉, and A unifies with D
undefined, otherwise
The leftward merge of referent systems is defined as follows:
Definition 3.11 Let α = [µ1, . . . ,µm] and β = [ν1, . . . , νn] be two referent sys-
tems. The leftward merge •(α,β, 〈r1,r2〉) of α and β relative to the renaming
〈r1,r2〉 is defined iff
• α is saturated
• there is an i,1 ≤ i ≤ n such that µ1 accesses νi
• for every k with 1 ≤ k ≤ m
– µk / νi+(k−1) is defined
– r1(ref(µk)) = r2(ref(νi+(k−1))) = ref(µk)a1, and
• for all j between 1 ≤ j ≤ n with j , i + (k−1), r2(ref(ν j)) = ref(ν j)a2
In this case •(α,β, 〈r1,r2〉) = 〈[p : 1 ≤ p ≤ n]〉 where:
p =
{
µk / νi+(k−1) if i ≤ p ≤ i + (m−1)
〈ref(νp)a2, 〈vd(νp),hd(νp)〉,n(νp)〉 else
Definition 3.12 Let α = [µ1, . . . ,µm] be a saturated referent system and β =
[ν1, . . . , νn] another referent system. Then µ1 accesses νi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) iff (i) either
µ1 / νi or νi .µ1 is defined, and (ii) there is no νk with i < k ≤ n such that µ1 / νk
or νk .µ1 is defined
As it is formulated, the merge requires that the first AIS of the saturated referent
system access the first AIS from the bottom of the functor referent system for
which the left- or rightward merge of AIS is defined. The notion of access can
be made dependent on the language, so that for example in some languages
the merge requires that the first AIS of the saturated referent system can only
access the last AIS of the functor referent system.
The rightward merge of argument identification statements and referent
systems can be formulated analogously.
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4 A Referent Systems Analysis of Direction and Obviation
In this section we provide an analysis of the direction and obviation system in
terms of referent systems, and illustrate this analysis by deriving the following
two sentences:
(14) a. O-
3poss-
wi¯ce¯wa¯kan
companion
-a
-obv
∅-
3-
miskaw
find
-e¯
-dir
-w
-3
awa
dem:prox
ne¯hiyaw.
Cree
‘The Creeprox found his comrades.’
b. Ki-
2-
pe¯htaw
hear
-iti
-inv(1→2)
-n
-sap.sg
‘I hear you (sg).’
Combining the sign miskaw with the direction suffix e¯ results in:
/miskaw/ (‘find’)
e :M  :
 cat : trvpre : −
suf : −

x : 4 :
[
θ : A
]
y : 4 :
[
θ : P
]
e
find′(e)
p.finding(e)  x
e.found(e)  y
•
/-e¯/(3prox → 3obv,direct)
e : ♦ R:
 cat : trvpre : −
suf : −

x1 : O R:
[
θ : A
]
x2 : 4 :
[
per : 3
prox : +
]
y1 : O R:
[
θ : P
]
y2 : 4 :
[
per : 3
prox : −
]
x1  x2
y1  y2
=
/miskaw-e¯/
e1 : 4 :
 cat : trvpre : −
suf : −

x1 : − :
[
θ : A
]
x22 : 4 :
[
per : 3
prox : +
]
y1 : − :
[
θ : P
]
y22 : 4 :
[
per : 3
prox : −
]
e1
find′(e1)
p.finding′(e1)  x1
e.found(e1)  y1
x1  x22
y1  y22
The referent system of miskaw contains an AIS for the event variable e, and
one AIS for each argument variable x and y. Since the event variables of stem
and direction suffix have matching morphosyntactic information, they get iden-
tified. Moreover, the merge of the two referent systems also identifies x and x1
(as well as y and y1), due to the matching value for the θ-role feature. As a
result the variables x and x1 are both renamed to x1 (y and y1 are renamed to
y1). Since the referents x1 and x2 of the direction suffix are coreferential, the
two referents x1 and x22 of the referent system for miskaw-e¯ are also corefer-
ent, which in effect means that the referent x22 is assigned the semantic role of
person finding. Given its associated morphosyntactic information, this referent
can only identify with 3rd person proximate noun phrases.
The attachment of the fifth suffix −w to this base imposes the restriction
that one referent is third person and the other is either third person or a sin-
gular SAP. Moreover, the fifth suffix transforms the suffix value from − to +,
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provided that the base is prefixless.
/miskaw-e¯/
e : 4 :
 cat : trvpre : −
suf : −

x : 4 :
[
per : 3
prox : +
]
y : 4 :
[
per : 3
prox : −
]
e
find′(e)
p.finding′(e)  x
e.found(e)  y
•
/-w/
e : ♦ R:
 cat : trvpre : −
suf : −→ +

x : ♦ R:
[
per : 3
]
y : ♦ R:
[
per:3
]
unionsq
[
per :1
num:sg
]
unionsq
[
per :2
num:sg
] =
/miskaw-e¯-w/
e1 : 4 :
 cat : trvpre : −
suf : +

x1 : 4 :
[
per : 3
prox : +
]
y1 : 4 :
[
per : 3
prox : −
]
e1
find′(e1)
p.finding′(e1)  x1
e.found′(e1)  y1
The first AIS of the zero prefix provides the morphosyntactic information asso-
ciated with the event variable. This AIS can only merge with a variable whose
prefix value is − and whose suffix value is +. If this is the case, it transforms
the prefix value from − to +, making sure that only one prefix can attach to the
base. The next two AISs of the zero prefix contain referents which are corefer-
ential and whose categorial information is required to be identical (this is what
the indices a and b are supposed to mean). The reason for this is as follows.
The zero affix must be prefixed to the base, therefore the linear information
associated with x1 (and y1) is S. However, we would like the resulting refer-
ent to be identifiable either to the left or to the right. To achieve this, we add
a coreferential referent x2 to the zero prefix, and require that it be identifiable
either to the left or to the right, i.e. with .
/∅/
e : ♦ S:
 cat : trvpre : −→ +
suf : +

x1 : O S:
[
per : 3
]
a
x2 : O : [ per : 3 ]
a
y1 : O S:
[
per : 3
]
b
y2 : O : [ per : 3 ]
b
x1  x2
y1  y2
•
/miskaw-e¯-w/
e : 4 :
 cat : trvpre : −
suf : +

x : 4 :
[
per : 3
prox : +
]
y : 4 :
[
per : 3
prox : −
]
e
find′(e)
p.finding′(e)  x
e.found′(e)  y
=
/∅-miskaw-e¯-w/
e1 : 4 :
 cat : trvpre : +
suf : +

x11 : − :
[
per : 3
prox : +
]
a
x21 : O : [ per : 3
prox : +
]
a
y11 : − :
[
per : 3
prox : −
]
b
y21 : O : [ per : 3
prox : −
]
b
e1
find′(e1)
p.finding′(e1)  x11;x11  x21
e.found′(e1)  y11;y11  y21
The prefixation of the zero affix then identifies the referents e, x1, y1 of the
zero affix with the referents e, x, y of the base miskaw-e¯-w, respectively, and
consequently the referents x2 and y2, renamed to x21 and y21, are assigned the
semantic roles of person finding and entity found, respectively.
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As can be seen, the referent x21, which bears the role of person finding, can
only identify with referents which are third person proximative, and the referent
y21 bearing the role of entity found can only be identified with third person
obviative referents. Now the two noun phrases can be combined (in any order).
Combining first the obviative NP result in the identification of the referent x of
the NP referent system with the referent y of the verb, which in turn entails that
the the semantic role of entity found is assigned to the comrades:
/o-wi¯ce¯wa¯kan-a/
x :M  : [prox : -]
x
comrades′(x)
•
/∅-miskaw-e¯-w/
e : 4 :
 cat : trvpre : +
suf : +

x : O : [ per : 3
prox : +
]
y : O : [ per : 3
prox : −
]
e1
find′(e)
p.finding′(e)  x
e.found′(e)  y
=
/o-wi¯ce¯wa¯kan-a ∅-miskaw-e¯-w/
e2 : 4 :
 cat : trvpre : +
suf : +

x2 : O : [ per : 3
prox : +
]
x1 : − :
[
per : 3
prox : −
]
x1,e2
find′(e2)
p.finding′(e2)  x2
e.found′(e2)  x1
comrades′(x1)
Finally, combining this verb phrase with the proximate NP results in the
identification of the referent x of the proximate NP with the referent x of the
verb phrase referent system, so that this referent gets assigned the semantic role
of person finding.
/o-wi¯ce¯wa¯kan-a ∅-miskaw-e¯-w/
e : 4 :
 cat : trvpre : +
suf : +

x : O : [ per : 3
prox : +
]
y : − :
[
per : 3
prox : −
]
e,y
find′(e)
p.finding′(e)  x
e.found′(e)  y
comrades′(y)
•
/awa ne¯hiyaw/
x :M  : [prox : +]
x
cree′(x)
=
(13)
e1 : 4 :
 cat : trvpre : +
suf : +

x1 : − :
[
per : 3
prox : +
]
y1 : − :
[
per : 3
prox : −
]
e1,y1
find′(e1)
p.finding′(e1)  x1
e.found′(e1)  y1
comrades′(y1)
cree′(x1)
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Second derivation:
/pe¯htaw/ (‘hear′)
e :M  :
 cat : trvpre : −
suf : −

x : 4 :
[
θ : A
]
y : 4 :
[
θ : P
]
e
hear′(e)
p.hearing′(e)  x
stimulus′(e)  y
•
/-iti/(1−2, inverse)
e : ♦ R:
 cat : trvpre : −
suf : −

x1 : O R:
[
θ : A
]
x2 : 4 :
[
per : 1
]
y1 : O R:
[
θ : P
]
y2 : 4 :
[
per : 2
]
x1  x2
y1  y2
=
/pe¯htaw-iti/
e1 : 4 :
 cat : trvpre : −
suf : −

x1 : − :
[
θ : A
]
x22 : 4 :
[
per : 1
]
y1 : − :
[
θ : P
]
y22 : 4 :
[
per : 2
]
e
hear′(e1)
p.hearing′(e1)  x1
stimulus′(e1)  y1
x1  x22
y1  y22
/pe¯htaw-iti/
e : 4 :
 cat : trvpre : −
suf : −

x : 4 :
[
per : 1
]
y : 4 :
[
per : 2
]
e
hear′(e)
p.hearing′(e)  x
stimulus′(e)  y
•
/-n/
e : ♦ R:
 cat : trvpre : −
suf : −→ +

x : ♦ R:
[
per : 1unionsq2
num : sg
]
y : ♦ R:
[
per : 1unionsq2
num : sg
] =
/pe¯htaw-iti-n/
e : 4 :
 cat : trvpre : −
suf : +

x : 4 :
[
per : 1
num : sg
]
y : 4 :
[
per : 2
num : sg
]
e
hear′(e)
p.hearing′(e)  x
stimulus′(e)  y
/ki-/
e : ♦ S:
 cat : trvpre : −→ +
suf : +

x1 : O S:
[
per : 2
]
a
x2 : O : [ per : 2 ]
a
y1 : O S:
[
per : 1unionsq3 ]
b
y2 : O : [ per : 1unionsq3 ]
b
x1  x2
y1  y2
•
/pe¯htaw-iti-n/
e : 4 :
 cat : trvpre : −
suf : +

x : 4 :
[
per : 1
num : sg
]
y : 4 :
[
per : 2
num : sg
]
e
hear′(e)
p.hearing′(e)  x
stimulus′(e)  y
=
/ki-pe¯htaw-iti-n/
e1 : 4 :
 cat : trvpre : +
suf : +

x11 : − :
[
per : 2
num : sg
]
a
x21 : O : [ per : 2
num : sg
]
a
y11 : − :
[
per : 1
num : sg
]
b
y21 : O : [ per : 1
num : sg
]
b
e1
hear′(e1)
p.hearing′(e1)  y11;y11  y21
stimulus′(e1)  x11;x11  x21
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5 Conclusion
Referent systems provide an interface between syntax on the one hand and se-
mantics on the other by allowing to detail the way in which variables are being
linked (i.e. identified) under merge. Certain aspects of the system have been
omitted, such as parameters or quantification, in order to make the presentation
focused. We have shown how referent systems allow for greater flexibility in
syntax, by opening up access in argument structure. It should be fairly obvi-
ous that merge is a fairly inexpensive operation. It consists in two steps: the
first is to calculate the resulting argument structure and the substitutions before
merge, and the step in executing the substitutions and then merging the se-
mantic representations. Although complete syntactic flexibility has its price in
terms of combinatorial explosion, referent systems allow morphology to keep
this search simple by providing clues as to how arguments have to be linked.
And it seems that in practice languages do employ ways of keeping this com-
binatorial problem at bay.
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Abstract. This paper proposes a novel neo-Davidsonian semantics of one 
another-reciprocals that appear in several Indo-European languages. Ar-
guments are presented that suggest that such expressions be treated as 
compositionally complex, in contrast to standard approaches that treat them as 
primitive polyadic quantifiers. A theory of logical form for one another-
reciprocals is developed that can account for a non-trivial range of their 
syntactic distribution as well as a wide range of the attested readings of 
reciprocal sentences. 
 
1	   Introduction	  
This paper addresses the logical form of reciprocal sentences containing one-
another reciprocals (OARs), a common type reciprocal expression found in 
many Indo-European languages. After considering some empirical facts 
about OARs in the languages where they are found, I will argue that we must 
view the OAR as a complex expression, contrary to the standard assumption 
that argument reciprocals (reciprocals that can appear in argument positions) 
are primitive semantic elements; more specifically, that they are polyadic 
quantifiers (see Dalrymple et al. 1998 and much subsequent work). I will 
show that with a certain neo-Davidsonian decomposition, it is possible to 
treat OARs as being composed of essentially the same one and other that 
occur outside of OAR constructions, while also accounting for a large amount 
of the polysemy known to be associated with reciprocals. This will require us 
to consider some developments of recent work in event semantics, which has 
already shown to be useful in analyses of reciprocity (Schein 2003, Dimitri-
adis 2008, Dotlačil 2010) and other issues concerning plurality in general 
(Schein 1993, Lasersohn 1995, Landman 2000, Pietroski 2005, Zweig 2008). 
The paper will be organized as follows. In the second section, I will 
highlight some descriptive facts about the distribution of OARs that not only 
suggest that they are compositionally complex, but also that each part of the 
OAR (one and other) is associated with thematic content distinct from the 
In Reich, Ingo et al. (eds.), Proceedings of Sinn & Bedeutung 15,  
pp. 397–417. Universaar – Saarland University Press: Saarbrücken, Germany, 2011. 	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other part. In the third section, I will review some of the relevant parts from 
the reciprocal and event semantics literature, and propose a novel logical 
decomposition for sentences involving OARs. I will show that the proposals 
offered here, guided by the empirical facts of section 2, can account for a 
large portion of the range of attested reciprocal readings. The final section 
will summarize the results of the paper. 
2	  	  	   The	  Complexity	  of	  OARs	  
In this section I will argue that OARs are structurally complex in that each of 
its elements, one and other, are separate nominal expressions. While a 
treatment of this kind might seem obvious, the standard in the reciprocal 
literature for the past fifteen years or so has been to treat reciprocals 
expressions like each other and one another as polyadic quantifiers.1 
I do not doubt that it is possible for theoreticians to represent the 
meaning of reciprocal sentences in terms of polyadic quantification. The 
issue that I am concerned with is if this is the best way that we can model 
how meaning is represented in the minds of speakers. I believe that we should 
be wary about including in our model higher order relations like polyadic 
quantifiers if there is only one family of phenomena (anaphors) that seems to 
call for such a device. If there is a possibility of accounting for the same facts 
without climbing dangerously high up the Fregean hierarchy of types, then I 
believe that possibility should be explored. That is what I intend to do in the 
rest of the paper. 
2.1	   Empirical	  Arguments	  for	  Complexity	  	  
I will show that the empirical facts presented below not only pose serious 
problems for analyses that treat OARs as primitive, non-decomposable 
expressions, but they also suggest an idea that will form the basis of the 
analysis in Section 3: if one and other are distinct nominals, then perhaps 
they are associated with distinct thematic roles.  
Let us first consider the distribution of article determiners within OARs. 
Articles within OARs can be found in the Romance languages (Spanish (1), 
French (2), and Romanian (3)), as well as in Bulgarian (4). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 A type <1,2> quantifier in Generalized Quantifier Theory (see Peters and Westerståhl 2005). In 
Generalized Quantifier Theory, run-of-the-mill quantificational determiners are classified as type 
<1,1> quantifiers, because each argument to the determiner has an adicity of one; each one on its 
arguments is a monadic predicate. Reciprocals have been treated as polyadic quantifiers of type 
<1,2> in GQT, labeled as such since one of this quantifier’s arguments is a polyadic predicate 
(the verb). 
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 (1) Los estudiantes se  seguian los unos tras   los otros.  
 the  students    CL  follow   the ones behind the others 
 ‘The students are following one another.’ 
(2) Les  étudiants se  sont frappé les  uns  les autres.   
 the  students  CL  AUX hit      the  ones the others 
 ‘The students hit one another.’ 
(3) Băieţii     s   au   urmărit  unul    pe       celălalt.        
 boys.DEF CL  have followed one.DEF ACC-PART other.DEF 
 ‘The boys followed one another.’ 
(4) Gostite       tancuvaha  edin-ija  s    drug-ija.  
 guests.DEF  danced    one.DEF  with other.DEF 
 ‘The guests danced with one another.’ 
What is important for us is that it is possible to have article morphology 
appear on each part of the OAR simultaneously. Though some languages 
allow multiple articles per nominal (such as the Scandinavian double-
definiteness languages), the languages reported above do not allow this and 
we can take the simultaneous occurrence of two articles as evidence for two 
distinct noun phrases. 
Next we will consider the placement of prepositions that interact with 
OARs. In Germanic OAR constructions, prepositions are generally placed 
before the OAR complex, as in English (5) and German (6). 
(5) They danced with one another. 
(6) Sie   erzählten  voneinander.    
 they  talk        about-one-another 
 ‘They talk about one another.’ 
It seems however that preposition placement in Germanic OARs is the 
exception to a general pattern. In all the non-Germanic Indo-European 
languages where I found OARs to be a productive, the preposition always 
intervenes between one and other.2  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 It is also possible in some contexts, and with certain prepositions, that Germanic OARs can 
show the one-P-other word order that we find to be pervasive in Indo-European languages. 
 
(i) I put the books ones on top of another 
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Below, we see this in French (7), Spanish (8), Romanian (9), Bulgarian (10), 
Serbo-Croatian (11), and Ukrainian3(12). 
(7) Les étudiants se  sont donné des  livres les uns  aux   autres.    
 the  students  CL  AUX gave  some books the ones to-the others 
 ‘The students gave books to one another.’ 
(8) Los estudiantes  presentaron los profesores el  uno  al    otro.    
 the  students     introduced  the  professors the one  to-the other 
 ‘The students introduced the professors to one another.’ 
 (9) Oaspeţii   au   dansat  unul       cu   celălalt.           
 guests.the  have danced one.the.NOM with other.the.ACC 
 ‘The guests danced with one another.’ 
 (10) Te   stojat  edin do   drug.    
 they  stand  one  beside other 
 ‘They are standing beside one another.’ 
(11) Gosti   su   plesali  jedni  s    drugima.    
 guests  AUX danced one   with other 
 ‘The guests danced with one another.’ 
(12) Divčata hovoryly  odna    pro   odnu.     
  girls   talk        one.NOM about one.ACC  
 ‘The girls are talking about one another.’  
If the OAR were a primitive expression, it should come as a surprise that it is 
possible to break it up with prepositions, though this is what we find in a 
majority of languages that have OARs. Furthermore, if we can assume that it 
is the complements of prepositions that receive the thematic role associated 
with that preposition, then it is possible to attribute thematic distinctness to 
each element of an OAR since only one of them appears to be the 
complement of the preposition in these languages, the other element.4 
The last empirical phenomena that I will discuss concerns case mor-
phology within the OAR. In certain Slavic languages that use OAR 
constructions, each element of the OAR inflects for case. Interestingly, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Notice that Ukranian OARs are actually of the form one-one. I will assume that the second one 
forms a DP with a covert other adjective. 
4 Of course this would require us to say something about the Germanic cases where the whole 
OAR linearly follows the preposition. I suspect that there is either a transformation deriving the 
Germanic word order from the standard one-P-other order, or that the Germanic order came 
about by some form of diachronic univerbation. 
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case of one and the case of other are generally different. Consider the Serbo-
Croatian (13) and Ukrainian (14). 
(13) Studenti        su   udarali jedan     drugog.       
 students.NOM AUX hit    one.NOM other.ACC 
 ‘The students hit one another.’ 
(14) Studenty         vdaryly  odyn     odnoho.       
 students.NOM    hit        one.NOM     one.ACC 
 ‘The students hit one another.’ 
Considering just these “elementary reciprocal sentences” as they are often 
called (beginning with Langendoen 1978), it seems that the case of one must 
by nominative and the case of other must be accusative. However, when we 
look beyond these simple cases, we see that a deeper generalization can be 
made. Below are ditransitive construction in Serbo-Croatian (15a) and (16a), 
and Ukrainian (15b) and (16b) where the OAR is an indirect object. In (15), 
the interpretation is one where the students introduced the professors to other 
students (among the students), where in (16) the interpretation is where the 
students introduced the professors to other professors (among the professors). 
(15) a. studenti        su    predstavili profesore     jedni     drugima.   
  students.NOM  AUX  introduced professors.ACC one.NOM other.DAT 
  ‘The students introduced the professors to one another.’  
 b. Studenty        predstavyly profesoriv    odni    odnym. 
  students.NOM introduced  professors.ACC one.NOM one.DAT 
  ‘The students introduced the professors to one another.’ 
(16) a. Studenti      su   predstavili  profesore     jedne   drugima.   
   students.NOM AUX  introduced professor.ACC  one.ACC other.DAT 
  ‘The students introduced the professors to one another.’  
  b. Studenty       predstavyly  profesoriv      odnyx    odnym  
  students.NOM  introduced  professors.ACC one.ACC  one.DAT 
  ‘The students introduced the professors to one another.’ 
The English sentences that comprise the translations for (15) and (16) are 
ambiguous. Serbo-Croatian and Ukranian have no such ambiguity because of 
the case morphology within the OAR. Based on the meaning differences 
between the two pairs of sentences, in (15), it is the subject that appears to act 
as the antecedent for the OAR, while in (16) it appears that the direct object is 
the antecedent. This fact is reflected by the case morphology of the OAR. In 
(15), where the subject acts as the reciprocals antecedent, the case of one is 
nominative, the case typical of subjects. In (16), where the objects as 
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antecedent, the case of one is accusative, the case typically associated with 
direct objects. Notice that in each example in (15) and (16), the case of other 
does not vary. The proper descriptive generalization of these case facts seems 
to be that (i) the case of one will always match the case of the OAR’s 
antecedent, and (ii) the case of other will always be the case that we would 
expect based on the position of the OAR. In (13), since the OAR is in direct 
object position, the case of other is accusative. In (15) and (16), the OAR 
appears in indirect object position, thus the case of other is dative, the case 
typical of indirect objects. To the best of my knowledge, this is a novel 
observation. 
The facts presented here call for a complex treatment of OARs. While 
each argument alone might not be enough to convince one of this, taken 
together I believe that we have enough reason to seriously consider treating 
OARs as non-primitive. The data concerning preposition placement and 
(especially) case distribution not only call for a complex treatment, but also 
suggest that each element comprising the OAR be associated somehow with 
thematic content different from the other element. My proposal for exactly 
how this works will be the topic of 3.3. But before shifting to more formal 
matters, I want to conclude this section with a discussion of some relevant 
properties of one and other that are easily observable in their non-OAR uses. 
2.2	   Anaphoric	  Properties	  of	  one	  and	  other	  
In the introduction, I said that we should not only view OARs as complex, 
but also that we should view that as being composed from essentially the 
same one and other that we find outside of OAR constructions. In this 
subsection, I will discuss the relevant properties of these elements as they 
appear in cases of cross-sentential anaphora. In 3.3, the specific proposals 
about OARs will encode the same relevant anaphoric properties of these 
elements as they appear outside of reciprocal constructions. 
Consider first the use of other as a cross-sentential anaphor. We can see 
from sentences like (17) that it is impossible for other to refer to the 
individuals denoted by its antecedent. Rather, it must refer to something other 
than what its antecedent refers to, and other than the parts that comprise what 
its antecedent refers to. 
(17) Three boys wore hats. Another wore a sweater. 
On the other hand, one does have the ability to refer to an individual that is a 
part of the plurality denoted by the antecedent. (18), on this interpretation, 
has the same meaning as (19), with an overt partitive phrase. 
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(18) Three boys wore hats. One (also) wore a sweater. 
(19) Three boys wore hats. One of them (also) wore a sweater. 
Although it is possible for one to refer to a boy other than one that is part of 
the plurality that its antecedent refers to, this is not always the case; see (20). 
(20) Three boys walked in. One walked out. 
What is important for us is that one can, on some occasions, be used as a sort 
of partitive anaphor, referring to a proper part of what its antecedent refers to. 
When one is used this way, it can act as an antecedent for other so that 
otherness can be determined with regards to something within a plurality, an 
option that is not available in (17). We can see this in (21), where other is 
linked indirectly to three boys by having one as its antecedent, and this in 
turn acts as a partitive anaphor directly anteceded by three boys. 
(21) Three boys wore hats. One wore a sweater. Another wore a scarf. 
I believe that the “anaphoric chain” that we see here is exactly what is at 
work in OARs. This means that in OARs, other inherits one’s partitivity, and 
as a result otherness is determined by what one picks out. (22) shows a 
schematic representation about the structure of OARs under this approach. 
(22) [S …Antecedenti…[DP …one of themi…]k…[DP…other than thatk…]…] 
3	   The	  Logical	  Form	  of	  OARs	  
The last section has outlined facts that any theory of (one-another) recipro-
cals should address. I see no way of seriously maintaining a primitive, poly-
adic analysis of OARs given the data from 2.1. This, however, puts us in a 
quandary. Polyadic quantifier analyses have been so popular as of late be-
cause they capture facts about reciprocity better than earlier theories advo-
cating a complex treatment. However, as Schein (2003) notes, these earlier 
theories assume a logical syntax where verbs are understood as relational 
predicates. Like him, I believe that it is possible to revive the goals of these 
earlier approaches with the tools of neo-Davidsonian semantics. Before re-
viewing the relevant event literature and stating my own proposals, I think it 
is prudent to discuss at least one of the problems that have been at the 
forefront of the reciprocal literature, which I turn to immediately. 
3.1	   Polysemy	  and	  Reciprocity	  
While reasons of space prevent me from reviewing all of the aspects of the 
reciprocal literature that I believe bear on the issues raised here, I will at least 
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outline what I take to be one of the most central problems for the semantics 
of reciprocity that nearly the entire literature attempts to address in one way 
or another. The problem is summarized as such: how is it the case that the 
sentence in (23) can be true in so many different situations? 
(23) The dots are pointing at one another. 
This problem has been addressed as early back as Lasnik and Fiengo (1973). 
However, it was not until work of Langendoen (1978) that we first had an 
explicit typology of the different readings associated with (23). Langendoen 
classified these readings according to reciprocal “strength” (borrowing this 
term from Fiengo and Lasnik). For example, Strong Reciprocity (the strong-
est of reciprocal readings) is associated with the reading where every dot is 
pointing at, and is pointed at by, every other dot. In (Fig. 1), I have included a 
modern typology of these readings, taken from Beck (2001). Let A denote the 
plurality associated with the reciprocal antecedent, and R the verbal pre-
dicate. 
(Fig. 1) 
I. Strong Reciprocity (SR): 
∀x ∈ A: ∀y ∈ A [x ≠ y → xRy] 
II. Partitioned Strong Reciprocity (PartSR): 
There is partition PART of A such that ∀X ∈ PART: 
∀x ∈ X: ∀y ∈ X [x ≠ y → xRy] 
III. Intermediate Reciprocity (IR): 
∀x ∈ A: ∀y ∈ A: [x ≠ y → ∃zi … zn ∈ A[x = zi & y = zn & ziRzn & … zn-1Rzn] 
IV. Weak Reciprocity (WR): 
∀x ∈ A: ∃y ∈ A [x ≠ y → xRy] & ∀y ∈ A: ∃x ∈ A [x ≠ y → xRy] 
V. One-way Weak Reciprocity (OWR): 
∀x[x ∈ A → ∃y[y ∈ A & x ≠ y & xRy]] 
VI. Inclusive Alternative Ordering (IAO): 
∀x[x ∈ A → ∃y[y ∈ A & x ≠ y & (xRy ∨ yRx)]] 
Interestingly, as Langendoen noticed, there are certain entailment relations 
that hold among the possible reciprocal readings. (Fig. 2) shows these 
entailments, again taken from Beck (2001). 
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(Fig. 2) 
 
Because of these entailments, Langendoen suggested that we take reciprocal 
expressions as having one meaning, and that meaning should be weak. His 
reasoning was that if a reciprocal sentence is judged true where the truth 
conditions are those of a strong type of reciprocity, then the sentence will also 
be true when the truth conditions are those of a weaker type of reciprocity. 
For example, if we judge (23) to be true where truth is evaluated in terms of 
SR, then it will also be true when evaluated in terms of WR. Therefore, if we 
view the reciprocal as a having a weak interpretation, then we can use that 
single interpretation in accounting for the truth-conditional meaning of all 
reciprocal sentences, even if such sentences are used to describe situations 
where a stronger type of reciprocity holds. 
This elegant solution to the polysemy problem was called into question 
by Dalrymple et al. (1998). They raised the concern that such an under-
specification analysis makes incorrect predictions with regard to sentences 
like (24). 
(24) Alvin, Simon, and Theodor know one another. 
An account like Langendoen’s would predict (24) to be felicitous in a situ-
ation where there is less than full mutual acquaintance among the individuals 
mentioned in (24); say, where Alvin and Simon know one another, and 
Simon and Theodor know one another, but Alvin and Theodor never met. 
However, (24) cannot be used in such a situation. As Fiengo and Lasnik 
(1973) were the first to suggest, this infelicity seems to come about because 
stative verbs appear to require strong reciprocity. 
I believe the issue raised by Dalrymple et al. as a criticism of underspec-
ification analyses for reciprocity should be dismissed. My reason for this that 
it can be shown that stative verbs impose the same strength requirements 
even in non-reciprocal sentences. 
(25) John and Mary know Bill and Sue. 
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It is not possible to have an interpretation of (25) where John and Bill know 
one another, and Mary and Sue know one another, and that is all the knowing 
involved. Thus, we should not let the idiosyncratic properties of certain verbs 
influence theories of reciprocity, since these idiosyncratic properties have 
shown not to have anything to do with reciprocity in particular.5 
The account that I will give below follows in the spirit of Langendoen. 
Like him, I will propose that OARs have a single weak interpretation. In 
particular, the interpretation I give is analogous to the fifth reading above, 
OWR. This means that the conditions imposed by the proposed logical form 
schema will be met in situations that validate OWR and any stronger type of 
reciprocity, except in cases where there are independent restrictions on 
interpretation such as the idiosyncratic properties of certain lexical items as 
observed in (24) and (25). I say that the proposed interpretation is analogous 
to OWR because I will use a different metalanguage than what we see in 
(Fig. 1); a language that has higher-order variables that can range over both 
individuals and events, and where verbs are not represented as relations. In 
the next section, I will explicate my metalanguage assumptions. 
3.2	   Events	  and	  Plurality	  
I will assume familiarity with some basic tenets of neo-Davidsonianism, and 
take it as uncontroversial that an object language sentence like (26) can be 
represented as (27). 
(26) [S John drank the coffee quickly]  
(27) ∃e{AGENT(e, John) & DRANK(e) & THEME(e, the coffee) & QUICK(e)} 
Notice that, in contrast to logical forms like those in (Fig. 1), the verb is 
represented as a monadic predicate of events, which is related to it arguments 
indirectly by thematic relations which share the same event parameter as the 
verbal predicate. It is assumed that all (declarative) sentences are existentially 
closed by tacit event quantifiers. For discussion of the many benefits of this 
type of approach, see Davidson 1967, Casteneda 1967, Carlson 1984, Higgin-
botham 1985, Taylor 1985, Parsons 1990, Schein 1993, Kratzer 2002, Pie-
troski 2005, and Williams 2007, among many others. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See Kerem et al. (2010) for an account of reciprocals that reaches a similar conclusion. For 
them, strength is attributed to the notion of typicality; e.g., (23) and (24) sound bad when used in 
the relevant situations because the verb know is typically used in situations of full mutual 
acquaintance. 
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Schein (1993) has urged that the variables used in logical forms like (27) be 
construed as higher-order variables, in particular, plural variables that can 
have many values. As an illustration, we can represent (28) as (29).  
(28) The boys kissed the girls. 
(29) ∃ee{AGENT(ee, the boys) & KISS(ee) & THEME(ee, the girls) 
If we can interpret the singular quantifier ∃e in (27) into English as “there 
exists an event, e”, then we can interpret the plural quantifier ∃ee in (29) as 
“there exists one ore more events, the ee-s”. Crucially, as will be discussed 
more below, plural variables are number-neutral: their values can be one or 
many things. Schein has shown that modifying traditional neo-Davidsonian 
logical forms with higher-order variables accounts for many of the problems 
that are addressed in the literature on semantic plurality. The work of 
Landman (2000) reaches similar results, and even though his particular 
construal of higher order variables differs from Schein’s (Landman would 
have the variables in (29) range over sums or Groups), the central idea seems 
to be shared between these authors. For the purposes of this paper, I will 
follow Schein and use plural variables, though this is only a personal 
preference. As far as I can tell, variables ranging over sums or Groups work 
just as well, so long as these variables remain number-neutral.6 
I will take the rest of this section to outline the plural first-order 
language that I will use to represent sentences with OARs; for a more 
detailed exposition of these types of languages, I refer the reader to Schein 
(1993), and Linnebo (2008). This language can be seen as having everything 
that the language of first-order predicate calculus has (which I will not 
include here for purposes of space), plus the plural machinery I will describe 
below.  
As for terms in our language, in addition to familiar singular terms, such 
as singular variables x,e, and singular constants a,b, we have their 
corresponding number-neutral plural counterparts, xx, ee, aa, and bb. One of 
the central properties of plural languages is that plural terms can have many 
values, though they are just as happy with having a single value (Boolos 
1984). This number-neutral aspect of plural variables will be important for 
the present account of OARs.   
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Landman himself makes a distinction between variables that can have just one value and 
variables that can have a sum as a value. However, as Zweig (2008) shows, it is possible to have 
number-neutral variables in a Landman-type semantics for plurality. 
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There are three types of predicates in this language. First, there is the logical 
predicate ≤, which we can interpret as is one of; we can translate x ≤ yy into 
English as “x is one of the yy”. We also have singular and plural monadic 
predicates. Following Pietroski (2005), I will assume that at least the 
members of the open-class lexical categories can be represented as plural 
monadic predicates; e.g. ⟦dogN ⟧ = DOG(xx); ⟦kissV ⟧ = KISS(ee); ⟦smartAdj ⟧ = 
SMART(xx); ⟦quicklyAdv ⟧ = QUICK(ee). As an idealization, sufficient for the 
purposes of this paper, assume the following interpretive axiom for plural 
monadic predicates.7 
(30) P(xx) iff ∀x: x ≤ xx[P(x)] 
Exceptions to the monadic trend are certain open-class morphemes that are 
inherently relation. These include same, different, and of particular interest 
for us, other. I will treat these as formally dyadic, though in this paper, we 
will only consider cases when these predicates have singular arguments such 
as OTHER(x,y), which are interpreted as a simple first-order relation. See 
Moltmann (1992). 
The last type of predicate in our plural first-order language is dyadic 
thematic predicates. Aside from the logical predicate ≤, and the special 
relational open-class morphemes (same, different, other, etc.), these are the 
only non-monadic predicates in the language that I will consider here. These 
predicates represent the interpretation of thematic roles. Again, I will assume 
an idealized interpretive axiom for these predicates when they appear with 
plural arguments8 (cf. Schein 2005). 
(31) ϴ(ee, xx) iff ∀x: x ≤ xx [∃e: e ≤ ee [ϴ(e,x)]]  
 & ∀e: e ≤ ee [∃x: x ≤ xx [ϴ(e,x)]] 
All of these predicates alone count as formulas of the language. If two non-
logical predicates share a common parameter, such as P(ee) and Q(ee,xx), 
then the conjunction of these formulas, P(ee) & Q(ee,xx), is also a formula. 
The plural quantified expressions ∃vv.F, ∀v: v ≤ vv.F, and ∃v: v ≤ vv.F are 
formulas if F is a formula. I intentionally leave out discussion of reciprocals 
with quantificational antecedents since there is not enough space here to 
discuss treatments of quantificational determiners; however, when necessary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Certain plural monadic predicates are taken to be collective; for example, three(xx) can be true 
of some things taken together, even though it does not hold of any one x such that x ≤ xx. I will 
put aside this possibility and treat monadic predicates as being distributive in the sense of (30). 
8 Outlier effects are pervasive with plural DPs, especially when large pluralities are involved. 
Again, I will stick to the idealized interpretive axiom, though we will see exceptions to (31) even 
in this paper. 
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I will sometimes use the following notation of Schein’s when representing 
the content of determiners, and assume that the resulting constituent in logical 
form is a formula of the language that can be appended to other formulas in 
the same manner as the previously mentioned quantifiers. 
(32) The boys slept. 
(33) ∃ee{[the xx: BOY(xx)]AGENT(ee, xx) & SLEEP(ee)} 
Having outlined a suitable metalanguage, I will now turn to my specific 
proposals for OARs. 
3.3	   Interpreting	  OARs	  
The goal of this section is to put forth of theory of the interpretation of OARs, 
and the sentences in which they are embedded, in a way that not only respects 
the empirical facts from Section 2, but also captures a wide range of the 
attested readings from 3.1 in a straightforward manner.  
I want the logical forms of these sentences to not only reflect that OARs 
are complex, as argued for in 2.1, but as being composed of the same one and 
other that we saw in instances of cross-sentential anaphora (Section 2.2). This 
means that the analysis should include the following two things: (i), that one 
of OARs is inherently partitive, and (ii) that anaphora in OARs is linked in 
exactly the same way as it is in (21) and (22), specifically that the antecedent 
of OARs is only the antecedent to one, and other is indirectly related to this 
antecedent by being anteceded by one. And since one antecedes other, other 
inherits one’s partitivity.  
I will also propose some additions to the logical form, which are also 
guided by the facts from Section 2; additions that are necessary for explaining 
the range of polysemy discussed above. First, I propose that the case facts we 
saw at the end of section 2.1 reflect the thematic properties of both one and 
other. I believe that one inherits not only morphological case from its ante-
cedent, but also that it inherits its antecedent’s thematic role. When inter-
preted, one is associated with whatever thematic relation in logical form that 
its antecedent is (e.g., AGENT(e,x)), modulo specific values of variables. As 
for other, I suggest that its thematic role, like its case, be the one typical of 
the position where the OAR finds itself: if the OAR is a direct object, other 
will be interpreted as a Theme; if an indirect object, other will be interpreted 
as a Goal.  
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I also propose that the DP containing one has a covert distributive quantifier.9 
Much work in the event semantics literature have shown that it is useful to 
view distributive quantifiers as being immediately followed by sub-event 
quantifiers in logical form (see, for example, Pietroski and Hornstein 2002; 
Schein 1993 and elsewhere; Taylor 1985), and I will adopt this view here. 
There are several benefits to this approach to distributivity. For example, it 
allows us to apportion different adverbial modifiers to different event 
arguments, as shown in (34), an example from Taylor (1985). 
(34) Gracefully, Sally ate every crisp quickly. 
We can interpret this sentence as meaning that the entirety of the eating was 
graceful, but as far as the eating of each crisp is concerned, this happened 
quickly. This is represented in (35). 
(35) ∃ee{GRACEFUL(ee) & AGENT(ee, Sally) & EAT(ee)  
     & [every(y): CRISP(y)] ∃e’: e’ ≤ ee {THEME(e’,y) & QUICK(e’)}} 
From (35), we can see that it is possible to construe some event predicates as 
being associated with subevents, and others as being associated with the 
“larger event”. Schein (1993) has shown that this apportionment applies not 
only to adverbial predicates, but also verbal predicates and thematic relations; 
an assumption that forms the basis for his argument for thematic separation 
(see Schein 1993: Ch 4; Kratzer 2003). Observe (36), where the relevant 
reading is one where the two brothers did all the making, and for each 
customer, that customer received three slices of pizza. 
(36) Two brothers made every customer three slices of pizza. 
Schein captures this reading by representing (36) as (37), where the thematic 
predicate associated with three slices of pizza has its event variable bound by 
the sub-event quantifier introduced by the distributive DP, every customer. 
(37) ∃ee{AGENT(ee, two brothers) & give(ee) & [every x: customer(x)]  
 ∃e’: e’ ≤ ee{Goal(e’, x) & THEME(e’, three slices of pizza)}} 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Several authors have proposed that some things that are apparently indefinite (such as one 
here), can sometimes receive a universal interpretation. Consider (i) 
 
(i) Three students drank a bottle of beer 
 
Covert distributivity has been proposed to account for cases like (i) not only by those working in 
the plural event literature (Schein 1993, Landman 2000), but also in the DRT framework (Kamp 
and Reyle 1993). 
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I will implement this approach to distributivity in the case of OARs as 
follows. Assuming that other is interpreted within the scope of one, and that 
one is interpreted distributively (as “each one”), then the event variable 
within other’s corresponding thematic relation in logical form will be bound 
by the sub-event quantifier introduced by the distributive quantifier, in much 
the same way as the thematic predicate associated with three slices of pizza 
has its event variable bound in (37). 
With these points in mind, I propose (38) as the interpretation of one 
another. The thematic predicate ϴxx is meant to represent the thematic 
relation inherited from the reciprocal antecedent, i.e., the same thing whose 
values form the whole from which the one’s partitivity is determined. The 
thematic predicate ϴC is meant to represent the “canonical” thematic role 
associated with the position where the OAR. As the logical form shows, this 
thematic role is associated with whatever the value of other is, in accord with 
my proposals above. 
(38) ⟦one another⟧ = 
 ∀x’: x’ ≤ xx [∃e’: e’ ≤ ee {ϴxx(e’,x’) &       ←contribution of one 
 [∃x’’: x’’ ≤ xx & OTHER(x’, x’’) & ϴC(e’,x’’)]}]   ←contribution of 
other 
We can see that (38) also encodes the relevant properties that we observed at 
work in the cases of cross-sentential anaphora we saw in 2.2. Specifically, 
one’s partitivity is represented as x’ ≤ xx, where xx picks out the values 
associated with the antecedent; and other inherits this partitivity (x’’ ≤ xx) 
and determines distinctness with regard to what one picks out (OTHER(x’, x’’). 
We can also see the work of the sub-event quantifier introduced by the 
distributive quantifier that I claimed is part of [DP…one…]. The sub-events 
are such that each individual value of one, x’, has its own subevent e’, where 
itx’ act as a ϴxx, and in that e’ something other than itx’ acts as a ϴC. 
Let us now apply the schema in (38) to actual sentences with OARs. 
Consider first an elementary reciprocal sentence. 
(39) The boys hit one another. 
(40) ∃ee{[the xx: BOY(xx)]AGENT(ee, xx) & HIT(ee) 
 & ∀x’: x’ ≤ xx[∃e’: e’ ≤ ee{AGENT(e’, x’)      
 & [∃xx’’: x’’ ≤ x & OTHER(x’, x’’) &THEME(e’, x’’)]}]}   
We can see here how specific values of ϴxx and ϴC are determined. Since the 
OARs antecedent has the Agent role, the value of ϴxx is Agent in (40). And 
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since the OAR is a direct object, the role of other (40) is the role typical of 
direct objects, i.e., Theme. 
Turning now to more complicated cases, consider when the OAR is an 
indirect object, in which case it has multiple potential antecedents.  
(41) The students introduced the professors to one another. 
These are the cases discussed at end of 2.1, where Serbo-Croatian and 
Ukrainian show different case morphology on one, depending on the intended 
meaning. As I am claiming that both case and thematic role of one is 
dependant on the reciprocal antecedent, then we should expect that when one 
is nominative, it is associated with the thematic relation AGENT in logical 
form, and when one is accusative, it is associated with THEME. The logical 
forms below show that this association gives the correct interpretations. 
Consider first the reading of (41) where the professors are introduced to 
students. This is the reading that is represented in (42); where the case of one 
is nominative (cf. 15). Since the antecedent to one here is the subject, one 
gets interpreted as an Agent, and the whole from which one’s partitivity is 
determined by what the subject denotes, in this case, the students. 
(42) ∃ee{[the xx: STUDENT(xx)]AGENT(ee, xx) & HIT(ee)  
 & [the yy: PROFESSOR(yy)]THEME(yy) 
 & ∀x’: x’ ≤ xx[∃e’: e’ ≤ ee{AGENT(e’, x’)      
 & [∃x’’: x’’ ≤ xx & OTHER(x’, x’’) & GOAL(e’, x’’)]}]} 
Consider now the reading where the professors are introduced to professors 
(cf. 16). Here, one gets interpreted as a Theme, and its partitivity is de-
termined with regards to what the direct object picks out, in this case, the 
professors. 
(43) ∃ee{[the xx: STUDENT(xx)]AGENT(ee, xx) & HIT(ee)  
 & [the yy: PROFESSOR(yy)]THEME(yy) 
 & ∀y’: y’ ≤ yy[∃e’: e’ ≤ ee{THEME(e’, y’)      
 & [∃y’’: y’’ ≤ yy & OTHER(y’, y’’) & GOAL(e’, y’’)]}]} 
In both readings, other is interpreted as a Goal, which is expected since the 
OAR is an indirect object.  
Admittedly, there are certain situations that this approach predicts to be 
false, but are not. This concerns situations described by the following sen-
tences. 
(44) The students are following one another. 
(45) The plates are stacked on one another. 
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Imagine that the situations are such that there is a student at the front of the 
line that is not following anyone, and a plate at the bottom of the stack that is 
not stacked on anything. My proposed logical form would predict (44) and 
(45) to be false in these situations, because of the universal force associated 
with one. However, most people, including myself, would judge these sen-
tences to be fine in such situations. But before trying to save myself from this 
problem, let me first consider how the slightly flawed present approach fairs 
against other proposal to deal with this issue. And to consider this, let us 
reflect on a bit on the present methodology. I have tried here to revive Lang-
endoen’s underspecification approach for the reasons discussed in 3.1. Why 
is it then that I proposed something analogous to Reading 5 (OWR) and not 
the weakest reading, Reading 6 (IAO)? Something like IAO is able to capture 
the truth (44) and (45) as true in the relevant situations, and there exist ac-
counts, such as Dalrymple et al’s (1998), that take IAO to be a possible inter-
pretation. However, this comes at a price: while approaches that include IAO 
as a possibility can account for the “edge” cases in (44) and (45), they make 
bad predictions with regard to comparative sentences like (46) and (47). 
(46) #The students are taller than one another. 
(47) #The students exceed one another (in height). 
A theory with IAO would predict sentences like (46) and (47) to be true just 
as long as one individual is taller than the rest. The approach outlined in this 
paper predicts these sentences to be contradictory, and this prediction is borne 
out, as we can see from the logical form of (47)10 in (48). 
(48) ∃ee{[the xx: STUDENT(xx)]AGENT(ee, xx) & EXCEED(ee) 
 & ∀x’: x’ ≤ xx[∃e’: e’ ≤ ee{AGENT(e’, x’)      
 & [∃xx’’: x’’ ≤ x & OTHER(x’, x’’) &THEME(e’, x’’)]}]} 
This states, roughly, that every individual is associated (through an event of 
exceeding) with another individual such that the former is taller than the 
latter. This is something that cannot be true of every individual, hence the 
infelicity of (47). So we are left with a choice between two flawed theories, 
the current one, where we have to make exceptions for “edge” effects, or a 
theory with IAO, which runs into problems with comparatives. Sauerland 
(1998) has previously suggested in his work on reciprocals that there is a 
pragmatic principle, which he calls Benevolence, that allows for a certain 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 I am giving the logical form of (47), and not (46), since they illustrate the same thing, but 
interpreting (46) would require to me to discuss a neo-Davidsonian treatment of comparative 
constructions, a digression that unfortunately cannot fit in this paper. 
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degree of exception when judging a sentence to be true. If we allow for such 
a device, then that seems like a step toward saving the present approach in the 
face of these “edge” cases. Lastly, on par with the discussion above of the 
strength imposed by stative verbs, notice that it appears we must make ex-
ceptions for edges even in cases where reciprocals are not involved, 
suggesting that theories of reciprocity should not have to worry about accom-
modating a more general problem. 
(49) The plates are stacked.  
I want to close this discussion by briefly mentioning an extension of the 
current approach. As we know, there are more than just elementary reciprocal 
sentences that a theory of reciprocity has to account for. We have already 
looked at non-elementary sentences where the OAR is in indirect object 
position. I want now to consider OARs as they appear within noun phrases, as 
in (50). 
(50) I enjoyed the artists’ pictures of one another. 
We can interpret this sentence with the current approach by modifying (38) 
so that the existential quantifier introduced by distributive one be of a poly-
morphic type. That is, in some cases, it will range over events, and other 
cases, it will ranger over individuals. This modified version of (38) is shown 
below in (51). I will use u and uu as singular and plural metavariables, where 
specific instances of the OAR will dictate whether these variables range over 
events (e and ee) or individuals (x and xx). 
(51) ⟦one another⟧ = 
 ∀x’: x’ ≤ xx [∃u’: u’ ≤ uu {ϴxx(e’,x’) &        
 [∃x’’: x’’ ≤ xx & OTHER(x’, x’’) & ϴC(e’,x’’)]}]   
With (51) as our rule for interpreting OARs, the logical form for (50) would 
be as in (52). In what follows, I will simplify the logical forms for clarity, and 
only explicitly state the interpretation of nominals when necessary, and when 
not, I will just provide subscripted variable names. As for the existence 
nominal thematic roles, and for the specific ones used here, I refer the reader 
to Barker (1991) for POSS and Barker and Dowty (1993) for OF. 
(52) ∃ee{AGENT(ee, Ixx) & ENJOY(ee) 
 & ∃yy[POSS(yy, the artistszz) & PICTURE(yy) 
 & ∀z’: z’ ≤ zz [∃y’: y’ ≤ yy {POSS(y’,z’)  
 & [∃z’’: z’’ ≤ zz & OTHER(z’, z’’) & OF(y’,x’’)]}] 
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The only change that we had to make (38) to account for such constructions 
was to allow the relevant quantifier to range over different types of things; 
everything else stays the same, such as how thematic roles are apportioned 
and how antecedence works. We still need to elucidate exactly what 
determines what the quantifier will ranger over, but roughly, I believe that 
this is determined by the type of constituent that one is (immediately) 
embedded in. If it is occurs within a sentence, the quantifier will range over 
events, as in (41)-(48); if it occurs within a nominal, it will range over 
individuals, as in (50) and (52). For a more detailed account of this, see 
LaTerza (2011). 
4	   Conclusion	  
In this paper I have argued that OARs should be treated as compositionally 
complex expressions, where each element contributes essentially the same 
meaning here as in their non-OAR occurrences. I claimed that the only 
differences in this regard is that the one of OARS is always a partitive 
anaphor, and that it also contains a covert distributive quantifier. We have 
seen in 3.3 that a neo-Davidsonian theory designed to reflect the observable 
distributional properties of OARs (and the relevant cases of cross-sentential 
anaphora) can account for a wide range of the attested reciprocal readings, 
regardless of where the reciprocal appears in the sentence. Furthermore, it 
does so without positing any sort of ambiguity in reciprocal expressions, and 
also without resorting to polyadic quantification. I am not aware of any other 
approach that can accommodate such a wide range of readings and syntactic 
distribution with a uniform semantics for OARs (as we saw in (51)). While 
reasons of space prevent me from explicating how the logical forms 
discussed here are composed from smaller meaningful units, I refer the reader 
to LaTerza (2011) for the details of a recursive specification of semantic 
values, where I also provide proposals about the LF phrase markers that are 
interpreted. 
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Evidentials in Interrogatives: A Case Study of Korean∗
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Abstract. This paper concerns a puzzle about the interpretation of Korean di-
rect evidential -te- in interrogatives which I call evidential perspective shift in
questions (‘origo shift of evidentials’ in quesitons in Garrett 2001). This puzzle
consists in the evidential being interpreted as regarding a source of information
of the answerer rather than the questioner. Here I introduce a novel semantic ap-
proach to this phenomenon which derives it as a consequence of the interaction
of the meaning of questions and of evidentials. I will also illustrate the concep-
tual and empirical advantages of this view over previous accounts.
1 Introduction
Korean verbal ending -te- introduces the ‘implication’ that the utterer has direct
evidence relative to the ‘prejacent’.1 For example, unlike (1a), (1b) carries the
implication that the speaker has direct evidence (or the speaker saw) that John
looked at the speaker himself/herself. Furthermore, as shown in (1c), -te- also
introduces a similar implication when used in questions.
(1) a. John-i
John-NOM
na-lul
I-ACC
po-nta.
see-DECL
‘John looks at me.’
b. John-i
John-NOM
na-lul
I-ACC
po-te-la.
see-te-DECL
‘John saw me.’
Implication: The speaker has direct evidence that John saw the
speaker himself/herself
∗ I thank audiences in California Universities Semantics and Pragmatics (November 21, 2009,
UCSC) and in SuB 15 for their questions and comments. I am also indebted to the discussions
with Jean-Roger Vergnaud, Andrew Simpson, Stephen Finlay, Barry Schein, Seungho Nam and
Chungmin Lee. Special thanks go to Elena Guerzoni, whose detailed comments and suggestions
to the earlier version of this work were greatly helpful. All remaining errors are mine, of course.
1 Throughout this paper, the term implication is used to avoid making any theoretical commitment
to the question of whether it is truth-conditional, presuppositional, implicational, or illocutionary.
I also extend the notion prejacent to indicate the propositional content of the sentence from the
context of evidentials. I use this term in a purely descriptive way.
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c. John-i
John-NOM
na-lul
I-ACC
po-te-nya?
see-te-Q
‘Did John see me?’
Implication: The addressee is expected to answer based on his/her
direct evidence relative to whether John saw the speaker or not
(1) shows that evidentials behave like indexicals (Kaplan 1989): the implica-
tion it introduces varies depending on who the speaker is.2 For example, if the
utterer of (1b) is Bill, then it is Bill who has direct evidence, and if the utterer
is Tom, then it is Tom who has direct evidence. Similarly, the denotation of the
indexical, such as na ‘I’, is evaluated from the utter’s perspective. Therefore, if
the utterer of (1a) is Bill, then the sentence is true iff John looks at Bill, and if
the utterer is Tom, then it is true iff John looks at Tom.
However, we find that the parallelism between indexicals and evidentials
does not appear any more in questions. Both in the declarative (1b) and in the
interrogative (1c), the pronoun na ‘I’ is interpreted as the utterer. However,
the evidential implication introduced by -te- is ‘shifted’ from the speaker’s
perspective to the addressee’s perspective: in (1b), it is the speaker who has
the direct evidence, but in (1c), it is the addressee who is expected to have the
direct evidence. Here we have a puzzle of the evidential perspective shift in
questions: if both pronouns and evidentials exhibit indexicality, why are only
evidentials shifted from the speaker’s perspective to the addressee’s perspective
in questions?
This paper aims to solve this puzzle. Specifically, I will show that the
facts illustrated above can be derived from the standard semantics of indexicals
and questions by assuming a specific lexical entry for evidentials. To do that,
first I will outline the theoretical assumptions of this paper: Kaplan’s (1989)
semantics of indexicals and Hamblin’s (1973) semantics of questions (Section
2). Then I will make my own proposal and show how this proposal explains the
puzzle (Section 3). Next I will compare my proposal with other (plausible but
wrong, at least for Korean) proposals (Section 4). Finally I will conclude my
paper and discuss theoretical implications and remaining problems (Section 5).
2 Theoretical Backgrounds
2.1 Semantics of Indexicals: Kaplan (1989)
Kaplan’s (1989) theory of indexicals is intended to explain the difference be-
tween (2a) and (2b):
2 Higginbotham (2009) also pointed out this characteristics under the term First-person authority.
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(2) a. He must be rich.
b. The President of GM must be rich.
Suppose that (2a) is uttered with pointing out John as the reference of he. At the
time of utterance, the reference of he does not vary over world of evaluation,
and therefore, (2a) is true iff, at the time of the utterance, in every epistemic
alternative of the speaker, John is rich. In contrast, (2b) (with de dicto reading),
is true iff in every epistemic alternative of the speaker, the president of GM
is rich, no matter who the president of GM might be in that world. Here the
reference of the definite description the President of GM may vary depending
on the worlds of evaluation (in one world it may be John, while in the other
world it may be Mary, and so forth).
To account for the difference between indexicals and other definite de-
scriptions, Kaplan (1989) proposes that indexicals (like I, here and now), re-
ceive world-independent but context-dependent denotations. Once the refer-
ence of an indexical is established within an utterance context, it behaves like
a rigid designator across worlds of evaluation (Kripke 1980). To formalize this
idea, Kaplan proposes two-step semantics, where the meaning of a sentence,
which grammar generates, is called character, a function from contexts to in-
tensions. Then a character is evaluated via two steps. First, characters are ap-
plied to the context, resulting in intensions. Second, intensions are applied to
worlds of evaluation, resulting in extensions. In terms of type-driven seman-
tics, this idea can be formalized as (3).3 In addition to this, following common
practice, I assume the utterance context c is a triple which contains the world,
the time, and the speaker of utterance, as in (4).
(3) a. The character of φ : JφKχ = λc.λw.JφKc,w
b. The intension of φ at context c: JφKc¢ = λw.JφKc,w
(4) Utterance context c = <wc, tc, sc>4
Let us see how this system works with concrete examples. First consider (5).
(5) I am rich.
In Kaplan’s proposal, the pronoun I is interpreted as the speaker of the utter-
ance s∗ in the utterance context c∗:
(6) J I Kc∗ = J I K<w∗,t∗,s∗> = s∗
3 (3) is from von Fintel (2005). For the original formalization see Kaplan (1989: Ch.XVIII).
4 I only specify relevant parameters: for my purpose, other parameter such as the place of utterance
is not required.
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Therefore, the truth-condition of (5) differs depending who the speaker is in c∗,
as illustrated in (7). For example, if Mary utters (5) in c∗, then since I refers to
Mary, (5) is true if and only if Mary is rich in c∗. Similarly, if Tom utters (5) in
c∗, I refers to Tom, and (5) is true if and only if Tom is rich in c∗.
(7) a. If s∗ is Mary, then J I Kc∗ = J I K<w∗,t∗,s∗> = Mary
Therefore, (5) is true if and only if Mary is rich in c∗
b. If s∗ is Tom, then J I Kc∗ = J I K<w∗,t∗,s∗> = Tom
Therefore, (5) is true if and only if Tom is rich in c∗
Given this, let us further see how this system works for evidentials, which also
exhibit indexicality, as we saw in the introduction. Consider (8), for example,
where the declarative John-i Bill-ul po-te-la ‘John saw Bill’ contains -te-, and
is uttered in the context c∗. Then (8) carries the implication that the speaker s∗
in c∗ has direct evidence that John saw Bill.
(8) JJohn-i
John-NOM
Bill-ul
Bill-ACC
po-te-laKc∗
see-te-DECL
‘John saw Bill’
Implication: s∗ in c∗ has direct evidence that John saw Bill.
The implication introduced by -te- is speaker-dependent: it varies depending
on the speaker s∗ in c∗. For example, as illustrated in (9), if s∗ is Mary, then
the implication is that Mary has direct evidence that John saw Bill, and if s∗ is
Tom, then the implication is that Tom has direct evidence that John saw Bill.
(9) a. If the utterer of (8) is Mary, then s∗ is Mary.
The implication of (8): Mary has dir. evi. that John saw Bill.
b. If the utterer of (8) is Tom, then s∗ is Tom.
The implication of (8): Tom has dir. evi. that John saw Bill.
2.2 Semantics of Questions: Hamblin (1973)
Hamblin (1973) assumes that a question denotes the set of its possible answers,
that is, the set of propositions. The shift from propositions to sets thereof is
due to the semantics of wh-words. For example, in yes/no questions, Hamblin
assumes the lexical entry (10) for (either overt or covert) whether, where it
maps every proposition to the set containing it and its negation:5
(10) J whether K = { λ pst .pst ,λ pst .~pst }
5 For simplicity I only focus on yes/no questions, but my proposal can easily extend to wh-
questions.
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Since a wh-word denotes a set of individuals, properties, or functions taking
propositions, in different stages of semantic computation, we may find one of
the three cases in (11): either the function is in a set (11a), the argument is in a
set (11b), or both are in different sets (11c).
(11) a. [ [ α<σ ,τ> ] [ {β : β ∈ Dσ} ] ]
b. [ [ {α : α ∈ D<σ ,τ>} ] [ βσ ] ]
c. [ [ {α : α ∈ D<σ ,τ>} ] [ {β : β ∈ Dσ} ] ]
Since, in these cases, the usual functional application (FA) rule does not work
any more, Hamblin (1973) proposes a new rule, that is, a set-tolerant FA rule, or
a point-wise FA rule. This rule can be implemented into type-driven semantics
as (12), a rendition of Hamblin’s rule made by Heim & von Fintel (2001).
(12) Pointwise Functional Application Rule (PFA)
If α is a branching node and {β ,γ} is the set of its daughters, then:
a. JαK¢ = λw. Jβ K¢(w)(JγK¢(w))
b. or {λw. Jβ K¢(w)(x(w)): x ∈ JγK¢}
c. or {λw. f (w)(JγK¢(w)): f ∈ Jβ K¢}
d. or {λw. f (w)(x(w)): f ∈ Jβ K¢ & x ∈ JγK¢}
whichever is defined.
By these rules, in (11a), each argument in the set β can combine with the func-
tion α , returning a set of elements of type τ . Similarly, in (11b), each function
in the set α can combine with the function β , returning a set of elements of type
τ , and in (11c), each function in the set α can combine with each argument in
a set β , returning a set of elements of type τ .
Let us see how Hamblin’s (1973) semantics of questions actually works
with a concrete example, that is (13), whose LF is (14):
(13) Did John leave?
(14)
{ λ pst .pst ,λ pst .~pst }
λw. John left in w
Here the proposition that John left needs to combine with each of two functions
in the set denoted by whether, which can be done via PFA (12c). Therefore,
(14) is computed as shown in (15), where we can see that the denotation of
(13) is a set of two possible answers (or two propositions), that is, that John
left and that John did not leave, as expected:
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(15) J (13) K¢ = J Did John leave? K¢= J Whether (John left) K¢
= { f (λw. John left in w): f∈{λ pst .pst , λ pst .~pst}}
= {[λ pst .pst ](λw. John left in w), [λ pst .~pst ](λw. John left in w)}
= {λw. John left in w, λw. John did not leave in w}
3 Proposal
Given the backgrounds shown above, I propose that the lexical entry for -te- is
(16), where -te- takes a proposition as its argument and returns a character:6
(16) For any utterance context c∗,J -te- Kc∗ = λ pst .λc: sc has only direct evidence relative to p. p
(where c is a variable over contexts: a triple of < wc, tc, sc >)
According to (16), for any utterance context c∗, -te- takes a proposition as its
argument and returns a partial character with the definedness condition (that
is presupposition) that the speaker in c only has direct perceptive evidence
that p. When this partial character is applied to a context with the definedness
condition satisfied, it returns the proposition p itself.
This proposal makes the following two predictions. First, if the resulting
character is immediately applied to c∗, the evidential presupposition relates to
the utterance context c∗, and is anchored to the utterance speaker s∗. In this
case, both evidentials and indexicals are interpreted from s∗’s perspective. Sec-
ond, when characters of this sort are not directly uttered (for example, when
they are members of a set of answers), these characters are not directly applied
to the uterance context c∗. In this case, indexicals are still interpreted from s∗’s
perspective, whereas evidential presuppositions are not interpreted from s∗’s
perspective. In the rest of this section, I will show that the first prediction is
borne out in declaratives, and the second prediction is borne out in questions.
3.1 -te- in Declaratives
First consider (17).
(17) John-i
John-NOM
na-lul
I-ACC
po-te-la.
see-te-DECL
‘John saw me’
Presupposition: the speaker has direct evidence that John saw the speaker
himself/herself
The LF of (17) is (18):
6 For simplicity I ignore the temporal interpretation of -te-. Readers interested in this issue are
referred to Chung (2007) and Lee (2010), inter alia.
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(18) (ii)
-te-
John
saw me (i)
For any utterance context c∗ (i.e., the triple < w∗, t∗, s∗ >), the denotation of
(18) is derived as follows:
(19) a. J(i)Kc∗ = JmeKc∗ = s∗7
b. J(ii)Kc∗ = J(17)Kc∗
= J-te-Kc∗ (JJohn saw meKc∗ ) (by Intensional FA and (19a))
= J-te-Kc∗ (λw. John saw s∗ in w) (by (16) and FA)
= λc: sc has direct evidence that J. saw s∗. λw. J. saw s∗ in w
Here we can see that the evidential presupposition that the speaker in c has
only direct evidence that John saw s∗, is anchored to the context c, which is
still bound by λ . When the speaker s∗ in c∗ utters (17), he/she applies this
character to c∗ with the result in (20).
(20) J(17)Kc∗ = [λc: sc has dir. evi. that J. saw s∗. λw. J. saw s∗ in w](c∗)
= λw. J. saw s∗ in w (presupposition: s∗ has dir. evi. that J. saw s∗)
When the context s∗ satisfies the presupposition that s∗ has direct evidence that
John saw s∗, we get the proposition that John saw s∗ in w. Now we can see that
the first prediction is borne out in declaratives : both evidentials and indexicals
are interpreted from s∗’s perspective.
3.2 -te- in Questions
Consider the following question:
(21) John-i
John-NOM
na-lul
I-ACC
po-te-nya?
see-te-Q
‘Did John see me?’
In the question like (21), in principle, we have two possible logical forms,
with respect to the relative scope between whether and the evidential -te-. First
consider the case where whether takes wide scope over -te-, which is (22).
7 A careful reader may wonder how the pronoun gets its denotation from the utterance context.
I assume that this is done by Korean sentence final declarative/interrogative endings, which vary
depending on the utterance context. For a detailed explanation, see Lim (2010: Ch.5.1).
426 Lim
(22)
whether (i)
-te-
λw. John saw me in w
At the node (i), we have the following character which is of type < c,st >:
(23) λc: sc has dir. evi. that J. saw s∗. λw. J. saw s∗ in w
This is the same character as that in declaratives: see (19). However, each func-
tion in whether needs a proposition, and not a character, as its argument: see
(10). Therefore, we have type mismatch. This means that, for the logical form
to be interpretable, -te- should take wide scope over whether as in (24):
(24)
-te-
whether
λw. John saw me in w
As in declaratives, for any utterance context c∗, me denotes the speaker s∗.
Then the question whether John saw me is computed as we saw in Section 2.2,
resulting in the set of two propositions in (25):
(25) {λw. John saw s∗ in w, λw. John did not see s∗ in w}
-te-, as a function taking a proposition and returning a partial character (of type
< c,st >), combines with each proposition in this set via PFA, and returns a set
of two characters in (26):
(26) {λc: sc has dir. evi. that J. saw s∗ in w: λw. J. saw s∗ in w,
λc: sc has dir. evi. that J. didn’t see s∗ in w: λw. J. didn’t see s∗ in w}
At this point, let us recall the pragmatics of questions in general. In Hamblin’s
semantics of questions, to ask a question is to present a set of answers to the
addressee. When doing so, none of the answers is directly uttered by the ques-
tioner: each answer can be directly uttered only when the addressee chooses it
as a true answer. This holds no matter what the type of the answers may be,
either propositions or characters. Therefore, it follows that the characters in the
set of answers are not directly uttered by the questioner.
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This said, consider (26) again. Here we have the set of two characters, where
pronouns are interpreted from s∗’s perspective, whereas the evidential presup-
position is anchored to sc in c, which is still bound by λ . None of the characters
in this set is uttered directly by s∗, the questioner, but each character in (26) can
be uttered only when the addressee chooses one of them as a true answer. When
chosen, the character as a true answer is uttered by the addressee. Then it is ap-
plied to the addressee’s context, and the evidential presupposition is anchored
to the addressee’s perspective. Here we can see that the second prediction is
borne out: indexicals are still interpreted from s∗’s perspective, but evidential
presuppositions are not interpreted from s∗’s perspective.
To summarize, in this section, I proposed that -te- is a function from
propositions to characters, introducing a definedness condition that the speaker
has direct evidence relative to the prejacent. Furthermore, -te- takes wide scope
over wh-words, and a question containing -te- denotes a set of characters and
not a set of propositions (as standardly assumed). I have also shown that, once
we assume that -te- is a function from propositions to characters, we can derive
the evidential perspective shift in questions from the semantics of -te- and its
interaction with the semantics and pragmatics of questions in general, with-
out any fundamental revision of Hamblin’s (1973) semantics of questions or
Kaplan’s (1989) semantics of indexicals.
4 Comparison with Other Proposals
In this section I discuss possible alternatives of my proposal in this paper, and
show why my proposal has theoretical as well as empirical advantages over
these alternatives.
4.1 Potential Pragmatic Alternative
One might choose to account for the evidential perspective shift in questions
in terms of the pragmatics of questions, rather than the semantic account I
proposed above. The potential pragmatic account is as follows. Suppose that a
questioner asks a question to an answerer about the issue P (the term issue is
also used descriptively here). In genuine information-seeking circumstances,
the questioner is ignorant of P. This means that, typically, the questioner has no
evidence relative to P, no matter what the type of evidence may be. Therefore
the evidential cannot be anchored to the questioner. However, for the addressee
to answer the question, he/she is expected to have evidence relative to P. Hence,
the evidential perspective shift.
This kind of pragmatic account makes the following prediction. Suppose
that a questioner’s state of information is limited: that is, the speaker only has
reportative evidence about P, which is weaker than direct perceptive evidence.
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In this case, it is reasonable for the questioner to ask a question to the addressee,
who is expected to have stronger evidence, that is direct perceptive evidence.
Then it is expected in the pragmatic account that the questioner would use the
reportative evidential marker in his/her question, to indicate his/her own weak
evidence, without anchoring it to the answerer. This prediction is not borne out,
however. Consider the following scenario.
(27) John is a detective and is investigating a case of embezzlement in a
company. While interviewing several employees in the company, John
heard that Mary is the one who embezzled the money. Finally, he in-
terviewed Mary and asked a question...
Then imagine that John asked the following question under (27):
(28) #Tangsin-i
you-NOM
ton-ul
money-ACC
hoynglyengha-ess-ta-pnikka?
embezzle-PAST-ta-Q
‘Did you embezzle the money?’
The pragmatic account predicts that, under (27), the example (28), where Ko-
rean reportative evidential -ta- (Lim 2010) is used in a question, would be
felicitous: since the speaker only has reportative evidence, and the addressee
obviously has stronger evidence (since she is the embezzler), the reportative ev-
idential -ta- should be anchored to the speaker. However, as indicated in (28),
this prediction is not borne out, and under (27), (28) is simply infelicitous. This
indicates that in Korean, the perspective shift of evidentials in questions obliga-
torily occurs, and therefore the pragmatic alternative does not explain Korean
facts: we need an account based on the semantics, as proposed above.
4.2 Garrett (2001) on Tibetan
Garrett (2001) discusses the evidential perspective shift in Tibetan (which he
calls the origo shift), and claims that, to account for the shift, the extension
of a question should be modified as the set of assertions rather than the set of
propositions, as shown in (29) (from Garrett 2001: 237):
(29) The revised extension of Who left?
Answer-Set(Who left?) = {A<h,s> | λx. Content(A) = x left}
In words: the answer set for Who left? is the set of assertions A from
h to s such that there is x such that the content of A is that x left.
Garrett’s (2001) approach bears several problems. First, since both the speaker
parameter and the addressee parameter is specified in each answer, it seems
to predict that the shift is optional: it can be either anchored to the speaker or
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to the addressee. However, the evidential perspective shift in Korean is oblig-
atory, as we saw in Section 4.1. Second, it is unclear how to compositionally
derive the extension in (29). Finally, again, since both parameters are specified
in each answer, Garrett (2001) predicts that, when there is a shift, indexicals
should also shift, but at least in Korean questions the shift of indexicals does
not occur. Therefore we can conclude that Garret’s proposal do not extend to
Korean facts.8
4.3 Faller (2002) on Cuzco Quechua
Discussing Cuzco Quechua reportative evidential -si- in questions, Faller (2002)
observes that a question with -si- is ambiguous between two readings, introduc-
ing different implications, as shown in (30) (from Faller 2002: 230):
(30) Pi-ta-s
who-ACC-si
Inés-qa
Inés-TOP
watuku-sqa?
visit-PAST2
‘Who did Inés visit?’
(i) Speaker indicates that somebody else is asking.
(ii) Speaker expects hearer to have indirect evidence for his/her answer
The reading (i) is similar to the (indirect) quotation of the question: the speaker
indicates that somebody else is asking. The reading (ii) is the shifted reading,
similar to the evidential perspective shift in questions discussed in this paper.
To solve this problem, Faller (2002) assumes that the speech act QUEST(ION)
is a request of an assertion to the addressee:
(31) QUEST = REQUEST (ASSERTh(q)) (Faller 2002: 237)
Then Faller assumes scope ambiguity between different illocutionary acts. In
reading (i), the operator EVI takes wide scope over the operator REQUEST, and
in reading (ii) REQUEST takes wide scope over EVI:
(32) a. Reading (i): EVI (REQUEST (ASSERTh(q))) (speaker-anchored)
b. Reading (ii): REQUEST (EVI (ASSERTh(q))) (addressee-
anchored)
A question immediately follows from (32): Can we find the similar ambiguity
in a question with a different evidential marker in Cuzco Quechua? Faller’s
(2002) answer is positive, and her example is (33), where the BPG (best-
possible-ground) evidential -mi- is used in a question (from Faller 2002: 230,
8 Note that, due to the similar reason, McCready’s (2007) analysis does not extend to Korean facts,
either. McCready (2007) analyzes the perspective shift in some Japanese dialects, but in these
dialects, when the evidential perspective is shifted, indexicals are also shifted, unlike Korean.
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ex.189a):
(33) Pi-ta-n
who-ACC-mi
Inés-qa
Inés-TOP
watuku-sqa?
visit-PAST2
‘Who did Inés visit?’
(i) The speaker has the best possible grounds for asking
(ii) The speaker expects the hearer to base his/her answer on the best
possible grounds
The problem in (33) is that, as Faller herself agrees, the ambiguity with -mi- in
a question is less clear. Specifically, what does it mean that “the speaker has the
best possible grounds for asking”? According to Faller (2002), the speaker may
have ‘the best possible grounds for asking’ in two cases. First, we may imagine
the scenario where a teacher is asking a question (34a) to his/her students. Here
the speaker has authority over the hearer and therefore has the best possible
grounds for demanding an answer. Second, we may imagine the scenario where
a customer is asking a question (34b) to a merchant. In this case the speaker
has very good reasons for wanting to know the answer, and therefore has the
best possible grounds to ask a question.
(34) a. Hayk’a-n
how-much-mi
iskay
two
yapa-sqa
add-PP
iskay-man?
to-Illa
‘How much is two plus two?’ (Faller 2002: 232, ex.193a)
b. Hayk’a-n
how-much-mi
vale-n
cost-3
chay?
this
‘How much does this cost?’ (Faller 2002: 232, ex.193b)
However, in both examples, the addressee-anchored reading of -mi- is equally
available, and therefore it is unclear whether two questions in (34) actually
the addressee-anchored reading or the speaker-anchored reading. Faller (2002)
also agrees that there are ambiguities in (some) questions with -mi- between the
speaker-anchored reading and the addressee-anchored reading, which seems to
me that Faller’s account of the shift based on scope ambiguity is less plausible.9
Finally, even though Faller manages to solve all the problems pointed
out above, Korean does not show such an ambiguity as Cuzco Quechua. For
example, in (35), where the reportative evidential -ta- is used in a question, we
see that it only has the reading (ii), that is, the addressee-anchored reading. This
means that, no matter what Faller’s analysis on Cuzco Quechua evidentials in
questions may be, it cannot extend to Korean facts.
9 The natural question at this point is how to account for the ambiguity of si in (30). To me the
lexical ambiguity seems plausible, but more investigation is required.
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(35) Inés-nun
Inés-TOP
nwukwu-lul
who-ACC
manna-ess-ta-ni?
meet-PAST-ta-Q
‘Who did Inés meet?’
(i) The speaker indicates that somebody else is asking
(ii) The speaker expects the addressee to have indirect evidence for
his/her answer
Summarizing this section, I have shown that the simple-minded pragmatics-
based account does not explain the evidential perspective shift in questions in
Korean, since in Korean the shift is obligatory in questions. Furthermore, I
also showed my semantics-based proposal can capture the perspective shift in
Korean questions better than other proposals made for other languages.
5 Conclusion and Remaining Issues
In this paper, I showed that the evidential perspective shift in questions in Ko-
rean should be explained in terms of semantics rather than of pragmatics, be-
cause the shift obligatorily occurs when an evidential marker appears in a ques-
tion. I also explained the perspective shift by assuming that Korean evidentials
are functions from propositions to characters, without making any fundamen-
tal revision to Hamblin’s (1973) semantics of questions or Kaplan’s (1989)
semantics of indexicals.
There are several open questions which are not clearly answered in this
paper. One of such questions is about similarities and the differences between
evidentials and other perspective-anchored items such as expressives and utterance-
modifying adverbials (Amaral, Roberts & Smith 2007, Potts 2005, Potts 2007,
Harris & Potts 2009, i.a.). The main difference between these perspective-
dependent items and Korean evidentials is that the former allow the optional
shift in questions, but the latter are obligatorily shifted in questions. Since we
have already seen that Korean evidentials in questions are obligatorily anchored
to the addressee’s perspective, in this conclusion I will only show examples
containing other perspective-related items. First, consider (36), where the ex-
pressive pilemekul ‘damn’ appears in a question.
(36) Ne-nun
You-TOP
ku
that
pilemekul
damn
il-ul
job-ACC
kumantwu-ess-ni?
quit-PAST-Q
‘Did you quit that damn job?’
In (36), the implication introduced by pilemekul can be interpreted in two ways
- the speaker may think that the addressee’s job is pretty bad, or the addressee
may think that his/her own job is pretty bad. This shows that the perspective
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shift in (36) is optional, unlike the shift triggered by -te-.
The utterance modifying adverbial like solcikhi ‘honestly’ triggers an op-
tional shift in questions, unlike -te-. Consider the following question.
(37) Solcikhi,
Honestly
John-i
John-NOM
ne-lul
you-ACC
manna-ess-ni?
meet-PAST-Q
‘Honestly, did John meet you?’
When solcikhi is anchored to the addressee, (36) carries the implication that the
speaker asks the addressee to answer in an honest way. When it is anchored to
the speaker, however, (36) carries the implication that the speaker’s curiosity
in asking the question is genuine (or, he/she really does not know anything
about the answer). This ambiguity shows that, in Korean, utterance-modifying
adverbs are also optionally shifted in questions, unlike evidentials.
The previous two examples suggest to us that (at least) in Korean, ev-
identials are different from other perspective-anchored items with respect to
whether they are shifted optionally or obligatorily in questions: evidentials
are obligatorily shifted, but others are optionally shifted. This difference may
be due to the difference of implications they introduce: as shown above, Ko-
rean evidentials are presupposition triggers, whereas expressives and utterance-
modifying adverbials introduce conventional implicatures (Potts 2005) or ex-
pressive meanings (Potts 2007, Harris & Potts 2009). However, this account
leads us to another question. Presuppositions are usually regarded as informa-
tion which is already given and is shared by conversation participants, but in
many cases, evidentials seem to introduce some new information to the com-
mon ground. If evidential implications are presuppositions, how can they in-
troduce new information to the common ground?
This question is uneasy to answer. Because of this, Murray (to appear)
posits another level of meaning, that is, non-at-issue assertion. However, schol-
ars such as Stalnaker (2002) and Schlenker (2007) propose that a certain type
of presuppositions can systematically introduce new information to the com-
mon ground, and for the moment I assume that in Korean, the implications
introduced by evidentials are such presuppositions. Even though we still need
to investigate what kind of presuppositions can introduce new information, but
with other possible questions, I leave this question for future research.
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Abstract. This article discusses the role of noun phrases in Karitiana, 
especially in terms of the possibility that these phrases may express 
definiteness and indefiniteness in the language. As they are nominals without 
any overt functional morphemes, our claim is that they do not encode 
definiteness or indefiniteness in the language. Our claim is that the NPs in 
Karitiana only have the function of introducing a predicate and a variable in the 
logical form of a sentence, and that readings related to definiteness and 
indefiniteness are provided by the morphosyntactic or context in which the 
nominal phrase is used. 
 
1	   Introduction	  
This paper contributes to the description and analysis of the encoding of 
definiteness and indefiniteness in natural languages in general, by discussing 
the specific role of noun phrases (NPs) in Karitiana, especially the possibility 
that they may not express the definiteness and indefiniteness distinction. 
Cross-linguistically, there are languages such as the Romance and Germanic 
languages in which the determiners encode definiteness (e.g. the boy), or 
indefiniteness (e.g. a boy). However, there are other languages in which the 
determiners do not fulfill this role, such as some languages of the Salish 
family (see Matthewson 1996). There are also languages such as the creole of 
Guiné-Bissau and Karitiana in which there are no definite or indefinite 
articles. 
Matthewson (1996) discusses whether the distinction between definite-
ness and indefiniteness is necessarily expressed by the grammar of a 
language or whether this distinction may be outside the grammar in some 
languages. This paper contributes to this discussion in the sense that it 
assumes the impossibility of distinguishing between definiteness and 
indefiniteness in Karitiana solely by means of its grammar. The paper tries to 
answer the following question: do the NPs in Karitiana express definiteness 
In Reich, Ingo et al. (eds.), Proceedings of Sinn & Bedeutung 15,  
pp. 435–449. Universaar – Saarland University Press: Saarbrücken, Germany, 2011. 	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and indefiniteness as they do in determiner languages such as English or 
Portuguese?  
In Karitiana the NPs are always bare, which means that the functional 
morphemes, which are responsible for marking functions such as gender, 
case, definiteness, indefiniteness, and number are not present. The article 
claims that the NPs in Karitiana: (i) do not encode definiteness or 
indefiniteness; (ii) they only introduce a predicate and a variable in the lo-
gical form of a sentence. Karitiana belongs to the Tupí stock. It is spoken by 
approximately 400 people who live on a reserve northwest of Brazilian 
Amazonian region. It is a head final language, but the matrix sentences, in 
declarative mood, generally occur with the verb in second position (SVO, 
OVS), whilst in embedded sentences the verb always appears in final position 
(see Sorto 1999, 2003). In addition, Karitiana basically identifies two tenses: 
future and non-future. Agreement, mood and tense are marked only in the 
root sentences, as we can see in (1) below:1 
(1) [taso õwã   mangat-a-ty] y-ta-pyting-∅        yn. 
 man   child  lift<VT>OBL  1P-DECL-want-NFT  I2  
 ‘I want the men to lift up the children.’3 
Furthermore, as Storto (1999) has observed, Karitiana possesses an ergative-
absolutive pattern of agreement, which means that the verb agrees with the 
subject in intransitive sentences, as shown in the example in (2), and agrees 
with the object in transitive sentences, as shown in the example in (3). 
(2) A-ta-opiso-t        na.                       (Storto 1999)  
 2P-DECL-listened-NFT you 
 ‘You listened.’ (intransitive)4 
(3) An   y-ta-oky-t       yn.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The order for the presentation of the data is as following: on the first line, the morphological 
segmentation of each word; on the second line, the meaning of each segment; on the last line, the 
translation into English. The data presented were collected by Ana Müller through field work, 
except where they are explicitly attributed to another researcher. 
2 Abbreviations used: ASS=assertive; ∅=null morpheme; 1P=first person; 2P=second person; 
3P=third person; CAUS=causative; CONC=agreement; COP=copula; DECL=declarative; 
DET=determiner; IMP= imperfect; FUT= future; NFT=non-future; OBL= oblique; PART= 
participle; PASS=passive; POS=post-position; REDPL=reduplicative; SUB=subordinate; VT= 
thematic vowel. 
3 The translations given are those provided by the speaker or by the researcher in the particular 
context. It should be remembered that each sentence could have other interpretations. 
4 Non-future time (NFT) is equivalent to both past and present time. However, in most cases this 
time has been translated as past, since this was the form used in the context of the collection of 
the data. 
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 2P   1P- DECL-hurt-NFT I 
 ‘You hurt me.’ (transitive) 
In order to achieve our aim of verifying whether the NPs in Karitiana encode 
definiteness, Section 2 looks at the semantics of determiners in natural 
languages, especially with regard to the definiteness and indefiniteness which 
they may express. Section 3 describes the characteristics of the NPs in 
Karitiana. Section 4 deals with whether the NPs in Karitiana encode 
(in)definiteness. Finally, Section 5 analyses the data from Karitiana, and 
claims that the NPs in this language do not encode definiteness and 
indefiniteness, nor do they have the properties which would result from such 
encoding. We maintain, however, that the role of the NPs in Karitiana is only 
to introduce a predicate with its variable in the logical form of a sentence. 
2	   Definiteness	  and	  Indefiniteness:	  the	  Role	  of	  Determiners	  
Human languages have a group of expressions referred to as determiners 
which contribute to the meaning of an NP, and, of course, of the sentence as a 
whole. These expressions are responsible for a range of distinctions in 
languages, such as definiteness, gender, number and case, inter alia. In 
Romance and Germanic languages, for example, the articles can express a 
range of distinctions and, because of this, it has become the convention to 
separate them in accordance with this range. In Portuguese, for example, 
determiners can be definite (o, a, os, as) or indefinite (um, uma, uns, umas); 
they can possess masculine gender (o, os, um, uns) or feminine gender (a, as, 
uma, umas); they can express singular number (o, a, um, uma) or plural 
number (os, as, uns, umas). However, these distinctions are not expressed in 
the same way in all languages. As this article focuses on definiteness and 
indefiniteness, we shall begin by reviewing briefly what definiteness and 
indefiniteness express. 
We assume that one of the main difference between definite and 
indefinite phrases is the fact that the former indicate something familiar 
which is already present in the universe of discourse, whilst the latter indicate 
something which is novel in the discourse (see Heim 1982).5 Thus 
definiteness is a mark of the familiarity of an entity, and indefiniteness is a 
mark of the non-familiarity (novelty) of an entity in the discourse. This 
situation is common in narratives such as children’s stories. Sentence (4) 
illustrates the expression of the novel/non-novel distinction by articles. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 In this article, discourse, universe of discourse, and situation, are used in a general sense as 
synonyms for context. 
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(4) A king had a beautiful daughter. The daughter dreamed of becoming 
a professor. 
The reason why (4) is the only adequate sequence stems from the 
new/familiar relationship which is indicated by the phrases ‘a beautiful 
daughter’ and ‘the daughter’. Indefinite NPs introduce a new entity into the 
context and, once this entity has been introduced, it can be referred to again 
by means of expressions which indicate familiarity.  
Uniqueness is another property of definites which has been widely discussed 
in the literature on the subject (see Russell 1905, Heim 1991, inter alia). 
Definite determiners express uniqueness, i.e. a definite NP states that there is 
only one entity of the type denoted by the noun. When we read sentence (5) 
below, for example, we understand that the speaker is referring to a single 
article which is ready. If there are two or more articles or none, then sentence 
(5) is not interpretable. 
(5) The article is ready. 
In the same way, a definite plural NP denotes a single entity composed of the 
total sum of the relevant entities in the universe of the discourse, as in (6) 
below: 
(6) The articles are ready. 
In this case, the definite plural NP expresses that there is a single group of 
articles which is ready. Indefinite NPs, however, do not presuppose 
uniqueness. The difference between definite and indefinite NPs can be seen 
in negative sentences such as (7). While sentence (7a) presupposes that only 
one single article on semantics was to have been written by João, sentence 
(7b) does not raise this type of presupposition.  
(7) a. João did not write the article on semantics. 
    b. João did not write an article on semantics. 
Finally, another property which definite NPs possess is that of 
anaphoricity: these phrases cause an anaphoric interpretation in relation to an 
antecedent NP with the same type of denotation. This means that, when two 
NPs have equivalent meanings, if the second of these is definite, it refers 
back to the same individual introduced by the first NP, as in (8) below: 
(8) a. João ate the pizza, and Pedro ate the pizza, too. 
 b. A dog came in. The dog lay down on the floor. 
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The indefinite NPs, however, impose a disjoint interpretation in relation to an 
antecedent NP with the same denotation, i.e. if there are two equivalent NPs, 
and the second of these is an indefinite NP, it will not refer to the same entity 
introduced in the first NP, as in (9) below:  
(9) João ate a pizza and Pedro ate a pizza, too. 
Following the work of Kamp (1981) and Heim (1982), it has become 
customary to assume that indefinite NPs are variables. A “variable” is an 
expression whose value can vary in terms of reference. In Section 5 below, 
we will see that, as the NPs in Karitiana can be interpreted both in terms of 
existential quantification as in terms of universal quantification, as is the case 
with the indefinite NP in English.  
So far we have seen that definiteness and indefiniteness possess a 
number of properties, such as the novel/familiar distinction, uniqueness, and 
the possibility (or impossibility) of anaphoric reference. Some languages do 
have expressions which can be classified as “determiners”, but the NPs which 
contain these determiners do not denote some of the properties we have 
described above. This is the case with the languages of the Salish family. 
Matthewson (1996) shows that the Sechelt language, for example, possesses a 
determiner lhe which does not distinguish between the novel and the familiar.  
Let us now return to our target language, Karitiana. If a language such 
as Sechelt possesses a determiner which does not distinguish definiteness 
from indefiniteness, what should we expect from a language like Karitiana 
which has no determiners at all in the structure of the NP? It seems sensible 
to expect that languages may vary in whether or not they express definiteness 
and indefiniteness. It is possible that definiteness and indefiniteness will not 
be encountered in the structure of the NPs in Karitiana. This hypothesis will 
be considered below.  
In this section we have shown that definite and indefinite phrases have 
three important properties: the distinction between the novel and the familiar, 
uniqueness and non-uniqueness, anaphoricity and non-anaphoricity. In the 
next section we will present the characteristics of the NPs in Karitiana, and 
then investigate whether they encode definiteness or not. 
3	   Noun	  Phrases	  in	  Karitiana	  
Some of the functional morphemes which mark gender, number, 
determination, quantification, voice, aspect and time, inter alia, are absent in 
certain languages. In Karitiana, for example, the structural position of the 
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determiner is never overtly filled. In Karitiana, the NP is always bare without 
any determiners such as the, a or every, which are present in other languages. 
In Karitiana, the form is always the same and invariable (cf Müller et al, 
2006). The data in (10) give evidence concerning the morphology of (in) 
definiteness, and of the the marking of case. 
(10) Taso   ∅-naka-’y-t      boroja 
 man    3P-DECL-eat-NFT snake 
 ‘(The/A/some) man/men ate (the/a/some) snake(s).’ 
 ‘The/A man ate (a/the/some snake(s)).’ 
 Literally: ‘man ate/eats snake’ 
In (10), the NPs taso ‘man’ and boroja ‘snake’ do not possess any morpho-
logy of case, nor do they have determiners which are realised phonetically. 
The sentence can be used in different situations, as is shown in the translation 
(‘The/A man ate (the/a snake (s)’). The data in (11) below show that NPs in 
Karitiana are not marked for number, nor do they have numeral classifiers. 
The adverbial adjunct sypomp (‘two’, ‘twice’) is responsible for attributing 
the number of individuals who take part in the event and/or the number of 
events. Thus the sentence can indicate that the speaker ate two monkeys, or 
that he ate monkey twice.6 
(11) yn ∅-naka-'y-t       sypom-p  pikom. 
 I 3P-DECL-est-NFT  two-OBL monkey  
 ‘I ate two monkeys.’ or ‘Í ate monkey twice.’ 
The universal quantifier is also absent from the structure of the NPs in 
Karitiana. Universal quantification is expressed by a relative sentence (see 
(12)). In the sentence in (12) above, the insertion of the relative utterance taso 
akatyym ‘men who are (there)’ makes the interpretation of universal 
quantification in the sentence obligatory. Demonstrative roles are also played 
by relative clauses in Karitiana as illustrated by (13) below. 
(12) Taso aka-tyym  ∅-na-pon-pon-Ø        pikom. 
 man  cop-sub   3P-DECL-shoot-REDPL-NFT  monkey 
 ‘All the men shot at monkeys.’ 
 Literally: ‘Men who be there shot at monkeys.’ 
(13) Dibm     Ø-naka-tat-i       ony   taso  aka. 
 tomorrow  3P-DECL-leave-FUT  there   man COP 
 ‘Those men will leave tomorrow.’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Numerals are adjuncts in the language (see Müller et al 2006). 
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 Literally: ‘Men who be there will leave tomorrow’. 
In all the cases described so far, it is clear that NPs in Karitiana are bare, i.e. 
they do not possess functional morphemes, and this brings into question 
whether they encode definiteness and indefiniteness. If we take up 
Matthewson’s (1996:19) suggestion concerning the languages of the Salish 
family, we may ask whether Karitiana has other devices in its grammar 
(except context or discourse) to express definiteness and indefiniteness, or 
should we simply say that the distinction between definite and indefinite does 
not exist in the language? The following section discusses the properties of 
definiteness in Karitiana, with the purpose of verifying whether they can be 
expressed by these phrases or not. 
4	   Do	  Noun	  Phrases	  in	  Karitiana	  Express	  (In)Definiteness?	  
Before dealing directly with the behaviour of NPs in Karitiana, let us begin 
this section by recapitulating some of the properties of definite and indefinite 
NPs. In previous sections we have seen that: 
(14) Definite NPs: do not introduce a new entity into the universe of 
 discourse; presuppose the uniqueness of or familiarity of the entity they 
 denote; make obligatory an anaphoric reference in the discourse to a 
 previously-mentioned NP which has the same type of denotation. 
(15) Indefinite NPs: introduce a new entity into the discourse; do not 
 presuppose uniqueness or familiarity in relation to the entity they 
 denote; are not anaphorically linked in the discourse to a previously-
 mentioned NP which has the same type of denotation. 
In order to facilitate our analysis, this section will be divided into three sub-
sections. In the first of these we will discuss the question of the expression of 
definiteness through the use of NPs in Karitiana; in the second sub-section we 
will talk about the presupposition of uniqueness in these phrases; in the third 
sub-section we will deal with the issue of anaphoric and disjoint references in 
the language.  
4.1 (In)Definiteness	  in	  Karitiana	  
Our thesis is that the NPs in Karitiana do not distinguish between definiteness 
and indefiniteness. In (16) below, we analyse the case of õwã (‘child’). Once 
again, we will call attention to the absence of functional morphemes in the 
NPs, which is typical in Karitiana.  
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(16) a. Yn DECL-sadna-FUT  õwã  hadna   hyk 
  I   DECL-tell-FUT    child  story   about 
  ‘I am going to tell the story of a child.’ 
 b. Py-py-n-a       ãdyk-y-n         õwã 
  ass-know<VT>  IMPF.PASS<VT>NFT  child 
  ‘The child was intelligent.’ 
As indicated in (14) above, we expect that a definite NP will be used in 
situations like that in (16a), since it is a typical case of the introduction of a 
novel referent in the background of the conversation. On the other hand, 
(16b) would require a definite NP because it relates to the sequence of the 
story, and the referent is already familiar in the universe of the discourse. 
However, as shown in the data given above, in Karitiana there is no marker 
which distinguishes an indefinite NP from a definite one: in both cases the 
bare NP õwã is used.  
In terms of anaphoricity, we have seen that definite NPs, unlike 
indefinite ones, are anaphoric in relation to another NP with the same 
denotation. The data in (17) and (18) show that bare NPs in Karitiana can be 
taken up again by a singular pronoun, which is different from the process in 
English. 
(17) Context: the informant narrates his experience with a jaguar. 
 a. Yn  ’i-so’oo-t    õbaky-ty 
  I    3P-see-NFT   jaguar-OBL 
  ‘I saw a jaguar.’ 
 b. Yn  i-so’oo-t   sojxa  õbaky  i-‘yt 
     I    3P-see-NFT  boar   jaguar   3P-eat-NFT 
     ‘I saw that the jaguar was eating a wild boar.’ 
(18) a. Professo  enfermera  na-aka-t       i-amby-t          
    teacher   nurse    DECL-COP-NFT PART-come-CONC.COP    
    y-ambip 
  1P-house 
  ‘A teacher and a nurse came to my house yesterday.’ 
 b. Professor  na-aka-t        i-le-t                 livro-ty     
  teacher    na-COP-NFT    PART-ler-CONC.COP   livro-OBL     
  y-’iti        hot 
  1P-daughter  to 
      ‘The teacher read the book to my daughter.’ 
 c. Enfermera  na-aka-t       i- so’kym<VT>∅              
      nurse      na-COP-NFT   PART-take.care<VT>CONC.COP   
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  y-’tiita 
  1P-mother 
      ‘The nurse looked after my mother’. 
In the data provided in (17) above, the NP õbaky (‘jaguar’) is in the 
environment of a indefinite NP (17a), and also in another environment which 
is generally occupied by a definite NP (17b). In (18a) both professor 
(‘teacher’) and enfermera (‘nurse’) are new individuals in the discourse and, 
as such, can be regarded as indefinite NPs. However, the same NPs appear 
again in (18b) and (18c) respectively, but are now familiar. Thus the cases 
presented above demonstrate that the NPs in Karitiana are insufficient on 
their own to make the novel/familiar distinction. We will deal further with 
anaphoric reference in section 4.3 below. 
4.2 Presupposition	  of	  Uniqueness	  
In section 2, we saw that the definite NPs presuppose uniqueness (and 
familiarity); the indefinite NPs do not carry this type of presupposition. In 
Karitiana, the bare NPs are used both in contexts which presuppose 
uniqueness and in those where this presupposition is not present. Cases like 
(18) are also examples of the presupposition of uniqueness. 
At the same time as examples (18) show us that NPs in Karitiana do not 
distinguish between definite/indefinite or novel/familiar, they also indicate 
that the same NPs can be used in contexts that presuppose uniqueness. In the 
case of (18b,c), they denote unique teacher and unique nurse. Let us now look 
at some cases where this presupposition is not present (19). 
(19) I-so’oot-∅  Inácio  sojxa-ty? 
 3P-see-NFT  Inácio  boar-OBL 
 ‘Did Inácio see any boars?’ 
The sentence in (19) asks if Inácio saw two or more wild boars and, as a 
result, we can say that the NP sojxa (‘boar’) does not presuppose even if there 
was a wild boar to be seen. We do not attribute the property of uniqueness to 
the NP in this case, though this would be possible if we were dealing with a 
definite NP. On the basis of the data analysed above, we can deduce that an 
NP in Karitiana does not necessarily indicate uniqueness. 
4.3 Anaphoricity	  of	  NPs	  in	  Karitiana	  
At the end of section 2.1, we showed that the definite NPs oblige us to refer 
back anaphorically to a previous NP with the same denotation. On the other 
hand, the indefinite NPs manifest disjoint reference, i.e. they refer to a 
different individual to the one indicated by the previous NP with a similar 
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denotation. In Karitiana, the NPs permit anaphoric interpretations, but these 
are not obligatory. The data in (20a, b) are examples of disjoint reference 
between NPs, while the ones in (17-18) are examples of anaphoric reference 
between NPs. 
(20) a. Pyry-’a   tyka-n   irip   akan. 
  ASS-exist  IMP-NFT  tapir  village 
  ‘There is a tapir in this village.’ 
 b. Pyry- ’a  tyka-n   irip   akan   ota    pip    tyym. 
  ASS-exist  IMP-NFT  tapir  village  other  in      too 
  ‘There is a tapir in another village, too.’ 
As example (20) shows, the two occurrences of the same NP irip (‘tapir’) 
have disjunctive reference, i.e. they mention two different tapirs, one in each 
village. In (17), however, there is an anaphoric interpretation of the second 
occurrence of õbaky (‘jaguar’), in relation to the first occurrence. Whilst the 
first NP indicates a new entity in (17a), the second NP refers back to the same 
entity in (17b). Because of this, we can say that NPs in Karitiana can express 
both anaphoric reference and disjoint reference in relation to an antecedent 
NP with the same type of denotation.  
In this section, we have seen how the NPs in Karitiana are not capable 
of distinguishing between definiteness and indefiniteness. As a result, the 
same NP can introduce both entities which are new into the universe of 
discourse (which is a common feature of indefinite NPs) and refer to familiar 
entities (which is a common feature of definite NPs) in this same universe. In 
the same way, the NPs in Karitiana do not necessarily indicate uniqueness. 
Finally, we have dealt with the question of anaphoricity and have verified 
that the NPs in Karitiana can refer back to other NPs (which is a feature of 
definite NPs), as well as having disjoint reference to a previous NP (which is 
a feature of indefinite NPs). In the next section, we will present an analysis of 
the data from Karitiana.  
5	   Analysis	  
In line with the description of the data from Karitiana given in the previous 
section, let us posit two basic hypotheses: i) the NPs, which are bare 
nominals, do not encode definiteness and indefiniteness in Karitiana and ii) 
their function is only to introduce a predicate and a variable in the logical 
form of the sentence. This variable will be determined, either by means of 
open or hidden quantification, or by means of deixis. If the two hypotheses 
are correct, then we can predict the following consequences:  
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I. The NPs in Karitiana can occur in both definite and indefinite con-
texts.  
II. The NPs can occur in both existential and universal interpretations. 
III. The NPs will not behave like names of kinds. 
The first consequence was amply proved by the examples given in sections 3 
and 4 above: the NPs in Karitiana do not encode either definiteness or 
indefiniteness, and it is the context which causes us to interpret them as 
definite or indefinite when we translate them to English.  We will now look at 
the other two theses. 
Since the NPs in Karitiana are always bare and do not encode 
definiteness or indefiniteness, we predicted in (II) that they will appear both 
in contexts of universal quantification, and of existential quantification. The 
data in (21a-b) below show that the NPs in Karitiana produce universal 
interpretations. 
(21) a. Õbaky  Ø -na-aka-t    kinda-t. 
  jaguar  DECL-COP-NFT  entity-CONC.COP 
  ‘Jaguars are animals.’ 
 b. Oharyjn   Ø-na-aka-t     õbaky 
  head.good  DECL-COP-NFT  jaguar 
  ‘Jaguars are intelligent.’  
The examples in (21a, b) are typically generic, and the NP õbaky (‘jaguar’) is 
being used with a universal interpretation (‘every jaguar is an animal/ 
intelligent’). The NPs in Karitiana also appear in existential contexts, i.e. 
those contexts which affirm or presuppose the existence of a certain entity, 
which confirms the prediction we made earlier. The sentences in (22) below 
are typical existential structures and appear with the bare NPs in Karitiana. 
Another situation in which the interpretation is existential is the introduction 
of a novel entity in the universe of discourse, as in (23) below:  
(22) Pyry-kii-t       geladera  akan    pip 
 ASS-COP.PL-NFT  fridge    village  in 
 ‘There are refrigerators in the village.’ 
(23) Pyry-heredna-n   otiyrypo. 
 ASS-appear-NFT  star 
 ‘A star appeared.’ 
The third prediction made in this section was that the NPs in Karitiana would 
not always behave like names of kinds. In the example in (25) below, the NPs 
in bold refer to a kind, which is that of dinosaurs. 
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(24) Dinosaurs became extinct many years ago. 
In line with the work of Carlson (1977), the bare plural in English is 
considered to be a kind-denoting term, and could be used in the sentences 
above (‘dinosaurs’) to talk about the extinction of the species of dinosaurs. 
Thus before we verify if NPs in Karitiana behave like names of kinds, we 
must look briefly at bare plurals in English. Carlson observed that bare 
plurals can appear in negative sentences but, unlike indefinite NPs, they are 
not ambiguous between two interpretations. We can see this in the examples 
(25) in English. 
(25) a. John didn’t see a teacher. 
     b. John didn’t see teachers. 
The sentence in (25a) can have two interpretations. The first is that there is a 
certain teacher and that João did not see him/her. This is what is called a wide 
scope reading. The second interpretation of (25a) is that João did not see any 
teachers at all, and this is called a narrow scope reading.  
If the NPs in Karitiana are always bare nominals, we could entertain an 
initial hypothesis that they would behave like names of kinds, as is the case 
with the bare plural in English. On the other hand, we would expect the NPs 
in Karitiana to have only narrow and not wide scope. However, on the basis 
of the description we are undertaking, and of the analysis we are proposing 
here, we can predict that the NPs in Karitiana will be different from those in 
English. This means that we are predicting that the bare NPs in Karitiana will 
allow that sentences similar to (25b) can have two interpretations, one of 
wide scope, and the other of narrow scope. This prediction is borne out by the 
data in (26) below.  
(26) Enfermera otãm  tykiri   Ø-na-osedna-j  Inácio. 
 nurse      arrive when   DECL-feliz-FUT   Inácio 
 ‘Inácio will be happy when (a/some) nurse(s) arrive(s).’ 
In the sentence in (26), the NP enfermera (‘nurse’) could be referring to a 
specific nurse with a wide scope interpretation: Inácio will be happy when a 
specific nurse arrives. But this NP can also have a narrow scope inter-
pretation: Inácio will be happy when any nurse whatever arrives. Thus we 
can affirm that the NPs in Karitiana do not only have narrow scope, just like 
the bare nominals in English, and have scopal properties like the ones of 
indefinite NPs, as we saw above. 
Our analysis so far has shown that NPs in Karitiana do not encode 
definiteness and indefiniteness, and therefore we have not been able to 
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identify the presence or absence of any markers which could indicate 
familiarity or uniqueness in these NPs. We have also noted that despite the 
fact that they are bare NPs, they do not behave in the same way as the bare 
plurals in English. 
Let us now try to answer the question of whether the NPs in Karitiana 
are ambiguous in terms of their having definite and indefinite interpretations 
produced by an ambiguous zero determiner. Or would it be possible to defend 
the thesis that Karitiana has two zero (or covert) determiners, one definite and 
one indefinite? These questions are relevant because most theoretical para-
digms will assume the existence of empty categories with syntactic roles. We 
reject the possibility that there is an empty/zero and ambiguous determiner 
between a definite and an indefinite interpretation in line with the following 
argument. Let us imagine that there indeed was a determiner that was ambi-
guous between definite and indefinite interpretations – call it determiner D. 
The main problem for D would be its obligation to carry indistinguishable 
contradictory information. Thus, in a sentence such as (23), we would be 
faced with something like D otiyrpo (‘D star’), and D could indicate 
simultaneously ‘the star appeared’ and ‘a star appeared’. 
As a result, D would indicate simultaneously that ‘a novel star appeared 
in the discourse’ and ‘a familiar star appeared in the discourse’, i.e. contra-
dictory information would be linked to this determiner, which is incoherent. 
Another solution would be to recognize the existence of two different 
empty/zero determiners, one which would encode definiteness and another 
which would encode indefiniteness. In this case, if there were two different 
empty/zero determiners which were always possible in the same contexts, the 
existence of either one of these determiners would be impossible to prove. 
This hypothesis is therefore vacuous.  
Another problem concerning the existence of two empty determiners is 
their presupposition of uniqueness and their scope. They would indicate that 
the NP could be simultaneously interpreted as unique (like a definite NP) and 
as non-unique (like a indefinite NP). In line with this analysis, a sentence 
such as (26) would have two simultaneous interpretations: Inácio will be 
happy if the only nurse in context arrives, or if any nurse whatever arrives, 
which is contradictory and undesirable. In the light of the above, we claim 
that a zero D, either definite or indefinite, does not exist in Karitiana, and the 
interpretation of enfermera (‘nurse’) as a single person (wide scope) or as any 
nurse (narrow scope) would be resolved by the context. 
Finally, another point which supports our rejection of the existence of one or 
two zero Ds is that of anaphoricity. Since there would be ambiguity between 
definite and indefinite Ds (or, if there were two Ds, one definite and the other 
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non-definite), then in every sentence in Karitiana with at least one NP, D 
would necessarily indicate that the NP referred back to in the sentence could 
simultaneously refer or not refer to the same individual denoted by a previous 
NP. This means that the NP would make an anaphoric reference (as definite 
NPs do) and would at the same time have disjunctive reference (like 
indefinite NPs) in relation to an antecedent NP with the same denotation, i.e. 
it would have two mutually contradictory meanings.  
As we have been demonstrating throughout this paper, the NPs in 
Karitiana do not possess any functional projections (at least not overt ones), 
nor do they possess determiners; but they can have both universal and 
existential interpretations. Furthermore, they do not encode definiteness or 
indefiniteness, and their fundamental role is to introduce a predicate and a 
variable into the logical form.  
Matthewson (1999) argues that familiarity and uniqueness are certainly 
properties of definite NPs; however, the absence of familiarity and 
uniqueness is not necessarily a property of indefinite NPs. It stems from 
implicatures generated by the existence of definite determiners in languages 
which have them. In a language without definite NPs, the indefinite NPs or, 
in the absence of these, the unmarked NPs (as in Karitiana) would not 
generate the implicatures of non-uniqueness or non-familiarity, but would be 
neutral with regard to these properties. Thus these NPs could be used 
indistinguishably in contexts of [+/-familiarity] and [+/-uniqueness]. 
In the light of the above, we conclude that the NPs in Karitiana are 
neutral in relation to this difference, and that definiteness and indefiniteness 
are determined by the particular context. A theoretical consequence of this is 
that the bare nominals will necessarily have an indefinite interpretation, but 
do not necessarily have a definite interpretation.  
6	   Conclusions	  
In this paper, we have tried to verify whether the NPs in Karitiana are able to 
codify definiteness and indefiniteness. Since Karitiana does not have open 
determiners or functional categories in its NPs, our aim has been to find out 
whether the bare NPs alone were capable of encoding definiteness and 
indefiniteness. We therefore conclude that the NPs in Karitiana are neutral in 
relation to this difference, and that definiteness and indefiniteness are 
determined by the particular context. 
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Abstract. Generally, it is assumed ever since Pratt & Francez (2001) that tem-
poral expressions have a context-dependent meaning in the sense that they not
only denote a set of time intervals according to their lexical content but rather
their denotation is additionally restricted to some contextual time. Hence, Mon-
day does not just denote the set of Mondays but a function from time intervals
to the Mondays in them. This is useful in dealing with concomitant quantifiers
such as John kissed Mary every second semester on every Monday for it allows
them to restrict each other domain of quantification. In this paper I propose a
way to eliminate this context dependency of temporal expressions building up
on an idea of Irene Heim that domain restriction in the temporal domain is a
matter of presupposition projection. In particular I argue that temporal prepo-
sitions presuppose that their argument, a time interval, intersects a higher time
interval. This not only helps to derive concomitant quantification but also solves
some classical problems of competing theories.
1 Introduction
Temporal quantification, i.e. the compositional derivation of the truth condi-
tions of a sentence like (1), is a classical issue in semantic theory and a hard
one at the same time. I think a fair amount of confusion is around in the lit-
erature concerning this topic for the most part due to uncertainty about the
readings that should and should not be derived.
(1) John called on every first Monday after every competition that he won
in every second decade.
In this paper I will develop a not too complicated theory of temporal quantifi-
cation in the framework of transparent LF that tackles two of these confusions.
First, scholars have assumed that time denoting expressions, such as Monday
have context dependent denotations. I will show that this assumption is both
theoretically and empirically inadequate and I will show how to replace it by
∗ This research has been funded by the German Initiative of Excellence, which I gratefully ac-
knowledge. In addition I wish to thank Ingo Reich for organizing the Sinn und Bedeutung confer-
ence and editing this volume and Regine Eckardt and Sarah Zobel for comments and discussion.
Needless to say: all shortcomings are my own.
452 Onea
postulating that temporal prepositions are presuppositional. Second, real quan-
tifier stacking, i.e. applying several quantifiers to the same thematic role, and
concomitant quantifiers that restrict each other’s domain of quantification are
different phenomena. In fact, I will argue that it is indeed possible (and at times
necessary) to apply several temporal prepositional phrases in the same clause.
The first section explains the two problems to be discussed. First, the is-
sue of the interaction between temporal quantifiers and tense, which lead to
the introduction of context dependent meanings for temporal expressions, and
second, the problem of stacked quantifiers. In the following I first present a the-
oretical argument against context dependent meanings, followed by a sketch of
a theory for dealing with temporal quantification partly following von Stechow
(2002). In passing, I propose a particular version of the well known predicate
abstraction rule of Heim & Kratzer (1998). Finally I discuss the case of stacked
temporal prepositional phrases and conclude the paper.
2 The Problems of Temporal Quantification
Temporal quantification is complicated because the interpretation of tempo-
ral quantifiers needs to interact with the tense operator, which seems to get
quite murky. To see this, consider a fairly simple example like (2) from Ogi-
hara (1994). If there were no tense involved the sentence would not pose any
problems, however as soon as we want to consider the fact that the calling
took place in the past, both conceivable representations that attempt to model
this interaction in terms of scope given in (2a) and (2b) are nonsensical. What
we really need is the representation in (2c), which uses the past as a domain
restriction when quantifying over Mondays, but getting the past to restrict the
domain of quantification of every is compositionally non-trivial, given standard
assumptions about the place of tense in the syntactic representation of (2), in
particular, past is not directly combined with Monday.
(2) John called every Monday.
a. ∃i.past(i)∧∀x.Monday(x)→ in(x, i)∧ call(J, i)
b. ∀x.Monday(x)→∃i.past(i)∧ in(x, i)∧ call(J, i)
c. ∃i.past(i)∧∀x.Monday(x)∧ in(x, i)→ call(J, i)
The standard proposal to solve the problem is to assume a higher-order mean-
ing of time-denoting expressions such as meeting, Monday, year etc. such that
they do not simply denote sets of time intervals, as naturally represented in
(3a), but rather functions from time intervals into sets of time intervals as in
(3b). This is useful, since it provides a lexical slot in time denoting expressions
which can be used to essentially get the dependency on the past into the restric-
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tor of the quantifier, as required in (2c). The lexical entry in principle allows
for something like (3c), which allows the interaction between the past operator
and the restrictor of the quantifier every via the variable j. (Getting this to work
is still non-trivial but at least the basic ingredients are there.)
(3) a. JMondayK= λ i.Monday(i)
b. JMondayK= λ i.λ j.Monday(i)∧ in(i, j)
c. JeveryMondayK= λQ.λ j.∀x.Monday(x)∧ in(x, j)→ Q(x)
I will argue in this paper that this way of thinking is conceptually and empiri-
cally inadequate and show how to get rid of it.
Temporal quantifiers tend to have another problem as well, namely that
they may come stacked, as in (4). Pratt & Francez (2001) argue that this is
the very same problem as the interaction with tense. This is because Pratt &
Francez (2001) apply both quantifiers one after the other at the clause level,
as in (4a), and attempt to model the fact that they restrict each other’s scope.
For them, every Monday in (4) quantifies over every Monday that is in every
second year, just the same way as one would model that every Monday actually
quantifies over every Monday that is in the past for (2).
I think the argument of Pratt & Francez (2001) is correct, although the
cases in which we really need stacking of temporal quantifiers, are rare, and
distinguishable truth conditionally, whenever no real quantifiers are involved
but rather definite descriptions. For most cases, temporal quantifiers modify
each other like in (4b), as argued in von Stechow (2002). So, in (4), on every
second year is interpreted as directly modifying Monday. Therefore, there is
no stacking of quantifiers here. We rather have an embedding problem. This is
modeled in a completely different way than the interaction with tense. Such a
solution is rather similar to an intuitive treatment of (5), which does not seem
particularly puzzling and crucially has nothing to do with time.
(4) John called every Monday on every second year.
a. John called [every Monday] [on every second year]
b. John called [every Monday [on every second year]]
(5) Peter called every son of every son of Michael.
Interestingly, the LF-style given in (4a) is used by Pratt & Francez (2001) to
derive the so-called short reading of temporal prepositional phrases, readings
that are ultimately intersective, i.e. the calling must be both every Monday and
on every second year, with the twist, however, that only Mondays are consid-
ered that are in every second year. An LF-like (4b) is used by von Stechow
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(2002) to derive the so called long reading which only requires the calling to
be on Monday, but knowing that Mondays are within years makes the differ-
ence hard to see in such examples. And, finally, Beaver & Condoravdi (2007)
use the LF (4a) and derive the long reading with it.
The short readings do exist, however, and cannot be reduced to scope
variation in long readings. Consider (6). The first two readings, (6a) and (6b)
are available for von Stechow (2002), Pratt & Francez (2001) and Beaver &
Condoravdi (2007), but the third reading, the short reading, is only predicted
by Pratt & Francez (2001). That is not quite true, however, for Pratt and Francez
would require either the Tuesday to be after the meeting or the meeting to take
place on Tuesday, hence, making (6c) truth conditionally equivalent to either
(6a) or (6b). Beaver & Condoravdi (2007) are aware of this fact and explicitly
postulate that we only need to derive the readings in (6a) and (6b), the short
reading coming for free then.
(6) John called after the meeting on Tuesday.
a. John called after the meeting which was on Tuesday.
b. John called on Tuesday which was after the meeting.
c. John called in the intersection between Tuesday and the time after
the meeting.
But assume the following scenario. There is a meeting which starts on Monday
at 2 pm and finishes on Tuesday at 2 pm. Now, (6c) requires a calling event to
take place between Tuesday 2 pm and the end of Tuesday. I think this reading
actually exists and does not boil down to neither (6a), since the meeting was not
on Tuesday, nor (6b), since the Tuesday under discussion did not start after the
meeting. Superficially, this could be solved by allowing overlapping between
time intervals instead of inclusion, hence getting the readings (7a) and (7b).
Unfortunately, however, not even the reading (7b) captures the short reading
entirely correctly, for it would allow the calling to take place in a part of Tues-
day that is during the meeting, for instance Tuesday at 1 pm, which is contrary
to the fact.
(7) a. John called after the meeting which overlaps Tuesday.
b. John called on Tuesday which overlaps the time after the meeting.
Getting a unified account for both kinds of readings is the natural task arising.
Such a theory does not exist, however. To be clear, all existing theories fail
already in singling out the right Tuesday for the reading in (6c).
Summing up there are two problems to solve. Getting rid of context de-
pendent denotations for time-denoting expressions, and distinguishing between
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real temporal PP stacking and the case of embedded quantification.
3 Against Context Dependent Denotations
It should be the null-hypothesis that temporal expressions have no context de-
pendent denotation, so actually one needn’t argue against them, but rather in
favor of such denotations. That never actually happened. Still, I will give some
additional reasons to refrain from assuming such denotations.
Intuitively, Monday denotes the set of Mondays simpliciter, just like chair
denotes the set of chairs in a model. In order to get a more constrained set
of chairs or Mondays we need to do additional work. Whenever possible we
should not mess around with this intuition. And indeed, even very simple sen-
tences like (8) would get problematic if we did.
(8) This is a Monday.
One could argue that Monday is ambiguous. But even this does not seem to
hold generally. It rather seems that (8) cannot have a reading which can be
paraphrased as This is a Monday in t. Consider for instance the dialogue in (9)
and assume that the day Mary killed the cat was two years ago, but indeed a
Monday. If Monday denoted Mondays in a salient interval, one would expect
the answer (9b) to be at least conceivable, since the day under discussion is not
in the salient interval, hence the sentence is just false. But as a matter of fact, it
(9b) is completely nonsensical, whereas the answer (9a) is good.
(9) A: Last year, Peter called every Monday.
B: No, the day on which Marry killed the cat was a Monday and Peter
did not call.
a. A: No, that Monday is not relevant, for it was more than two years
ago.
b. A: ??No, that’s not a Monday, for it was more than two years ago.
Yet another argument involves deictic expressions like today, this year. Such
expressions also need to interact with the tense operator, hence, it is expectable
that their denotation will also be analogous, including a context dependent vari-
able.1 So, we get the representations in (10) or something similar. But binding
j by the past operator would predict that today is part of the past, which is non-
sense, for as long as today is not over, some part of it will be part of the present
and part of it will even be in the future.
1 Of course one could assume that deictic expressions are interpreted higher than tense, but even
so, the intersection between e.g. today and past will somehow need to me modeled.
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(10) λ j.ι i.today(i)∧ in(i, j)
A final argument is based on example (11). The example seems perfectly nat-
ural. But if, indeed, meeting meant meeting in x and x were bound by past, we
would require a past meeting, however, as the continuation shows, the meeting
is a future one although the tense operator is past. This, again, is absolutely
impossible according to the theory of Pratt & Francez (2001) or von Stechow
(2002). In fact the same applies to any theory that uses context dependent de-
notations for time denoting expressions.
(11) John called before the meeting, just as he promised. Look, the meeting
will be tomorrow, and he already called.
I conclude that assuming that time denoting expressions have a context depen-
dent denotation leads to more problems than it solves. If temporal quantifica-
tion can be made to work with such denotations, they should be abandoned. In
the next section I give an explicit proposal to this extent.
4 The Proposal
The system I propose in the following involves three aspects. First, I need the
lexical entries and the syntactic representation. Then, I need a theory of pre-
supposition projection. Finally I derive some examples and discuss some of the
benefits of the theory both with embedded quantifiers modifying each others
restrictor, and with real quantifier stacking.
4.1 Basic Elements
I assume that time-denoting expressions (or event-denoting expressions co-
erced to time) have simple lexical meanings as given in (12) for a couple of
examples. I tacitly assume that all time variables involved in natural language
are intervals and omit writing up their types for simplicity.
(12) a. JMondayK= λx.Monday(x)
b. JyearK= λx.year(x)
c. JmeetingK= λx.meeting(x)
I further assume that temporal prepositions come with a presupposition of ade-
quacy, i.e. they presuppose that the time determined by their internal argument
overlaps some contextually defined time, as shown in (13). Note that there is a
huge conceptual advantage in including context-dependency in the meaning of
functional words as compared to the lexical denotation of content words: for
instance, all examples discussed in Section 3 do not apply to temporal expres-
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sions headed by a preposition.
(13) a. JduringK= λx.λP.λ i[i∩ x 6= /0].P(x∩ i)
b. Jbe f oreK= λx.λP.λ i[i∩ tto(x) 6= /0].P(tto(x)∩ i)
c. Ja f terK= λx.λP.λ i[i∩ t f rom(x) 6= /0].P(t f rom(x)∩ i)
For the more technically interested reader: time intervals are treated as ordered
sets of time points, as defined in (14) hence the set theoretical operation ∩
applies and delivers an interval.
(14) a. x is a time point iff x ∈ T IME.
b. chron is a total function: T IME→ R defined in each model M.
c. Iff chron(x)< chron(y) then x precedes y.
d. a is an INTERVAL iff
∀x.x ∈ a→ x ∈ T IME ∧∀x,y.x,y ∈ a∧ chron(x) < chron(y)→
∀z.chron(z)> chron(x)∧ chron(z)< chron(y)→ z ∈ a
The operators tto and tfrom are defined in (15a) and (15b) respectively.
(15) a. tto(a) = {x|x ∈ T IME ∧ chron(x)< chron(MIN(a))}
b. t f rom(a) = {x|x ∈ T IME ∧ chron(x)> chron(MAX(a))}
c. MIN(a) = ιx.x ∈ a∧∀y.y ∈ a∧ y 6= x→ chron(y)> chron(x)
d. MAX(a) = ιx.x ∈ a∧∀y.y ∈ a∧ y 6= x→ chron(y)< chron(x)
Further I assume that tense is not an operator but rather a contstant, like a
proper name, as given in (16).
(16) a. JPAST K= tto(NOW )
b. JFUTUREK= t f rom(NOW )
c. JPRESENT K= NOW
d. NOW = {x| 2
√
(chron(x)− chron(now))2 ≤ r}
now = the deictic time point
r is contextually specified
In addition, I assume that aspect introduces temporal variables into a clause,
as shown in (17) and that aspect existentially closes the event variable, but this
assumption is not a necessary ingredient of the theory.2
(17) a. JPERFECT IV EK= λP.λ i.∃e.in(τ(e), i)∧P(e)
2 In fact, in order to deal with the distributive readings of temporal quantifiers with before and
after we might need additional interaction with events in the meaning of quantifiers in general, as
argued in Krifka (1989), but I think there are alternative possibilities also: e.g. after could mean
not longer than x after in those cases.
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b. JPERFECT K= λP.λ i.∃e.be f ore(τ(e), i)∧P(e)
c. JIMPERFK= λP.λ i.∃e.in(i,τ(e))∧P(e)
d. be f ore(a,b) = true iff chron(MAX(a))< chron(MIN(b))
e. in(a,b) = true iff chron(MIN(b))< chron(MIN(a))∧
chron(MAX(b))> chron(MAX(a))
Coming to the syntax, I assume that any quantifier comes with a domain restric-
tor C and must be raised from the immediate argument position of any temporal
preposition to a position higher than tense, which is more or less classical QR.
I assume, further, that temporal quantifiers may appear as sisters of the restric-
tor argument of higher quantifiers, similar to von Stechow (2002), as shown in
(18). In addition they can also be applied separately to an IP.
(18)
QP i
Q NP P ti j TENSE
P t j IP
4.2 Presupposition Accommodation
Recall the original example (2), repeated here for convenience as (19). The
needed reading is given in (19a). The problem is that the Mondays quantified
over must be restricted to Mondays in the past. Therefore, we want the infor-
mation that the Monday must be in the past to somehow enter the restrictor
domain of the quantifier every. Competing theories achieve this by opening a
slot in the representation of Monday such that Monday denotes a Monday in
some interval. I rejected this line of attack altogether and proposed that instead
what we have is a presupposition triggered by the covert during that its argu-
ment is in a contextually salient time. Every Monday will be raised out of the
argument position of the preposition and it will end up in the highest possible
position. The question, now, is whether one can accommodate this presupposi-
tion such that it enters the restrictor of every.
(19) John called (during) every Monday.
a. ∃i.past(i)∧∀x.Monday(x)∧on(i,x)→ call(J, i)
This could be a case of intermediate accommodation in the sense of Geurts &
van der Sandt (1999). However, it has been forcefully argued by Beaver (2001),
but see also von Fintel (2008), that intermediate accommodation does not exist.
In my view this question is not totally settled and I prefer to remain agnostic
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about this issue. For explicitness I will assume that what looks like intermediate
accommodation is in fact global accommodation. In particular this means that
intermediate accommodation appears to exist because there is a global domain
reduction to the very same extent (to avoid presupposition failure).
A formal side note is in order here. I use predicate abstraction in the
sense of Heim & Kratzer (1998) to model QR. Predicate abstraction, however,
has one particularly unfortunate property, namely that it loses presuppositions
attached to traces abstracted over. Consider the abstract case in (20). The reason
why the presupposition attached to 1 is lost is that in the predicate abstraction
rule, there is nothing that would save them. While the sister node of 1 is defined
for any g such that R(b,g(1)), the higher node basically frees up this constraint.
(20) Q(b,a) - whether or not R(b,a)
a λx.Q(b,g[1→x](1))
1 Q(b,g(1)) iff R(b,g(1)) by presupposition resolution
b λx.[R(x,g(1))].Q(x,g(1))
The problem can be solved, however, with a small change in the predicate
abstraction rule, given in (21). This rule now globally projects presuppositions
after predicate abstraction as well, just as (presumably) originally intended in
Heim & Kratzer (1998).
(21) Predicate abstraction with presuppositions: If γ is a tree consisting
of α and β , and α is an index i, then for any g for which Jβ Kg is
defined, JγKg = λx.[Jβ Kg[i→x]is de f ined].Jβ Kg[i→x]
4.3 Embedded Quantification
I will derive one reading of each of the four examples given in (22a), (22b),
(22c) and (22d) in the following. The derivations are given in in classical trans-
parent LF style.
(22) a. John called every Monday.
b. John called every Monday every summer.
c. John called today.
d. John called before the meeting.
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I first derive the constituent John called with a perfective aspect, which will
appear in each of the sentences, as shown in (23).
(23) λ i.∃e.in(τ(e), i)∧C(J,e)
PERF
λP.λ i.∃e.in(τ(e), i)∧P(e)
John calls
λe.C(J,e)
Note that any kind of temporal modification is made available by the presence
of aspect. Until the event itself is built up, there is no time variable in play
whatsoever. As noted before, the fact that I existentially close the event variable
can be circumvented by treating it as a pronominal element.
I start with (22a). I assume that every Monday is headed by a covert prepo-
sition like on or during. First, I apply during every Monday to the result of (23),
as shown in (24). Note that every Monday is only represented by the trace t1,
being raised to a higher position in the tree. The whole tree fragment is only
defined for assignements g such that g(1)∩ i 6= /0, via the presupposition of
during. In the next step I apply PAST to the result and lambda abstract via the
rule (21), which now preserves the presupposition.
(24) λx.[x∩ tto(NOW ) 6= /0].∃e.
in(τ(e),x∩ tto(NOW ))∧C(J,e)
1 ∃e.in(τ(e),g(1)∩ tto(NOW ))∧C(J,e)
PAST
tto(NOW)
λ i.∃e.in(τ(e),g(1)∩ i)∧C(J,e)
λP.λ i.P(g(1)∩ i)
during
λx.λP.λ i[i∩ x 6= /0].P(x∩ i)
t1
g(1)
λ i.∃e.in(τ(e), i)
∧C(J,e)
Now, all that remains to be done is to apply the QR-ed every Monday which
goes trivially, as given in (25). The result is defined exactly if every Monday in
C overlaps with the past, and suffers presupposition failure otherwise.
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The arising reading is this: it is presupposed that all Mondays in C overlap
the past (could be included, of course) and it is stated that in the overlapping
part between each Monday in C and the past interval, there is an event of John
calling. This predicts that whenever we are explicitly speaking about non-past
Mondays, the sentence is strange.
(25) ∀y.M(y)∧ y ∈C→∃e.in(τ(e),y∩ tto(NOW ))∧C(J,e)
every Monday
λQ.∀y.M(y)∧ y ∈C→ Q(y)
λx.[x∩ tto(NOW ) 6= /0].∃e.
in(τ(e),x∩ tto(NOW ))∧C(J,e)
Consider a scenario in which A utters (26) in June. It seems to me that the
answer in (26a) is at least more natural than the one in (26b). This is quite
similar to the classical behavior of presuppositional sentences like in (27).
(26) A: Speaking about the 52 Mondays this year, John called every Mon-
day.
a. B: Well, that’s only true for the past Mondays.
b. C: ?Of course he did.
(27) A: Speaking about the 82 Million Germans, every German loves his
Mercedes Benz.
a. B: Well, that’s only true for those who have one.
b. C: ?Of course they do.
Let us now consider example (22b). This time, the quantified PP during ev-
ery summer modifies directly the NP restrictor of the quantifier every, namely
Monday. We get the structure given in (28).
(28)
every summer
1
every
Monday on t1
2
PAST
on t2 John called
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The interesting question is, how every summer modifies Monday. The relevant
part of the tree is given in (29). The presupposition associated with on every
summer survives and results in the global presupposition that every summer
in C overlaps the past, and the presupposition associated with on every Mon-
day is locally accommodated as it ends up being in the restrictor of a universal
quantifier. Apart from this, the computation is standard, hence embedded quan-
tification poses no problem whatsoever for the system.
(29) ∀z.S(z)∧ z ∈C→∀x.x∩ z 6= /0∧M(x∩ z)→
∃e.in(τ(e),x∩ tto(NOW ))∧C( j,e)
∀ Sunday1
∀ λ i.[i∩g(1) 6= /0].M(i∩g(1))
Monday
λx.M(x)
on t1
λP.λ i.[i∩g(1) 6= /0].
P(i∩g(1))
λx.
[x∩ tto(now) 6= /0].
∃e.
in(τ(e),x∩ tto(NOW ))
∧C( j,e)
The problem of deictic expressions like today comes out trivially in the cur-
rent approach, as shown in (30), which simply contains the predicted truth
conditions for (22c). Presupposing that the past overlaps today is trivial and
harmless.
(30) John called today.
a. asserts: ∃e.in(τ(e), tto(NOW )∩ ιx.today(x))∧C(J,e)
b. presupposes: tto(NOW )∩ ιx.today(x) 6= /0
Finally, let us consider the example (22d), which turns out to be simpler than
expected, cf. (31). The crucial point is that there is no presupposition that the
meeting itself need be in the past. This is because before x only presupposes
that the time before x will overlap the contextual time (the past). In a way, this
is a fairly trivial presupposition, but if we had after every meeting, we had a
more meaningful presupposition, as this would really require past meetings.
(31) a. asserts: ∃e.in(τ(e), tto(ιx.Meeting(x))∩ tto(NOW ))∧C(J,e)(y)
b. presupposes: [tto(ιx.M(x))∩ tto(NOW ) 6= /0].
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4.4 Stacking Quantifiers
Recall that (6), repeated here as (32), does not boil down to scope ambiguity
alone but has a strong short reading. But for the scenario discussed in the in-
troduction, this does not seem to suffice. Assume a meeting which starts on
Monday at 2 pm and finishes on Tuesday at 2 pm. Now, (6c) requires a calling
event to take place between Tuesday 2 pm and the end of Tuesday. As opposed
to Pratt & Francez (2001) and von Stechow (2002) and Beaver & Condoravdi
(2007) who actually even fail to find the right Tuesday in such a case (since
there is no Tuesday in the time after the meeting and no Tuesday which in-
cludes the time after the meeting), the theory sketched here fails because it
allows, in the second reading, the calling to take place on the right Tuesday,
but during the meeting, i.e. in the part of Tuesday that is not after the meeting.
(32) John called after the meeting on Tuesday
a. John called in the overlapping time between the past and the time
after the meeting which overlaps Tuesday
b. John called in the overlapping time between the past and the
Tuesday which overlaps the time after the meeting
For this reason I assume that we need stacking temporal PPs as well to get the
short reading of Pratt & Francez (2001). Fortunately, the system has absolutely
no problems with stacking PPs. I demonstrate in (33) for (32) on a strongly
simplified tree, in which M stands for the meeting and T for the Tuesday.
(33) [tto(NOW )∩ t f rom(M)∩T 6= /0]
∃e.in(τ(e), tto(NOW )∩T ∩ t f rom(M))∧C( j,e)
PAST λ i.[i∩ t f rom(M)∩T 6= /0]
∃e.in(τ(e), i∩T ∩ t f rom(M))∧C( j,e)
after the meeting λ i.[i∩T 6= /0]
∃e.in(τ(e), i∩T )∧C( j,e)
on Tuesday λx.∃e.in(τ(e),x)∧C( j,e)
Stacking two real quantifiers which would undergo QR would result in presup-
position failure. The problem is that we get two presuppositions hanging on
both traces that depend on each other and thereby make global accommoda-
tion obscure. The only system that can handle these is Geurts & van der Sandt
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(1999) but it is not clear whether those readings actually exist. Does (34) have
a reading such that it presupposes that for every meeting there is a Tuesday
such that that Tuesday overlaps both the time after that meeting and the time of
the meeting and the calling must have taken place in the part of each Tuesday
that is after the meeting? I think, the required reading does neither exist nor
does it make particularly much sense. Remember that if the Tuesday was not
overlapping the time of the meeting, we could reproduce the truth conditions
with embedded quantification.
(34) Peter called after every meeting on every Tuesday.
5 Conclusion
In this paper I have shown first of all that it is possible to do temporal quan-
tification without assuming any kind of context dependent lexical meanings
for time-denoting expressions. This is a very important finding as it seems to
deliver a solid ground for refuting a number of theories. In passing, a more
elaborate version of predicate abstraction was given and in addition it has been
shown that peculiar cases in which temporal prepositional phrases are really
stacked can be dealt with without any further refinement of the system. Pre-
sumably, however, quantifier stacking involving more than one quantifier does
not occur.
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Abstract. In this paper we propose an event-anaphor based analysis of Mon-
golian focus constructions and wh-questions. Mongolian has two types of corre-
sponding wh-question-answer paradigms involving either in situ or ex situ foci
and wh-words. The apparent difference between these constructions involves ex-
haustiveness on the focus-side and presuppositionality on the question-side. The
analysis, however, reveals that both contrasts amount to the presence or absence
of an anaphoric event argument. We provide a large set of data that confirm the
predictions of the analysis.
1 Introduction
In Khalkha-Mongolian (the main Mongolian dialect) two types of wh-questions
can be distinguished with regard to both syntactic properties and interpretation.
We call the first type of question in situ and the second type ex situ. In situ ques-
tions as (1) are such that the wh-word appears at its base generated position (or
at the first merge position in minimalist parlance) whereas in ex situ questions,
as in (2) the wh-word appears at some higher syntactic position, which we as-
sume to be a kind of focus position. The most striking correlating semantic
properties are that, in a sense, ex situ questions are strongly presuppositional,
whereas in situ questions are not: One can answer an in situ question nega-
tively, e.g. with nobody, as shown in (1a), whereas for an ex situ question, such
an answer is marked (even infelicitous at times), as shown in (2a).1
(1) Tuya
Tuya
hen-tei
who-COM
gerle-j
marry-CVB
bai-san
be-PST
be?
Q
‘Whom did Tuya marry?’
a. Tuya
Tuya
hen-tei
who-COM
ch
FOC
gerle-j
marry-CVB
bai-gaa-güi.
be-NPST-NEG
∗ This research has been supported by the German Initiative of Excellence (Göttingen) and the
Project C2 “Case and Referential Context: Argument Realization and Referential Context” as part
of the SFB 732 “Incremental Specification in Context” funded by the German Science Foundation
(DFG) at the University of Stuttgart. In addition, we wish to thank Andreas Haida, Klaus von
Heusinger, Hans Kamp and Malte Zimmermann for comments and suggestions, and Ingo Reich
for organising the Sinn und Bedeutung conference and editing this volume.
1 We explicitly mark focushood only if an example appears without the corresponding wh-question.
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‘Tuya married nobody.’
(2) Hen-tei
who-COM
Tuya
Tuya
gerle-j
marry-CVB
bai-san
be-PST
be?
Q
‘Whom did Tuya marry?’
a. #Hen-tei
who-COM
ch
FOC
Tuya
Tuya
gerle-j
marry-CVB
bai-gaa-güi.
be-NPST-NEG
‘Tuya married nobody.’ (The speaker doesn’t want to tell who
Tuya married)
In addition, there is a correlation between the syntactic position of the answer-
ing constituent and the syntactic position of the wh-word, as can be seen on
the position of hentei ch in the answers above. The arising empirical general-
ization is then, that ex situ foci as answers to ex situ questions are necessarily
exhaustive whereas in situ foci may or may not be exhaustive. Examples are to
come.
In this paper we develop an analysis of the observed phenomena, widely
following ideas from Onea (2010) for Hungarian focus, along the following
lines: We assume that ex situ questions are about a particular event and so are
the ex situ answers. The apparent stronger presuppositionality of ex situ ques-
tions is then nothing but a result of the fact that events must have participants
(otherwise they don’t exist), and the exhaustiveness arises in many but not all
cases from the fact that some expressions totally specify the participants of an
event.
2 Generalizations
Mongolian is an SOV language with postpositions, prenominal modifiers, a
complex differential case marking system Guntsetseg (2009, 2010b) and word
order constrained by grammatical roles and information structure (cf. Poppe
1951). Foci in Mongolian receive prosodic prominence and may or may not be
moved from their base position. Our first impression is that a B-accent distin-
guishes contrastive topics from foci, which receive A-accents sensu (Bolinger
1972). Similarly, topics may or may not be moved.
It is not always trivial to distinguish in situ and ex situ questions (or foci).
This is because not only focus gives rise to syntactic movement, and, hence,
moved foci may surface as if they were in situ and vice versa. Given that the
information structurally unmarked overt structure of the Mongolian sentence is
the one in (3a), exemplified in (3), we can only safely conclude that a focus or a
wh-word is ex situ whenever it precedes some expression that in the unmarked
case would surface at its left.
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(3) Öchigdör
yesterday
Peter
Peter
Mari-g
Mary-ACC
shunaltai
passionately
üns-sen.
kiss-PST
‘Yesterday, Peter kissed Mary passionately.’
a. clausal adverbs > subject > object > verbal adverbs > verb
We remain silent on the hierarchical structure of Mongolian sentences in this
paper. To avoid syntactic complications we limit the analysis to simple tran-
sitive sentences. We only use wh-questions about the object. We assume that
whenever the wh-word is in front of the subject, as in (4a) we have an ex situ
focus, and also we assume that whenever the wh-word is after the subject, as in
(4b) it may be interpreted in situ (but needn’t be).
(4) a. Hen-ig
who-ACC
/
/
MARI-g
Mary-ACC
Peter
Peter
üns-sen
kiss-PST
(be)?
Q
‘Whom did Peter kiss? Peter kissed Mary.’
b. Peter
Peter
hen-ig
who-ACC
/
/
MARI-g
Mary-ACC
üns-sen
kiss-PST
(be)?
Q
‘Whom did Peter kiss? Peter kissed Mary.’
Given these assumptions, we have the following observed facts to model: i) ex
situ questions are more presuppositional, and ii) ex situ answers are exhaustive.
3 Questions
As a general framework for questions we assume a Hamblin-Rooth type of
semantics in which questions are modelled as sets of possible answers, cf. e.g.
Rooth (1992) and Beaver & Clark (2008) as a recent variant.
We assume that wh-questions of the type given in (5) may have two dis-
tinct representations given in (5a) and (5b). (5a) says that the semantic value
of a question consists of all possible answers with an existentially closed event
variable and (5b) says that the semantic value of a question consists of all pos-
sible answers with a presupposed event variable. In the second case we say that
the question is a about a particular event.
(5) Who P?
a. {(∃e)(P(e,x))|x ∈ D}
b. {P(ιe((∃y)(P(e,y)∧ e ∈C∧MAX(e)))),x)|x ∈ D}
Note, of course, that if the event under discussion is maximal and contextually
unconstrained, the two representations are completely equivalent, however, of
course, in the lack of a context, (5b) suffers presupposition failure. We assume
that ex situ questions have the semantic representation in (5b) whereas in situ
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questions have the semantic representation in (5a).
We now illustrate: In (6) the ex situ question is not felicitous, as the con-
text does not satisfy the presupposition. In (7) the question with ex situ wh-
word is acceptable and clearly refers to the event under discussion that the
speaker has just reported. In (8) the question is felicitous and since the context
maximizes the event under discussion to Peter’s entire life, the interpretation is
as given in the example, just as explained above.
(6) Context: /0
a. #Hen-ig
who-ACC
Peter
Peter
üns-sen
kiss-PST
be?
Q
‘Whom did Peter kiss?’
(7) Context: I just saw that Peter kissed a girl, but I didn’t recognize her.
a. Hen-ig
who-ACC
Peter
Peter
üns-sen
kiss-PST
be?
Q
‘Whom did Peter kiss in the event you saw?’
(8) Context: I’m sure, Peter kissed some girl or another in his life.
a. Hen-ig
who-ACC
Peter
Peter
üns-sen
kiss-PST
be?
Q
‘Whom did Peter ever kiss?’
Evidence that in situ questions do not target the event under discussion is a bit
more involved, as we must make sure that the construction contains in situ foci.
Assuming that simple unstressed personal pronouns in Mongolian are inappro-
priate sentence topics but full DPs, especially with demonstrative articles, are,
the contrast in (9) is enlightning. Note that (9b) is otherwise grammatical and
fully acceptable as a general question with no salient event.
(9) Context: I just saw that a woman kissed someone, but I didn’t recognize
the kissee.
a. Ter
the
hüühen
woman
hen-ig
who-ACC
üns-sen
kiss-PST
be?
Q
‘Whom did the woman kiss in the event you saw?’
b. #Ter
she
hen-ig
who-ACC
üns-sen
kiss-PST
be?
Q
‘Whom did she kiss in the event you saw?’
An interesting question is what happens in the case of contrastive topics, which
in Mongolian appear in front of the focused expression (or question word).
Superficially, one may expect that contrastive topics may not appear with ex
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situ foci, for – as argued in Büring (2003) – contrastive topics would signal
the existence of a super-question: e.g. for (10) this would be a who-kissed-
whom? type of question, leading to the non-existence of a unique kissing event.
However, even though Peter is a contrastive topic in (10), it is clearly part of
the background. Hence, the event that has to be accommodated involves Peter
kissing someone, and not just any kissing event. This correctly predicts that ex
situ questions may cooccur with contrastive topics, as shown in (11) (Note that
the question word appears left to the subject in (11), hence necessarily being
ex situ).
(10) PeterCT
Peter
hen-ig
who-ACC
üns-sen
kiss-PST
be?
Q
‘As for Peter, whom did he kiss?’
(11) Mari-gCT
Mary-ACC
hen-d
who-DAT
Peter
Peter
tanilzuul-san
introduce-PST
be?
Q
‘As for Mary, to whom did Peter introduce her?’
Let us now see how we can compositionally derive the difference between the
ex situ and in situ questions. We assume the existence of a particular syntactic
position which, similar to Hungarian (cf. Onea 2010), is responsible for the
event-presupposition and syntactically requires a [+Foc] feature on its speci-
fier, such that only wh-words (bearing focus according to Haida (2007)2) and
foci may appear in its specifier. We assume that the semantics of the E head
is the one given in (12). We dub this position EP. Note that the first argument
is the question word, and the second the background. The formula assumes
that question words are quantifiers, but of course, question words are, strictly
speaking, sets of individuals (treated as generalized quantifiers) in order to de-
rive the ordinary meaning of questions as sets of propositions. We leave this
part to the reader, however.
(12) λφ .λψ.ψ(λx.φ(x)(ιe.e ∈C∧MAX(e)∧∃y∈De .φ(y)(e)))
4 Foci
Answers to wh-questions contain narrow foci such that the narrowly focused
constituent matches the wh-word in the question. We assume Alternative Se-
mantics (Rooth (1992); Beaver & Clark (2008) as a general semantic frame-
work for focus interpretation. In particular: Foci trigger a presupposition over
sets of alternative propositions which have to match the ordinary semantic
value of some question in the context by ⊆ relation.
2 We do not follow his semantic analysis of wh-words, however.
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In Mongolian, foci appear at the same syntactic position at which the question
they answer would appear. Syntactically, we model this by assuming that ex
situ foci are moved to EP whenever EP enters the numeration. The reason is
that the [+Foc] feature on the answer must be checked.
Semantically, the effect of the EP is, again, the introduction of the event
presupposition, and for (13), we get the result in (14). (14) says that in the
contextually unique event of Peter kissing someone, he kissed Mary.
(13) MARI-g
Mary-ACC
Peter
Peter
üns-sen.
kiss-PST
‘Peter kissed Mary.’
(14) a. ordinary meaning:
kiss(ιe.e ∈C∧MAX(e)∧∃y∈De .kiss(e,P,y),P,M)
b. presupposed set:
{kiss(ιe.e ∈C∧MAX(e)∧∃y∈De .kiss(e,P,y),P,z)|z ∈ De}
It should be obvious now, that for (13) we have just derived the exhaustiveness
inference, as it is not possible for an event to have two distinct participants on
the same argument role, even if one contains the other. So, if for e the patient
argument is Mary, the event e’ which contains e and has Mary and Jane as a
patient argument, must be distinct from e.
The exhaustification works, however, only accidentally, since it is a prop-
erty of proper names as generalized quantifiers to maximally cover their re-
strictor set. For typical monotone increasing quantifiers such as three women
exhaustification is not expected to arise as the derived meaning ultimately only
says that in the event under discussion the cardinality of the set of individuals
who are both women and have been kissed by Peter is at least three. Any fur-
ther exhaustification must be purely pragmatic. This prediction is born out as
shown in (15). Note that the lack of contrast between (15b) and (15d) is fully
predicted as in these cases the arguments are treated as a sum individual.
(15) a. Gurvan
three
ohin-ig
girl-ACC
Peter
Peter
üns-sen.
kiss-PST
Bas
also
neg
a
hövgüün-ig.
boy-ACC
‘Peter has kissed three girls. And a boy.’
b. Gurvan
three
ohin(-ig)
girl-ACC
bolon
and
bas
also
neg
a
hövgüün-ig
boy-ACC
Peter
Peter
üns-sen.
kiss-PST
‘Peter has kissed three girls and a boy.’
c. #Mari-g
Mary-ACC
Peter
Peter
üns-sen.
kiss-PST
Bas
Also
neg
a
hövgüün-ig.
boy-ACC
‘Peter has kissed Mary. And a boy.’
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d. Mari(-g)
Mary-ACC
bolon
and
bas
also
neg
a
hövgüün-ig
boy-ACC
Peter
Peter
üns-sen.
kiss-PST
‘Peter has kissed Mary and a boy.’
There is an additional test for the contrast between the exhaustification in case
of proper names and other upward monotonic quantifiers, such as three girls.
Consider the question in (16). Now an answer like (16a) is correctly predicted
to be completely out in our theory, since this would mean that Peter didn’t
kiss Mary. An answer like (16b) is, on the other hand, not predicted to be
infelicitous, since Peter kissing three girls is not supposed to be exhaustive.
For one thing, of course, in principle (16b) could mean that Peter kissed a
totality of three girls, however this is a marginal interpretation in Mongolian.
If native speakers are confronted with the dialogue: (16)-(16b) they would say
that Peter kissed a totality of four girls. The fact that (16b) is marked with
a question mark rather comes from a more optimal candidate which native
speakers would prefer: (16c) and (16d) which would include a special marker
that we are speaking about additional girls.
(16) Mari-gaas
Mari-ABL
öör
different
hen-ig
who-ACC
Peter
Peter
üns-sen
kiss
be?
Q
‘Except Mary, who did Peter kiss?’
a. #Tuya-g
Tuya-ACC
Peter
Peter
üns-sen.
kiss-PST
‘Peter kissed Tuya’
b. ?Gurvan
three
ohin-ig
girl-ACC
Peter
Peter
üns-sen.
kiss-PST
‘Peter has kissed three girls.’
c. Öshöö
more
Tuya-g
Tuya-ACC
Peter
Peter
ünssen.
kiss-PST
‘Peter kissed also Tuya.’
d. Öshöö
more
gurvan
three
ohin-ig
girl-ACC
Peter
Peter
üns-sen.
kiss-PST
‘Peter kissed also three girls.’
Note that this contrast is particularly strong, as not every Mongolian speaker
would have problems with (16b) at all, whereas (16a) is completely out.
We do not discuss downward entailing or non monotonic quantifiers here
in detail as their treatment in event semantics is fairly complicated, but note
that similar to Hungarian, cf. Onea (2010), they never occur as in situ foci,
as shown in (17). The reason for this is that simply existentially quantifying
over an event variable will not get the correct truth conditions (Krifka 1989),
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moving such quantifiers into the EP position, however, correctly predicts that
they apply to one particular maximal event. If needed, of course, that event can
be extended without any limit.
(17) a. Yag
exactly
gurvan
three
ohin-ig
girl-ACC
Peter
Peter
üns-sen.
kiss-PST
‘Peter has kissed exactly three girls.’
b. #Peter
Peter
yag
exactly
gurvan
three
ohin-ig
girl-ACC
üns-sen.
kiss-PST
‘Peter has kissed exactly three girls.’
Note that if explicit negation applies, any kind of foci may appear in situ. This
is different in Hungarian. The reason for this seems to be that Hungarian has
an explicit syntactic projection which contributes the existential closure of the
event, whereas this is more flexible in Mongolian as far as we can judge at the
current stage of our research.
5 Predictions
The system proposed in this paper has a number of surprising predictions,
which are (fortunately) borne out:
For one thing, adjuncts that do not individuate events, such as explana-
tions, will never be exhaustified even if they come as ex situ foci. This is be-
cause an event may have several reasons and therefore naming one reason or
explanation for an event will not trigger any special individuating information
about that event. Therefore, in the answer to a why-question there is no differ-
ence with regard to exhaustiveness between in situ and ex situ foci, as shown in
(19) vs. (21), however, there is still a very clear difference in the interpretation
of the questions. (18) must target a particular journey which most probably was
discussed in the context, whereas (20) is a general question.
(18) Yagaad
why
chi
you
Mongol
Mongolia
ruu
to
yav-san
go-PST
be?
Q
‘Why did you go to Mongolia (on a particular salient occasion)?’
(19) Minii
my
eej
mother
övd-sön
be_sick
bai-san
be-PST
uchraas
because
bi
I
Mongol
Mongolia
yav-san.
go-PST
Bas
also
minii
my
egch
sister
gerle-h
marry-INF
gej
that
bai-san
be-PST
uchraas.
because
‘I went to Mongolia, because my mother was sick. And because my
sister was getting married.’
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(20) Chi
you
Mongol
Mongolia
ruu
to
yagaad
why
yav-san
go-PST
be?
Q
‘Why did you go to Mongolia (some day)?’
(21) Bi
I
eej
mother
övd-sön
be_sick-PST
bai-san
be-PST
uchraas
because
Mongol
Mongolia
yav-san.
go-PST
Bas
also
egch
sister
gerle-h
marry-INF
gej
that
bai-san
be-PST
uchraas.
because
‘I went to Mongolia, because my mother was sick. And because my
sister was getting married.’
In Mongolian the system proposed above predicts that for stative verbs ex situ
foci will have difficulties finding the contextually salient event the question or
answer should be about.
Some states can be very well individuated in time, in fact, probably they
can be even thought of as events. Such is the case for having a headache, being
angry with John. This is fairly difficult for more extended events such as having
a car, loving John, dispising John. If so, we may expect that in Mongolian only
for the first type of states ex situ questions are available, for they do have well-
individuated possible discourse antecedents. Yet this prediction is apparently
wrong, since both (22) and (23) are perfectly acceptable.
(22) Hen-d
who-DAT
Peter
Peter
uurla-san
be_angry-PST
be?
Q
‘With whom is Peter angry?’
(23) Hen-ig
who-ACC
Peter
Peter
üzen_jad-dag
hate-HAB
ve?
Q
‘Whom does Peter dispise?’
A closer look shows that there is a difference between these cases: for (23) we
need a context in which someone has informed us that Peter dispises someone.
The interpretation of the sentence is identical with (24). Indeed, an answer to
(23) is not interpreted as an exhaustive list of people who Peter dispises but
rather as an exhaustive list of people that have been mentioned to be dispised
by Peter in the context.
(24) Hen-ig
who-ACC
Peter
Peter
üzen_jad-dag
hate-HAB
gej
that
John
John
hel-sen
say-PST
be?
Q
‘Whom did John say that Peter dispises?’
This means that in cases in which an event or a particular temporally well in-
dividuated state (which can be under discussion) cannot be reconstructed (or is
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hard to reconstruct) from an utterance, an external event (of uttering/ speaking/
informing) will be used as a target event: instead of getting a salient event of
Peter dispising someone, we get a salient event of saying that Peter dispises
someone. We ignore the syntactic details.
It depends on the question semantics employed whether or not questions
will need to have existential presuppositions or not. This issue is not totally
settled, but we are inclined to follow Haida (2007) in saying that questions
do have an existential presupposition. If this is correct, the fact that nobody
is a good answer in a dialogue as in (25) needs an explanation. We follow
Haida (2007) in the assumption that negations can be used to protest against
a presupposition, and hence, the acceptability of (25) in English is not a valid
argument against the presuppositionality of wh-questions.
(25) A: Who do you love?
B: Nobody.
But then the question arises why Mongolian behaves differently. So, why is
it that when (2a) is used to answer (2) in Mongolian, native speakers get the
impression that the person uttering (2a) is lying, i.e. he does not want to di-
vulge the secret, who Tuya married? First, this cannot be because an existential
presupposition is imposed by the question, as (2a) could simply contradict that
presupposition. Moreover, it can be shown that even in situ questions do have
an existential presupposition. So, for instance, (26), if uttered by a judge or a
lawyer in court would still be rejected as presuppositional by the defence if
kissing were a crime.
(26) Ter
she
hen-ig
who-ACC
üns-sen
kiss-PST
be?
Q
‘Whom did she kiss?’
The explanation for the markedness of nobody-type answers for ex situ ques-
tions is explained by the anaphoricity of the event which the question is about.
Since such an event must exist, no participant of that event can be nobody.
So, clearly, if in the answer one says that the participant under question is
nobody, we get a contradiction that will be pragmatically interpreted as a non-
willingness to divulge a secret. The contradiction is sentence internal, however,
and not between the presupposition of the question and the answer, since in the
answer itself an event presupposition is triggered by the ex situ position of
the answer focus. If, however, one chooses to answer with nobody to such a
presuppositional question in situ (remember that nobody can be in situ despite
the downward entailing properties, since it is accompanied by verbal negation)
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only a contradiction between the presupposition of the question and the answer
arises. This is still not quite the situation in English, however, since in Mon-
golian even in this case the presupposition of the question is stronger (event
related) than the one in English (which is merely existential), so we expect in
Mongolian a presupposition failure marker to be used. Exactly this happens in
practice as shown in (27).
(27) a. Ter
she
hen-ig
who-ACC
üns-sen
kiss-PST
be?
Q
‘Whom did she kiss?’
b. Ter
She
hen-ig
who-ACC
ch
FOC
üns-ee-güi
kiss-NPST-NEG
shdee
actually
‘Actually, she kissed nobody.’
The same effect can be reproduced in English, as shown in (28). Note that if
we omitted the embedding under John said, we would get a plain contradiction
between A’s utterances.
(28) A: John said that Peter kissed a girl in the coffee break.
B: Who did he kiss?
a. A: ? He kissed nobody.
b. A: Actually, he kissed nobody.
Haida (2007) argues that the uninformativity of a pure existential as an answer
to a wh-question is a better test for presuppositionality as shown in (29).
(29) A: Who did you kiss?
B: ? Somebody.
The lack of any contrast between (30) and (31) in this respect shows that in-
deed, both types of questions in Mongolian are presuppositional, even if only
one of them is about a particular event.
(30) a. Peter
Peter
hen-ig
who-ACC
üns-sen
kiss-PST
be?
Q
‘Who did Peter kiss?’
b. ?Peter
Peter
hen_negn-ig
someone-ACC
üns-sen.
kiss-PST
‘Peter kissed somebody.’
(31) a. Hen-ig
who-ACC
Peter
Peter
üns-sen
kiss-PST
be?
Q
‘Who did Peter kiss?’
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b. ?Hen-negn-ig
someone-ACC
Peter
Peter
üns-sen.
kiss-PST
‘Peter kissed somebody.’
6 Outlook: Comparison to Hungarian
In this paper we have developed a sketchy analysis for two interesting facts
about Mongolian questions and foci: For one thing Mongolian has two types
of questions, namely in situ and ex situ questions, and also two types of typical
answers containing narrow foci that can appear ex situ or in situ and which,
for the most part, strictly correlate with the type of the question. We modelled
this correlation and the arising semantic facts: presuppositionality differences
in the question and exhaustiveness differences in the answers.
The correlation as such is partly purely syntactic: We have assumed a
particular EP projection which attracts focused elements, and since we assume
that question words have a [+Foc] feature, it follows that question words and
narrow foci share the syntactic position in Mongolian whenever EP enters the
numeration. In addition, we have assumed that the E head transforms the event
argument of the clause into a presupposed maximal event, i.e. a contextually
unique event of the type described in the background part. This explains the ex-
haustiveness of ex situ foci for proper names but not for most other quantifiers.
Evidence has been given that this prediction is correct. The presupposition-
ality difference in the question is not related to the existential presupposition
wh-questions generally have but rather the event-relatedness of the questions.
Again, evidence to this extent has been given.
The question arises how Mongolian focus relates to Hungarian preverbal
focus, which is the most prominent example of exhaustive focus in the litera-
ture, cf. Szabolcsi (1981); É. Kiss (1998), and, even more importantly, whether
from Mongolian anything significant with regard to the general exhaustiveness
debate follows. As a background, it must be noted that there are a number of
competing analyses for Hungarian focus. For instance, it has been claimed that
preverbal focus in Hungarian comes with an exhaustiveness operator similar
to only (Szabolcsi 1981; É. Kiss 1998), that exhaustiveness in Hungarian is a
matter of exhaustive identification (Szabolcsi 1994) or that Hungarian focus
is only exhaustive in an event related manner (Onea 2007), or exhaustiveness
could even be a pure pragmatic implicature (Wedgwood 2005).
The analysis proposed here is very similar to the event-based exhausti-
fication analysis proposed in Onea (2007, 2010) for Hungarian. This similar-
ity is not incidental, however. While in Hungarian there is only one type of
wh-questions, Mongolian exhibits an analogon to focus-phenomena also in the
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realm of wh-questions. It turns out that it is difficult or even impossible to apply
any non-event-based analysis of Hungarian focus to the Mongolian questions,
for it is, for instance, not at all obvious what it means for a question to be
exhaustive. Consider, for instance, the oddity of (32) even in English, which
straightly translates to Hungarian and Mongolian.
(32) Only whom did Peter kiss?
Also, the event-based exhaustification approach has a number of predictions
that are hard to achieve in the competing theories. For instance, the prediction
that there is a strong exhaustiveness difference between arguments and adjuncts
(i.e. why-questions) and also the difference between proper names and other
quantifiers. While these predictions seem empirically unclear for Hungarian
according to Onea (2010), we have provided strong evidence that in Mongolian
they are all borne out.
In addition, one particular prediction of Onea (2010) is that wh-questions
may come either with existentially bound event variables or with anaphoric
event variables, which can be modelled with the ι operator. Mongolian overtly
distinguishes between these types of questions, if our analyis is on the right
track. Contextual constraints on the possibility to use these types of questions
suggest that the distinction is, indeed, real.
In a way, then, Mongolian suggests that focus exhaustiveness may gener-
ally be related to event-anaphors. A similar analysis, based on event anaphors,
has been proposed by Hole (2011) for shi...de clefts in Chinese, and Grubic &
Zimmermann (2011) for marked foci in Ngamo.
We conclude with a somewhat puzzling difference between Hungarian
and Mongolian. While in Hungarian focused all-phrases cannot appear ex situ,
that is to say, as immediate preverbal foci, in Mongolian, in some contexts,
all-phrases can pop up as ex situ answers to how-many-questions, as shown in
(33a) vs. (34a).
This fact seems to suggest that there are differences between Hungarian
and Mongolian which have not been accounted for by the analyses of Onea
(2010) and the present analysis. Whether this means that after all, it is only
Mongolian and, crucially, not Hungarian to which the event-based analysis
should apply or whether there is some independent explanation of this con-
trast, we leave for further research.
(33) Heden
How-many
hün-ig
person-ACC
Peter
Peter
üns-sen
kiss-PST
be?
Q
‘How many persons did Peter kiss?’
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a. Büh
all
hün-ig
person-ACC
Peter
Peter
üns-sen.
kiss-PST
‘Peter kissed all the persons.’
(34) Hány
How-many
lányt
girls.ACC
csókolt
kissed
meg
PRT
Péter?
Peter
‘How many girls did Peter kiss?’ Hungarian
a. *Péter
Peter
minden
every/all
lányt
girl.ACC
csókolt
kissed
meg.
PRT
‘Peter kissed every girl.’
We do hint, however, at the fact that even in Mongolian, every-phrases cannot
be ex situ foci, which again, is similar to Hungarian, as shown in (35a).
(35) Heden
How-many
hun-ig
person-ACC
Peter
Peter
üns-sen
kiss-PST
be?
Q
‘How many persons did Peter kiss?’
a. *Hün
person
bolgon-ig
every-ACC
Peter
Peter
üns-sen.
kiss-PST
‘Peter kissed every person.’
So the solution of this asymmetry might come for free from a proper analysis
of büh (‘all’)-phrases in Mongolian as compared to Hungarian. For instance,
Guntsetseg (2010a) shows that as opposed to the single universal quantifier
minden in Hungarian, and the three English quantifiers (each, every, all) Mon-
golian has four universal quantifiers which strongly differ in their semantic
properties: büh (‘all’), bühen (‘generic every’), bolgon (‘distr. every’) and bür
(‘each’).
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Abstract. I present a speech act approach to relevance topics (RTs) that builds 
on Krifka’s (2001) analysis of speech acts as operations on commitment states. 
RTs can be marked with separating phrases (as for) or as antecedents of rele-
vance conditionals. They are speech acts of their own and are used in contexts 
in which the speaker wishes to address something that was not addressed im-
mediately before. A RT must be followed by a speech act that is relevant in 
relation to the topical element (which subsumes relations of predication and 
frame setting). Without the RT the discourse would be incoherent because the 
prerequisites of the subsequent speech act (e.g. Gricean maxims of relevance) 
would be violated. RTs cannot introduce completely new discourse referents. 
They must be referential, which in the case of properties as RTs can be 
achieved by a type shifting operation, but they can also pick up portions of ear-
lier discourse by quoting. I compare RTs to hanging topics, which are a diffe-
rent type of speech act, as well as to frame setters, which can be expressed by 
very similar formal means to RTs. 
 
1	   Introduction	  
The notion of (sentence) topic has proven difficult to define, the reason being 
that there are different semantic-pragmatic types of topics, e.g. aboutness 
topics, frame-setting topics or contrastive topics, that seem to share a kind of 
family resemblance but cannot be reduced to one unifying characteristic (e.g. 
Jacobs 2001). In this paper I am concerned with what often is called a free 
topic or freies Thema in German, and which, for reasons that will become 
clear instantly, I refer to as relevance topics (RTs). RTs are typically realized 
by ‘separating constructions’ like was x betrifft (‘as regards x’) in (1). The 
hanging topic construction illustrated in (2), which has a DP at the left peri-
phery and whose referent is picked up by a pronoun in the main clause, is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* This work was supported by the German Research Foundation DFG as part of the Collaborative 
Research Centre (SFB) 632 ‘Information Structure’ within project A2 at the Humboldt-Universi-
tät zu Berlin. Special thanks go to Andreas Haida & Stefan Hinterwimmer for valuable discus-
sion. I also thank Manfred Krifka and the audiences at SuB 15, the International Conference of 
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often thought to be another instantiation of a free topic (e.g. Altmann 1981). 
In this paper I will show that the hanging topic construction has different 
semantic-pragmatic characteristics from RTs and is subject to different re-
strictions. 
(1)  Was [ Peters  Geburtstag TOPIC] betrifft, er will   einen  Traktor. 
 what Peter's birthday      regards he wants a    tractor 
 ‘As regards Peter’s birthday, he wants a tractor.’ 
(2) [Peters Geburtstag TOPIC], wir  wollen  ihn  nächste  Woche  feiern. 
  Peter's birthday     we  want    it   next    week   celebrate 
 ‘Peter’s birthday, we want to celebrate it next week.’ 
For RTs like the one in (1) I will argue that they are clause-external and con-
stitute a speech act of their own that must be followed by another speech act, 
in (1) this is the assertion that the referent of er wants a tractor. Between the 
RT and the subsequent speech act there needs to be a relation of relevance. 
Unlike aboutness topics RTs do not require a predication relation between the 
topic phrase and the main clause (comment), and unlike frame setters they do 
not need to restrict the domain of reality with regard to which the truth of the 
main clause is evaluated. But they can do both (cf. Jacobs 2001). The purpose 
of a RT is to create a coherent discourse if coherence cannot be established 
without the RT speech act. For instance, in (3) the phrase with regard to 
marks an RT. Truth-conditionally this RT can be left out without a meaning 
change. Discourse-wise, it is crucial: the discourse is incoherent without it.  
(3) ...The relative amounts of ammonia, nitrite and nitrate depend on a num-
ber of factors of which the most important are pH and temperature. 
Below a pH of 8 the majority of ammonia is present in the non-toxic 
ammonium form. Above 8 the toxic form becomes increasingly more 
prevalent. With regard to [temperature TOPIC], there is approximately 
five times as much toxic ammonia at a temperature of 20° than at 5°C. 
[From BNC-FBN Practical Fishkeeping. Peterborough, Cambs: EMAP 
Pursuit Publishing Ltd, 1992]  
Thus, a RT has a discourse-managing function. It introduces a new discourse 
segment by taking up information that is in the common ground but which is 
not addressed in the immediately preceding context. 
2	   Relevance	  Topics	  as	  Speech	  Acts 
The speech act view of topics is not new. Searle (1969) identifies a specific 
act of referring (≈ topic act) and an act of predication. Jacobs (1984) suggests 
Relevance Topics   485 
that 'free topics' (see above) constitute speech acts of their own. Endriss 
(2009) spells this out for aboutness topics. Ebert, Endriss & Hinterwimmer 
(2008) transfer these ideas to conditionals, where the antecedent serves as the 
topic act and the consequent as the second speech act.  
Although all these proposals take a speech act view on topics they are 
underdefined as regards the actual illocutionary aspects of the speech act. Ac-
cording to Endriss (2009), for instance, the speech act character of topics ma-
nifests itself as follows. If a topic-comment structure is embedded under an 
illocutionary operator such as ASSERT and if the topical referent is not fami-
liar the update of the common ground proceeds in two steps. In a topic act, a 
discourse referent/ storage address is created. Then, the comment is applied 
to it. If the topical referent is familiar it is identified with an existing address 
and then the comment is applied to it. If the operator is non-illocutionary (e.g. 
a verb like announce) the establishment of a discourse referent is part of the 
ordinary semantic content. In this account, the illocutionary aspects of the 
topic act are characterized in terms of its semantic update effects but not in 
terms of the social commitments of the discourse participants that arise from 
performing it. In this sense the account is only 'near-speech act' take on to-
pics. 
According to Krifka (2001) speech acts are operations that apply to a 
commitment state s, i.e. a set of social commitments between discourse parti-
cipants, and deliver the commitments that characterize the resulting commit-
ment state s'. A speech act is an appropriate act A for a state s if s fulfils the 
'presuppositions' for the performance of A. I assume that such 'presupposi-
tions' include felicity conditions, sincerity conditions and Gricean maxims 
(e.g. relevance). Some acts create the commitment to react with a correspon-
ding act, e.g. questions commit the hearer to answer (cf. Krifka 2001: 13):  
(4) If s is a neutral state and Q is a question act, then Q(s) = s′ is a state  
 in which an answer A is expected that will lead back to a neutral state: 
 A(Q(s)) = A(s′) = s″,  
 where Q is appropriate for s, and A is appropriate for s′, 
 and where s and s″ are neutral states and s′ is a non-neutral state 
On the basis of this I suggest that the speech act character of RTs should be 
captured in the following way: 
(5) Relevance topics as speech acts 
 ACTsp(RTOPxsp (s)) = ACTsp(s') = s'',  
 where RTOP xsp is appropriate for s, and  
 ACTsp is appropriate for s' and relevant in relation to x.  
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Let s be a neutral conversational state and RTOPx a relevance topic performa-
tive act. The speaker commitment delivered by RTOPx is: I will address x, 
where x is the topical element. RTOPx(s) = s' is the resulting non-neutral state. 
s' requires another speech act ACT that leads back to a neutral state s''. The 
superscript sp both on RTOPxsp and ACTsp in (5) indicates that the speaker of 
the RT act and the speaker of the subsequent speech act are the same. This is 
different for questions, which place a commitment on the hearer to answer 
(unless they are used as rhetoric devices in monologic discourse). The neutral 
state s'' is only achieved if ACT asserts something relevant in relation to x. 
For non-assertive acts, ACT also needs to be relevant in relation to x. 
However, it will not lead back to a neutral state but to a state that might 
require yet another speech act, e.g. in the case of questions. Furthermore, 
before the performance of RTOPx the speaker did not address x (n.b. this does 
not mean that x was not mentioned in the previous utterance): ACT, if 
performed without the preceding RTOPx, would have been inappropriate for s. 
Applied to example (3) from above we can discern the following se-
quence of conversational states and speech acts: 
(6) 〈s〉  [RTOP With regard to temperature] 〈s'〉    [ACT there is approximately 5 
times as much toxic ammonia at a temperature of 20° than at 5°C]  〈s''〉  
In the conversational state s, which is a neutral state, the performance of ACT 
(= Assert [...]) would not be appropriate due to a lack of relevance at this 
stage. RTOPtemperature (s) is appropriate because temperature was not addressed 
immediately beforehand. The resulting state s' is a non-neutral state: It con-
tains the commitment of the speaker to address temperature. ACT(s') now is 
appropriate because ACT addresses temperature. The resulting state s'' is a 
neutral state because the commitment has been fulfilled by ACT. 
(7) and (8) illustrate how a RT can precede a question and a directive, 
respectively (also cf. Altmann 1981 for such data), which are relevant with 
respect to the topic act: a plausible reading of (7) is that the meeting was a 
meeting with the boss, and a plausible reading of (8) would be that the 
addressee has a problem with the boss and that the speaker recommends 
calling a friend for advice. 
(7) Wegen    deinem Chef, war Max eigentlich pünktlich beim  Termin?
 because.of your   boss was Max actually   on.time  at.the  meeting 
 ‘About your boss, was Peter actually on time at the meeting?’   
(8) Wegen    deinem Chef, ruf doch mal  bei  Sarah an! 
 because.of your   boss  call PART PART with Sarah on 
 ‘About your boss, go ahead and call Sarah!’ 
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3 Different	  Shapes	  of	  Relevance	  Topics	  
The data in (9a-c)(i) suggest that, apart from being introduced with a 
separating phrase, a RT can be a hanging topic, see (9b)(i), and a relevance 
conditional (Ebert et al. 2008), see (9c)(i). (9a-c)(ii) reveal, however, that in 
contrast to the construction with a separating phrase and in contrast to the 
conditional the hanging topic construction is restricted to cases where the 
topical referent is taken up in the comment, as in (9b)(i), i.e. there must be a 
predication relation between topic and comment. (9b)(ii), where such a 
relation is missing, is unacceptable. 
(9) a. Was Peters  Gesundheit betrifft,--      
  what Peter's health     concerns         
  ‘As regards Peter's health,--’              
 b. Peters  Gesundheit,-- 
  Peter's health 
  ‘Peter's health,--’ 
 c. Wenn du  etwas    über  Peters  Gesundheit wissen  willst,-- 
  if    you something about  Peter's health     know   want 
  ‘If you want to know something about Peter's health,--’ 
 a  / b / c   -- (i) sie  hat in den letzten Jahren sehr  gelitten. 
             she has in the last   years  very suffered 
             -- ‘it suffered a lot in the last few years.’ 
 a /#b / c   -- (ii) es gibt   jetzt eine Spenderniere. 
           it  gives  now  a   donor.kidney 
           -- ‘the hospital has a donor kidney now.’ 
The example in (10) from Altmann (1981:49) might be taken to be a coun-
terexample to this generalization about hanging topics but there might be 
independent reasons for its acceptability. The first is that (10) involves an 
epithet as the anaphoric device (this face by many speaker is viewed as an 
epithet of slim blonde) so that there actually is a predication relation between 
topic and comment here. Alternatively, we might assume that the face being a 
part of the topical referent is sufficient to establish a predication relation in 
this pointing scenario. These issues need closer scrutiny. 
(10) Die schlanke Blondine  da   drüben,   ich glaube, ich  habe 
 the  slim    blonde    there over.there I   believe I   have 
 dieses Gesicht schon  einmal  gesehen.   
 this   face   already once   seen   
 ‘The slim blonde over there: I think I've seen that face before.’ 
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Hanging topics differ from RTs with separating phrases also in their 
discourse characteristics: they can occur at the end of a discourse:  
(11) Context: Peter ist in einem Modelleisenbahnverein. Er hat eine CB-
Funkanalage, sammelt alte Faxgeräte und liest jeden Elektronikblog, 
den er finden kann. 'Peter is in a model train club. He has CB radio, 
collects old fax machines and reads every electronics blog he can get 
hold of.'  
 [HANGING TOPIC Peter], er ist ein ganz  schöner Geek. 
         Peter  he is  a  whole nice    geek 
        ‘Peter, he is quite a geek.’ 
These data suggest that hanging topics are a different speech act from RTOPx 
let us call it H-RTOPx. H-RTOPx does not come with the 'presupposition' of 
RTOPx that the speaker did not address x before the performance of RTOPX. 
Furthermore, H-RTOPx requires the subsequent speech act to be about x in the 
predication sense and not just relevant in relation to x. I have not the space to 
elaborate on hanging topics here (see Frey 2004 for further observations). 
4	   Two	   Speech	   Acts	   –	   two	   Clauses:	   Relevance	   Topics	   in	  
Comparison	  to	  Frames	  
The view that RTs constitute a separate speech act is corroborated by evi-
dence for their extra-clausal position. It is instructive in this respect to com-
pare RTs to frames. So far I have mainly looked at RTs that 'only' have a rele-
vance relation with their subsequent speech act but RTs can also have a 
frame-setting relation with the subsequent speech act: if they restrict the do-
main of reality with regard to which the truth of the proposition expressed by 
that speech act is evaluated, as in the English (12). In such cases the content 
of the second speech act is trivially relevant for the domain of the frame. 
(12) Changes in primary care: The imposition of the new GP contract. [...] 
With regard to [the health care of older people RT] the most salient 
feature of the new contract is that they will be required to annually 
invite each patient on their list aged 75 and over to participate in a 
consultation which should assess the health of the patient. [From BNC-
ECE 1849 Victor, C. (1991) Health and health care in later life. Milton 
Keynes: Open University Press, 14-156.]  
A corpus analysis investigating the most frequent separating phrases in 
English (as for x, as far as x is concerned, as to, with regard to x) revealed 
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that 42% of the investigated expressions had a frame-setting relation with the 
main clause.1  
I suggest that frame setting is not automatically an instance of relevance 
topicality. In German, RTs can be clearly set apart from frames. To begin, 
consider that like in English, in German separating expressions can be used to 
mark a frame, see (13), which hosts the frame in Spec,C. (14) is the corres-
ponding example with a frame adverb. (15) and (16) show that frames are not 
restricted to a syntactic position that would be characteristic of topics: they 
are not restricted to a left-peripheral position, or to one before the comment. 
Note that there does not need to be an intonational break between the frame-
setting clause and the remainder of the sentence. The commas in (15) are an 
orthographical convention. 
(13) [CP Was  seine Gesundheit  betrifft [C' geht [IP es Peter  gut]]] 
  what his  health      concerns goes    it Peter good 
 ‘As far as his health is concerned, Peter is fine.’ 
(14) [CP Gesundheitlich [C' geht [IP es Peter gut]]]  
  healthwise      goes    it Peter good 
‘Health-wise Peter is fine.’ 
(15) a. Peter geht es, was seine Gesundheit betrifft, gut.  
 b. Peter geht es gut, was seine Gesundheit betrifft. 
(16) a. Peter geht es gesundheitlich gut. 
 b. Peter geht es gut gesundheitlich. 
Next consider (17), where the separated phrase is not a frame – it does not 
restrict the domain with regard to which the truth of the proposition that 
Peter has diabetes is evaluated. Variants (b) – (d) show that the separated 
phrase must occur before Spec,C, which need not be a clause-external posi-
tion but can be (cf. Frey 2004). Note that the judgements for (b) vary but for 
most speakers the presence of so (‘so’) is strongly preferred. Also note that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The corpus analyzed was the British National Corpus. The frequencies of the most frequent 
clause-initial separating phrases were: as for - 15.9 per million words, as far as - 12.3 pmw, as to 
- 5.9 pmw, with regard to - 3.3 pmw. 42 % of the separated RTs had a frame-setting function, as 
indicated above, 23 % had a predication relation with the comment, and 35% had neither a frame 
nor a predication relation. Amongst the separating phrases, as far as was used more often than 
the other phrases to mark frames – 76% vs. 20% vs. 46% vs. 26% in the above order (χ2 = 39.24, 
p < 0.0001). The reason for this is that in contrast to the other separating phrases as far as can be 
used to mark what can be called a judge, or an epistemic source: a person that restricts the 
validity of the statement, e.g. as far as I am concerned…, as far as he knows…, which accounts 
for the great majority (88%) of frames in this category. 
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(c) and (d) improve for some speakers if a strong intonational break plus 
gesture(s) indicate that the separated phrase is inserted parenthetically post-
hoc as a correction for mismanaged discourse. Such cases are irrelevant 
because they are not instances of RTs but – as just specified – correction 
measures. (18) gives the same set of data with the frame as an adverb, where 
all variants are completely unacceptable.  
(17) a. Was   seine Gesundheit  betrifft,   [CP Peter [C' hat Diabetes]]  
  What his  health     concerns    Peter   has diabetes 
  ‘As far as his health is concerned, Peter has diabetes.’ 
 b. Was seine Gesundheit betrifft, [CP ??(so)  [C'  hat Peter Diabetes]] 
 c. *[CP Peter hat, was seine Gesundheit betrifft, Diabetes] 
 d. *[CP Peter hat Diabetes, was seine Gesundheit betrifft] 
(18) a. *Gesundheitlich, [CP Peter [C' hat Diabetes]] 
   health-wise       Peter   has diabetes 
 b. *Gesundheitlich (so) hat Peter  Diabetes  
 c. *[CP Peter hat gesundheitlich Diabetes] 
 d. *[CP Peter hat Diabetes gesundheitlich] 
I suggest that (17c-d) and (18), which contain potential frames but no RT, are 
deviant because restricting an eventuality by a frame to a domain only is 
allowed if the eventuality principally could be in some other domain (cf. 
Ernst 2004). Having diabetes can only be defined in the domain of health (in 
the absence of an easy-to-accommodate metaphorical relation). Note that it is 
not the presence of the vague predicate (good), that makes the difference in 
the frame-setting examples. Such a predicate could be argued to provide 
some variable that must be constrained by the frame. However, frames can 
co-occur with non-vague predicates (midget), see (19a), and a vague pre-
dicate (fat) without an alternative domain as in (19b) is just as impossible as a 
non-vague predicate without an alternative domain. 
(19) a. He is a midget politically.  (Ernst 2004: 106)   
 b.  *He is fat physically. 
Turning to binding we find clear indications that RTs are clause-external 
whereas frames are not. In (20) the separating phrase is before the CP and the 
comment is a CP with a filled Spec,C. The pronoun in the comment can be 
co-referential with the referent, resulting in a predication relation – another 
trivial instantiation of relevance. In (21), where the separated expression is in 
Spec,C, the binding options change and the separated expression is inter-
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preted as a frame. The RT in (20) is clause-external, the frame in (21) is 
clause-internal.  
(20) Was Maxi betrifft, [CP eri/k [C' hat sich  als sehr nützlich erwiesen]] 
 what Max concerns   he    has REFL as  very useful  turned.out 
 ‘As regards Maxi/k, hei/k has turned out to be very useful.’ 
(21) [CP Was  Maxi betrifft [C' hat er*i/k sich  als sehr nützlich erwiesen]] 
  what Max concerns has he   REFL as  very useful  turned.out 
 ‘He*i/k has turned out to be very useful as regards Maxi.’ 
5	   Relevance	  Topics,	  Referentiality	  and	  Familiarity	  
The speech act view on RTs proposed above allows us to explain some cha-
racteristics of RTs that would come as a surprise otherwise. The type of 
expression that may occur as a RT is restricted in a different way than the 
type of expression that can occur as aboutness topics, which have been 
studied in some detail with respect to this issue and which have been assumed 
to be restricted to referential expressions (Reinhart 1981, Jacobs 2001) or 
quasi-referential expressions (e.g. Ebert & Endriss 2003; Endriss 2009). The 
latter essentially are indefinites with unmodified determiners. For these 
quantifiers a sensible representative can be formed from which a discourse 
referent can be created that can serve as an aboutness topic.  
In this section I show that RTs must be individuals (type e) but can also 
be properties that are turned into individuals by type shifting. In addition, 
RTs can refer to previous portions of discourse (by quoting). These charac-
teristics follow from the addressation function of RTs. Furthermore, the status 
of RTs as separate speech acts explains why RTs cannot be in the scope of 
propositional operators in the subsequent speech act (e.g. the generic ope-
rator). Finally, RTs must be familiar (in a way to be specified): they cannot 
introduce new discourse referents. This follows from their discourse manage-
ment function. Let us start with the latter aspect.  
(22) illustrates that specific indefinites are allowed as RTs if they come 
with the modifier gewiss ('certain') but not if they occur unmodified. Also 
note that if gewiss in (22) were replaced with its close relative bestimmt 
('certain'), the result would be unacceptable. 
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(22) Context: My neighbour has a secret affair with your friend Peter. 
 Was einen *(gewissen) Freund  von dir betrifft,  meine Nachbarin 
 what a    certain   friend  of  you concerns my   neighbour 
 war in letzter Zeit  verdächtig   häufig erst  morgens     daheim. 
 was in last   time suspiciously  often  only in.the.morning at.home 
 ‘As far as a (certain) friend of yours is concerned, recently my  
 neighbour's been getting home only in the wee hours of the morning.’ 
If we assume that RTs pick up familiar information (but not information that 
was immediately addressed before the utterance of the RT) the contrast in 
(22) follows: Let us take familiarity to mean identifiability as in Ebert, Ebert 
& Hinterwimmer (to appear), so that a referent is familiar to a speech act 
participant if s/he can distinguish it from other referents on the basis of a 
particular property it has. Ebert et al. argue that gewiss signals that the 
referent of the indefinite can be identified by the speaker, i.e. is familiar to 
the speaker. They also discuss cases, however, where it is required that both 
speaker and addressee can identify the referent. These cases are questions. An 
example is given in (23b), with a minimal variant that uses bestimmt instead 
of gewiss in (23a) (see Ebert et al. example (70) ff.): 
(23) a.  Geht Paul immer   in eine bestimmte Kneipe? 
  goes Paul  always  in a   certain    pub 
  ‘Does Paul always go to a particular pub?’ 
 b. Geht Paul immer in eine gewisse Kneipe? 
   ‘Does Paul always go to a certain pub?’ 
By asking (23a) the speaker enquires whether Paul goes to a specific pub on a 
regular basis, without being interested in the actual pub itself (it could be any 
pub, as long as Paul is a regular there). A felicitous answer could be Yes, but I 
forget which one it is. By asking (23b) the speaker indicates that it is a 
particular pub s/he has in mind and that the addressee knows which one that 
would be, with the pub at issue being noteworthy one way or another – it 
could be the pub where Paul's prospective girl-friend works. Answering (23b) 
with yes, but I forget which one it is is inappropriate. So by using gewiss the 
speaker indicates both speaker and hearer familiarity.  
(22) suggests that this is exactly what licenses the gewiss-indefinite as a 
RT. The referent of the indefinite is picked up as familiar information from 
the common ground. If the hearer is not able to identify the referent, which 
s/he could signal by asking Who are you talking about? the purpose of the RT 
failed: the discourse was incoherent for the hearer. Gewiss cannot be replaced 
by bestimmt because bestimmt signals that the respective referent can be 
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identified by some salient agent, which means that it is not necessarily 
familiar to speaker and hearer (cf. Ebert et al. to appear). The discourse ma-
naging function of the RT would fail. If there is no modifier the specific inde-
finite introduces a brand-new referent. Again, this is not possible for a RT. 
Let us turn to the felicitous use of specific indefinites in partitive con-
structions as in (24). In partitives, the indefinite is used to introduce an indivi-
dual from a set that is already familiar, so in (24) the set of animals from 
which one animal is singled out must be part of the common ground. Note 
that the accent on eins ('one') is only one prosodic option, it is also possible to 
place the main accent in the RT on Tiere ('animals'), indicating the presence 
of (focus) alternatives for animals. 
(24) Was  EINS der     Tiere    betrifft,   so  mache ich  mir  Sorgen. 
 what  one  the.GEN  animals  concerns so  make  I   REFL  sorrows 
 ‘As far as one of the animals is concerned, I am quite worried.’ 
I suggest that familiarity with the set licenses the introduction of the dis-
course referent the indefinite refers to in cases like (24). Both speaker and 
hearer must be able to identify the set. Note, however, that the hearer can 
adequately react to (24) with Oh yes, which one is it?, which suggests that it 
is not necessary that the hearer can identify the individual introduced by the 
indefinite. Importantly, though, this which-question is only adequate if the 
hearer is at least somewhat familiar with the make-up of the set, i.e. knows 
which (or what) individuals are members of the set. I leave the particulars of 
this issue to future research. 
Let us next turn to generic interpretations of indefinites, which like 
specific indefinites have been argued to be acceptable in aboutness topic 
positions like the left-dislocated position in German, illustrated below (Ebert 
& Hinterwimmer 2010): 
(25) a. Ein Hund,    der          ist         anhänglich. 
 b. Hunde,      die          sind        anhänglich. 
    {a dog / dogs}  PRON{SING/PL} be{SING/PL}  devoted 
 ‘A dog is devoted. / Dogs are devoted.’ 
The RT counterpart of (25) is only possible with the bare plural: 
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(26) a. *Was  einen Hund betrifft,  er ist  anhänglich. 
  What a   dog   concerns he is  devoted. 
  ‘As for a dog, it is devoted.’ 
 b. Was   Hunde betrifft,  sie  sind anhänglich. 
  what  dogs  concerns they are  devoted. 
  ‘As for dogs, they are devoted.’ 
Bare plurals like in (26b) have been argued to refer to kinds (Carlson 1977 
and many others) and therefore have a referential reading. Singular indefi-
nites cannot refer to kinds.2 They are interpreted as one of the arguments of a 
generic operator whose other argument is delivered by the predicate of the 
sentence. If, as I argue, the RT is extra-clausal and constitutes a separate 
speech act the indefinite in (26a) cannot provide the (restrictor) argument re-
quired for the generic operator. Note that for the generic operator it is un-
reasonable to assume that the argument can be provided by the context as in 
the case of some other quantifiers. Further note that even though the pronoun 
er in the second speech act is problematic in (26a) – a speaker can only refer 
anaphorically with a singular pronoun to a referent denoted by an indefinite if 
s/he made an epistemically specific use of the indefinite (Kamp & Bende-
Farkas 2006) – replacing this offending pronoun by a d-pronoun, analogously 
to the felicitous (25a), does not improve (26a).3 Since Frey (2004) has shown 
convincingly that left dislocation in German is a monoclausal structure and 
since I assume that RTs are extra-clausal we can assume that it is indeed the 
missing restrictor that is the problem in (26a).4  
Let us next look at the unspecific reading of indefinites. (27) can be 
used in a situation where the speaker wants to make clear that s/he will not 
buy a dog, and that for a good reason. From the use of the indefinite in (27) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Pace sub-kind readings, which would be indicated by an accent on the determiner and under 
which (27)(a) improves, just as expected. 
3 Krifka et al. (1995:88) show that d-pronouns can be used to refer to kinds, which is not given 
here: 
 
(i)  Hans fuhr Mercedesi. *Eri war grau. / Dasi ist ein zuverlässiger Wagen. 
 'Hans drove (a) Mercedesi. Iti was grey. / Thati is a reliable car. 
 
4 Construing sentences like (26a) without a pronoun invariably results in a reading of the 
indefinite as an unspecific indefinite, see (i), cf. (27) in the main text for a plausible context: 
 
(i) As for a poodle, {a poodle / a dog} is demanding. 
 
This is predicted by the above analysis. The generic operator takes as its arguments subject and 
predicate of the second speech act. The RT is still outside its scope. The unspecific reading is 
available for reasons given in the next paragraphs. 
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the existence of the individual does not follow: there is no particular dog 
under discussion here.   
(27) Was  einen  Hund  betrifft,   meine  Wohnung   ist  zu  klein. 
 what a     dog   concerns  my    apartment  is   too  small 
 ‘As far as a dog is concerned, my apartment is too small.’ 
If the unspecific indefinite does not introduce a referent we expect that we 
cannot refer anaphorically to it by means of a singular pronoun. This is 
confirmed by data like the following:5 
(28) Wegen [einem Geschenk für Max]i, ich war gestern einkaufen. #Esi hat 
 5 Euro gekostet. 
 ‘About a presenti for Max, I went shopping yesterday. Iti cost 5 euros.’ 
The behaviour of unspecific indefinites – to have no existential import – is of 
course familiar from intensional contexts, where indefinites are interpreted as 
properties without existential quantification (and where intensional verbs can 
be assumed to take properties of arguments, cf. Zimmermann 1993). Let us 
assume that unspecific indefinites as RTs are also interpreted as such pro-
perties, and let us see if other expressions denoting properties can occur as 
RTs as well. This is indeed the case, cf. (29). For reasons of space I illustrate 
with an English example with a verb in the gerund form, the observations 
carry over to German non-finite verbs.  
(29) [From BNC-FR4 The impact of social policy. Wilding, P & George, V. 
 London: Routledge & Kegan Paul plc, 1984.] 
The chances of an unskilled manual worker's child being a poor reader are six 
times greater than those of a professional worker 's child." There is no evidence 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The data are not totally clear here. If the second speech act is in subjunctive mood, anaphoric 
reference with a d-pronoun improves with unspecific indefinites, see (i)-(ii). One way to deal 
with this would be to say that we do not have unspecific indefinites here (or above) but 'formal' 
kinds, rather than 'conventional kinds' (Schubert & Pelletier 1989), since kinds can be picked up 
by d-pronouns (see footnote 3). Also see Krifka's (1995) notion of 'concept', which can also be 
applied to properties in general. Also cf. Müller-Reichau (2006). All this deserves thorough 
discussion for which there is no space here.  
 
(i)  Was eine neue U-Bahnlinie betrifft, die müssten wir dann nächstes Jahr in Planung 
 nehmen (wenn wir sie realisieren wollen). 
 'As far as a new metro linei is concerned, we would have to start planning thati next year 
 (if we want to build it). 
 
(ii) Was ein Geschenki für Peter betrifft, dasi könnte ich bei Dussmann besorgen. 
 'As far as a present for Peter is concerned, I could buy that at Dussmann's' 
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to show whether such differences have changed over the years. There is 
evidence, however, to show that these differences in school attainment at age 7 
do not decrease, but rather increase as children get older. [new paragraph] [As 
far as passing examinations is concerned RT], the obvious applies. The 
proportion of children passing Ordinary and Advanced level examinations is 
positively correlated with social class.  
I assume with Chierchia (1984) that non-finite verbs like in (29) denote indi-
viduals that are derived from the respective property by a nominalization 
function. Since this nominalization function applies to properties it also 
applies to unspecific indefinites like in (27) and (28) – but not to semantic 
objects denoted by adverbs, prepositions etc.6 This accounts for the fact that 
adverbs or prepositions cannot occur as RTs (see section 4 for adverb data). 
Further note that Chierchia (1998) also accounts for the behaviour of kind-
denoting expressions with the nominalization function (and the corresponding 
predicate function), a parallel which resounds in the behaviour of these 
different expressions as RTs.  
The last type of expression I would like to look at are modified quanti-
fiers which like unspecific indefinites are excluded as aboutness topics. As 
RTs they are acceptable: 
(30) Was  höchstens zwei Fehlschüsse betrifft,    
 what at.most   two  failures    concerns  
 das  Prüfungsamt ist gar  nicht so streng. 
 the  exam.office  is at.all not  so strict 
 ‘As for at most two failures the exam office is not quite so strict.’ 
(31) Was Peters mindestens 15  Freundinnen betrifft, 
 what Peters at.least    15  girl.friends  concerns 
 das  Großmaul  lebt  noch bei  seiner Mutter. 
 the  big.mouth  lives still  with his   mother 
 ‘As for Peter's at least 15 girl friends, that bigmouth still lives with is 
 mother.’ 
I suggest that the quantificational phrase in these examples is used as a quote. 
The quote is used as a name by which the speaker refers to the contents of a 
previous utterance (also cf. Searle 1969). For instance, in (31) that previous 
utterance could have been an assertion that Peter has had at least 15 girl 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 We also find non-finite constructions with subjects, cf. (i). These can be analysed as zero-place 
propositional functions (Chierchia 1984). 
 
(i) [As for him having a permanent dwelling RT], where is he supposed to live? [From BNC-K52 
Northern Echo. Leisure material]. 
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friends, or a question whether Peter indeed has had at least 15 girl friends. 
The RT picks up these utterances. For aboutness topics this is not possible 
because they must refer to semantic objects. RTs can designate a previous 
utterance as relevant.  
6	   Summary	  
I have characterized RTs in terms of their formal and their speech act proper-
ties. RTs constitute separate speech acts that function as discourse-structuring 
devices by committing the speaker to a subsequent speech act which is rele-
vant with respect to the RT by adding information, asking a question etc. RTs 
are different from aboutness topics in that they are clause-external, and in that 
they have different restrictions with respect to the types of expressions that 
are licit RTs. I have put this down to the illocutionary characteristics of RTs. 
Frames need not occupy a structural position that would classify as a typical 
topic position: left peripheral, or before the topic. I have suggested that they 
are not topics unless they are also RTs.  
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Abstract. Inquiries into the acquisition of scalar implicatures (SIs) have 
focussed on the question why children calculate SIs less often than adults. To 
answer this question several hypotheses, such as the Processing Limitation 
Hypothesis, the Reference-Set Hypothesis and the Pragmatic Delay Hypothesis 
have been suggested (Chierchia et al. 2005). All of these studies assume that 
implicatures are a late acquisition phenomenon, because individual types of 
implicatures are not distinguished. However, one should not treat all kinds of 
implicatures in the same way. This study shows that some types of implicatures 
occur very early and it proves that even 5-year-old children calculate 
implicatures – although different ones than adults. Based on these findings a 
new hypothesis on the acquisition of SIs is formulated. 
 
1	   Scalar	  Implicatures	  
Implicatures are additional and implicit meaning-components beyond the 
meaning of the explicitly uttered statement. Scalar Implicatures (SIs), a 
subgroup of conversational implicatures, are computed if scalar terms – terms 
which can be arranged on a scale according to the degree of their semantic 
strength and informativeness – occur in an utterance. SIs are based on the fact 
that the meaning of a weaker term is entailed in the stronger one and that the 
hearer relies on the Conversational Principles (Grice, 1975) and assumes that 
once a weaker term of the scale is uttered, the stronger one does not hold. 
Specifically, Grice’s Maxim of Quantity “1. Make your contribution as 
informative as is required (for the current purpose of the exchange).” and “2. 
Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.” (Grice 
1975: 45) are involved in the interpretation of scalar terms and the 
computation of SIs. Depending on which of these two principles the hearer 	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relies on, there are two kinds of scalar implicatures. Upper-bound SIs are 
inferences from the first Maxim of Quantity, while lower-bound SIs are 
inferences based on the second Maxim of Quantity. 
(1) Some of us have been to the Christmas Market. 
The implicature in statement (1) is based on the scale <all, some, none>. 
When hearing (1), the hearer compares the scalar term some to all and none, 
the stronger and weaker term of the same scale respectively, and infers that it 
is neiter true that all of the people went to the Christmas Market nore that 
none of them went there, since otherwise the speaker should have said all or 
none. This shows that statement (1) is lower and upper bound at the same 
time since the hearer expects the speaker to obey the Conversational Maxims 
and to make his contribution as informative as required but not too 
informative. 
1.1	   Acquisition	  Studies	  
The acquisition and development of implicatures, especially of SIs, has been 
widely discussed in literature (Chierchia et al., 2005; Noveck, 2005; Noveck 
et al., 2007a; Noveck & Sperber, 2007b). One of the first studies concerned 
with the acquisition of SIs was a study by Noveck (2001) that examined how 
French children interpret the scalar terms <must – might> and <all – some>. 
In this experiment children were confronted with three boxes. Two of the 
boxes were open, so that the participants could see the content. The third box 
was closed. Participants were then told: “A friend of mine gave me this box 
and said ‘all I know is that whatever is inside this box looks like this box 
(experimenter pointed to the Horse + Fish Box) or what’s inside this box 
(experimenter pointed to the Horse-only Box)’” (Noveck, 2001: 172). Based 
on this information participants had to evaluate statements about the possible 
and necessary content of the box. Among some neutral statements, which 
were designed to check whether the task was understood, there was the 
critical statement In this box might be a horse. This statement is under-
informative, since there has to be a horse in the box. Noveck expected that 
participants who calculate SIs should reject this statement, since it is 
underinformative. Participants who do not draw a SI should accept it. 
 Noveck’s findings were that 7-year-old children are the youngest ones 
that show overall competence in mastering this task and that 7- to 9-year-old 
children accept the weaker term of the scale <must – might> in a situation 
where the stronger term is more informative more often than adults. While 
72% of the 5-year-old, 80% of the 7-year-old and 69% of the 9-year-old 
children accepted the statement In this box might be horse (the weaker scalar 
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term) although they knew that In this box must be a horse (the respective 
stronger statement) is more informative in this situation, only 35% of the 
adults did so. These results show that children accept underinformative 
statements more often and hence calculate SIs less often than adults. 
In the following years, several studies on scalars such as <all – some>, 
<finish – start>, <at least – at most> and <and – or> were conducted in 
different languages such as English, Italian and Greek (Chierchia et al., 2001, 
2005; Papafragou & Musolino, 2003; Guasti et al., 2005; Noveck et al., 
2007a; Noveck & Sperber, 2007b). These studies confirm Noveck’s findings 
and support the idea that children enrich underinformative statements less 
often than adults and thus calculate less SIs. Trying to explain  these findings 
several hypotheses, such as the Processing Limitation Hypothesis and the 
Pragmatic Delay Hypothesis (Noveck 2001; Chierchia et al. 2005) have been 
proposed in the literature and will be introduced and discussed in 4.1. 
2	   German	  Replication	  Study	  
2.1	   Linguistic	  Purpose	  
A modified replication study of the first experiment of Noveck (2001) was 
designed and conducted to see whether and from which age on German 
children calculate implicatures. 
 In other areas of language acquisition such as semantics and syntax 
children overgeneralize meanings, grammatical features or rules beyond its 
use in adult language before they start using it correctly. (cf. Lust, 2006) 
Over-generalizations are an important component in the process of language 
acquisition and children’s understanding and discovery of how language 
works. I assume that overgeneralizations, which are part of the learning 
process, are also important for and part of the acquisition of pragmatics. 
Participants who overgeneralize the first Maxim of Quantity might interpret 
statements differently than expected. For example, if participants interpret the 
utterance heard in this experimental setting as exhaustive description of the 
content of the box and thus as the most informative statement, then a different 
kind of implicature might be calculated. Consequently, particular attention 
was paid to statements which might possibly trigger different kind of 
implicatures. To figure out, whether children stick to or overgeneralize the 
Conversational Principles and/or calculate other implicatures than adults (e.g. 
based on a different reading or understanding of the statements), close 
attention was paid to participants answers and comments. 
Additionally, the formulation of the task was modified, so that it did not 
contain the conjunction or. This was done to avoid the use of a second scalar 
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term or any other critical term in the experiment since it could have an 
additional impact on the results of the reasoning experiment. 
These changes in the experimental design and evaluation of the resulting data 
might also be informative with respect to the adequateness of the hypotheses 
about the acquisition of SIs. If it turns out that children stick to or 
overgeneralize the Conversational Principles, then the Pragmatic Delay 
hypothesis (see 4.1) could be rejected. 
2.2	   Methods	  
2.2.1	   Participants	  
Seven 5-year-old children, eight 7-year-old children and seven 9-year-old 
children took part in the experiment. Their mean ages were 5;5 years, 7;6 
years and 9;6 years. All participants were native speakers of German and 
recruited from a kindergarden and primary school in Thuringia. 
2.2.2	   Materials	  and	  Design	  
The materials were similar to the ones Noveck (2001) used in his study. 
However, the statements in my experiment were presented in German. 
Moreover, I only presented the positive statements and added the following 
additional statements to stress the contrast between the modal verbs könnte 
(‘might’) and muss (‘must’): In der Box muss auf jeden Fall A sein (‘In any 
case there has to be A in the box’); In der Box könnte vielleicht A sein (‘There 
might possibly be A in the box’). This was done to see whether children are 
more likely to compute SI if the contrast between the statements is stronger. 
The statement In der Box kann A und B sein (‘There might be A and B in the 
box’) was added to see whether participants understood and were able to cope 
with the task. The task was formulated so that it did not contain the scalar 
term or, to avoid possible influences from other scalar terms. 
2.2.3	   Procedure	  
The session began with a short conversation and a pre-task. For the pretask 
participants were presented with two boxes. Box I contained item A, box II 
contained items A and B. Children were then given another box which was 
empty and asked to fill it in the way that it contains the same items as box I or 
box II in the end. The purpose of this pretask was to see whether the task or 
setting was too difficult for the participants, whether the logical term or has 
an impact on children’s calculation of SI in the experiment and to familiarize 
the children with the situation and task of the experiment. 
In the actual experiment subjects were shown three boxes (see figure 1). 
The first box contained A, e.g. a bear. The second box contained A and B, 
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e.g. a bear and a rabbit. Both boxes were opened so that the children were 
able to see the contents. The third box remained closed. Participants were 
given a glove-puppet which was supposed to help the child to evaluate the 
statements they were going to hear. They were told that the closed box 
contained the same toys as one of the two open boxes in front of them. Then 
one of the following six sentences was uttered in terms by two puppets that 
were controlled by the experimenter: (1) In der Schachtel muss B drin sein. 
(false); (2) In der Schachtel kann A und B drin sein. (true); (3) In der 
Schachtel muss auf jeden Fall A drin sein. (true); (4) In der Schachtel könnte 
vielleicht A drin sein. (true); (5) In der Schachtel könnte vielleicht B drin 
sein. (true); (6) In der Schachtel kann A drin sein (true). The puppets were 
introduced so that the experiment appears like a quiz-game rather than a test 
to the children. The procedure was repeated so that each child had evaluated 
three sets of statements with different toys. Children were told to evaluate the 
statement either as richtig (‘correct’), halbrichtig (‘semi-correct’) or wrong 
(‘wrong’). 
                
Figure 1: depicts the experimental design 
To test whether children focus on truthfulness or falsity rather than on 
appropriateness when evaluating a statement, participants were confronted 
with an argument of the puppets at the end of the session. One puppet said 
that the statement In der Schachtel kann/ könnte A sein (‘There might/ might 
possibly be A in the box’) was true while the other claimed that the statement 
In der Schachtel muss A sein (‘There has to be A in the box’) was correct. 
Participants were asked to act as a mediator between the two glove puppets. 
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2.2.4	   Expectations	  
If participants understood the task properly and in the expected way, they 
should reject (1) In der Schachtel muss B sein. If a statement is true for at 
least one of the open boxes, then it is also true for the covered box.  
Additionally, SIs can be calculated for statement (4) In der Box könnte 
vielleicht A drin sein. If participants accept this statement, it indicates that 
they consider könnte (vielleicht) as compatible with muss auf jeden Fall. 
While the affirmation of this statement would show that the participant did 
not enrich the meaning of the weaker scalar term, the rejection of the 
statement in favour of the stronger scalar term would indicate that he 
computed a SI. If statements (4) and (6) are evaluated as semi-correct, it 
indicates that participants realized that these statements are underinformative 
but do not consider this violation as bad enough to reject the statements. 
Statement (6) In der Schachtel kann A drin sein is a variation of 
statement (4) In der Schachtel könnte vielleicht A drin sein. If participants 
reject sentence (4) but accept (6), it would indicate that they compute SIs 
more easily if the distance on the Horn Scale1 between the uttered scalar term 
and the most informative scalar term is bigger. Moreover, if SIs are 
calculated more easily if the distance on the Horn Scale is bigger and the 
scalar term kann (‘might’) should not be weak enough in this kind of 
reasoning experiment, then sentence (4) should be rejected while its variation 
(6) should be accepted. 
Different kinds of implicatures may be calculated for some of the 
statements, if participants consider the statements about the covered box as 
exhaustive descriptions of its content. For example, if the hearer exploits the 
meaning of the uttered statements and interprets the utterances as upper-
bound (as the most informative utterance), then she or he will, for example, 
not only focus on item B but also on other items that have to be in the box 
once B is in the box. This kind of interpretation affects the following 
statements: In der Schachtel muss A sein; In der Schachtel kann/ könnte 
vielleicht A sein; In der Schachtel könnte B sein. 
If participants consider the statements as exhaustive descriptions of the 
content of the box then they are expected to reject statement (5) In der 
Schachtel könnte B sein because B can only be the content of the box if A is 
the content of the box as well. Under these circumstances statement (3) In der 
Schachtel muss A sein would also be false, since A alone is only possibly (not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Horn Scales are named after the linguist Laurence Horn. Scalar terms are linearly ordered on 
this scale according to their semantic strength. The most informative term is presented at the left 
end of the scale, the weakest one at the right. 
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necessarily) true for the covered box. The statement In der Schachtel kann/ 
könnte vielleicht A sein is also true under these circumstances since A (alone) 
is only a possible content of the covered box. 
In the puppets argument at the end of the experiment children, who 
evaluate a statement based on its truthfulness or falsity, rather than on 
appropriateness, are expected to say that both statements are right. 
Participants who evaluate a statement according to its appropriateness should 
say that the statement In der Schachtel muss A sein is the better one. 
2.3	   Results	  
In the pretask children’s interpretation of the scalar term or in the setting of 
the actual experiment was tested. This was done to figure out whether a 
higher amount of 5-year-olds answered the statement In der Schachtel könnte 
vielleicht A sein of the actual experiment in the affirmative because they 
understood the task differently than adults. It can be said that nearly all of the 
participants mastered this pretask well and filled the empty box with the same 
items as in box I or in box II. The only exception was a 5-year-old girl, who 
had interpreted the task differently and changed the content of one of the 
open boxes as well. After the task was explained again she filled the empty 
box with the correct items. The results show that the vast majority of children 
interpreted or in this task as exclusive-or and suggest that young children’s 
reasoning results are not influenced by a different reading of or if the 
disjunction was used in the actual experiment. 
With respect to the expectations of the actual experiment mentioned 
above, it can be said that more SIs were computed for the weaker scalar term 
könnte vielleicht than for the stronger one kann. This shows that the distance 
on the Horn-Scale has an impact on the amount of calculated SIs. Moreover, 
some participants interpreted the uttered statements as exhaustive 
descriptions of the content of the covered box and calculated, based on this 
different interpretation of the statement, a different kind of implicature.  
In the situation where participants had to act as mediator because two 
puppets were arguing whether the statement In der Schachtel kann/ könnte 
vielleicht A sein or the statement In der Schachtel muss A sein was right, 83% 
of the 5-year-old, 81% of the 7-year-old and 80% of the 9-year-old children 
favoured the more adequate statement In der Schachtel muss A sein.  
The t-value for proportions was calculated with a non-directional test of 
significance. The results were then compared with the critical t-value of the t-
distribution to see whether the results are significant. 
The results of the reasoning experiment for each age-group are depicted 
in table 1. The answers of the 5-year-olds are significantly above chance level 
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in three out of six statements. In total the responses for possible conclusions 
is highly significant and the one for necessary conclusions are highly 
significant above chance level. This shows that even 5-year-old children are 
able to master the reasoning task. The 7-year-old children gave answers 
which are highly significant for four out of six statements. Their answers to 
necessary conclusions as well as possible conclusions are even highly 
significant above chance level. The oldest group of participants, the 9-year-
old children, gave the expected answers for all of the statements except for In 
der Schachtel kann/ könnte vielleicht A sein. Most of their answers were 
highly significant above chance level, which shows that they are consistent in 
their answers and competent enough to master this task. 
Table 1: shows the average of correct responses. In this table yes is 
considered to be the correct answer to the statements In der Schachtel kann/ 
könnte A sein although it underdetermines the fact that there actually has to 
be A in the covered box. This is because once a statement is true for at least 
one of the open boxes, it is also true for the covered box.  *: p < .05; **: p < 
.01 
2.3.1	   Child-­‐Implicatures	  
However, if one looks at the responses to the necessary conclusions in table 
1, one can see that younger and older children give answers that are highly 
significant to different types of statements within the group of necessary 
conclusions. In order to figure out why the statements that got a correct 
answer, which is significantly above chance level, differ between the age 
age (years) statement answer 
5 7 9 
necessary conclusions   
muss auf jeden Fall A Yes 82.4** 66.6 94.4** 
kann A Yes 61.5 94.7** 44.4 
könnte/ könnte 
vielleicht A Yes 50 58.3 38.7 
total  64.6* 73.2** 59.3 
     
possible conclusions   
muss B No 40 63.3 94.4** 
könnte vielleicht B Yes 80** 80.9** 83.3** 
kann A und B Yes 100** 91.3** 100** 
total  74.5** 78.6** 92.3** 
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groups, the results and answers of all participants were looked at in more 
detail. It turned out that younger and older children evaluated the statements 
at rates that are significantly above chance level for different statements, 
because their results are influenced by a different interpretation of the state-
ment and a different strategy to solve the task. 
Table 2: average percentage of child-implicatures for each age group 
Some participants, especially the 5-year-old children, appeared to consider 
the statements as exhaustive descriptions of the content of the box, because 
they believed that the utterance they heard about the covered box was the 
most informative one to describe its content. This had an impact on their 
response to In der Schachtel muss A sein and In der Schachtel könnte B sein. 
Therefore, they said that the statement In der Schachtel könnte B sein is 
wrong because in any case B can only be part of the content of the box. The 
statement In der Schachtel muss A sein was rejected, because it is only 
possibly but not necessarily true that there is only A in the box. Especially 
young children calculated this kind of implicature. Since this kind of early 
implicatures are especially calculated by young children, they are referred to 
as child-implicatures in this paper. 
The data in table 2 shows that even children at the very young age of 
five do calculate implicatures, e.g. for the statement In der Schachtel könnte 
B sein and for the statement In der Schachtel muss A sein. Although some of 
the 9-year-old participants still calculate child-implicatures, this kind of 
implicature decreases with age. Child-implicatures are upper bound scalar 
implicatures and based on the first Maxim of Quantity (see above). 
Table 3: percentage of participants who considered the statements as 
exhaustive descriptions of the content of the box 
Table 3 shows the percentage of children who understood the uttered 
statements as exhaustive description of the content of the box. As mentioned 
age (years)   statement 
5 7 9 
muss auf jeden Fall A 17.6 29.2 5.6 
könnte vielleicht B 33.3 23.8 16.7 
age (years)   statement 
5 7 9 
muss auf jeden Fall A 41.2 33.3 5.6 
könnte vielleicht B 33.3 33.3 16.7 
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earlier, this interpretation is the prerequisite for the calculation of child-
implicatures. Table 4 shows the percentage of children who calculated child-
implicatures out of those children who interpreted the statements in the way 
that the content of the box must be exhaustive. The results show that children 
who considered the statements as exhaustive descriptions are – at least for the 
statement In der Schachtel kann B sein – in all age-groups very likely to 
calculate child-implicatures. 
Moreover, some of the 5-year-old children calculated an implicature 
based on exhaustive reading for the statements In der Schachtel kann/ könnte 
vielleicht A sein. They evaluated the statement as halbrichtig because it 
describes only one of two possible contents of the box. Since this description 
of the content of the covered box would be wrong if it turns out that there is 
A and B in the box, they evaluated these utterances as semi-correct. This 
shows that the children did not only focus on the modal verb of the utterance 
but on the item mentioned and considered the statements as exhaustive 
descriptions of the content. 
Table 4: shows the average amount of calculated child-implicatures out of 
those children who interpreted the statements in the way that the content of 
the box must be exhaustive in percentage. *: p < .05; **: p < .01 
Since the evaluations falsch and halbrichtig could indicate both an exhaustive 
reading of the statement and the calculation of SIs, it could – especially for 
the halbrichtig-answers – not always be clearly distinguished whether an 
implicature was calculated or an exhaustive reading was applied to the 
statement. Therefore, it cannot be said clearly how many percent of children 
understood this statement as exhaustive description. Moreover, only no-
answers and those answers which came with an explanation and clearly 
indicated that SIs were calculated were included in the results of table 3. 
2.3.2	   Scalar	  Implicatures	  
Concerning children’s calculation of SIs the following can be said: The 
results of this experiment show that a small but not representative minority of 
the 5-year-old participants calculated SIs for the statement In der Schachtel 
könnte A sein. This indicates that they are able to calculate SIs for this 
statement if they apply the expected (not exhaustive) reading to the statement. 
age (years)   statement 
5 7 9 
muss auf jeden Fall A 38.9 93.3** 33.3 
könnte vielleicht B 100** 72.2 100** 
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The majority (94.7%, see table 1) of the 7-year-old participants did not reject 
the statement In der Schachtel kann A sein. This is a significantly higher 
amount than the one of the 5- and 9-year-old participants. This might be 
because they are equivocal between the exhaustive reading of the utterance 
and the reading that A is possibly part of the whole content of the box but do 
not calculate SIs. Table 5 shows that indeed only a small amount of 7-year-
olds calculated SIs for this statement. However, for the slightly less 
informative statement In der Schachtel könnte/ könnte vielleicht A sein, a 
higher amount of 7-year-olds calculated SIs. This might be because this 
statement is even more underinformative and because the exhaustive reading 
is not as adequate for this statement as it is for the slightly stronger one In der 
Schachtel kann A sein. 
Table 5: Percentage of scalar implicatures calculated for the modal 
statements. 
The 9-year-olds are the age-group that calculates the highest amount of SIs. 
This is probably because the vast majority of this age-group does not apply 
the exhaustive reading to the statements anymore. This realization is a 
perquisite to the discovery that the statements In der Schachtel kann/ könnte 
vielleicht A sein are underinformative. Therefore, this age-group calculates 
SIs much more often than the 5- and 7-year-old children do. It can be said 
that the amount of calculated SIs increases with the age of the participants. 
When one compares the results of both underinformative statements with 
each other, it can be said for all age-groups that the critical statement In der 
Schachtel könnte/ könnte vielleicht A sein is more likely to trigger impli-
catures (see table 5). 
When children were asked to act as mediator between the puppets, some 
of them did indeed consider both statements as right but added that the more 
informative statement In der Schachtel muss A sein was more appropriate. 
20% of the 5-year-old, 50% of the 7-year-old and 75% of the 9-year-old 
participants said that both statements In der Schachtel kann A sein and In der 
Schachtel muss A sein are right or that the latter one was more appropriate. 
The rest of the children said that the puppet who had said In der Schachtel 
kann A sein was wrong. This shows that more children recognize that this 
age (years)   statement 
5 7 9 
kann A 7.6 5.3 44.4 
könnte/ könnte vielleicht A 11.1 29.2 50 
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statement is under-informative when they are confronted with both 
statements at the same time and forced to make a decision. 
2.3.3	   Scalar	  Implicatures	  Compared	  to	  Child-­‐implicatures	  
If one compares the amount of calculated child-implicatures with the amount 
of calculated SIs among the age-groups (see tables 2 and 5) one can see that 
SIs are increasing with age, while the amount of calculated child-implicatures 
decreases. While 5-year-olds calculate child-implicatures more often than SI, 
roughly the same amount of 7-year-olds calculated SI’s for the statement In 
der Schachtel könnte A sein as they considered the statement as exhaustive 
description of the content of the box and calculated child-implicatures for the 
statement In der Schachtel muss A sein. Moreover, 9-year-old children 
compute SIs much more frequently than child-implicatures.  
The reason for this change in the calculated kind of implicature seems to 
be that the understanding of the task and the conversational maxims which 
participants focus on seem to differ. While older children and adults seem to 
value the second Maxim of Quantity and the third Maxim of Manner in this 
task and setting most, younger children seem value the first Maxim of 
Quantity and the second Maxim of Manner more than the other maxims. 
Therefore, the in this setting expected (adult-like) SIs are upper-bound while 
child-implicatures are lower-bound SIs. 
3	   Discussion	  
Let us finally turn to the question whether the present results support any of 
the acquisition hypotheses discussed in literature.  
3.1	   Acquisition	  Hypotheses	  
The Pragmatic Delay hypothesis states that children have semantic but lack 
pragmatic knowledge. This hypothesis was first proposed by Chierchia et. al 
(2001). The data of my study shows that 83% of the 5-year-old, 81% of the 7-
year-old and 80% of the 9-year-old children favoured the more adequate 
statement In der Schachtel muss A sein, in a situation where two puppets 
were arguing whether the statement In der Schachtel kann/ könnte vielleicht 
A sein or the statement In der Schachtel muss A sein was right. These results 
as well as the data from Chierchia et al. (2005) show that children know and 
use the Maxim of Quantity, which is essential pragmatic knowledge for the 
calculation of SIs. Children even rely on the Maxim of Quantity and therefore 
assume that the speaker uttered the most informative statement concerning 
the content of the covered box. Based on this interpretation children calculate 
child-implicatures. In order to be able to do so, they have to use pragmatic 
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knowledge and the Conversational Maxims. The present findings suggest that 
the Pragmatic Delay hypothesis does not hold for the tested age groups since 
young children’s evaluations are based on the exhaustive interpretation of the 
statements and not on a lack of pragmatic knowledge. 
The Processing Limitation hypothesis suggests that children have a 
limited working memory and hence problems to keep and compare two 
represen-tations of a statement. Due to this disadvantage children are said to 
calculate implicatures less often than adults. According to Chierchia (2005), 
children who fail to compute SIs are expected to achieve worse results in a 
task that requires a good memory system than children who calculate SIs. On 
the first glance, the fact that older children, who are thought to have a more 
advanced working memory, calculate more SI than younger ones seems to 
support this hypothesis.  
However, in connection with a different experiment about pragmatic 
enrich-ment processes in children, a working memory test was conducted 
with 5-, 7- and 9-year-old children. Children heard and had to repeat non-
words of differing length (amount of syllables) and semantic relatedness to 
known words. This test measured the ability of repeating new and never 
heard non-words. In order to be able to repeat these non-words, participants 
have to memorize them based on their length and semantic relatedness to 
known words in the phonological working memory. First preliminary results 
show that there is no interaction between the amount of points that 
participants gained in the working memory test and the amount of 
implicatures calculated in the experiment (Röhrig, manuscript in preparation). 
This indicates that the hypothesis that children calculate less implicatures 
because they have a limited working memory does not seem to hold. 
An alternative hypothesis by Chierchia et al. (2005) states that children 
make their judgements about a statement based on truthfulness or falsity of a 
statement rather than on appropriateness. If this thesis was right, then 
children who are confronted with statements In der Schachtel kann/ könnte A 
sein and In der Schachtel muss A sein are expected to say that both of them 
are right. Indeed, some participants of this study considered both statements 
to be right. However, they added that the more informative statement In der 
Schachtel muss A sein was more appropriate. These results support 
Chierchia’s hypothesis in the way that they suggest that children do focus on 
truthfulness and falsity of a statement when making an evaluation. The 
important point however is that children do not neglect appropriateness in 
favour of truthfulness or falsity, instead they pay attention to appropriateness 
at the same time, though to a lesser extent. 
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3.2	   A	  New	  Approach	  to	  the	  Acquisition	  of	  Scalar	  Implicatures	  
Based on the results of the study described in this paper, the following 
hypothesis is proposed. Before children calculate the expected SIs in the 
setting of the experiment described above, they calculate child-implicatures, 
based on exhaustive readings because they value different maxims of the 
Conversational Principles more than adults. In particular they overgeneralize 
the first Maxim of Quantity by using it in situations where it is less 
appropriate and hence interpret statements differntly than expected. This 
observation indicates that overgeneralizations, which are an important part of 
the learning process in many areas of languaguage acquisition, also play an 
important role in the acquisition of pragmatics. 
In the first stage children rely on the Cooperative Principle and over-
generalize the first Maxim of Quantity. Therefore, they interpret the 
statements as exhaustive descriptions of the content of the covered box. 
Moreover, they use a different strategy to solve the task since they try to 
match the statements heard with one of the open boxes and evaluate the 
statement as richtig (‘right’) if it is true for one of the open boxes. 
In the second stage children still strongly rely on the first Maxim of 
Quantity and consider the statements as exhaustive description of the content 
of the covered box. What is new in this stage is that children begin to fully 
exploit the first Maxim of Quantity by calculating child-implicatures based 
on this maxim. In this stage children typically reject the statement In der Box 
muss A sein by either just saying falsch (‘wrong’) or by explaining Nur A 
also. Das ist falsch (‘So only A. That is wrong.’). This shows that children 
are capable of calculating implicatures based on the first Maxim of Quantity. 
However, they are not aware that the speaker applies to the second Maxim of 
Quantity and says less than actually meant. Children’s answers are based on 
the assumption that the speaker obeys the first Maxim of Quantity.  
In the third stage children discover that the speaker violated the first 
Maxim of Quantity and applied to the second Maxim of Quantity as well as 
the third Maxim of Manner. This realization helps children to understand the 
uttered statements in a different way. They do no longer overgeneralize any 
of the Maxims. For this reason the exhaustive interpretation of the statements 
becomes less prominent and the amount of calculated child-implicatures 
decreases. Moreover, children do no longer match the sentences heard to one 
of the open boxes but consider the items mentioned in the statement as 
possible or necessary part of the content of the covered box. Children now 
interpret statements in the same way as adults do, but neglect the first Maxim 
of Quantity. Therefore, they do not calculate as many SIs as adults do. 
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In the fourth and final stage children are aware of  both maxims of Quantity 
as well as the third Maxim of Manner. The amount of calculated scalar 
implicatures increases because children exploit the first Maxim of Quantity. 
4	   Summary	  and	  Outlook	  
In contrast to current research literature, I found that even young children are 
able to calculate implicatures given an appropriate setting although the 
statement which triggers an implicature and the type of implicature are not 
the same as the ones adults calculate. Child-implicatures are upper-bound SIs 
in this experiment and setting based on the exhaustive reading of statements. 
The differences between childlike and ‘normal’ or adult type of scalar 
implicatures in this setting, arise because the conversational maxims that 
children and adults value most differ. While adults seem to value the second 
Maxim of Quantity and the third Maxim of Manner most, children seem to 
value the first Maxim of Quantity and the second Maxim of Manner more 
than the other maxims of Grice’s Conversational Principles. Therefore, I 
suggest that different kinds of implicatures should not be treated in the same 
way. The present results also suggest that implicatures cannot be considered a 
generally late acquisition phenomenon, because different types of 
implicatures, in this case child-implicatures and the ‘adultlike’ scalar 
implicatures, are acquired at different ages and thus have to be distinguished 
from one another. 
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Abstract. This paper explains three known constraints on scope reconstruction 
– reconstruction is blocked into wh-islands, after remnant movement, and after 
countercyclic merge – by postulating an underlying condition on semantic 
reconstruction, which follows naturally from minimalist assumptions on chain 
formation in combination with the principle of compositionality. 
 
1	   Introduction	  
In scope reconstruction, a moved element takes scope at, or close to the posi-
tion it occupied before the movement. Consider (1): 
(1) someonei is likely [TP ti to arrive ] 
 a. there is some person x s.t. it is likely that x arrives 
 b. it is likely that there is some person x s.t. x arrives 
This sentence allows the surface-scope reading (1a), and the reconstructed 
reading (1b), where someone seems to be interpreted in the position it 
occupied prior to Raising to Subject. 
A major question discussed in the literature on scope reconstruction is 
whether it should be dealt with by syntactic or semantic means. May’s (1977) 
solution for (1b) was syntactic: at LF, someone optionally undergoes a 
movement operation (Quantifier Lowering) that lowers it into the scope of 
likely. However, lowering movement is not otherwise attested and generally 
assumed to be impossible. Chomsky's (1993) copy theory of movement made 
a less problematic syntactic treatment available. On this theory, A-movement 
creates the structure in (2). Only one copy of someone must be retained at 
each of the interface levels PF and LF; deleting or ignoring the higher copy at 
LF, as in (2a), will yield the narrow scope, reconstructed reading. 
 (2) someone is likely [TP someone to arrive ]  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* I am grateful to Eefje Boef, Ora Matushansky, and audiences at SuB15 and the Utrecht Syntax 
Circle for comments and discussion. Naturally, all errors are my own. 
In Reich, Ingo et al. (eds.), Proceedings of Sinn & Bedeutung 15,  
pp. 515–529. Universaar – Saarland University Press: Saarbrücken, Germany, 2011. 	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 a. someone is likely [TP someone to arrive ] 
 b. someone is likely [TP someone to arrive ] 
The semantic treatment of scope reconstruction was made prominent by 
Cresti (1995), Rullmann (1995), and others. Such a treatment proceeds on the 
assumption that the syntactic representation invariably has someone in its 
surface position (or higher). The reconstructed reading can be derived by 
postulating that the trace left by movement can function not only as an e-type 
variable (which yields the surface scope reading, as shown in (3a)) but also as 
a variable of the type of a generalized quantifier. In this case, function-
argument relations are reversed, and the result is the interpretation (3b) in 
which likely in effect scopes over someone.1 
(3) someonei is likely [TP ti to arrive ] 
 a. someone (λxi[likely(^ arrive(xi) )])   ti is x of type e 
 b. (^someone) λXi[likely(^ ∨Xi(arrive))]  ti is X of type <s,<<e,t>, t>> 
   ≡ likely(^someone(arrive)) 
The comparison of syntactic and semantic approaches to scope re-
construction in the literature has focused on which approach is better able to 
account for the interaction between scope reconstruction and reconstruction 
for binding theory, a topic I will touch on in section 5. In this article I want to 
provide support for the semantic approach with evidence of a different type. I 
want to apply to scope reconstruction the same strategy that was employed in 
evaluating the syntactic and semantic treatments of upward scope shift 
(Quantifier Raising): I will argue that several constraints on when scope 
reconstruction can and cannot take place, are best explained by one natural 
condition on semantic reconstruction. If this account is successful, it con-
stitutes an argument in favor of the semantic approach.  
The empirical material comes from three previously observed 
constraints on scope reconstruction. Longobardi (1987) observed that a wh-
phrase extracted out of a wh-island does not reconstruct into the island. Barss 
(1986) showed that extraction followed by remnant movement does not 
reconstruct. Several authors have observed that late merger blocks scope 
reconstruction. 
For each of these constraints, various explanations are available in the 
literature. So far, however, no unified account of the phenomena has been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Assume, for concreteness, that a GQ-type variable is always intensionalized (type 
<s,<<e,t>,t>>), and composition can always add ^ and ∨ when necessary (see Cresti 1995:fn 16). 
I will attempt to abstract away from this issue in my presentation. 
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proposed. The present paper proposes that they reflect a more general 
underlying constraint: semantic reconstruction of a DP into a trace position is 
possible only if it can be locally determined that the DP and the trace are 
identical. I will argue in the next section that this constraint makes perfect 
sense given a semantic approach to reconstruction. Absent an equally 
plausible syntactic rationale for such a constraint, it provides an argument for 
semantic reconstruction. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains 
the constraint on semantic reconstruction I propose, and its relation to the 
interpretation of chains. Sections 3, 4, and 5 discuss the freezing effects 
induced by wh-islands, remnant movement, and late merger, respectively. 
2	   On	  the	  Interpretation	  of	  Chains	  
This section states the condition on scope reconstruction I propose, and 
shows how a rationale can be provided for it on the basis of the copy theory 
of movement and the semantic approach to reconstruction. 
I assume the copy theory of movement, which is the standard in current 
syntactic theory. At the same time, I adopt the semantic approach to re-
construction. That is, I assume that the downstairs copy of a movement chain 
is always interpreted as a variable; reconstruction is achieved by ma-
nipulating its type. Let us consider what is required in order to interpret a 
movement chain under these assumptions. First of all, we need to obtain a 
variable in the place of the downstairs (struck-out) copy of the moved 
element. Secondly, we need to bind this variable from the landing site. 
Thirdly, we need to fix the type of this variable. I will deal with the two less 
crucial questions first. 
Consider (4), the syntactic representation the copy theory derives for a 
simple case of A-movement: 
(4) [TP some man [T'  T [VP arrived some man]]] 
How do we obtain a variable at the foot of the movement chain? One option 
is to replace the struck-out copy of some man with a variable, or with a larger 
expression containing a variable (as does the Trace Conversion rule of Fox 
2002:67). However, since such a move is at odds with Chomsky’s (1995:225) 
Inclusiveness Condition, which provides the conceptual motivation for the 
copy theory, I will assume that traces are not replaced with variables or 
subject to any kind of trace conversion. A struck-out copy simply is a 
variable. Technically, what this means is that LF structures are interpreted 
relative to assignment functions which are defined as functions from syntactic 
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constituents to entities in the domain. Semantic composition in (4) proceeds 
in a bottom-up manner, starting from man. When the DP node dominating 
some man is reached, it is somehow discovered that this DP is a movement 
trace (exactly how is a technical question for the copy theory that is not 
particular to my proposal; assume for concreteness that the presence of 
unchecked uninterpretable features (Case in (4)) indicates that the element is 
(part of) a trace). Therefore, what composes with 'arrived' is not the regular 
semantic value (λX∃x[man'(x) ∧ X(x)]) computed so far; this is discarded in 
favor of g([DP some man]) (g the current assignment function).  
The next step in interpreting a movement chain is to bind the variable 
from the landing site. In pre-minimalist syntax, which provided indexed 
variables at the foot of a movement chain, it was standard to assume that the 
sister of a moved element XPi is interpreted via lambda-abstraction over the 
variable with index i. The implementation in Cresti (1995) (based on Heim 
1993, among others) converted the index on the moved element into a 
separate syntactic node, as shown in (5): 
(5) [TP [some man] [T'2 i [T'1 [VP arrived [NP t ]i ]]]] 
This allows for interpretation by familiar means: the index identifies the 
variable to be abstracted over, and triggers the semantic abstraction rule. 
There is, however, no syntactic evidence for the operation deriving (5), and it 
is at odds with the minimalist goal of doing away with indices. I therefore 
prefer to move the necessary complications into the composition rule for 
movement derived structures. The proposal is stated informally in (6): 
(6)  Given a structure [HP A B ], where B has been the target of internal 
merge due to a relation of Attract between the label of B and a 
constituent D, [[ HP ]]g is obtained by composing [[ A ]]g with that 
function h s.t. for every d, h(d) = [[ B ]]g[ D / d]. 
This tells us to interpret the TP in (4) w.r.t. assignment g by composing  
[[ some man ]]g with the function h s.t. for every d, h(d) =  [[ [T’ arrived some 
man] ]]g[ [some man] / d ] .  
The simple methods I have described for obtaining a variable at the foot 
of the chain, and for binding it, do not appear to be crucial for the treatment 
of scope reconstruction phenomena I want to propose. If the reader prefers, 
(s)he may assume instead, for instance, that a hidden morpheme is affixed to 
a struck-out copy which functions to replace it with a variable, which is then 
bound in the manner of (5). I would find this less elegant, but it would not 
necessarily be incompatible with the constraint on scope reconstruction 
proposed below.  
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This finally brings us to the key question: how does the grammar determine 
the type of the variable contributed by a trace? Consider an abstract example: 
(7) [HP A  λD.[H'  ... [Z' Z  D  ]]] 
In (7), D has moved, targeting H'. D is the struck-out bottom copy of the 
chain. As indicated, rule (6) causes the variable contributed by D to be 
abstracted over at H'. This lambda-expression then composes with A, which 
in most cases is just the moved element D, but not always, as we will see 
later. How is the type of D determined? 
One option, of course, is to pick any random type. But in most cases, 
this would cause the composition to fail, if not at Z', then at the point where 
H' composes with A. This would force the derivational process to backtrack, 
until a fitting type happened to be chosen for D. I want to abide by the 
minimalist tenet (which first became relevant in the context of Chomsky's 
(1995) rejection of global economy constraints, in favor of local ones) that 
backtracking is undesirable: choices in the derivational process are preferably 
made once and on the basis of local information. 
What I want to propose therefore is this. Any type may be chosen for 
the variable D, provided that we can be certain that this choice will not lead 
to a type-clash at the point where the variable is λ-bound, that is, where H' 
composes with A. If we cannot be certain that the type we pick will allow 
composition to proceed at HP, then we must default to the lowest possible 
type, which for a DP will be type e. 
The next question is: when can we be certain that a type for D will fit at 
HP? There is one condition under which we can: namely if A=D. This is 
because, if A=D, we can pick for D any type that D itself could have (that is, 
the type of any regular, non-variable interpretation of D). For if we pick a 
possible type of D for the variable D, then A, being identical to D, will be 
able to have this type as well.2 And if Type(D) = Type(A), the composition at 
HP will always fit. 
As a result, there are two cases in which we cannot be certain, at the 
point in the derivation where we are deciding the type of D, which types will 
fit. One case is: when A≠D. For in this case, in order to determine whether 
the type we pick for D will fit at HP, we would need to calculate the type of 
A separately. But this would violate compositionality. At the point where we 
are deciding on the interpretation of D, we do have access to the type of D 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 There is one exception: if A=D, but A is itself a trace forced down to type e by (8) below. For 
cases I am aware of, regular type shifting will always make backtracking unnecessary. 
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(which we just interpreted, before deciding to discard it and replace it with a 
variable) but the principle of compositionality does not allow us to make the 
interpretation of D dependent on the interpretation of some distinct A some-
where higher up in the structure. Hence, in this case, D defaults to the lowest 
type (e). The other case in which we cannot pick all possible types of D for D 
is when A is outside the local domain of D. Assuming that interpretation 
proceeds phase-by-phase (Chomsky 2000, 2001), we cannot "see A" at the 
point where we are interpreting D if A is not in the same phase as D, but in 
some higher phase. In this case, we do not know whether the expression 
resulting from λ-binding D will eventually compose with an A identical to D, 
hence we must again default to the lowest type (e). 
In sum, we can pick a higher type for a variable, resulting in semantic 
scope reconstruction, just in case A=D and we can determine locally that 
A=D. This constraint is stated informally in (8):3 
(8)  If D is a trace then D is interpreted as a variable of some type τ. If D is 
attracted to a phase-accessible target B, and D is identical to the sister of 
B, then τ can be the type of any non-trace interpretation of D. 
Alternatively, τ can default to the lowest type compatible with the 
category of D. 
I have argued that this constraint follows naturally from the interaction of 
standard minimalist assumptions and the principle of compositionality. In the 
next three sections, I will show how it applies to the data. 
3	   Why	  wh-­‐Islands	  Block	  Scope	  Reconstruction	  
This section discusses the scope freezing effect found in island constructions. 
Consider (9) and (10): 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 A formal implementation of (8) of course presupposes an implementation of Semantic Re-
construction. This is not entirely routine. Existing implementations (Cresti 1995, Rullmann 
1995) create a syntactic ambiguity by postulating different traces that translate as variables of 
different types. In a copy theory, the same effect could be achieved by enriching a trace copy 
with a diacritic that marks its type; this would also, technically, remove the remaining tension 
between the compositionality principle and (8). But these are clearly coding tricks: there is no 
independent evidence that a moved DP can leave traces with different properties and indices. I 
agree with Rullmann (p. 177) that the complication is best moved into the interpretation rule. 
However, if we are to avoid representationalism, this presupposes a semantic treatment of traces 
as untyped variables. This can be done by making the type of a variable depend on the as-
signment function, and then letting the interpretation of an expression be defined only relative to 
assignment functions that treat the variable as being of the desired type. I must leave this issue 
for another occasion. 
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(9)  How many peoplei do you think ti I should talk to ti? 
 a.  For what n: there are n-many people x s.t. you think I should talk to 
x 
 b. For what n: you think there should be n-many people that I talk to. 
(10) How many peoplei do you wonder whether I should talk to ti? 
 a. For what n: there are n-many people x s.t. you wonder whether I 
should talk to x 
 b.* For what n: you wonder whether there should be n-many people that 
I talk to. 
(9) allows both a wide scope reading for n-many people, paraphrased in (9a), 
and a narrow scope reading, paraphrased in (9b), which is apparently the 
result of scope reconstruction undoing the effect of wh-movement. In (10), in 
which wh-movement of how many people has crossed a wh-island, the re-
constructed reading (10b) is blocked, as first observed by Longobardi 1987. 
The discussion here can be brief because, for these data, the treatment I 
propose is a straightforward implementation of the generalization proposed 
by Frampton (1999), which was stated by Cresti (1995:103) as (11): 
(11) *[ … λP … [CP wh [IP … P … ]]]  ( P of the GQ type)  
The question is how (11) can be explained. As pointed out by Cresti 
(1995:103), this is a filter that “needs to be defined on a non-local con-
figuration.” A variant is needed that can be locally checked. Frampton pro-
posed a reduction of (11) to the ECP. Cresti (1995) proposes that (10) is 
derived via intermediate adjunction to the CP whose Spec is filled by 
whether. She then states a filter to the effect that traces so adjoined must be 
treated as type e. This entails that semantic reconstruction cannot be to a 
point lower than the filled Spec. This achieves the desired local 
configuration, but, as Cresti admits, her account does not explain why the 
constraint expressed by the postulated filter should hold. 
I assume the syntactic representations for (9) and (10) in (12) and (13), 
respectively. 
(12)  [CP How many people do you [vP how many people [vP think [CP how 
  many people [IP I should [vP how many people [vP talk to how many 
 people ]]]]]]]? 
(13) [CP How many people do you [vP how many people [vP wonder [CP 
 whether [IP I should [vP how many people [vP talk to how many 
 people ]]]]]]]? 
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In (12) how many people moves through the edge of every phase (CP, vP), 
presumably attracted by a P-feature inserted for this purpose (see Chomsky 
2001). As a result, each trace has a local antecedent, hence can be type <et,t> 
by (8). In (13), the embedded Spec,CP is filled, so that the underlined trace 
cannot assess the type of the constituent that composes with its binder, which 
is two phases up. It therefore defaults to type e.4 
I feel my treatment of these data is a slight improvement over earlier 
treatments. First, because it provides a local restatement of (11), with a ra-
tionale that makes it less stipulative than Cresti’s filter. But more importantly, 
because the treatment extends to the scope freezing effects of remnant 
movement and late merger, which I discuss in the next two sections. No such 
extension seems possible for existing accounts of (10).  
However, my account differs slightly in its empirical predictions from 
other implementations of (11). On the one hand, it shares the success of (11) 
and Cresti’s implementation in accounting for the absence of other types of 
“higher order” readings for elements extracted from wh-islands. E.g., (14) 
does not allow the functional reading for which book paraphrased in (14a), 
where the trace is arguably a function-type variable: 
(14) which book do you wonder whether every man dislikes t 
 a. *for which function f mapping men to a book, do you wonder  
  whether every man x dislikes f(x) [his oldest, his cheapest, …] 
See Cresti (1995) for discussion. On the other hand, Cresti’s implementation 
covers only filled Spec,CP islands, and does not extend to other weak islands 
that block reconstruction, such as negative islands. (15) is from Rullmann 
(1995:198): 
(15) a. How many books was John able to read? 
 b. How many books was John not able to read? 
(15a) allows reconstruction, but (15b) has only the wide scope reading for n-
many books. Rullmann proposes a semantic account in terms of maximality 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The question arises how (13) can be derived at all. If the wh-phrase does not move through the 
edge of CP, it is not clear that it can be attracted by the next phase head, given Chomsky's (2000) 
PIC; but if it does, then why does it not leave a trace in spec,CP, which will then be local to the 
trace inside the island? One possible solution is suggested by Sabel (2002): the embedded C 
attracts how many people to a (second) specifier, but this does generate a violation (English +wh 
C does not tolerate a specifier containing a trace). Hence, the trace in spec,CP is *-marked. The 
trace is subsequently deleted (as in Chomsky and Lasnik 1993), resulting in only a weak 
(subjacency level) violation. I will assume that some such solution is possible. 
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(which, in turn, does not extend to wh-islands); whether my account can 
cover (15) depends on whether NegP can be argued to delimit a local context 
(see Sabel 2002 for some discussion and references). 
On the down side, Cresti implements Frampton’s generalization more 
precisely than (8) does by requiring all traces in the offending configuration 
to be type e, not just DP-traces. This entails that adjuncts cannot be extracted 
from wh-islands at all, since they cannot bind e-type variables. My 
implementation could be adjusted to entail the same prediction: rephrase (8) 
so that a trace without a local antecedent does not default to the lowest type 
compatible with its category, but to type e. On the other hand, the prediction 
is not correct for all adjuncts, as discussed in Rullmann (1995). I will leave 
this issue for further research. 
4	   Why	  Remnant	  Movement	  Blocks	  Reconstruction	  	  
As (17) shows, A-movement out of a structure that is subsequently fronted 
does not reconstruct into the fronted constituent.  
(16) some politiciani is [AP likely [IP ti to address every rally ]] 
 a. for some politician x: it is likely x addresses every rally 
 b. it is likely that for some politician x: x addresses every rally 
 c. it is likely that for every rally y: for some politician x: x addresses y 
(17)  [AP how likely [IP ti to address every rally ] ] is some politiciani tAP ? 
a. for which d, for some politician x: it is d-likely x will address every  
  rally 
b. *for which d, it is d-likely that for some politician x: x will address 
  every rally 
 c. *for which d, it is d-likely that for every rally y: some politician x: x 
   will address y 
Whereas (16) allows both wide scope and narrow scope relative to likely for 
some politician (and, optionally, relative to every rally as well, following 
local QR of the latter), (17) allows only the wide scope reading roughly para-
phrased in (17a), as observed by Barss (1986). Barss’ explanation, based on a 
Quantifier Lowering theory of reconstruction, was that QL can only move 
straight down (into a c-commanded position), not sideward and down. 
An explanation more in line with current understanding of movement 
phenomena was proposed by Sauerland (1999), Sauerland & Elbourne (2002) 
(q.v. for discussion of Barss’ work). A-movement can take place either in 
syntax, or in the PF branch (provided that this yields an additional scope 
option); it does not reconstruct. Wide scope in (16) is the result of A-
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movement in syntax feeding into LF. Narrow scope results from PF A-
movement, with the pre-movement structure feeding into LF. Given some 
further assumptions, this approach to A-movement reconstruction predicts the 
freezing effect in (17), where A-movement is followed by A-bar-movement. 
Since A-bar-movement must take place in syntax, so must any A-movement 
preceding it; this yields the wide-scope reading. 
There are several problems with this explanation. First, since the ac-
count of reconstruction applies only to reconstruction from A-movement, it 
does not explain why A-bar-movement also fails to reconstruct after remnant 
movement, as observed by Sauerland. More seriously, the analysis predicts 
that (under the right conditions) any A-moved element should be able to 
behave for all syntactic purposes (e.g. ECP effects, superiority, NPI li-
censing) as though it had not moved. There is no evidence that this is correct. 
Finally, details of the analysis aside, the explanation does not of course 
extend to the scope freezing effects in wh-islands and after late merger dis-
cussed in sections 3 and 5. 
Sauerland & Elbourne (2002) do present the data in (18) as independent 
evidence for their theory. 
(18) a. *?[Which constraint]i are [good examples of ti ]j always provided tj? 
 b. [Which constraint]i are [good examples of ti ]j always sought tj?  
(19) 2x  good examples of this constraint are always provided 
They argue that (18b) fails to violate the Subject Condition that rules out 
(18a) because the object can delay raising to subject to PF, as this will allow 
it to remain in the scope of the intensional verb. However, the ambiguity of 
(19) shows that the presence of the quantificational adverb in (18a) should 
also be enough to license PF-movement. While I do not have an account for 
the contrast in (18), it does not appear to support Sauerland & Elbourne's 
theory of A-movement reconstruction.  
Turning to my analysis, consider the abstract structure (20): 
(20) [CP [XP ... ti ... ]  [C' C [TP NPi ... XP ]]] 
On a semantic approach to reconstruction, we must interpret the top copy of 
XP. The bottom copy only contributes a variable. Whether NP reconstructs 
therefore hinges on the type assigned to its trace(s) in the top XP. Since the 
head of the NP chain does not c-command into the top XP, the λ-binder of the 
highest of these traces (if there is a λ-binder at all) must compose with 
something not identical to NP. (8) therefore blocks reconstruction, explaining 
Barss' observation. 
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Before we can make this analysis of (17) more concrete, we need to deal with 
a serious complication. The NP trace in the fronted copy of XP is unbound. 
On a syntactic reconstruction approach, this is not a problem: XP moves back 
down at LF, or we delete the upstairs copy of XP and retain the downstairs 
copy, and the trace becomes properly bound. But on the semantic 
reconstruction approach, we must interpret the top copy of XP, so we cannot 
avoid ending up with an unbound variable. This does not yield a correct 
interpretation. The phenomenon of remnant movement as such creates a se-
rious problem, not just for my proposal, but for the entire semantic approach 
to reconstruction. 
For a concrete illustration of the problem, and of the solution I propose, 
I will focus on some structurally simpler examples, from Huang (1993):  
(21) a. [VP ti love himself], Johni never will tVP 
 b. [VP ti admire Stalin], noonei did tVP 
Huang proposed that the reconstruction effect in (21a), by which himself is 
licensed despite VP-fronting, is explained by the VP-internal Subject 
Hypothesis, which causes the VP to contain a trace of John that A-binds the 
anaphor. But how is the trace itself bound? Examples like (21b) show that the 
VP-internal trace must be able to function as a bound variable. The obvious 
solution is to invoke reconstruction. As noted, syntactic reconstruction solves 
the problem. On standard assumptions, however, semantic reconstruction is 
not able to produce the bound reading. We obtain for (21b) the (defective) 
interpretation in (22a), rather than the desired (22b). 
(22) a. (admire(x,stalin)) λpt[ noone (λx.p)] 
 b. noone (λx.admire(x,stalin)) 
It is important to note that this problem exists independently of the proposed 
constraint on scope reconstruction. Quite generally, the apparent im-
possibility of deriving a meaning for (21a) or (21b) without syntactic re-
construction might be taken as damning evidence against any (exclusively) 
semantic approach to reconstruction. This problem – how to make a semantic 
reconstruction theory deal with constituents containing a variable, when they 
have been moved out of the scope of the variable’s binder – has been 
addressed before. Sternefeld (2001) (q.v. for further references) proposes a 
solution in which traces are interpreted as variables over functions from 
assignment functions to normal denotations. It appears that this system might 
support a solution for scope freezing in (17) as well, although not in the way 
Sternefeld develops it. While the issue is mostly outside the scope of this 
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paper, I will sketch an alternative (partial) solution which fits better with the 
treatment of chains I am proposing. 
The first possibility is to start from these assumptions: that any 
displaced element functions as a phase (as suggested by one of Chomsky’s 
(2000) diagnostics for phases), and that an XP that is extracted out of a phase 
must first move into its edge. We can now propose the derivation (23) for 
(21b): 
(23) [vP noone admire Stalin] [C’noone [T’ did [vP noone [vP noone  admire 
Stalin]]]] 
 a. λxe[ x admire Stalin ] λX<e,t>[C’ noone λx[T’ [vP x X ]]] 
 b. (λxe[admire(x,Stalin)]) λX<e,t>[C’ noone (λx[vP X(x) ])] 
Noone first attaches to the vP phase, and then moves to Spec,TP. Sub-
sequently, the lower segment of vP moves to Spec,CP, leaving the underlined 
trace and stranding the doubly underlined trace. The fronted vP now does not 
contain a free variable, because it is a movement target subject to the 
abstraction rule (6); it can undergo semantic reconstruction and then apply to 
the variable that is the doubly underlined trace of noone. (23a) schematically 
indicates how different traces function; (23b) clarifies the function-argument 
relations. The result is equivalent to (22b) by lambda-conversion. 
Scope freezing falls out as desired. (24) is from Huang (1993): 
(24) [vP  ti see everyone], (I am sure) someonei did    ∃ > ∀ , *∀ > ∃ 
Everyone in (24) cannot scope over someone, which indicates that someone 
does not reconstruct, as per Barss' generalization. The full structure is given 
in (25a): 
(25) a. [CP [vP someone see everyone ] [C' someone did [vP someone
 [vPsomeone see everyone]]]] 
 b. [CP λxe[vP xe see everyone] λX<e,t> [C' someone λxe[T’ did [vP x 
  X ]]]] 
The boldfaced someone in (25a) cannot reconstruct. The lambda binder of the 
italicized trace (at the top of the fronted vP) does not compose with the 
“antecedent” of the italicized trace (the doubly underlined trace), but with the 
C’. Hence, (8) causes the italicized trace to default to type e; the result is 
(25b). The rationale is that one would need to inspect the semantics of the C’ 
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to determine that, indirectly, the types would match for any possible type of 
someone. The considerations of compositionality built into (8) prevent this.5 
This solution does not require any new semantic assumptions, but the 
syntactic assumptions are not unproblematic. First of all, it is unclear why the 
subject must move to Spec,vP (and how it can), given that it is already in the 
edge of the vP-phase. One possible answer is, that this movement step is 
needed precisely because the vP will otherwise contain a free variable after it 
is fronted. Another option is that what is fronted in VP-fronting is a 
constituent slightly bigger than vP (cf. Huang 1993); this constituent 
functions as a phase when it fronts, so that the subject must move through its 
edge. Another potential problem is that the analysis requires fronting of a 
segment of vP. Again, we may speculate that segment movement is allowed 
here, perhaps exceptionally, because fronting the complete category will front 
a free variable.  
An alternative would be to implement essentially the same solution by 
manipulating the semantics. Assume that any fronted constituent containing 
traces in its edge will undergo “lambda-closure”: all free traces in the edge 
are abstracted over in some fixed order. The terminal trace of the fronted 
constituent is raised in type accordingly, and then fed the same variables as 
arguments. This will also deal with cases where more than one element is 
extracted before remnant movement, although the syntactic treatment can be 
adapted to such cases as well. For reasons of space, I must leave an 
exploration of these options for another occasion.  
5	   Why	  Late	  Merger	  Blocks	  Scope	  Reconstruction	  	  
It has repeatedly been observed (Fox 1999, Fox & Nissenbaum 1999, Bhatt & 
Pancheva 2004) that counter-cyclic merger blocks scope reconstruction of the 
XP merged into. Consider just one example (from Fox & Nissenbaum 1999): 
(26) I looked for [A a picture] very intensely [B a picture] by this artist         
∃ > look for ,  * look for > ∃ 
Fox & Nissenbaum derive extraposition in (26) via movement of a picture, 
creating the chain (B, A), followed by late merger of the PP into B. A is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The underlined trace may start out as type e, but also as type <et,t>, because it has a local 
antecedent (the doubly underlined trace). This means, that the vP trace starts out as ambiguous 
between types <e,t> and type <<et,t>,t> (those are the types of its "non-trace interpretations" in 
(8), so both those types are allowed for the vP trace as a variable). But the upstairs copy of the vP 
can only be type <e,t> (because the italicized trace cannot be <et,t>). This leaves only <e,t> as an 
option for the vP trace, as the higher type will lead to a mismatch. 
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realized at PF, but only B can be interpreted at LF: the countercyclic merger 
blocks the reconstructed reading. A syntactic theory of scope reconstruction 
along the lines of (2a) easily explains why: deleting B would leave the PP 
modifier dangling. On a semantic theory of scope reconstruction, the effect is 
unexpected, but it is explained by (8): the λ-binder of the variable A com-
poses with a non-identical DP, so the variable defaults to type e. Fox's (1999) 
analysis of the correlation between reconstruction for scope and binding can 
be captured in this way, as well. I must defer discussion of these and related 
cases to another occasion. 
6	   Conclusions	  	  
I have argued that three constraints on scope reconstruction, which thus far 
had not received a satisfactory or unified explanation, follow naturally from 
one underlying condition on reconstruction. While this condition depends on 
the copy theory of movement (Chomsky 1993), it also relies crucially on the 
semantic approach to scope reconstruction (Cresti 1995, Rullmann 1995). 
Further evidence might be found in the absence of scope reconstruction 
into Parasitic Gaps and in tough constructions. Further research is also 
needed into reconstruction in A-chains, and in the relation to Kennedy's 
puzzle, among other topics. 
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Abstract. Negative degree questions such as How short is John?, and negative 
equatives such as John is as short as Mary imply that John is short. Existing 
theories explain this ‘norm-related’ implication by means of (i) a competition 
between unmarked and marked antonyms, and (ii) by introducing a standard-
variable in parallel with the standard analysis of the positive form John is tall. 
This paper argues against these principles and in favor of an analysis, whereby 
the zero on the measurement scales of norm-related adjectives is relative, rather 
than absolute. This principle captures the fact that norm-related implications 
arise with many positive adjectives (alongside with their negative antonyms) 
and are cross-linguistically tied with non-licensing of measure phrases. 
 
1	   Introduction:	  Norm-­‐Relatedness	  
What do we know about norm-relatedness to date? First and foremost, we 
know that degree questions and equatives with ‘negative’ adjectives trigger 
norm-related implications. For example, the question how short is Bill and 
equative Bill is as short as Mary imply that Bill is short, while the question 
how tall is Bill and equative Bill is as tall as Mary do not imply that Bill is 
tall. To explain these facts, linguists often exploit notions such as ‘unmarked’ 
vs. ‘marked’ antonyms; marked expressions have a limited distribution; in 
certain contexts they are either ungrammatical or infrequent, and their usage 
is characterized by an interpretation shift, e.g. norm relatedness (Lehrer 1985; 
Horn 1989). Evidence for the narrower distribution (hence, markedness) of 
negative adjectives includes in particular their non-licensing with measure 
phrases and ratio phrases, except in the comparative, as illustrated by the 
felicity of twice as tall as versus infelicity of #twice as short as, and by the 
contrasts in (1). 
(1) a. Bill is 1 meter shorter than John;  *Bill is 1.50meters short 
 b. Bill is 20 years younger than John; *Bill is 20 years young 
A markedness-based analysis within formal semantics is proposed by Rett 
(2007, 2008), who argues that negative adjectives are banned from linguistic 
contexts in which their substitution with the positive (‘unmarked’) antonym 
In Reich, Ingo et al. (eds.), Proceedings of Sinn & Bedeutung 15,  
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preserves truth conditions. For example, the neutral reading of as short as is 
banned, since individuals are equally tall iff they are equally short. 
A main drawback of this view is that in many pairs of antonyms, the 
negative and positive members are both norm-related (Bierwisch 1989), as 
the following examples illustrate.  
(2) [Bill and Mary are skinny]  
 a. #Bill is as fat as Mary;     
 b. #How fat is Bill? 
(3) [Bill and Mary are fat]   
 a. #Bill is as skinny as Mary.     
 b. #How skinny is Bill? 
(4) a. How rich is John?     ⇒  John is rich  
 b. John is as rich as Bill.   ⇒  John is rich  
(5) a. How poor is John?     ⇒  John is poor 
 b. John is as poor as Mary. ⇒  John is poor 
(6) a. ?This ice-cream is as warm as that one. 
 b. ?How warm is the ice-cream? 
 c. ?How cold is the fire? 
(7) a. How heavy is the bag?       ⇒  The bag is heavy 
 b. The bag is as heavy as the box. ⇒  The bag is heavy  
(8) a. How light is the bag?         ⇒  The bag is light 
 b. The bag is as light as the box.   ⇒  The bag is light 
Furthermore, none of the members of these pairs licenses measure phrases, 
except in the comparative (Schwarzschild, 2005), and many of the positive 
adjectives resemble their negative antonyms in rarely licensing ratio phrases 
(Sassoon 2010). Thus, neither the positive nor the negative is ‘unmarked’. 
(9) a. Bill is 1 kg fatter/ skinnier than John;     vs. *150kgs fat/ skinny  
 b. Bill is 200$ richer/ poorer than John;     vs. 1,000$ rich/ poor  
 c. It is 2° warmer/ colder than yesterday;    vs. 20° warm/ cold 
Such pairs are prevalent in languages as diverse as English, German, Chinese, 
Hebrew and Esperanto (Bierwisch 1989; Breakstone 2009; Kennedy 2009). A 
corpora study of Esperanto, which users are native speakers of a variety of 
languages, suggests that they are prevalent even in this artificially construed 
language – most positive adjectives resemble their negative antonyms in 
rarely licensing ratio phrases (van Cranenburgh et al 2011). 
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Hebrew speakers’ judgments concerning nominalizations exhibit parallel 
patterns (Breakstone 2009; Sassoon 2010). In many antonym pairs, both 
negative and positive members are marked, as (10b) and (12b) illustrate. 
(10) a. Godel/??Katnut ha-bayit; ‘The size/??smallness of the house’ 
 b. Mishkal/??Koved ha-noca; ‘The weight/?‘heaviness’ of the feather’ 
(11) a. Orex kaful/ shney meter; ‘Double length; 2 meters of length’ 
 b. *Katnut kfula/ shney meter; *‘Double smallness/ smallness of 2ms’ 
(12) a. Mishkal kaful / 30kg; ‘Double weight / weight of 30kg’ 
 b. *Koved kaful / 2kg; *‘Double heaviness / heaviness of 2kg’  
Moreover, in languages like Russian, all adjectives not morphologically 
marked for comparison are norm-related and do not license measure phrases 
(Krasikova 2009). Even tall is marked, so to speak. 
(13) *Катя низкая, она такая/настолько же высокая, как/насколько и 
 Лариса; 
 ‘Katja is short, she is as tall as Larissa.’ 
(14) a. Насколько стол широкий? 
  ‘How wide is the desk?’      (very, fairly, little, *20cm) 
 b. *Кровать 80 см *широкая/ *узкая/ шириной. 
      ‘The bed is 80 cm wide.’ 
Only adjectives morphologically marked for comparison (e.g., the Russian 
equivalents of English ‘taller’) are ‘unmarked’ – they are neutral and they 
license measure- and ratio-phrases. All other degree constructions, whereby 
the adjective occurs with no morphological marking (the Russian equivalents 
of ‘tall’, ‘more tall’, etc.) are norm-related and ban measure phrases. 
(15) a. Катя не выcокая, но она выше, чем Сергей. 
  ‘Katja is not tall, but she is taller than Sergej.’ 
 b. *Катя не высокая, но она более высокая,чем Сергей  
   ‘Katja is not tall, but she is more tall than Sergej.’ 
These cross-linguistic generalizations call for a unified account of norm-
relatedness in natural language, and its interactions with polarity and measure 
phrases. 
2	   Existing	  Theories	  	  
This paper utilizes a representation of background contexts c via context-sets 
Wc (sets of indices w consistent with the information in c; Stalnaker 1978), 
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such that a statement S is true in c iff ∀w∈Wc, S is true in w; S is false in c 
iff ∀w∈Wc, S is false in w, and S is undetermined in c, otherwise. Let Dx and 
Dr be the domain of possible individuals x and degrees r, respectively, and let 
gradable adjectives denote in indices w measure functions, f(P,w): Dx→Dr; 
for example, f(tall,w) is a degree function (also symbolized as ftall,w) – a 
mapping of entities x∈Dx to values r∈Dr. The interpretation of a positive 
construction, x is P, is the truth value ‘true’ in w iff f(P,w)(x) exceeds P’s 
standard in w, s(P,w) (Kennedy 1999). 
The degree functions of positive adjectives are monotonic with respect 
to conventional measures, while those of negative adjectives are reversed 
with respect to those of their antonyms, e.g., the more height one has (wrt any 
possible measure), the taller one is, but the less short one is. Thus, the 
ordering imposed by fshort,w is equivalent to the ordering imposed by the 
reversed height function λx∈Dx. − ftall,w(x).  Let us, then, represent this fact by 
assuming that for any c and w∈Wc, fshort,w is roughly equivalent to ≅ λx. − 
ftall,w(x).  However, the arguments in this paper do not hinge on this analysis 
of antonymy; they generalize to other contemporary analyses of antonymy 
(Kennedy 1999, 2001; Heim 2008, etc.) 
Theories such as Rett (2008) seek to explain the data with two 
principles: 
(16) a. Markedness (restricted distribution): Norm related implications are 
due to a competition between marked and unmarked forms. Marked 
(negative; ‘reversed’) adjectives can be used iff substitution with the 
‘unmarked’ antonym does not preserve truth conditions. 
 b. Null morphemes (‘Pos’/‘Eval’): Norm related implications are 
explained by analogy with the positive construction, which is 
normally analyzed as containing a null morpheme – POS or EVAL – 
that introduces a membership-standard variable into the syntax and 
semantics. For example, ‘Dan is tall’ is analyzed as conveying that 
Dan is taller than tall’s contextual standard (Kennedy 1999).  
Therefore, since the neutral interpretations of, for example, equally tall and 
equally short are equivalent, by principle (16a), the latter is not licensed. 
However, when EVAL enters the derivations, the outcome consists of two 
non-equivalent norm related interpretation for the positive and negative 
equatives. Hence, both are licensed. For example, the negative equative Dan 
and Bill are equally short has a derivation of the form Equally(Eval Dan is 
short, Bill is Short), which conveys that Dan and Bill are equally short and 
Dan is shorter than the standard height norm, rs. Likewise, the norm related 
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interpretations of negative and positive as equatives and degree questions are 
different so both are licensed. 
This theory is appealing because it is economic and highly intuitive. 
Can we, then, use a modified version of it to explain the facts concerning 
antonym pairs whereby the negative and positive are both marked? The 
answer is no. Norm-related readings with positive adjectives cannot be based 
on comparisons with an ‘unmarked’ form, because their negative antonyms 
are also marked – they do not license ratio- and measure-phrases.  
The moral is twofold. First, non-licensing of ratio and measure phrases 
cannot be explained merely as a result of the reversal characterizing negative 
antonymy, for otherwise the fact that many positive adjectives do not license 
ratio- and measure-phrases will remain unexplained. Second, norm-related-
ness cannot be explained by relying on a notion as general as markedness. 
What we need to explain is why ‘marked’ adjectives have a constrained 
distribution in the first place, and the reasons explaining this would probably 
reveal why they tend to also be norm-related.  
A theory that seeks to explain norm-relatedness in terms of reasons for 
non-licensing of measure phrases will be more explanatory. First, it will 
explain the cross linguistic patterns. Krasikova (2008), for example, adopts 
principles (16a, b) to account for the English data; this forces her to propose a 
different account for Russian, to capture the apparent role of degree 
morphology in this language. So she is forced to use separate accounts for an 
apparent cross-linguistic feature – norm relatedness always goes with non-
licensing of measure phrases. Second, an account of norm-relatedness which 
is based on non-licensing of measure- and ratio-phrases has the potential 
advantage of explaining data pertaining to norm-relatedness in measure- and 
ratio-phrases. In particular, why is it that when people do use ratio-phrases, as 
in This paper is twice as short as that one, the result is neutral? After all, 
other modified equatives (e.g. at least as short as) are norm related. 
Additional problems with existing analyses pertain to principle (16b) –
the assumption that the derivation and semantics of equatives and degree 
questions is mediated by a standard variable. One problem pertains to the use 
of for-phrases in equatives (Sassoon and van Rooij 2011). For-phrases are 
adjective modifiers indicating what the implicit standard is, as illustrated with 
the positive construction in (17a). These modifiers cannot modify equatives 
(17b). When accepted, the for-phrase is an adjective modifier, which pro-
duces a shift in the adjective interpretation (17c). Due to this shift, (17c) does 
not at all entail that the two arguments are equally short.  
(17) a. Dan is tall for his age  
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  (= Dan is taller than tall’s standard, namely his age’s norm) 
 b. *Dan is as short as Bill for their age(s) 
(≠ Dan is shorter than short’s standard, namely his age’s norm and 
Dan and Bill are equally short) 
 c. Dan is as short for his age as Mary is for her age 
(≅ Dan is short for his age to the same degree as Mary is short for 
her age) 
Why? A for-phrase can only modify the adjective occurring in an equative, 
thereby creating a between-adjective equative; Thus it produces a shift in 
interpretation, not necessarily towards a norm-related interpretation, but 
towards a deviation interpretation – the adjectival function is replaced with a 
function assigning to entities the distance between their value and the norm in 
their respective categories. The for-phrase does not and cannot modify the 
equative itself, which is straightforwardly explained if and only if no standard 
parameter is added by virtue of the use of an equative without for. 
Similar problems arise with the use of standard boosters like very 
(compare, for example, the felicity of Dan is very tall to the utterly odd 
sentences #Bill is as very short as Dan and ?? How very short is Bill?). Why? 
Again, very cannot modify an equative or degree question by boosting the 
value of the norm variable, probably because there is no such value in their 
semantics. In conclusion, equatives and degree questions are inherently 
different from positive forms. Their derivations are mediated by neither a null 
morpheme, nor a standard variable (Sassoon and van Rooij 2011). 
In sum, an account of norm related implications in these constructions 
cannot be based on principles (16a, b). Norm-related implications must derive 
from something else, which characterizes the interpretation of marked 
adjectives, including positive ones. The rest of this paper will provide an 
implementation of the idea put forward in this section, namely an account of 
norm-relatedness that bind it, rather than to a general notion of markedness, 
to a more specific, pervasive feature of norm-related adjectives 
crosslinguistically: non-licensing of measure phrases and rarity of licensing 
of ratio phrases.  
3	   Accounts	  Based	  on	  Licensing	  of	  Measure	  Phrases	  
I will make use of measurement theory’s explanation of the distribution of 
measure phrases (Krantz et al 1971), whose relevance to linguistics has 
already been noted (Klein 1991; Krifka 1989; van Rooij 2010; Sassoon 
2010). I will discuss specifically the difference between ratio- and difference-
scales, which pertains to the status of the zero on a measurement scale and its 
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effects. On this proposal, the so-called ‘norm related implications’ are 
actually ‘zero related implications’, and the so called ‘Unmarked-’ versus 
‘Marked-adjectives’ are adjectives with absolute- versus relative-zeros. 
Section 3.1 explains these notions in more detail. 
3.1	   Zero	  the	  Hero	  
Let the domain of degrees, Dr, include a special element, 0∈Dr. Let adjectival 
interpretations in indices w include, besides a cutoff point, also a zero point – 
the set of entities whose P value in w is 0: zero(P,w) ={x∈Dx: f(P,w)(x) = 0}. 
Like the cutoff point, also the zero can be either semantically determined or 
context relative. P’s zero is absolute in c iff it is index invariant (i.e. the same 
extent of the given property is regarded as zero in every accessible index; 
(18a)) and it marks absence of P-hood by comprising P’s absolute lower 
bound (18b). Otherwise, P’s zero is relative. 
(18) Absolute zeros are index invariant lower bounds: 
 a. ∀w1,w2∈Wc, zero(P,w1) = zero(P,w2)   
 b. ∀w∈Wc,∀x∉zero(P,w), f(P,w)(x) > 0). 
What, then, distinguishes neutral adjectives (like English tall and old) from 
norm-related ones (fat, rich, warm and negative antonyms in general)? In the 
former, the zero is absolute. It marks complete absence of height, width, age, 
etc. Conversely, in the latter, the zero is relative. The ‘out of the blue’ context 
fails to determine precisely which entities cease to have any amount of the 
measured properties. Which entities are minimally fat? Rich? Short? At 
which point on the warm-cold scale are entities not even somewhat cold? 
Warm? Our linguistic capacity is as indeterminate with regard to the zero (or 
minimum) of these adjectives as it is with regard to the cutoff point of tall. If 
I do not want to be fat at all – not even minimally fat – what weight should I 
aspire for? If I want to warm up a soup so that it is not at all cold, what 
temperature should I aspire for? 
Some of the adjectives lacking an absolute zero, e.g., short, have no 
minimum at all, because there is no maximal height. Others, e.g., fat, could 
have had an absolute zero – 0 weight – but in actuality, fat doesn’t appear to 
measure mere weight, but rather – overweight. The point at which entities 
begin to have a noticeable amount of overweight (‘minimum fatness’) is 
context relative. So is the point at which entities begin to have noticeable 
deficits compared to the average height (‘shortness’) etc. 
Significantly, relative zeros do not have to equal the membership norms. 
For example, while somewhat open entails open and slightly wet entails wet, 
one can be somewhat fat, but not fat, meaning that the reference point relative 
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to which we begin to measure overweight (fat’s zero) may be different from 
fat’s norm. Likewise, one can be somewhat short, but not short, meaning that 
the reference point relative to which we begin to measure height-deficit (the 
zero) may be different from short’s norm. Notice that according to the 
economy principle (Kennedy 2007), if there is a point that stands out on a 
scale (usually either a minimum or a maximum on the scale), the adjective’s 
norm will be identified with it, rather than be context-relative. This is the case 
in open/closed; dry/wet, but not in fat/skinny and tall/short. They seem to 
reference midpoint standards, despite the fact that speakers easily recognize 
an absolute zero on the height and weight scales, and despite the role that this 
zero plays in the interpretation of adjectives like, e.g., tall – explaining their 
licensing of ratio- and measure-phrases (as illustrated shortly). 
Finally, notice that sentences such as The surface of the floor is zero 
(cms) tall are funny or infelicitous, but they are easily interpretable, whereas 
corresponding examples, e.g., The surface of the floor is zero (cms) short are 
both funny and senseless (Sassoon 2010). This is because the degrees 
assigned by short – including those of entities whose height measures zero – 
are shifted by an unspecified value, which results in a relative zero. In typical 
contexts of use c, we do not know which entities belong in zero(short) in c 
(formally, for many w1,w2 in Wc, zero(short,w1) ≠ zero(short,w2)). No 
absolute ‘zero’ is available, only local zeros. So we have found a common 
denominator: All norm-related adjectives have relative zeros. We can 
describe their degree functions as shifted by an index-dependent value, 
symbolized below as ‘Tran’, from ‘transformation value’. For example, the 
zero on the Kelvin scale is absolute. Nothing can get any colder. But the zero 
on the Celcius scale is arbitrary – frozen water exemplifies this degree. The 
Celsius scale can be defined in terms of Kelvin degrees plus a transformation 
by exactly 273 degrees. The scales of natural language adjectives can also be 
described as transformed, but by an undetermined (index relative) value. 
(19) a. ∀w∈Wc,  ∃Tran∈Dr: fwarm,w = λx. fKelvin(x,w)   − Tran  
 b. ∀w∈Wc,  ∃Tran∈Dr: fshort,w = λx. Tran −  ftall(x,w) 
This is not to say that speakers always need to possess a representation 
of an additive temperature scale a kin to Kelvin; rather, the result of trans-
forming Kelvin by different arbitrarily given values constitutes a correct 
description of the representations speakers do possess for temperature 
adjectives. 
Measurement theory tells us that measure phrases are only licensed with 
ratio (‘additive’) scales, namely ones with absolute non-shifted zeros (Krantz 
et al 1971). To illustrate measurement with an absolute zero, consider for 
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example, an index w whereby tall maps entities whose height is 1 centimeter 
to 1, and assume that Sam and Dan’s heights are 50 and 100 centimeters, 
respectively, and in accordance, they are mapped to the degrees 50 and 100, 
respectively. Since ratio-based scales have an absolute zero, they assign no 
negative values, and the values they assign adequately represent differences 
and ratios between entities’ manifestations of the given property (e.g. height). 
For examples, we can say that Dan is twice as tall as Sam since the ratios on 
tall’s scale are meaningful and indeed 100 = 2 × 50. We can also use units 
and measure phrases as in Dan is 100 cms tall, because the ratios on tall’s 
scale are meaningful and Dan is in fact 100 times as tall as a centimeter.  
By contrast, consider an index w whereby ‘tall’ is linked to a trans-
formed function (which is, arguably, the case in Russian), for instance, one 
that maps entities whose height is 1 centimeter to 0 (λx. height(x,w) − 1; so 
Sam and Dan are assigned 49 and 99, respectively). Since such transformed 
(‘difference’) scales have an arbitrary zero, they typically assign negative 
values, and the ratios between their values are not meaningful; so in Russian, 
we cannot felicitously say that Dan is twice as tall as Sam because indeed, 
e.g., 99 ≠ 2 × 49. Likewise, we cannot felicitously say that Dan is 100 cms 
tall because 99 is not 100 times 0. For similar reasons, English speakers tend 
to avoid statements such as Sam is twice as short as Dan; reversed and 
transformed degrees do not capture ratios. Still, measure phrases are okay in 
morphologically-comparative adjectives in these two languages (e.g., we can 
say that Dan is 50 cms taller than Sam), because when calculating degree 
differences, the transformation values cancel out – the difference between 
Dan and Sam’s tall degrees is 50, and so is the difference between their short 
degrees ((1 − 100 ) − (1 − 50) = 50); this value is precisely 50 times the value 
of a centimeter, as stated by the measure phrase (Sassoon 2010). 
Absolute zeros are a relatively recent invention, and conceptually, 
difference scales are still more prominent than additive ratio-scales (Smith et 
al 2005). For instance, according to judgments of 7-year old children, 
dividing an object repeatedly will eventually make it disappear, or reduce its 
weight to zero. Why? Because children use difference-scales and subtraction 
instead of ratio-scales with division. Correct reasoning typically occurs at age 
8-12 or latter, and latter for weight than for matter and space. 
These findings are consistent with the linguistic data – most adjectives 
do not license measure phrases and rarely license ratio phrases (and they do 
so mainly with round numbers). Data from Esperanto suggest that there is no 
statistically significant difference between negative and positive adjectives in 
the frequency of ratio modifiers (as well as nominalizations; van 
Cranenburgh et al 2010), except for distance predicates like tall. This 
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suggests that all negative adjectives are non-additive, but so are also many 
positive adjectives. In addition, adjectives and their comparative and super-
lative forms (which do not require calculation of ratios) are acquired earlier 
than measure phrases (Tall > Taller, tallest > 2m tall; Beck et al 2010). 
Finally, nominalization morphology is consistent with this view. After all, 
height, weight, width and length are all non-generative forms, while most 
other (non-additive) adjectives tend to combine with other, more generative 
morphemes, such as ‘-ness’ and ‘-ity’ (e.g., highness, obesity, etc.) 
To summarize, ‘markedness’ in adjectives does amount not to negative 
antonymy, but to the notion of difference scales, meaning – scales with 
relative zeros, either by virtue of a transformation of an additive base (tall-
short), or due to absence of an additive base in the first place (glad-sad). 
Transformed adjectives do not license measure phrases, but their com-
paratives do; they license twice only if context biases towards a non-
dominant non-transformed interpretation; we are uncertain about their zero 
point, and – they are norm-related in equatives and ‘how’ questions. This last 
feature must be related to the previous features. An account based on this 
insight is presented in the next section. 
3.2	   Be	  Positive!	  
Norm related implications arise if the adjective’s function is transformed. 
Why? One possibility is that denotation members always have to have 
positive degrees (∀w∈Wc, s(P,w) ≥ 0), but non-members may have negative 
degrees. In each context, entities’ value fails to exceed 0 iff they fail to have a 
contextually noticeable or significant amount of the measured property. Thus, 
adjectives cannot be used to rank these entities: 
(20) Be positive! Use adjectives P to rank entities whose value in P exceeds 
zero. 
Formally, then, x is P is felicitous in c iff ∀w∈Wc, f(P,w)(x) > 0. This idea 
has been out there for a pretty long time; as Winter (2005) writes: “a possible 
explanation, discussed by Seuren and Kennedy, is that the scales of adjectives 
such as fast and expensive do not exhaust all the physically legitimate values” 
(Winter 2005: 39). Likewise, Heim and Kratzer (1998) and Kennedy (2007) 
have argued for various sorts of adjectival domain restrictions, covering 
among other things, also the role of zeros. But, to the best of my knowledge, 
the relations have never been worked out in detail, between zeros and norm-
relatedness in positive and negative adjectives across languages (see Winter 
2005 and Breakstone 2010 for previous discussions). This section includes a 
preliminary account of these relations and many questions for future research. 
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First, notice that the maxim in (20) can only be violated when, in denying P, 
its application turns P’s negation unusable; i.e., it makes sense to apply not P 
of entities whose P value fails to exceed 0 in c iff all non Ps fail to do so 
(∀w∈Cc, s(P,w) ≤ 0), namely in minimum standard adjectives (cf. the door 
isn’t open vs. #the surface isn’t tall).1 Furthermore, on the basis of (20) we 
can claim that transformation in negative adjectives has a purpose, namely to 
avoid negative values. By virtue of transformation, positive and negative 
antonyms may apply to slightly different domains. Thus, trans-formation is 
bad for ratio- and measure-phrase licensing, but it is good to tell apart 
negative- from positive-antonyms (Rett 2007; Tribushinina 2009). Besides 
these observations, this proposal has the following outcomes. 
First, by (20), tall (whose zero is absolute, i.e. marks complete absence 
of height) can be used to rank entities iff they have some height, but not 
necessarily much height. Hence, tall is neutral. Conversely, almost only fat 
entities are surely ‘somewhat fat’ (have a noticeable overweight and so a 
positive degree). So we can only use fat ‘safely’ to rank denotation members, 
or at least ‘somewhat fat’ entities. 
Second, the strength of an evaluative implication (e.g. fat vs. somewhat 
fat) varies with the location of the zero. For example, soon after switching on 
a slow oven to warm up some cold bread, one can ask how warm is the 
bread? (I am grateful to Ewan Klein for this observation). In this context, 
soon after the oven is switched on, some heat is added to the bread, rendering 
it at least ‘somewhat warm’, i.e. more than ‘zero’ warm. This is all that is 
required for an appropriate use of warm by (20). Similarly, after cutting some 
part of a very long rope to shorten it, we can ask how short is the rope? Even 
if the rope is still clearly not short. Also, how brown only implies somewhat 
brown, even out of the blue (Heim 2009). Stronger constraints, directly 
relating to cutoff points, cannot capture these judgments (Rett 2007, 2008). 
Transformed adjectives may be partial in disguise, if their relative 
standard is taken to equal their relative zero – this is the case in contexts in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Still, with negation, we find evidence for a weaker version, something like “be able to be 
positive!”. For example, The door isn’t open is okay because the door might be open. However, 
#The surface isn’t tall is odd because a surface cannot possibly ever exceed zero height. Then 
again, consider a line X on a screen whose length varies with time and is now zero; reporting the 
ongoing changes X undergoes one may say that right now, X isn’t long (because it  might be 
long.) 
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which, for instance, x is somewhat fat is taken to imply fat. In such cases, we 
only use the adjectives (even in the comparative) in order to rank members. 
Thus, the present account converges with the account of norm-relatedness in 
comparatives of partial (minimum-standard) adjectives (Kennedy and 
McNally 2005); in contexts in which the relative zero and norm of fat are 
equated, fatter is norm related for the same reasons sicker or more open 
usually are – to count as Per one has to have some non-zero degree of P; 
when this suffices for P-hood, ‘x is Per’ entails ‘x is P’. The standard is 
context relative, but entities below it are below 0 so they can’t be ranked. 
Third, languages like Russian provide additional evidence for relative 
zeros (even for adjectives like, e.g., tall). Combinations like ‘entirely short’, 
whereby a maximizer modifies a relative adjective, are just fine in Russian. 
Yet they do not refer to tall‘s absolute zero, but to some context dependent 
minimum height (Tribushinina 2009, 2010), namely tall’s relative zero. 
Again, this zero is clearly not the standard of tall and short. Similar evidence 
is provided by certain English negative, relative- or partial-adjectives, as in 
the felicitous and frequent combinations completely different and entirely 
sick.2 We find similar Hebrew data (e.g., ‘legamrey kar’ ‘entirely cold’ is 
perfectly grammatical). Such maximizers occur not only with maximum-
scale adjectives (clean; closed; full; empty), but also with relative adjectives, 
and they refer to the (possibly local) zero of those adjectives’ antonyms. 
Fourth, (20) is a restriction on the use of adjectives P, but not of other 
lexical items, including ones decomposed of P, like unP or Per. In fact, 
although the interpretation of the latter is mediated by P’s degree function, 
they can be used without implying P-hood. Thus, (20) captures the role of 
morphology, including the fact that, for instance, unhappy doesn’t imply 
happy, and shorter doesn’t imply being short. Conversely, less short, as short 
and how short are correctly predicted to imply short. So (20) captures the role 
of comparative morphology in Russian, namely the fact that morphologically 
marked comparatives are neutral and they license ratio- and measure-phrases. 
Also, for Bierwisch (1989), Krasikova (2009) and Kennedy (2001), more P 
differs from Per in being norm-related, as (200 predicts.3,4  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Syrett (2007) shows that maximizers are a cue for the acquisition of standard type – invented 
labels are regarded as total (maximum-standard) adjectives if modified by maximizers like 
completely. But Syrett cites relative- or partial- (mininum standard) adjectives like different 
among the most frequent adjectives licensing maximizers like entirely. 
3 Why aren’t measure-phrases licensed here, as in #2m/twice more wide than long? After all, the 
transformation values cancel out, so relative zeros cannot be the reason. Probably, this 
construction employs a richer semantics than a mere difference calculation. Independent 
evidence for this is the fact that noun phrases are freely licensed in this constructions across 
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Notice, however, that er-comparatives, being lexical entries in their own 
right, may have either an absolute or a relative zero. If Per has a relative zero, 
then only entity pairs whose values in P differ to a contextually noticeable or 
significant extent, count as somewhat Per. This explains why sometimes Per 
implies (somewhat) P; e.g ??this feather is heavier than that one is odd, 
because differences in weight between feathers (unlike, say, bags) are too 
fine grained for heavier to capture, rendering heavier semi norm-related. The 
sentence improves if, say, a wet feather is compared to a dry one, since their 
weights differ more notably (Ewan Klein, p.c.) On a similar vein, we can say 
that The winter in Antarctica is warmer this year, either if it feels noticeably 
warmer, or if we report about fine-grained scientific measures that render the 
two winters discernable. 
Fifth, it weighs conveys It weighs a lot, rather than It weighs something 
(Bierwisch 1989) perhaps due to the triviality of the latter, which, by (20), 
holds true of all weigh’s domain. A question for the future is whether the 
meaning of adjectival positive forms (e.g. x is tall) can also derive from 
triviality (Fox and Hackl 2006; Heim 2009; Rett 2007). 
Finally, this account is more explanatory than an account in terms of a 
mere competition between marked and unmarked forms, in that it generates 
predictions about cases we previously could not understand. In particular, it 
explains why ratio phrases are not norm-related (Rett 2007), e.g., a tall person 
can be twice as short as a house. Why? The licensing of ratio phrases 
requires an accommodation of a ratio-scale – an absolute zero must be 
accommodated, which means that the norm relatedness is eliminated. 
Also, this account has implications even for mere exceptions to the 
cross linguistic generalization. Consider, for example, the pair late-early. It is 
obviously norm related – both How late/ early is the train? and This train is 
as late/ early as that one imply that The train is late/ early; still, it also 
licenses measure phrases – both  2 minutes late and two minutes early are 
felicitous across many languages. These adjectives are also particularly 
amenable to deviation interpretations (Kennedy 2001). Other examples of 
deviation readings include, for instance, 2 month short of her birthday, 2 
minutes short of time (Schwarzschild 2005), and Dan is (2cms) taller than 
Mary is short which is a direct comparison of deviations (Kennedy 2001). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
languages, as in more a car than a truck and more a bird than a horse (versus #more bird or 
#birder). 
4 This proposal predicts a difference in implications between little fat, slightly fat or barely fat 
and rather skinney, and between slightly ful and rather empty. Empirical research should 
ultimately determine whether this prediction is on the right track. 
544   Sassoon 
What explains the norm related implications? Importantly, time is a 
difference measurement. It has an unspecified or contextually chosen zero 
(recall that, for instance, year 1 is different in the Christian and Jewish 
calendars). However, early and late often select contextually determined 
zeros in an anaphoric or indexical way. For example, the zero may be defined 
by the time school’s bell rings (the time of an event ebell). In such contexts, 
Tranlate/early = fTime(ebell). These adjectives, then, are linked with a measure of 
deviation from the bell time, f(late,w) = λe. fTime(e,w) − fTime(ebell,w) and 
f(early,w) = λe. fTime(ebell,w) − ftime(e,w) (where ‘e’ is a variable over events). 
These functions compare ‘transformed’ time values of two given entities; the 
transformation-values cancel out, and so measure phrases are licensed. 
Too is a marker of deviation readings, e.g. in You arrived late, but not 
too late, the first occurrence of late has a relative zero and norm, while the 
second is interpreted relative to, e.g., the bell-ringing time, which functions as 
both the zero and the standard. In Dutch, the use of te (‘too’) is compulsory in 
these contexts, as in Jullie moeten hier zijn voor de bel; Jullie zien *(te) laat 
(‘You must arrive before the bell rings; you arrived *(too) late’); te is 
obligatory for the meaning “after the bell” (cf. Syrett’s 2007 treatment of too 
as a marker of minimum standard adjectives).  
To conclude, directly connecting between non-licensing of measure 
phrases and norm-relatedness is fruitful. Empirical research is required to 
determine the precise implications from degree constructions – facts 
pertaining to sub-deletion comparatives with more; the connection between 
granularity and norm-relatedness, etc. Finally, maybe derivations with 
equatives and degree-questions (but crucially not er comparatives) involve a 
measure phrase variable M, e.g., a projection of the form x is M Adj. (cf. 
Doetjes 2009; Fox and Hackl 2006). Since negative adjectives like short do 
not license fine-grained neutral measure phrases like two meters, M can only 
be saturated by an evaluative entry like very, fairly and for his age. Crucially, 
even negative modifiers (‘answers’) such as little short or not short allow for, 
and perhaps even defeasibly suggest, not tall (for empirical findings see 
Paradis and Willners 2006 and references therein). This idea, too, captures 
norm relatedness in positive adjectives that fail to license measure phrases 
(such as fat, warm and rich, in English). 
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Abstract. This paper argues that the similarities long observed between 
English Comparative Correlative sentences (CCs) such as the bigger they are, 
the harder they fall and English conditionals are the result of the conservativity 
of generalized quantification and not the identity of the quantifiers involved in 
conditionals and CCs. I review the similarities, noted by Thiersch (1982), Fill-
more (1987) and Beck (1997), inter alia, before presenting new data showing 
differences in both the kind of quantification (universal/generic v. proportional) 
and the defeasibility of quantification on the basis of what kinds of Adverbs of 
Quantification are found with each and how they affect interpretation. I 
conclude that CCs are not merely a subclass of conditionals as previously 
theorized (cf. Beck 1997, Lin 2007 and Brasoveanu 2008), positing an alter-
native theory in which a proportional quantificational force is part of the lexical 
meaning of the first the in the CC. 
 
1	   Introduction	  
The following are examples of the English Comparative Correlative. Exam-
ples (1d)-(1g) are from Google, and (1a) is a common idiom.  
(1) a. The bigger they come, the harder they fall.  
 b. The faster we drive, the sooner we'll get there.  
 c. The more a dog eats, the more it drinks. 
 d. The longer they remain, the greater the chances of disaster.  
 e. The larger the barrel, the bigger the curl.  
 f.  The further the horizon, the greater the perceived scenic beauty.  
 g. The steeper the diagonal line, the tighter the folds will be in the 
 swag.  
Each CC under consideration here has two primary phrases separated by a 
comma, each beginning with the. These can be clearly clausal, as in, e.g. 
(1a)-(1d), or appear without verbs, as in (1e). In this paper, I will concentrate 
on the clearly clausal examples. I'll call the the that begins the first clause the1 
and the the that begins the second clause the2.  
In Reich, Ingo et al. (eds.), Proceedings of Sinn & Bedeutung 15,  
pp. 547–563. Universaar – Saarland University Press: Saarbrücken, Germany, 2011. 	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The interpretation of the CC in (2) is paraphrased by Beck (1997) in the 
following way (in (3)). Though Beck is primarily analyzing the German CC, 
she is clear in her intention for its analysis to apply equally to English. I use 
her work as the exemplar analysis throughout this paper since it is the first 
detailed compositional analysis of the semantics of the CC in any language. 
(2) The faster we drive, the sooner we'll get there. 
(3) ∀w1∀w2 [[We drive faster in (w1) than (w2)] → [We get there sooner in 
 (w1) than (w2)]]  
In prose, (3) expresses that the meaning of the CC correlates increases of one 
kind with increases of another kind across situations/worlds/individuals; here, 
increases in speed and earlier arrival times are correlated. Though this par-
ticular example's correlation is governed by a natural law relating speed and 
time, in general, neither causation nor any particular kind of functional re-
lationship are required. In other words, CCs in English can be used to express 
seemingly random correlations such as (4) and a variety of non-linear rela-
tions as in (5), which is exponential. In addition, a sentence like (6) is judged 
to be true in a model in which a one-degree temperature difference correlates 
with a three-goal increase, while a five-degree temperature difference cor-
relates with a single-goal increase. Thus, linearity (among other proper-ties) 
should not be included as part of the semantic representation of the CC. For 
more on this and related issues, see Beck (1997). 
(4) The more prolific the semanticist, the taller her husband. 
(5) The greater a number, the greater its square. 
(6) The warmer it was, the more goals the team scored. 
Given a suitable sentence-level interpretation for the CC, the question is 
naturally how to compose it. All past work on the semantics of CCs, 
including Beck (1997), Hsaio (2003), Lin (2007) and Brasoveanu (2008) treat 
the English CC as a kind of conditional.1 This paper argues that CCs are not a 
subclass of conditionals but rather that both CCs and conditionals are sub-
classes of the group of expressions that involve a generalized quantifier. In 
section 2, I review the compelling similarities between conditionals and CCs. 
In section 3, I focus on the differences, including new differences based on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Brasoveanu does argue that not all CCs are conditional, but those that he excludes are Roma-
nian equative-type CCs that mean something like ‘the difference in height between mom and dad 
is the same as the difference in height between me and my brother’, so the kind of CCs at issue 
here are still considered conditionals. 
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proportional interpretations (in 3.1) and adverbs of quantification (in 3.2). In 
section 4, I discuss the repercussions of these new differences for the compo-
sitional analysis of CCs. 
2	   Similarities	  between	  CCs	  and	  Conditionals	  
Thiersch (1982) observed the first similarities between CCs and conditionals, 
which were then taken up and added to by Fillmore (1987) and McCawley 
(1988) who were the first to hypothesize that CCs were a kind of conditional. 
What follows are some of the similarities between CCs and conditionals. 
First, both license donkey anaphora. 
(7) If a farmer owns a donkey, he loves it. 
(8) The more often a farmer milks a cow, the more he appreciates it. 
Second, neither allow will as a future tense in the first clause. 
(9) If a farmer (#will milk) milks a cow, he will make butter. 
(10) The more often a farmer (#will milk) milks a cow, the more butter he 
 can (will be able to) make. 
Third, both allow backward pronominalization when the pronoun is in the 
antecedent but not the consequent. 
(11) a. If hei has to wait a long time, Johni gets angry.  
 b. #Hei gets angry if Johni has to wait a long time. 
(12) a. The longer hei has to wait, the angrier Johni gets.  
 b. #Hei gets angrier, the longer Johni has to wait. 
Fourth, in both, tag questions can be formed only on the basis of the second 
(matrix) clause:2 
(13) a. If Max has to wait, Lucy gets angry, doesn’t she?  
 b. *If Max has to wait, Lucy gets angry, doesn’t he?  
(14) a. The longer Max waits, the angrier Lucy gets, doesn’t she?  
 b. *The longer Max waits, the angrier Lucy gets, doesn’t he?  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Whether the CC is an instance of a subordinate-matrix structure is a contentious issue in the 
literature on the syntax of the CC (cf. Culicover & Jackendoff 1999, Borsley 2004 and den 
Dikken 2005), but here, I will assume that the first clause of the CC is indeed a subordinate 
clause, which is the assumption of the semantics literature. 
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Beck adds additional similarities to the list. In both CCs and conditionals, the 
meaning of the subordinate clause restricts the domain of cases under 
consideration and the meaning of the matrix clause asserts something about 
those cases. Also in both, when quantification is over worlds, worlds where 
something miraculous or unexpected happens are ignored (so when you say If 
he went to the store, he forgot his money, you're excluding worlds in which 
he gets run over by a car on his way to the market). She says that 
counterfactual statements are possible in both, as in (15) and (16), though 
(16) sounds odd to me. 
(15) If he had run faster, he would be more tired now. 
(16) The faster he had run, the more tired he would be now. 
Finally, Beck discusses adverbs of quantification (AQs). There is a long 
history of work on conditionals (see von Fintel 1994 and Bhatt & Pancheva 
2006 for overviews), and one of its most influential observations is the extent 
to which conditional antecedents serve as domain restrictors of AQs such as 
always, sometimes, usually, seldom, normally, etc. Like conditionals, AQs 
show a wide range of quantification, leading Lewis (1975) to hypothesize that 
what is being quantified over with AQs (and conditionals and therefore, 
potentially, CCs) is a case. A case is any admissible value assignment for all 
the variables that occur free in an open sentence modified by an AQ 
(according to Heim). This importantly includes all participant, time, and 
world variables. So basically, the AQ is a kind of operator in a tripartite 
structure of the form [Operator] [Restrictor] [Nuclear Scope] (Heim 1982, 
Kamp 1981). In the case of AQs (and also modals), the restrictor is typically 
given by an if-clause, but it can be implicit, meaning that its value is 
determined almost entirely by context, as in examples like Usually, I go to 
the store where we're already talking about what I do after school, etc. 
Similarly, it is possible to have an if-clause restrictor without an explicit AQ 
or modal, as in (17a) and all of the examples of conditionals we have seen up 
to this point. Beck argues that CCs once again parallel conditionals in 
showing the same behavior, as in (18). This observation by Beck is crucial to 
her analysis, as we will soon see. 
(17) a. If I buy fruit, I eat it before it goes bad. 
         b. Usually, if I buy fruit, I eat it before it goes bad. 
         c. If I can buy fruit, I eat it before it goes bad. 
(18) a. The more fruit I eat, the less often I get sick. 
 b. Usually, the more fruit I eat, the less often I get sick. 
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 c. The more fruit I can eat, the less chocolate I crave. 
In both cases shown here, Beck argues that the (a) variant without an explicit 
AQ is understood as having universal (or possibly generic) scope. Beginning 
with Kratzer (1986), an implicit epistemic modal or universal/generic AQ has 
been posited as existing in sentences with a bare conditional antecedent. 
Similarly, then, it could be extended to the analysis of the CC, in which case 
the universal quantification in the CC would not be a part of the lexical 
meaning of the. This is the approach Beck takes. Looking at the form in (3) 
once again, her analysis ingeniously composes the meanings of the, the 
comparative morpheme, the adverb fast, and we drive to yield 'we drive faster 
in (w1) than in (w2)'. The same process is used to compose the meaning of the 
second clause. Thus, the only thing remaining to derive the form in (3) is the 
default universal/generic AQ that unselectively binds variables across these 
two expressions and provides the quantificational force and material 
conditional. This analysis makes a strong prediction that conditionals and 
CCs will pattern alike with respect to quantificational force and its defea-
sibility, which, as we will see in sections 3.1 and 3.2, is not borne out. 
3	  	   Differences	  between	  CCs	  and	  Conditionals	  
Despite the similarities listed in the last section, there are a number of ways 
in which the conditional and CC are known to differ. Beck notes the 
following. First, conditionals do not necessarily contain a comparative mor-
pheme (or involve a comparative meaning), while CCs do.  
(19) If a dog runs, it gets thirsty. 
(20) *The a dog runs, the it gets thirsty. 
Second, when conditionals do contain comparatives, than phrases are present, 
unlike the CC.  
(21) If Fido runs faster than Spot, Fido will win the race. 
(22) *The faster Fido runs than Spot, the more likely he is to win the race.3 
Third, CCs require quantification over at least two variables, and con-
ditionals, only one. To see this, compare the form in (3), with quantification 
over two worlds, to the interpretation of a hypothetical conditional, which 
would quantify over a single world. This last difference might be taken as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Though I have marked this as ungrammatical in keeping with Beck's judgment, see Smith 
(2010) for a complete discussion of the felicity of than-phrases in English CCs. 
552   Smith 
challenge to the sketch of Beck's analysis presented earlier, but Beck 
proposes that because the default quantifier for conditionals and CCs is 
unselective, it is additionally polyadic, binding as many variables as nec-
essary (and thus is a single quantifier across the constructions). The other two 
differences are both cases of restrictions present in the CC but not the 
conditional, which form her basis for arguing that the CC is a restricted 
subclass of conditionals.  
Another difference between the conditional and CC that does not 
weaken Beck's claim that CCs are a subclass of conditionals but is often 
overlooked is the following. The conditional paraphrase for the CC in (24) 
(which appears in (23)) is not equivalent in meaning to that CC.  
(23) If you run faster, then you're more likely to win. 
(24) The faster you run, the more likely you are to win. 
Only (23) can be interpreted as a statement about one particular faster speed 
rather than as a generalization about any possible faster speed. We can easily 
construct situations in which (24) would be false but (23) true, showing a lack 
of synonymy between the two sentences. Suppose we are discussing 
marathons. In running a marathon, you actually don't want to run too fast or 
you'll run out of steam too early and not finish the race, so (24) is false 
because after some cutoff speed, you jeopardize finishing, let alone winning. 
But it could be that you are talking to a friend before the race and you know 
her normal marathon pace and also that she is capable of running a little 
faster without dropping out of the race. In this case, you can utter (23) and 
have it mean that if she runs one half of a mile faster per hour, she is more 
likely to win the marathon, without committing yourself to any statements 
about any other faster speeds or the truth of this statement on any other day or 
for any other race. In other words, if you uttered (24), you would be 
committing to the idea that running the fastest speed possible is the best way 
to win, in this race or any other, whereas uttering (23) merely commits you to 
the idea that there is some faster speed that would lead to better results but 
not that it is the fastest she is capable of running. This is likely related to the 
above-noted difference between single- and double-variable quantification 
requirements. 
The next two subsections discuss differences that do get in the way of 
the picture presented thus far. In 3.1, I argue that quantification in the CC is 
proportional rather than universal/generic, and in 3.2, I show that the 
distribution of AQs is different with CCs v. conditionals, arguing that the 
proportional quantificational force should not merely be a default. 
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3.1	   Proportional	  Interpretations	  
There is a well-known issue regarding what kinds of things to count (farm-
ers? farmer-donkey pairs? etc.) in certain kinds of sentences, including condi-
tionals.  
(25) If a farmer owns a donkey, he is rich. 
(26) If a farmer owns a donkey, he is usually rich. 
In example (25), under a universal interpretation, it doesn't matter what you 
count because all farmers, pairs, etc. must verify the statement.4 In (26), on 
the other hand, the presence of the proportional quantifier usually creates a 
problem in models like the following, from Heim 1990. 
Model for (26): There are 100 farmers, 99 of whom each own one donkey 
and are poor; the remaining one owns 200 donkeys and is rich. 
If we count by donkey-farmer pairs, there are more rich pairs than poor pairs, 
which should make the sentence true. If we count by farmers alone, it would 
be false, which is how native speakers judge this sentence (and thus, theories 
of conditionals are modified to reflect this fact). In this model, then, both (25) 
and (26) are judged to be false. A similar kind of test can be used here for the 
purpose of discerning whether there is a difference in quantificational force 
between the default universal/generic force, as in (25) and an overt pro-
portional force, as in (26). If they are truth-conditionally different, we would 
expect that in a model where most but not all of the farmers, etc., fit the 
paradigm, (26) would be true while (25) would be false. Toward this end, I 
surveyed native speakers about examples like the following: 
(27) If a dog knows a command, it is intelligent.  
(28) If a dog knows a command, it is usually intelligent. 
Model for (27) and (28): There are 200 dogs that know commands. 167 know 
one command and are intelligent. 33 know two commands and are dumb. 
As predicted, across a range of sentences of this type, speakers say that 
examples like (27) are false or ‘weird’ in models like these, while examples 
like (28) are judged to be true.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Kadmon 1990 disagrees, stating that donkey sentences without overt proportional quantifiers 
can still give rise to asymmetric (proportional) readings of the kind of interest here, but a survey 
of native speakers showed a judgment difference between examples like (25)/(27) and examples 
like (26)/(28) for every single participant. 
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Now that we have a test for the difference between universal/generic and 
proportional quantification, the question is which the CC patterns like. If the 
CC is a subclass of conditional, it should pattern with the universal/ generic 
conditionals in (25) and (27) in the default case where no overt proportional 
AQ is present with the CC. The same native speakers, however, rated CCs 
like (29) and (30) as they would examples like (26) or (28) where an overt 
proportional AQ was present. Speakers judge (29) to be false in its model and 
(30) to be true in its model (for the full list of examples and models tested, 
see Smith 2010). 
(29) The more a man loves a woman, the more flowers he brings her. 
Model for (29): We know five men. One has nine girlfriends, and his love for 
each depends upon her behavior. The nicer she is, the more he loves her, and 
the more flowers he brings her each week. The other four men each have one 
girlfriend, and even though their love for their girlfriends grows over time, 
they only bought them flowers during the first couple months of their 
relationship and now, years later, they don't buy flowers no matter what. 
(30) The more a man likes a tie, the more money he paid for it. 
Model for (30): There are 400 men who like at least one tie. 250 of the men 
have three ties each: one they like so-so and paid $10 for, one they like better 
and paid $20, and one that is their favorite and paid $30 for. The remaining 
150 men own 2 dozen ties each and got some of the nicest ones on sale for 
less than some of the ones they like only so-so.  
From this evidence, we see that CCs without an overt proportional 
quantifier pattern like conditionals with one. Quantificational force in the CC 
is therefore more restricted than in the conditional and is proportional. This is 
unexpected if CCs are a kind of conditional, though Beck and others could 
argue that the subclass of conditionals that CCs are a part of have a pro-
portional rather than generic or universal default. In the next section, I show 
that even that revision would be untenable.  
3.2	  	   Adverbs	  of	  Quantification	  
As mentioned above, an overt AQ affects the quantificational force of a 
conditional. This is one of the reasons that Lewis (1975) and Kratzer (1986) 
originally proposed that if not be a generalized determiner itself, because the 
quantificational force of a conditional can vary. From the outset, however, 
not all kinds of forces can occur in the interpretation of the CC. We have 
already seen that conditionals can be statements about a particular instance, 
while CCs have to be generalizations about more than two differences (or 
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pairs for which there is a difference) of one kind correlated with more than 
two differences (or pairs for which there is a difference) of another kind. In 
other words, a form like that in (31) with a simple existential force simply 
does not model native speaker intuitions that correspond to any CC regardless 
of modification. (31) is not a possible interpretation of (32) with or without 
the AQ sometimes, for example, because (31) would be true in a situation 
where, of all the trips taken, there was only one where faster driving resulted 
in an earlier arrival, in which case, native speakers find it infelicitous to use a 
CC. 
(31) ∃w1 ∃w2 [[We drove faster in (w1) than (w2)] → [We got there sooner in 
 (w1) than (w2)]] 
(32) Sometimes, the faster we drove, the sooner we got there. 
Despite the fact that a true existential is not possible, the fact remains that we 
do find CCs modified by AQs like sometimes, as in (32). Sometimes is 
certainly closer to an existential than a universal, though the bare minimum it 
requires seems to differ between the conditional and the CC. This is puzzling; 
consider, for example, that when it comes to statistical significance, a 
correlation is either significant or it is not; it cannot be somewhat significant 
in technical terms (only almost significant). One might hypothesize, then, that 
CCs only occur with universal or proportional AQs requiring at least a 
majority of points to be correlated and that sometimes and other existential-
type AQs might not be attested (the only examples Beck gives of AQ 
modification of CCs are with majority-force quantifiers). 
To this end, I conducted a corpus search (of Google, given the large size 
needed to see significant counts of CCs). I searched for AQs in initial 
position only since they are unambiguously construed as wide-scope 
modifiers in that position (whereas, in situ, there is the potential for am-
biguity and further work is required). For each AQ X, I used the search term 
“X the more the” for the CC and “X if the” for the conditional. I did the same 
search with the indefinite article and found similar results, so I am only re-
porting the results with the definite here. Note that this means that the results 
also don't cover CCs with bare plurals, prepositional phrases, etc. after the 
more, but I used the definite article because searching for “the more” by 
itself does not uniquely find CCs. Finally, I searched through dozens of pages 
worth of individual entries for each AQ looking for responses that were not 
the target, then ran the search again with a limitation that would rid the search 
of those unwanted responses. For example, the searches for always the more 
the and always if the turned up many responses with not always, which was 
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not the quantificational force of interest, so the searches were run again, 
excluding not always. The results of the March 2010 search are shown in two 
tables (for space purposes) below: 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Table 1: Results of the March 2010 search 
In the first set, we see the universal-type AQs as well as never, which, with 
the CC, is like sentential negation due to the fact that in-situ negation is 
unambiguously narrow scope (cf. Beck 1997). Also, the first column gives 
the counts for the unmodified CC and conditional (i.e. the more the and if the 
by themselves) to give a sense of the general difference in their frequency. In 
the second set, we see the existential-type AQs. 
There are two particularly important differences between the 
distributions of AQs with conditionals v. CCs. The first is that usually, often, 
and sometimes occur much more often with CCs than conditionals (especially 
when adjusted for their relative overall frequency). The second is that 
occasionally, seldom, and rarely occur only with conditionals and not CCs 
(the few results indicated with occasionally and rarely were not instances of 
the target; they were times when the AQ occurred at the end of one sentence 
and the next sentence was a CC). This is not consistent with a theory in which 
CCs are treated as conditionals. Because Google is notorious for fluctuating, I 
replicated these results at regular intervals. The following set of tables from 
six months after the original search show that, while there is certainly some 
variance, the general pattern remains intact, and both of the major differences 
are replicated. 
 
 
 Unmodified Always Usually Often Never 
CC  111,000,000 38,100 5,290,000 7,070,000 5,950 
Cond.  783,000,000 2,090,000 3,020,000 2,770,000 540,000 
 Sometimes Occasionally Seldom Rarely 
CC  6,770,000 9 0 4 
Cond.  5,090,000 730,000 2,230,000 6,390,000 
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       Table 2: Results of the September 2010 search 
Again, none of the results for the CC with occasionally, seldom, and rarely 
were actually CCs modified by these AQs, but most of the results with the 
conditional were, as in (33)-(35). 
(33) Rarely, if the cyst is near the main bile ducts, it can cause obstruction 
 and jaundice.  
(34) Occasionally, if the Committee is split in its opinion, they may send the 
 vote to the floor with no recommendation.  
(35) Seldom, if the subsidence has not been repaired, it can be solved by re-
 implantation or dorsal pedicle screw fusion of that lumbar segment.  
The fact that all of the AQs that can occur with the conditional and not the 
CC are existential-type AQs adds strength to my contention that there is a 
proportional quantificational force (which is inconsistent with an existential) 
inherent to the CC but not the conditional. Similarly, the fact that usually and 
often occur with the CC much more often than with the conditional could be 
further evidence of the proportional force, but this will be discussed more 
below. The puzzling case is sometimes and why it does not pattern with other 
AQs like occasionally. In the March 2010 search, sometimes appears more 
often with CCs than conditionals, while in the September 2010 search, it 
appears with CCs and conditionals in more equal measure considering their 
overall difference in frequency, but either way, they clearly occur with CCs. 
The following are examples of conditionals and CCs with the highest-
frequency AQs: usually, often, and sometimes, which will help us shed light 
on this puzzle.  
 Unmodified Always Usually Often Never 
CC   98,200,000 94,400 351,000 524,000 5,400 
Cond.  381,000,000 1,480,000 3,130,000 2,390,000 517,000 
 Sometimes Occasionally Seldom Rarely 
CC  1,050,000 17 5 10 
Cond.  5,530,000 566,000 1,350,000 5,940,000 
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(36) The stiffer the skiboard, the more weight and lean you need to put into 
 carving. Of course, side-cut factors in here too. Often, the more the 
 side cut, like in skiboards with a deep parabolic cut, the easier it is to 
 carve turns.  
(37) Usually, the more the sole of the foot that makes contact (leaves a 
 footprint), the flatter the foot. In more extreme cases, known as a kinked 
 flatfoot, the entire inner edge of the footprint may actually bulge 
 outward, where in a normal to high arch this part of the sole of the foot 
 does not make contact with the ground at all.  
(38) With layering, sometimes the more the better. When you layer a lot of 
 black, you're like a walking Louise Nevelson sculpture, and that's pretty 
 attractive. 
(39) Often, if the cruise is canceled because of weather, the cruise line uses 
 verbiage that allows the line to issue credits as it sees fit. 
(40) Usually if the product was a freebie and they didn't say anything 
 negative about it, I don't trust the review. 
(41) Sometimes if the wealthy suffer a serious loss, they are probably not 
 well-trained or socialized to cope well with that since they've been 
 successful. 
In the cases of usually and often, they seem to be used in both the conditional 
and CC merely to implicate that there are exceptions to the generalization 
they modify. This is consistent with the idea that all of these AQs form a 
Horn scale (Horn 1972) and that a proportional AQ would be used to 
implicate that no stronger statement (with a universal AQ like always) would 
be possible. Similarly, sometimes should implicate only sometimes, i.e. the 
majority of the time, this is not the case. However, this is where we see a 
difference. Though (38) is but one example, in all of the dozens of examples I 
looked at, sometimes with a CC implicates something stronger. In the case of 
(38), it implicates not merely that it is usually not the case that more layering 
is better (in which case it could be true that no particular relationship holds 
for the majority of data points); it implicates instead that usually the reverse 
is true, i.e. more layering is usually worse, but in the case of layering all 
black, more can be better. In fact, many of the examples on Google are cases 
where there are two CCs one after another. The first states the generalization, 
and the second states a generalization to be found among the outliers. Fur-
thermore, within the minority of data points that do not fit the larger 
generalization, the majority of those must fit the counter-generalization in the 
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case where sometimes is used. In other words, when looking at the full set of 
situations in which there is a difference in amount of layering, it is true that 
only some of them are cases in which more layers are correlated with a better 
result, but it is also true of the majority of the outliers to the otherwise robust 
correlation between more layers and a worse result. 
I conclude that the proportional quantificational force in the CC is not as 
easily overridden as that in the conditional. In the conditional, sometimes 
overrides the universal or generic force, as do a wide range of existential-type 
AQs. As we have seen, the CC does not occur with any existential AQs other 
than sometimes, and even then, sometimes is used to indicate a majority cor-
relation among the data points that fall outside the stronger correlation in the 
other direction. I take this as evidence that the proportional force in the CC is 
part of the lexical meaning of the1 rather than a default, as proposed for the 
conditional. 
Though the differences between conditionals and CCs presented in this 
section are not an exhaustive list (e.g. the CC can clearly at least appear to be 
non-clausal, while the conditional cannot), these are the major differences 
that seem relevant for the broad semantics of the CC that is at issue here. 
4	   A	  New	  Theory	  
Given the evidence from the previous section, I define a quantificational 
operator CORREL that has a meaning similar to that of MOST/USUALLY to 
account for the fact that it must be a proportional quantifier. As it is defined 
in (42), its form is identical to that given for most, but that is just because, as 
for most, this is a rough approximation. An individual's idea of what it takes 
to establish a correlation may be more strict depending upon the person. It 
could also differ reliably from what someone would judge to be true for most, 
which is why I gave CORREL its own title.5  
(42) CORREL(A)(B) = |A∩B| ⊃ |A-B| 
If CORREL were a phonologically null default quantifier with the CC, we 
would expect the CC and the conditional to have the same pattern as AQs, 
which they do not. I assume that if the quantificational force is not a default, 
it must be part of a lexical item. Thus, in the revised theory, it is part of the 
meaning of the1, which heads the subordinate clause. In all other ways, the 
semantics of the1 can be consistent with Beck's or others' analyses. If what is 
built as the meaning of the subordinate clause on those analyses is as in (44) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Additionally, sets A and B here are sets of pairs, which is a further difference from the unary 
sets typically assumed to be the arguments of operators such as MOST. 
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for the CC in (43), the revised theory would instead yield (45). Then, in both 
the old and new theories, the meaning of the matrix clause would be as in 
(46), so whereas Beck and others take the meaning of the two clauses to be 
the same modulo the lexical meanings of the nouns and verbs that populate 
them, the new analysis gives them different meanings. This is actually an 
advantage of the new theory because the1 and the2 do seem to have a different 
status in the CC. When the clauses are reversed and the matrix comes first, its 
the does not appear, as in (47). Because the revised theory keeps the cor-
relational force needed to compute the sentence meaning in the subordinate 
the, we would expect the subordinate the and not the matrix the to remain 
necessary. 
(43) The faster we drive, the sooner we'll get there.  
(44) [[ The faster we drive ]]    =  λw1 λw2 .we drive faster in (w1) than (w2)  
(45) [[ The faster we drive ]]    =  λ?<s,st> .CORREL(λw1 λw2 .we drive faster in 
(w1) than (w2))(?)  
(46) [[ The sooner... ]]    =  λw1 λw2 .we'll get there sooner in (w1) than (w2)  
(47) We'll get there sooner, the faster we drive. 
(48) CORREL(λw1 λw2 .we drive faster in (w1) than (w2))( λw1 λw2 .we'll get 
 there sooner in (w1) than (w2)) 
The revised sentence-level meaning for (43) is (48) (compare to (3)). This 
will be true just in case more than half of the pairs of worlds in which we go 
faster in the first than the second are also pairs of worlds in which we arrive 
sooner in the first world as compared to the other. This resolves the main 
problems raised by the data in sections 3.1 and 3.2 in that the quantificational 
force in the CC is proportional and indefeasible. The two remaining issues 
are how the CC's meaning interacts with the meaning of various AQs and 
how to account for the parallels between conditionals and CCs from section 2 
now that they are given different analyses. 
Though a theory of AQs is beyond the scope of this paper, it seems 
unlikely that all AQs behave similarly when it comes to the CC. If, as I have 
proposed, there is a lexically-specified quantifier that is part of the CC, any 
instance of an overt AQ would seem to be a case of multiple quantification. 
Cinque (1999) and others have studied this in more detail, suggesting that 
when there is more than one, each quantifier quantifies over different things: 
intervals v. subintervals, etc. It seems that this is what is going on in the case 
of sometimes but that it is somehow the ‘chosen’ existential AQ in that none 
Comparative Correlatives   561 
of the others occur with the CC. Since sometimes is used to signal a pattern 
among outliers, the others are simply infelicitous as they are taken to quantify 
over the same worlds, etc., as CORREL, which, if accepted, would create an 
inconsistency in the common ground (the implicature that no more than a few 
data points fit a generalization would clash with the entailment of CORREL). 
The other proportional and universal AQs, on the other hand, can quantify 
over the same worlds, etc., as CORREL without leading to a problem in the 
common ground since the meaning of the modified CC would entail the 
meaning of the unmodified CC. This kind of varied pattern (where some 
combinations are licit and others illicit) is in keeping with the literature on 
multiple quantification, though much more work needs to be done in this area 
to determine the validity of an argument along these lines. 
As for the similarities between the conditional and the CC, it turns out 
that none of these are unique to these two constructions. They are true either 
of other subordinate-matrix constructions or of other constructions involving 
a conservative operator in the sense of Barwise & Cooper (1981), or both.  
(49) Conservativity is the property of being a predicate (OP) on two 
 properties such that OP(A,B) is equivalent to OP(A, A&B). 
The conservative operator in the conditional is the default (or overt) AQ, and 
in the CC, it is CORREL. A generalized quantifier (GQ) analysis has already 
been applied to the adverbial domain by de Swart (1991), setting a precedent 
for this analysis. In fact, treating the first clause of CCs as a GQ explains the 
presence of donkey anaphora if Chierchia (1995) is right that conservativity 
is at the root of their donkey-sentence-hood. Regardless, sentences that are 
not conditional show the same patterns observed above, such as (50)-(51) for 
the lack of future will or Every farmer who owns a donkey loves it for the 
case of donkey anaphora. 
(50) Cats that (*will) mate in the wild (will) have higher fertility rates. 
(51) However often he (*will) greet(s) me, that's how often I will greet him. 
Though Bhatt & Pancheva (2006) also treat relative clauses as in (51) as 
conditionals, their definition for what constitutes one is a structure “involving 
an adverbial clause interpreted as stating the conditions under which the 
proposition expressed by the main clause is true” (641). Since the matrix 
clause in the CC is not propositional (yielding a set of pairs of worlds), Bhatt 
& Pancheva are unwittingly excluding CCs from consideration, as I have 
argued one should. 
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Abstract. This paper investigates the various contexts in which the lexical item
most can be used (e.g. Fred has read most/the most/at most 15 Shakespeare
plays; Fred bought the most expensive book), with the goal of determining to
what extent they can be reduced to a single underlying core semantics. It is
shown that most across its uses can be analyzed as the superlative form of many
or much, an approach that builds on work by Hackl (2009). However, the ade-
quate treatment of most as a proportional quantifier requires also positing a role
for pragmatic strengthening of semantic meaning.
1 Introduction
The English lexical item most occurs in a wide range of contexts that on the
surface are difficult to connect. In (1), most is a proportional quantifier mean-
ing (roughly) more than half (the majority reading). Most in (2) acts as the
superlative of many: the preferred interpretation of (2) is that Fred has read
more Shakespeare plays than has any other member of some contextually de-
termined set of individuals (the relative reading). In (3), most seems merely to
spell out the superlative morpheme. Finally, in (4), most forms part of what is
commonly called a superlative quantifier.
(1) Fred has read most Shakespeare plays majority
(2) Fred has read the most Shakespeare plays relative
(3) Fred bought the most expensive book adjectival superlative
(4) Fred has read at most 15 Shakespeare plays superlative quantifier
Within the semantics literature, the most’s in (1)-(4) have typically been
treated separately, and the possibility that they might have a common semantics
has not received much serious attention (exceptions being Yabushita (1999)
∗ Support for this research was provided by the European Science Foundation (ESF) and the
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) under the auspices of the EUROCORES Programme
LogICCC. For very helpful comments and suggestions, I would like to thank Anton Benz, Uli
Sauerland and Hubert Truckenbrodt, and especially the audiences of Sinn und Bedeutung 15 and
of LENLS7, where this work was also presented.
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and Hackl (2009), who each treat a subset of the data in (1)-(4)). The objective
of the present paper is to investigate the connections between the four most’s
exemplified above. Specifically, the question addressed is to what extent all of
these occurrences of most can be reduced to a single underlying core meaning.
It will be shown that most across all of the uses exemplified here can
be analyzed as the superlative form of many or much, an approach that builds
on a recent proposal by Hackl (2009). However, majority most presents an
additional complication that suggests we must also posit a role for a mechanism
of pragmatic strengthening of semantic meaning.
2 Hackl (2009): Unifying Majority and RelativeMost
Let us begin by considering the relationship between majority and relative
most, as exemplified in (1) and (2). Note first that while these two sentences
are superficially similar, they are truth-conditionally distinct. For example, if
Fred has read 12 of the 37 attested Shakespeare plays, and no other contex-
tually relevant individual has read more than 10, (2) is true but (1) is false.
Conversely, if Fred has read 28 but Barney has read 30, (1) is true but (2) is
false.
Yet despite their divergent truth conditions, Hackl (2009) proposes that
majority and relative most can receive a unified analysis as superlative forms
of many. Hackl relates the two readings to a well-known ambiguity in superla-
tives. For example, (5) can mean either that Fred climbed the highest mountain
in existence (the so-called absolute reading) or that he climbed a higher moun-
tain than any other contextually relevant individual (the relative reading).
(5) Fred climbed the highest mountain
Building on Heim’s (1999) influential analysis of the superlative, Hackl pro-
poses that the distinction between majority and relative most (like the dis-
tinction between absolute and relative readings of superlatives) derives from
a difference in the LF scope of the superlative morpheme -est. On the majority
reading of most (like the absolute reading of superlatives), -est has DP-internal
scope (6a). On the relative reading of most (and of superlatives generally), -est
has wider scope, at the VP level (6b):
(6) a. Majority:
Fred has read [DP [NP -est1 [NP d1-many Shakespeare plays]]]
b. Relative:
Fred [VP -est1 [VP has read [DP the [NP d1-many Shakespeare
plays]]]]
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The scope difference in turn corresponds to a difference in argument struc-
ture. On this approach, the superlative morpheme -est is analyzed as a degree
operator that takes three arguments: an individual x, an expression relating in-
dividuals to degrees D, and a set of individuals C representing a comparison
class.
(7) J-estK(C〈et〉)(D〈d,et〉)(xe) = 1 iff
∀y ∈C [y 6= x→∃d [D(d)(x) ∧ ¬D(d)(y)]]
. . . defined iff x ∈C and C has multiple members
When -est is interpreted DP-externally, as is the case with the relative read-
ing of (the) most, the comparison class argument C is contextually provided,
consisting of a set of individuals of which the individual argument is a mem-
ber. For example, in (2), the comparison class might be as in (8a). This yields
the logical form in (8b), which in simple terms states that Fred has read more
Shakespeare plays than any other member of C:
(8) Fred has read the most Shakespeare plays
a. C = {Fred,Barney,Sue,T heresa, . . .}
b. ∀x ∈ C[x 6= Fred → ∃d[∃y[S.play(y) ∧ read(Fred,y) ∧ |y| ≥ d]
∧¬∃y[S.play(y) ∧ read(x,y)∧|y| ≥ d]]]
On the other hand, when -est is interpreted DP-internally, as is the case with
majority most, the comparison class C is equated with the denotation of the
noun phrase. Thus in the case of (1), the comparison class is the set of plural-
ities of Shakespeare plays, as in (9a), and the resulting logical form is that in
(9b):
(9) Fred has read most Shakespeare plays
a. C = {Hamlet uLear,OthellouLearuMacbeth, . . .}
b. ∃x[S.play(x) ∧ read(Fred,x) ∧ ∀y : S.play(y)[x 6= y→ ∃d[|x| ≥
d ∧ ¬|y| ≥ d]]]
The formula in (9b) states that Fred has read a plurality of Shakespeare
plays that is larger than any other plurality of Shakespeare plays. Initially, this
does not seem to be what we want (Fred does not need to have read the largest
plurality of Shakespeare plays, i.e. all of them, for it to be true that he read
‘most’ Shakespeare plays). But Hackl argues that non-identity of pluralities
(x 6= y) should in this case be interpreted as non-overlap (xu y = /0). On this
interpretation, (9b) means that Fred has read a plurality of Shakespeare plays
that is larger than any non-overlapping plurality of such plays. That is, (9b)
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is equivalent to the simpler (10), which states that the number of Shakespeare
plays that Fred has read is greater than the number he hasn’t read, the appro-
priate interpretation for majority most.
(10) |S. plays Fred has read|> |S. plays Fred hasn’t read|
The analysis of most as a superlative thus offers the possibility of unit-
ing its majority and relative occurrences. Before considering in greater depth
whether this analysis is fully adequate, in the next sections I will examine how
other instances of most can also be brought into the fold.
3 Degree-Based Analysis ofMany/Much
In extending the analysis to additional cases, I begin with a modification of
Hackl’s proposal, based on the degree-based account of adjectives of quantity
developed in Solt (2009, 2010). I take most to be the superlative form of both
many and much (Bresnan 1973). Many and much themselves I analyze not as
quantifiers (as for example in Barwise & Cooper 1981) or adjectival elements
(as assumed by Hackl), but rather as degree operators. This approach is moti-
vated in particular by examples such as (11), in which many cannot be treated
as either a quantifier or a cardinality predicate, but rather describes the differ-
ence between two points on a scale.
(11) Many fewer than 100 students attended the lecture
Specifically, I propose the following lexical entry:1
(12) JmanyK= JmuchK= λdλP〈dα〉.P(d)
Here, many and much take as arguments a degree d and an expression P whose
first argument is a degree argument, and apply P to d. In the quantificational
uses of these terms, the role of linking degrees to individuals is played by a null
measure function MEAS, introduced by a functional head of the same name
(per Schwarzschild 2006); quantificational force arises via existential closure
(see Solt 2009 for a more detailed presentation of this analysis).
With these elements in place, the previously discussed examples of ma-
jority and relative most receive analyses equivalent to those obtained under
Hackl’s proposal. For example, for relative most we have the LF structure in
(13), where many has raised from its DP internal position to take VP scope,
1 Here I do not address what distinguishes many from much. In Solt (2009), I argue the difference
is one of dimension: many is specialized for the dimension of cardinality, while much is used for
other dimensions.
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and -est has subsequently raised out of the QP containing many:
(13) Fred [VP -est2 [VP [QP d2-many1] [VP has read [DP the d1-MEAS Shake-
speare plays]]]]
The lower VP in (13) has the interpretation in (14a), denoting an expression of
type 〈d,et〉, the right type to serve as an argument of many. After application of
d2-many and lambda abstraction over the trace d2 of -est, the resulting interpre-
tation is that in (14b), equivalent (notation aside) from the earlier expression.
Application of -est now yields the same results as in (8).
(14) a. Jhas read the d1-MEAS Shakespeare playsK=
= λd1λx.∃y[S.play(y) ∧ read(x,y) ∧ |y| ≥ d1]
b. Jd2-manyK(Jhas read the d1-MEAS Shakespeare playsK) =
= λd2λx.∃y[S.play(y) ∧ read(x,y) ∧ |y| ≥ d2]
Majority most can be handled similarly.
While the degree-operator treatment of many/much does not offer imme-
diate advantages in the analysis of relative and majority most, it proves crucial
to extending the analysis, as described in the next sections.
4 Adjectival SuperlativeMost
Let us turn to most in its adjectival superlative use, as in (3), repeated below:
(3) Fred bought the most expensive book adjectival superlative
What is puzzling about examples such as this is that most seems only to
spell out the superlative morpheme, without adding any additional semantic
content. For example, (15a) and (15b) are parallel in interpretation, suggesting
that most is semantically equivalent to -est.
(15) a. Fred is the smart est student
b. Fred is the most intelligent student
Note also that adjectival superlatives formed with most exhibit the same abso-
lute/relative ambiguity as those formed with -est; for example, (3) can either
mean that Fred bought the most expensive contextually relevant book (abso-
lute) or that he bought a more expensive book than any other contextually rel-
evant individual (relative).
The analysis presented in the preceding section is able to account for these
patterns. With the entries in (12), many and much are essentially semantically
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empty. This is seen clearly in the derivation in (14), where many acts as an
identity element, taking as argument an expression of type 〈d,et〉 and returning
(after further lambda abstraction) the same expression. Adjectival superlative
most can be analyzed as containing a similarly null much. Specifically, an ex-
ample such as (3), on the relative reading, has the LF structure in (16), where
there are again two stages of raising:
(16) Fred [VP -est2 [VP [QP d2-much1] [VP bought [DP the d1-expensive
book]]]]
The lower VP has the interpretation in (17a). Just as in the previous example,
application of much followed by lambda abstraction yields the same expres-
sion, as in (17b). The superlative morpheme -est may now take this expression
as an argument, yielding the final logical form in (18), the identical result as
would have obtained if -est had composed directly with the lower VP.
(17) a. Jbought the d1-expensive bookK=
= λd1λx.∃y[book(y) ∧ bought(x,y) ∧ COST (y)≥ d1]
b. Jd2-muchK(Jbought the d1-expensive bookK) =
= λd2λx.∃y[book(y) ∧ bought(x,y) ∧ COST (y)≥ d2]
(18) ∀x ∈C[x 6= Fred→
∃d[∃y[book(y) ∧ bought(Fred,y) ∧COST (y)≥ d]
∧¬∃y[book(y) ∧ bought(x,y) ∧COST (y)≥ d]]]
The analysis of most as the superlative form of an essentially null degree op-
erator much thus allows the unified analysis to be extended also to adjectival
superlative most, which receives an interpretation that is fully parallel to that
of superlatives with -est.
5 Superlative QuantifierMost
Modified numerals of the form at most n have been the subject of consider-
able study in the semantics literature (see for example Krifka 1999; Geurts &
Nouwen 2007; Nouwen 2010). But while the term ‘superlative quantifier’ is
now standard, there has to my knowledge been little attempt to connect their
analysis to canonical examples of superlatives.2 There is, in fact, considerable
evidence that such a connection should be made.
First, superlative quantifiers can be paraphrased by explicit superlatives.
2 Though see Krifka (2007) for relevant discussion, and especially Penka (2010) for an analysis
similar to the one developed here.
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For example, the original example (4), repeated below, can be paraphrased as
‘the largest number of Shakespeare plays that Fred could have read is 15’.
(4) Fred has read at most 15 Shakespeare plays superlative quantifier
Beyond this, other superlatives have a very similar use in expressing a maximal
value:
(19) a. Fred is 30 at the oldest
b. Fred will arrive by 11 at the latest
And it is not only in English that the meaning of a superlative quantifier is
expressed with a transparently superlative form. German for example uses the
superlative form not of many, but of high (höchstens, ‘highest’), as in the fol-
lowing, the equivalent of (4):
(20) Fred hat höchstens 15 Stücke von Shakespeare gelesen
Perhaps most significantly, Nouwen (2010) points out that superlative quan-
tifiers are necessarily interpreted relative to a range of values. For example,
(21a) implies that the speaker does not know precisely how many people Fred
has invited. It would be infelicitous if uttered by a speaker who knew the exact
number of invitees (say, 27), but acceptable in the case where the speaker’s
knowledge was uncertain. By contrast, (21b) and (21c) are both felicitous even
in the situation of full speaker knowledge.
(21) a. Fred invited at most 30 people
b. Fred is allowed to invite at most 30 people
c. Classes at our institute have at most 30 students
What distinguishes the acceptable uses is that there is a range of actual or
possible values under consideration, and not just a single value. This constraint
mirrors a restriction on the superlative to situations where the comparison class
has multiple members. For example, (22a) would be infelicitous if Fred is the
only student I have, and (22b) is odd for a similar reason.
(22) a. Fred is the smartest student I have
b. ?You’re the best mother I have
I would like to propose that these restrictions derive from the same source. The
semantics of superlatives inherently involve picking the extreme value out of a
(non-singleton) set of values. In this respect, superlative quantifiers behave just
like any other superlatives. In the approach to the superlative adopted in this
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paper, the non-singleton requirement is captured as a presupposition on -est
that the comparison class it introduces have multiple members (per (7)). This
suggests that superlative quantifier most – like other instances of most – should
likewise be analyzed as based on a superlative morpheme that introduces a
comparison class presupposed to have multiple members.
In Section 2 it was proposed that relative most invokes a comparison class
of individuals, while majority most invokes a comparison class of pluralities.
What sort of comparison class might we have in the case of superlative quan-
tifier most? Here, the most obvious possibility is that it is a comparison class
of numbers. Informally speaking, the comparison class C in (4) might be taken
to be the set of numbers n such that Fred might have read n Shakespeare plays.
The sentence could then be analyzed as conveying that 15 is larger than any
other other member of this class or, to put it slightly differently, that 15 has
more of the property ‘large-ness’ or ‘many-ness’ than does any other member
of C. This implies that the primary descriptive content of the sentence serves
somehow to provide the comparison class argument of -est.
In formalizing this, I assume to start the LF syntax in (23), where the su-
perlative quantifier has raised from its base-generated position to take sentential
scope (here I do not attempt to specify the structure of the QP at many+-est 15,
nor do I discount the possibility that certain of its elements raise further out of
the QP at LF):
(23) [IP [QP at many+-est 15]1 [IP Fred has read d1-MEAS Shakespeare
plays]]
Turning to the interpretation of this structure, the semantics given previ-
ously for the superlative morpheme are those in (7), repeated below:
(7) J-estK(C〈et〉)(D〈d,et〉)(xe) = 1 iff
∀y ∈C [y 6= x→∃d [D(d)(x) ∧ ¬D(d)(y)]]
. . . defined iff x ∈C and C has multiple members
The preceding discussion suggests that in the case of superlative quantifiers, all
of the arguments of -est must range over something in the domain of degrees.
As a first attempt, suppose that all of the type e arguments in (7) are replaced
with arguments of type d:
(24) J-estK(C〈dt〉)(D〈d,dt〉)(xd)
With this modification, the numeral occurring in the quantifier (in the above
example, 15) could, as an expression of type d, saturate the ‘individual’ (i.e. x)
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argument of -est. Putting aside for a moment the question of where the main
degree predicate D comes from, we would then seem to have a good candidate
for the comparison class argument C, namely the set of degrees formed by
lambda abstraction over the trace of the quantifier in the lower IP of (23).3
(25) C = {d : ∃x[S.play(x) ∧ read(Fred,x) ∧ |x| ≥ d]}
But here we have a problem. The comparison class as defined in (25) is
well formed. In all but the trivial case in which Fred has read no Shakespeare
plays, C has multiple members, a consequence of the semantics of the ‘greater
than or equal’ operator ≥. And even if ≥ were replaced by =, the presence of
the existential quantifier ∃ would still guarantee that C is not a singleton set: if
there exists a plurality of 15 Shakespeare plays that Fred has read, there also
exists a plurality of 14 such plays that he has read, a plurality of 13 that he has
read, and so forth. Thus we have no account for the fact that an example like
(4) is infelicitous in the situation where the speaker knows exactly how many
Shakespeare plays Fred has read, and only felicitous when there is some sort
of epistemic uncertainty.
A solution to this problem can be developed by drawing on the analysis
of many and much introduced in Section 3. Recall that on the definition in
(12), many/much has a flexible type, taking as arguments a degree d and an
expression P whose first argument is of type d. Up to this point in the analysis,
we have been working with a version of many/much in which P is of type
〈d,〈et〉〉. But another possible instantiation of this schema is the following,
where many’s second argument has the simpler type 〈dt〉:
(26) Jmany〈d,〈dt,t〉〉K= λdλP〈dt〉.P(d)
Returning to the semantics of -est in (7), if its type e arguments are re-
placed with arguments of type 〈dt〉, as shown below, then many as defined in
(26) has the right type to saturate its degree predicate D argument.
(27) J-estK(C〈dt,t〉)(D〈d,〈dt,t〉〉)(x〈dt〉)
And this seems intuitively right, in that, as noted above, the interpretation of (4)
seems to involve comparing the ‘many-ness’ of 15 with that of other members
of the comparison class. Continuing along these lines, if we let the numeral 15
in this case denote not a single degree but rather the set {d : d ≤ 15}, then it
can satisfy the x argument.4 For the comparison class C we then require a set
3 Here and in what follows I alternate between lambda and set notation.
4 In Solt (2009) I provide further evidence that numerals should sometimes be analyzed as denoting
sets of degrees, or equivalently scalar intervals, rather than degrees.
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of sets of degrees. The only set of degrees that seems to be available is that in
(25), so perhaps C has the form in (28), where I is a variable that ranges over
sets of degrees:
(28) C = {I : I = {d : ∃x[S.play(x) ∧ read(Fred,x) ∧ |x| ≥ d]}}
But this is of course a singleton set, and hence would fail to satisfy the presup-
position that C have multiple members.
However, there is a way to derive a well-formed comparison class. Fol-
lowing Nouwen (2010), I take examples such as (4) to be covertly modal, in that
they incorporate a variable that ranges over (epistemically) accessible worlds.
The comparison class can then be taken to be not (28) but rather the following:
(29) C = {I : ∃w ∈ Acc[I =
{d : ∃x[S.play(x) ∧ read(Fred,x) ∧ |x| ≥ d]w}]}
So long as there are epistemically accessible worlds that differ in the number
of Shakespeare plays that Fred has read in them (that is, so long as there is
uncertainty as to the number he has read), the set in (29) will have multiple
members. For example, if the possible number he has read is between 6 and
8, the members of C are {d : d ≤ 6}, {d : d ≤ 7} and {d : d ≤ 8}. Epistemic
uncertainty is thus required to satisfy the presupposition on -est, from which
follows the implication of (4) that the speaker does not know the exact number.
Formally, (4) receives the following truth conditions, where C is defined
as in (29):
(30) J(4)K = 1 iff J-estK(C)( Jmany〈d,〈dt,t〉〉K)(λd.d ≤ 15) = 1
...iff ∀I ∈C[I 6= λd.d ≤ 15 → ∃d′[d′ ≤ 15 ∧ ¬I(d′)]]
In simpler terms, the final formula in (30) says that the maximum number of
Shakespeare plays that Fred has read in any accessible world is 15. This corre-
sponds correctly to the intuitive interpretation of (4).
To conclude this section, I have argued here that superlative quantifier
most can and should receive an analysis that aligns it to superlatives more
generally. The elements that make this analysis possible are, once again, the
decomposition of most into many/much plus the superlative morpheme, and
the analysis of many/much itself as a type-flexible degree operator which, in
this case, provides one of the arguments of -est. The benefits here are twofold:
not only can we extend the unified account of most to the case of superlative
quantifier most as well, but we also are able to derive constraints on the use of
superlative quantifiers from an independently attested property of superlatives.
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There are, to be certain, questions that remain to be explored. The analysis
developed above is not fully compositional, particularly with respect to the
derivation of the set that serves as the comparison class. And I have not ad-
dressed how the analysis might be extended to cases with overt modals (21b)
and plural noun phrases (21c). I must leave these as topics for future work. But
the results to this point are promising.
6 Majority and RelativeMost Revisited
Having considered how adjectival superlative and superlative quantifier most
can be analyzed, let us return to the relationship between majority and relative
most, discussed in Section 2. There is a lot to be said in favor of the unified,
scope-based account presented here. It first of all relates the identical form of
the two most’s to an identical underlying meaning. Furthermore, these paral-
lels are not limited to English. As discussed by Boškovic´ & Gajewski (2008),
it is common cross-linguistically for these two meanings to be conveyed by the
superlative form of many, further evidence that the English facts are not a mat-
ter of coincidence. From a different perspective, Hackl demonstrates that the
compositional analysis of majority most as the superlative of many provides
an account for the absence of a corresponding ‘minority’ fewest: while most
characterizes a subset of a set that is larger than all non-overlapping subsets,
fewest would characterize a subset that is smaller than all non-overlapping sub-
sets – an impossibility. In short, there are reasons to think that this approach is
fundamentally correct.
But side by side with the points in favor of the unified account, there is
also a significant issue with it, a divergence in the behavior of majority and
relative most that it does not, on the surface, account for. The logical form
derived in (9) renders majority most logically equivalent to more than half. But
in fact, speakers find most infelicitous for proportions very close to 50%. For
example, (1) would be inappropriate in the situation where Fred has read 19
Shakespeare plays, even though this number exceeds 18, the number he did not
read; for felicity, we would require a more substantial difference in the size of
these two sets. That is, the comparison in (9) is tolerant to small differences
in set size. In this, majority most behaves quite differently from relative most,
which allows precise comparisons; for example, if Fred read 19 Shakespeare
plays and John read 18, (2) could be true.
This is a non-trivial characteristic that sets majority most apart from rel-
ative most (and the other most’s discussed here), and it seems to argue against
the unified analysis, in favor of an account that treats majority most as a sep-
arate lexical item. But in light of the other points in favor of unification, it is
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worth exploring whether this aspect of its interpretation can be accounted for
within the framework of the analysis developed so far. In the remainder of this
section, I outline one possible way that this might be accomplished.
In Solt (2011), I argue that majority most’s typical ‘tolerant’ interpreta-
tion arises as a result of pragmatic strengthening to an interpretation relative to
a more weakly ordered degree structure than the cardinal numerals. To see why
this might be the case, note first that the strong tendency for the use of most
to be restricted to situations where there is a significant difference between
set sizes is reminiscent of cases of what Horn (1984) terms R-based implica-
ture, where a more general predicate is pragmatically restricted or narrowed to
stereotypical instances. Such implicatures derive from Horn’s R-Principle ‘say
no more than you must’. Examples of R-based implicatures discussed by Horn
include the strengthening of ability modals (such that ‘John was able to solve
the problem’ R-implicates that he in fact solved it) and the restriction of lexical
causatives such as kill to cases of direct causation.
For such an approach to be extended to most, we must have reason to
think that the prototypical or stereotypical case of a ‘greater than’ relation-
ship between two set sizes is the one where the difference is a significant one.
Here, findings from research on numerical cognition provide relevant insights.
It is now well established that in addition to the capacity to represent precise
number, humans have a separate and more basic ‘approximate number system’
(ANS) that is involved in the representation and manipulation of quantity infor-
mation (for an overview of research in this area, see especially Dehaene 1997).
In this system, (approximate) quantities are thought to be represented as pat-
terns of activation on the equivalent of a mental number line. These essentially
analog representations are sufficient to support approximate arithmetic as well
as, importantly, the comparison of quantities. The hallmark of the operation of
the ANS is its ratio dependence: the differentiability of two values improves in
proportion to the ratio between them, and two values insufficiently distant from
each other (in terms of ratio) are indistinguishable, or perhaps distinguishable
only in a noisy and error-prone way.
The ANS is evolutionarily and developmentally more basic than the abil-
ity to represent and compare number precisely, being present not just in liter-
ate adults but also in preverbal infants, members of societies without complex
number systems, and even animals. That is, a mode of comparison that is sensi-
tive only to ‘significant’ differences in values is a core component of our most
primitive numerical capabilities. As such, it is a good candidate for a stereo-
typical interpretation of a ‘greater than’ relationship.
The sort of approximate representations of numerosity generated by the
ANS can be modeled via a scale structure in which degrees are conceptualized
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not as points but rather ranges, with the ‘greater than’ relationship between two
degrees requiring non-overlap of their ranges. Formally, such a degree structure
corresponds to a semi-order (van Rooij 2011), an ordering structure in which
the ‘greater than’ relationship is transitive but the indifference relationship is
not. Turning back to the interpretation of majority most, when a logical form
such as that in in (9b) is interpreted relative to a semi-ordered degree structure
of this sort, truth will obtain only when the set in question is ‘significantly’
larger than any other non-overlapping subset of the domain. This in turn will
be the case only if the proportion in question is significantly greater than 50%,
exactly the situation in which most is typically used.
Pietroski et al. (2009) provide evidence that the verification of sentences
containing most at least sometimes proceeds via the ANS. My claim here is
that this system plays an even more fundamental role in the interpretation of
majority most. Specifically, the logical form for most can be assessed relative
to a scale whose structure mirrors the output of the ANS. Furthermore, since
this corresponds to our most basic or primitive mode of quantity comparison,
the interpretation of most tends to be pragmatically strengthened via R-based
implicature to this type of interpretation even in the case where precise number
is available, resulting in the tolerant interpretation discussed above.
We are then left with the question of why similar pragmatic strengthening
does not occur in the case of relative most. While I have no conclusive expla-
nation, one possibility relates to a subtle difference in logical form between the
two most’s. The relevant portions of the logical forms are shown below:
(31) a. Fred has read most Shakespeare plays Majority
λx.S.play(x) ∧ ∀y : S.play(y)[y 6= x→
∃d[|x| ≥ d ∧ ¬|y| ≥ d]]
b. Fred has read the most Shakespeare plays Relative
λx.∀y ∈C[y 6= x→∃d[∃z[S.play(z) ∧ read(x,z) ∧|z| ≥ d]
∧¬∃z[S.play(z) ∧ read(y,z) ∧ |z| ≥ d]]]
The formula for majority most in (31a) is based on the pairwise comparison of
pluralities (specifically, pluralities of Shakespeare plays) with respect to their
cardinalities. It is this sort of comparison that I have argued tends to receive a
strengthened stereotypical interpretation that corresponds to our basic capac-
ities for approximate comparison of set sizes. But the corresponding formula
for relative most in (31b) is different. Nowhere in this formula are two plural-
ities compared directly. Rather, it is individuals (readers) that are compared,
the parameter of comparison being the number of Shakespeare plays each has
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read. I hypothesize that this sort of comparison does not stand in the same re-
lationship to our approximate numerical capabilities as the previous one. Put
differently, there is no stereotypical case of a comparison of this nature, and as
such no potential for pragmatic strengthening. The interpretation thus remains
that provided by the semantics.
The main point of this section is that the ‘tolerant’ interpretation of ma-
jority most can be given a pragmatic account, one that aligns it to other in-
stances of R-based implicature, and which is motivated by insights into how
numerosity is mentally represented. I have proposed one possible explanation
for the absence of similar strengthening for relative most. This pattern would
certainly benefit from more in-depth exploration, and here experimental work
on speaker’s interpretation of the various most’s could be useful. Provision-
ally, however, I conclude that the particular interpretative properties of majority
most discussed here can be accommodated within the unified account.
7 Conclusions
Most occurs in a variety of contexts that have traditionally been analyzed sep-
arately. I have shown here that despite their surface differences, the various
most’s share a common core meaning. A unified semantic analysis has been
developed by drawing on two proposals which are independently motivated: i)
the decomposition of most into many or much plus the superlative morpheme
-est; ii) the analysis of many/much themselves as semantically inert degree
operators. In closing, let me mention two possible extensions of the present
analysis. The first involves the use of most(ly) as an adverbial element (e.g.
‘the paper is mostly finished’, ‘the circle is mostly red’), which shares with
the cases discussed here an element of superlative meaning. The second is the
previously discussed usage of other superlatives to express the maximum in a
range (e.g. ‘30 at the oldest’). I leave these as topics for the future.
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Abstract. This paper presents three self-paced reading studies on the 
processing of presuppositions. In these studies, we investigated the predictions 
a classical theory of presuppositions would make for the cognitive processing 
of presuppositions. This concerns mainly the triggering of presuppositions, 
their verification in a given context and their accommodation in cases where 
they are not supported by the context. Our studies revealed not only that 
presuppositions are evaluated on-line, but also that the classical theory of 
presuppositions makes solid predictions about their processing. 
1	   Motivation	  
For decades, presuppositions (PSPs) have been a vital topic in the semantic 
and pragmatic literature (see Beaver & Geurts (to appear) and the literature 
discussed therein). Up to the present, however, very basic issues surrounding 
the notion of PSP have not yet been resolved. They primarily concern the 
linguistic source of PSPs (“triggering problem”) and their behaviour in 
compound sentences (“projection problem”). It seems fair to say that there is 
as yet no agreement on what the right theory of PSP is. In recent years, a 
venue of PSP theory has developed which involves empirical studies, using 
psycholinguistic methods. These efforts seek to understand PSPs via the way 
they are processed and evaluated by speakers (e.g. Schwarz 2007, Chemla 
2009, Chemla & Bott 2010). Most of these studies deal with very elaborate 
questions concerning PSPs such as projection in quantified sentences or local 
versus global accommodation. The goal of our three studies is to go to the 
very core of PSP processing. This means that we first want to clarify basic 
questions such as whether it is possible to capture the processing of PSPs at 
all. Schwarz’s (2007) findings suggest that the processing of PSPs can be 
made visible within a self-paced reading paradigm. We therefore set up our 
three experiments to be self-paced reading studies as well, albeit with more 
basic questions such as ‘When are PSPs triggered?’ (trigger study), ‘When 
are PSPs validated within a context?’ (verification study), and ‘When does 
accommodation take place?’ (accommodation study). In this paper, we 
present the predictions that a classical theory of PSPs makes about their 
In Reich, Ingo et al. (eds.), Proceedings of Sinn & Bedeutung 15,  
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processing and report the results from three studies that were conducted to 
test these predictions. 
2	   Theoretical	  Background	  
In the following subsections, we will lay out what we call a classical theory 
of PSPs (cf. Heim 1990, Stalnaker 1973, Heim & Kratzer 1998), and the 
predictions this theory makes for sentence processing. 
2.1	   Classical	  Theory	  of	  Presuppositions	  
PSPs are restrictions on appropriate contexts. This means that (1) is only 
felicitous in a context that entails that Sue is a linguist. 
(1) Pete knows that Sue is a linguist. 
It is generally assumed that the PSP is encoded in the lexical entry of the PSP 
trigger. Therefore the definition of the PSP trigger know in (2) entails that the 
truth value of a sentence containing the trigger may be undefined in a world. 
(2) [[know]] = λw. λp. λx: p(w) = 1. x believes p in w 
The compositional outcome of our example in (1) in the notation of Heim & 
Kratzer (1998) would then be: 
(3) λw: Sue is a linguist in w. Pete believes that Sue is a linguist in w 
This means that the PSP as definedness condition is inherited by the whole 
sentence. As mentioned before, (1) can only be uttered felicitously in a con-
text which entails that Susan is a linguist. (4) states this restriction more pre-
cisely where c is Stalnaker’s context set. This is the set which contains all 
“possible worlds where all the propositions that are the background 
assumptions of speakers are true” (Stalnaker 1973: 450). 
(4) c ⊆  {w: Susan is a linguist in w} 
A sentence S can only be added to c if c entails the PSP of S, more formally: 
(5) S is only felicitous in c if for all w ∈ c: [[S]] (w) is defined 
This explains how a PSP as undefinedness (the output of semantic com-
putation) is mapped to appropriateness in a context. Von Fintel (2003) calls 
(5) Stalnaker’s Bridge. For our example in (1) this means that it can be added 
to a context only if the context establishes the PSP (that Sue is a linguist). If 
so, it gets updated with the proposition that Pete believes that Sue is a 
linguist. 
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(6) λc: c ⊆{w: Sue is a linguist in w}.c∩{w’:believe(w’)( λw.Sue is a 
 linguist in w)(Pete)} 
2.2	   Predictions	  
With the classical theory as a starting point, we can derive three predictions 
with respect to the processing of PSPs. In a sentence like (7) we identified 
three key areas where we expect semantic peculiarities which should be 
reflected in the processing. 
(7) Pete knows that Sue is a linguist, while Kim's job is unknown. 
The first area of interest is the trigger itself (here: know). Because the PSP 
that is semantically encoded in the trigger alerts the reader that she will have 
to look back at the preceding context, we would expect higher processing 
costs for a trigger in contrast to a word which does not trigger a PSP, e.g. 
believe. This should then be reflected in longer reading times on the trigger 
when compared with a non-trigger. We investigated this prediction in our 
trigger study. 
The second area where the theory leads us to expect an effect is the 
critical word (here: linguist). This is the point at which it is known what the 
content of the PSP is. Thus, a verification process with the context should be 
started. Our hypothesis is that the explicit falsification of a PSP in the context 
causes higher processing costs at this point than the explicit verification. 
Therefore we expect longer reading times on the critical word in a context 
where the PSP of the sentence (that Sue is a linguist) is falsified than in a 
context where this PSP is verified. Our verification study aims at exploring 
this prediction. 
The last interesting area is the sentence continuation (everything from 
the critical word onwards). This is so, because in the case when a PSP is 
neither falsified nor verified in the context, accommodation should kick in 
(Lewis 1979). In order to make sense of the sentence, the addressee will 
update the context with the information conveyed by the PSP. The 
expectation would thus be that this part of a presuppositional sentence should 
be harder to process when its PSP is neither verified nor falsified by the 
context (we will call this kind of context a neutral context). In our 
accommodation study, we investigate whether the continuation of a 
presuppositional sentence in a neutral context evokes longer reading times 
than in a falsifying or verifying context. 
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3	   Studies	  
The following section reports three studies which test the predictions of the 
classical theory. Since we expected different triggers to behave differently 
(cf. Abusch 2009), we selected a range of different triggers from the literature 
(iterative: wieder (again), definite NP: sein/e/s (his), additive particle: auch 
(too), aspectual verb: aufhören (to stop), factive verb: wissen (to know)). 
These triggers were the same throughout all the experiments. 
3.1	   General	  Procedure	  
Participants were seated comfortably in a sound-attenuated room. The 
stimulus material was presented on a computer screen in white on a blue 
background. First, participants read a global context which introduced the 
acting people in the test material. Then the trials were presented. A trial 
began with the presentation of a warning signal followed by a context sen-
tence, which was depicted as a complete sentence in the middle of the com-
puter screen. After participants had read the context sentence, they pressed a 
button to request the test sentence. The test sentence was presented word-by-
word in a self-paced manner, i.e., the participants demanded each word by a 
button press. Reading time was measured on-line. After reading the test 
sentence, participants rated the acceptability of the test sentence within the 
given context on a four-point scale. This scale ranged from very bad (1) to 
very good (4). Before each experimental session, participants worked on 
practice trials to get familiar with the experimental procedure. At the end of 
each session, they answered yes/no questions. These comprehension 
questions were included to ensure that participants processed the sentences 
attentively at a semantic level.  
3.2	   Trigger	  Study	  
3.2.1	   Methods	  and	  Material 
Thirty native speakers of German (24 women; mean age = 21.9; age range = 
19-29) participated in this experiment. Most of them were students from the 
University of Tübingen. They had normal or corrected to normal vision. They 
were paid 20 Euros or got course credit for participation. 
Sixty sets of experimental sentences were constructed. Each set 
consisted of a context sentence and three test sentences. The context sentence 
served as neutral context (8). The test sentences contained either a PSP 
trigger (9), a neutral word at the same position as the trigger which makes the 
sentence se-mantically acceptable (10), or a word at the same position that 
makes the sentence semantically unacceptable (11). 
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(8) Tina ist mit   einer guten   Freundin shoppen. 
 Tina is  with  a    good    friend   shopping. 
 ‘Tina is shopping with a good friend.’ 
(9) Sie  kauft  wieder  rote  Handschuhe. 
 She  buys   again  red   gloves. 
 ‘She buys red gloves again.’ 
(10) Sie   kauft  heute   rote  Handschuhe. 
 She   buys   today  red   gloves. 
 ‘She buys red gloves today.’ 
(11) *Sie kauft  freundlich  rote  Handschuhe. 
  She  buys  friendly    red   gloves. 
 ‘She buys red gloves friendly.’ 
We created twelve experimental sentence sets for each of our 5 PSP triggers 
(resulsting in a total of 60 sets). The stimulus material was randomly divided 
into three parts. The three test sentences of one experimental sentence set 
were presented in different sessions on different days. The order of pre-
sentation was balanced according to a balanced latin square. This was done to 
make the design and conditions non-obvious to the participants. To avoid 
response strategies and to mask the purpose of the study, thirty filler sentence 
sets were constructed. The filler sentence sets were designed similarly to the 
experimental sentence set concerning their acceptability, but did not include 
PSP triggers. They were randomly intermixed in the experimental sessions. 
At the end of one session, twenty out of sixty yes/no comprehension 
questions (e.g. “Did Tina buy blue gloves?”) were presented.  
The design included the factors SENTENCE CONDITION (PSP, acceptable, 
unacceptable) and TYPE OF TRIGGER (wieder, auch, definite NP, aufhören, 
wissen). Besides the off-line measures of the acceptability, the reading time 
of the word before the trigger (trigger -1), the trigger itself, the word 
following the trigger (trigger + 1) and the final word of a sentences as well as 
the reading time of the whole sentence (total, mean of all words within a 
sentence) was measured as on-line data and calculated per letter as dependent 
variable. The statistical analyses were carried out by analyses of variance 
(ANOVA). To investigate specific differences between conditions, contrast 
analyses were performed.  
3.2.2	   Results	  
For the acceptability judgments we focused on the influences by the 
CONTEXT/ SENTENCE CONDITION and TYPE OF TRIGGER, as well as on the in-
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teraction of the two factors. For the reading times we report only the 
influence of CONTEXT/ SENTENCE CONDITION.   
 
Off-line Data 
The statistical analysis revealed that the factor SENTENCE CONDITION 
influenced the acceptability judgements (F (2, 58) = 574.69, p < .01). The 
contrastive analysis showed that all context conditions differed from each 
other (p < .01) in the way that acceptable sentences were judged best, 
followed by the sentences with a PSP trigger, and the unacceptable sentences 
(see Figure 1 left side). TYPE OF TRIGGER additionally influenced 
acceptability judgments (F (4, 116) = 51.76, p < .01). There was also an 
interaction between SENTENCE CONDITION and TYPE OF TRIGGER (F (8, 232) = 
23.86, p < .01).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  
	  
 
Figure 1.  Left side: Mean Acceptability values for target sentences. Right side: Reading times 
for the words of interest. The asterisk marks significant differences between 
sentence conditions. 
 
On-line Data 
Reading times for the words of interest are presented in Figure 1 (right side).  
There was no effect of SENTENCE CONDITION for the word before the trigger 
(F (2, 58) = 1.38, p > .25). Importantly, however, reading times differed 
depending on SENTENCE CONDITION for the PSP trigger (F (2, 58) = 179.62, p 
< .01). The longest reading times were needed for the PSP trigger, less long 
reading times for the word of the acceptable condition and the least long 
reading times for the word of the unacceptable condition (all ps < .01). 
SENTENCE CONDITION evoked a further effect on the word following the 
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trigger (F (2, 58) = 12.74, p < .01). The reading times were longest for the 
words of the unacceptable sentence condition, less long for the words of the 
sentences with a PSP and least long for the words of the acceptable sentence 
condition (all ps < .05). An effect of SENTENCE CONDITION was also observed 
on the final word (F (2, 58) = 3.82, p < .05). Longer reading times were need-
ed for the words of the PSP condition compared to the words of the accept-
able conditions (p < .05). The reading time of the unacceptable condition did 
not differ from the others (all ps > .09). The reading times for the whole sen-
tence also differed depending on SENTENCE CONDITION (F (2, 58) = 21.52, p 
< .01). They were longer for sentences containing a PSP compared to the oth-
er conditions (p < .01), but the other two conditions did not differ (p > .33).  
3.3	   Verification	  Study	  
3.3.1	   Methods	  and	  Material	  
Twenty-five native speakers of German (18 women; mean age = 24.68; age 
range = 19-67) participated in the second experiment. Most of them were 
students from the University of Tübingen. They had normal or corrected to 
normal vision. They were paid 16 Euros or got course credit for participation. 
The data of one participant had to be excluded from the analysis because he 
did not reach 75% correctness for the comprehension questions. 
In this study we constructed two different context sentences. Each 
context sentence (12, 13) was paired with two test sentences (A, B) in such a 
way that the content of the test sentence’s PSP was verified (12A, 13B) or 
falsified (12B, 13A) by the context. If the content of the PSP of a test sen-
tence was verified by one context sentence, it was falsified by the other 
context sentence and vice versa. This design allows the comparison of the 
same test sentences under a verified and a falsified PSP. Altogether, sixty sets 
of experimental sentences (twelve sets for each trigger type) were created. 
(12)  Susanne hat  dieses  Jahr bereits   rote  Handschuhe  gekauft. 
  Susanne had this   year already red  gloves      bought. 
  ‘Susanne had already bought red gloves this year.’ 
 A Heute  hat Susanne wieder  rote  Handschuhe  gekauft und    
  Today  has Susanne again  red  gloves      bought and   
  sie    gleich        angezogen. 
  them   immediately   put on. 
  ‘Today, Susanne bought red gloves again and put them on right 
  away.’ 
 B Heute  hat Susanne wieder  keine  roten  Handschuhe  gekauft    
  Today  has Susanne again  no    red   gloves      bought   
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  und  ärgert sich.  
  and  is very upset 
  ‘Today, Susanne didn’t buy red gloves again and is very upset.’ 
(13) Susanne hat bisher     nie    rote  Handschuhe  gekauft. 
 Susanne had until now  never red  gloves      bought 
 ‘Susanne had never bought red gloves until now.’ 
 B Heute  hat Susanne wieder  keine  roten  Handschuhe  gekauft   
  Today  has Susanne again  no    red   gloves      bought   
  und  ärgert sich.  
  and  is very upset 
  ‘Today, Susanne didn’t buy red gloves again and is very upset.’ 
 A Heute  hat Susanne wieder  rote  Handschuhe  gekauft und    
  Today  has Susanne again  red  gloves      bought and    
  sie    gleich     angezogen. 
  them  right away  put on 
  ‘Today, Susanne bought red gloves again and put them on right 
   away.’ 
To avoid repetitions of sentences of the same set, the stimulus material was 
divided into four sessions. Each possible pair of a context and a test sentence 
was presented in a different session. Participants completed each session on a 
different day.  
The experiment included the factors CONTEXT CONDITION (PSP 
verifying context vs. PSP falsifying context) and TYPE OF TRIGGER. 
Acceptability judgments and reading times (per letter) of single words were 
collected analogous to Study 1. We expanded the analysis to one additional 
word, the so-called critical word. This is the word on which the content of a 
PSP is known to be verified or falsified by the context. In the above 
mentioned example it is the verb bought. 
3.3.2 Results	  
Off-line Data 
CONTEXT CONDITION influenced the acceptability judgments (F (1, 23) = 
484.53, p < .01) in that sentences in a PSP verifying context were judged 
better than sentences in a PSP falsifying context. The factor TYPE OF TRIGGER 
additionally influenced acceptability judgments (F (4, 92) = 213.40, p < .01) 
and there was also an interaction between CONTEXT CONDITION and TYPE OF 
TRIGGER (F (4, 92) = 91.79, p < .01). Acceptability judgments are presented 
in Figure 2 (left side). 
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Figure 2.  Left side: Mean Acceptability values for target sentences. Right side: Reading times 
for the words of interest. The asterisk marks significant differences between 
sentence conditions. 
 
On-line Data 
Reading times for the words of interest are presented in Figure 2 (right side). 
There were no effects of CONTEXT CONDITION on reading times for trigger –1, 
trigger, trigger + 1, and the final word (all ps > .59). Most importantly, 
however, reading times differed depending on CONTEXT CONDITION on the 
critical word (F (1, 23) = 12.66, p < .01). Longer reading times were needed 
for the falsifying context condition compared to the verifying context 
condition. This effect propagates to the whole sentence as longer reading 
times were needed for the falsifying context condition than for the verifying 
context condition (F (1, 23) = 4.87, p < .05). 
3.4	   Accommodation	  Study	  
3.4.1	   Methods	  and	  Material	  
Thirty native speakers of German (21 women; mean age = 25.33; age range = 
19-38) participated in the third experiment. Most of them were students from 
the University of Tübingen. They had normal or corrected to normal vision. 
They were paid 15 Euros or got course credit for participation.  
Sixty sets of experimental sentences were created. One set consisted of 
three different context sentences (14, 15, and 16) and one test sentence (17) 
that contained a PSP. Each context sentence of a given set was presented with 
the test sentence. The context sentence verified the content of the PSP of the 
test sentence (14), falsified the PSP’s content (15), or was neutral with 
respect to the PSP (16). Hence there were three different context conditions. 
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This design again allows the comparison of the same sentence in different ex-
perimental conditions. The stimulus material was presented in three sessions, 
where each context sentence of an experimental sentence set was presented in 
a different session. Participants worked on the sessions on different days and 
the order of sessions was balanced across participants. 
(14) Susanne  hat  bereits  rote  Handschuhe  gekauft. 
 Susanne  had  already red  gloves      bought. 
 ‘Susanne had bought red gloves before.’ 
(15) Susanne  hat  bisher    nie   rote  Handschuhe  gekauft. 
 Susanne  had  until now  never red  gloves      bought. 
 ‘Susanne had never bought red gloves until now.’ 
(16) Inge hat  bisher    nie   rote  Handschuhe  gekauft. 
 Inge had  until now  never red  gloves      bought. 
 ‘Inge had never bought red gloves until now.’ 
(17) Heute hat Susanne wieder  rote  Handschuhe  gekauft und sie 
 Today has Susanne again  red  gloves      bought and them 
 gleich       angezogen. 
 immediately  put on 
 ‘Today, Susanne bought red gloves again and put them on right away.’ 
Analogous to Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, thirty filler sentence sets were 
designed in parallel to the experimental sentence sets but without a PSP. At 
the end of each session, twenty out of sixty yes/no comprehension questions 
were presented. 
The experiment included the factors CONTEXT CONDITION (PSP 
verifying context, PSP falsifying context, PSP neutral context) and TYPE OF 
TRIGGER. The same words that were investigated in the second experiment 
were also investigated in the third experiment. 
3.4.2	   Results	  
Off-line Data 
As in the previous Studies, the factor CONTEXT CONDITION influenced the 
acceptability judgements (F (2, 46) = 377.20, p < .01). The contrastive 
analysis showed that all context conditions differed from each other sig-
nificantly (all ps < .01) in that sentences with a verifying context were judged 
best, followed by the sentences with a neutral context, and the sentences with 
a falsifying context (see Figure 3 left side). TYPE OF TRIGGER additionally 
influenced acceptability judgments (F (4, 92) = 35.30, p < .01).  
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An interaction between CONTEXT CONDITION and TYPE OF TRIGGER was 
observed (F (8, 184) = 61.41, p < .01). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Left side: Mean Acceptability values for target sentences. Right side: Reading times 
for the words of interest. The asterisk marks significant differences between 
sentence conditions. 
 
On-line Data 
Reading times for the words of interest are presented in Figure 3 (right side). 
There were no meaningful significant effects of CONTEXT CONDITION on 
reading times for trigger – 1, trigger + 1, the critical word, and the final word 
(all ps > .07). Reading times differed depending on CONTEXT CONDITION for 
the PSP trigger (F (2, 46) = 3.96, p < .01). Longer reading times were needed 
in the neutral context condition compared to the falsifying context condition 
(p < .01). The reading time of the verifying context condition did not differ 
from the others (all ps > .08). A similar pattern was present in reading times 
for the whole sentence (F (2, 46) = 3.68, p < .01). Reading times were longer 
in the neutral condition than in the falsifying condition (p < .01), but the 
reading times of the verifying context condition did not differ from the others 
(all ps > .15). A theoretical interesting trend of CONTEXT CONDITION on 
reading times on the critical word was observed (F (2, 46) = 2.83, p < .08). 
4	   Discussion	  
Off-line Data 
The off-line data of the trigger study and the accommodation study provide 
further interesting results for the theory of PSP triggers. In both experiments, 
auch (too) and sein (his) got the lowest acceptability ratings in neutral con-
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texts. The result for auch is not very surprising since the additive particle is 
commonly regarded as a “hard-core” trigger (Kadmon 2001: 207) whose PSP 
is very hard to accommodate. The appearance of auch is thus highly in-
appropriate in a context which does not entail its PSP. It is however 
interesting that the definite NP patterns with auch in this respect. The definite 
article is commonly seen as a soft trigger which does not impose a lot of 
difficulties when uttered in a context which does not entail the PSP of the 
sentence. In fact, Spenander (2002) found in a corpus study that 58% of the 
definite determiners in spoken language are used in a context which does not 
provide a salient referent. Yet, the acceptability rates of the two experiments 
show us that the use of the definite determiner in a neutral context does not 
go through as smoothly as expected. A theoretical discussion of these results 
would go beyond the scope of this paper, but it becomes apparent that the 
class of PSP triggers is not as homogenous commonly assumed. This has 
already been discussed in Abusch (2009) and should receive further attention 
in future theoretical considerations. 
Surprising are the relatively good acceptance rates for the definite 
determiner in supposedly falsifying contexts in the verification and the 
accommodation study. It has to be noted that in 50% of the falsifying 
contexts, we tried to explicitly falsify the uniqueness condition of the definite 
determiner (e.g. “Fritz has two dogs. Susanne fed his dog.”). Bade (2010) 
concludes that these results suggest “that the uniqueness condition for 
singular definite descriptions is not a very strong one”. They thus support 
Heim (1983) in denying Russell (1905) and claiming that definites 
“presuppose existence but not uniqueness” (Heim 1983: 233). 
On-line Data 
The hypotheses we started out with on the basis of the classical theory of 
PSPs are repeated below and on the next page. 
I. Trigger:       Needs more attention because it alerts the reader that she 
will have to look back at the preceding context 
          ⇒longer reading time of a trigger vs. a neutral word 
 
II. Critical Word: It is known what the content of the PSP is. A verification 
process is started immediately. 
          ⇒longer reading time when verification fails vs.  
          succeeds 
III. Continuation: Accommodation in case the PSP is neither verified nor 
falsified in the context 
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          ⇒longer reading time in neutral contexts vs.  
          verifying/falsifying contexts 
The trigger study provides supporting evidence for prediction I. The results 
of this experiment revealed that words which trigger a PSP evoked sig-
nificantly longer reading times than words which do not trigger a PSP. A 
cautionary remark: It is obvious that we have to deal with the fact that we are 
talking about three different words here. We tried to match them in frequency 
using the CELEX database (Baayen, Piepenbrock, & van Rijn 1993) and 
length, but this was not always possible. However, the effect we find on this 
word cannot be due to a frequency effect, which would predict that more 
frequent words are read faster, since the PSP trigger was always the most 
frequent word (M = 1334.10 in 6 million), the word in the acceptable 
condition was the second most frequent word (M = 379.31 in 6 million), and 
the word in the unacceptable condition the least frequent word (M = 85.98 in 
6 million). A further interesting effect emerges after the word of interest. In 
the semantically unacceptable condition, reading times increase after the 
word of interest but decrease relatively quickly after that. In the PSP con-
dition however, reading times are significantly longer compared to the 
control condition with the semantically acceptable word throughout. In other 
words, whilst the semantically unacceptable condition imposes processing 
difficulties for a rather short time span, the PSP condition is more difficult to 
process once the PSP trigger is known. This is also reflected in the reading 
times on the whole sentence where only the PSP condition differs 
significantly from the other two conditions. Since the sentences with a PSP 
were presented in a context which was neutral with respect to the content of 
the PSP, the processing difficulties can be assumed to reflect the cost that 
arises when the reader tries to incorporate the content of the PSP in the con-
text. That is when the reader goes through the process of accommodation. 
This observation is supported by the results of the accommodation study.  
In the verification study, we saw that a sentence carrying a PSP in a fal-
sifying context needs longer to read on the critical word than in a verifying 
context. This study provides us thus with supporting evidence for the second 
prediction. Our hypothesis about this region of the sentence is that at this 
point, Stalnaker’s Bridge applies and it becomes evident that a sentence is 
used inappropriately in the case where the PSP is explicitly falsified by the 
context. This conflict between the PSP of the sentence and the context is 
mirrored in the longer reading times on the critical word in the falsifying 
condition. The verification study reveals that PSP justification is checked as 
soon as the reader encounters the critical word. 
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The accommodation study shows that sentences carrying a PSP in a neutral 
context take longer to read on the critical word than the same sentence within 
a context which explicitly falsifies or verifies the content of the presuppo-
sition. This is to be expected from the theory, because at some point, the 
processor will start to search the context set for the relevant information. In 
the verifying context, the information is readily available. In the falsifying 
context, the PSP is established to be false. In the neutral context, however, 
the relevant information cannot be found in the context but it is also not 
explicitly not there. In order to make sense of the sentence, an accom-
modation process should be started. The fact that there is a trend on the 
critical word strongly suggests that this process happens immediately. 
Especially in the light of the trigger study, where a sentence carrying a PSP 
in a neutral context needed significantly longer to read than a sentence which 
did not trigger a PSP at all, we are very optimistic that further studies will 
provide us with more solid evidence for the third prediction. 
5	   Conclusion	  and	  Outlook	   	  
In accordance with Schwarz’s (2007) findings, the results of the three 
conducted studies strongly suggest that the processing of PSPs can be 
captured in psycholinguistic experiments. We have seen that PSP processing 
happens on-line. As a next step, we plan to stabilize the results with follow-
up studies. These will be further reading time experiments as well as ERP 
experiments. Once we get to the core of how PSPs are triggered (trigger 
study), validated within a context (verification study), and accommodated 
(accommodation study), we will eventually be able to tackle more contro-
versial theoretical questions such as the projection problem or the differences 
between PSPs and implicatures. 
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Abstract. We provide experimental evidence suggesting that the logical 
structure of linguistic expressions can directly influence aspects of non-
linguistic cognition. Specifically, we show that quantifier semantics provides a 
set of instructions to visual verification processes. Each of the two Polish 
majority quantifiers większość and najwięcej biases a distinct verification 
strategy that is used as a default under time pressure. Each canonical 
verification strategy overrides other alternative strategies for truth verification 
as proposed in Lidz et al. (2009).  
 
1	   Introduction	  
Lidz et al. (2009) propose that the lexical semantics of natural language 
quantifiers is transparently associated with canonical procedures for the 
verification of the truth/falsity of sentences in which they appear. In 
particular, Lidz et al. (2009) and Pietroski et al. (2008) provide experimental 
evidence that when processing the proportional quantifier most in the context 
of a visually presented scene, English speakers are biased towards using a 
certain verification strategy rather than an alternative. This is taken to be 
evidence in favor of a particular semantic representation of most, which in 
turn provides a direct set of instructions to the visual system that can override 
other cognitively available verification strategies. 
We provide further experimental evidence that quantifier semantics is 
transparently associated with a canonical verification strategy. We tested the 
processing of two majority quantifiers in Polish in a task similar to that of 
Lidz et al. The proportional większość has the semantics of English most, 	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while the relative najwięcej has the meaning of ‘the largest subset’. We 
obtained three notable results. First, the proportional większość is associated 
with the same pattern of accuracy as English most, directly replicating the 
findings of Lidz et al. for Polish. Second, the relative najwięcej is verified by 
a distinct strategy directly related to its semantics. Third and most important, 
each strategy is canonically followed during the processing of the respective 
quantifier. In principle, given that both strategies are easily available to 
speakers of Polish, when participants judge a scene, where either would yield 
the correct truth value, they could switch to the more efficient strategy. This 
is, however, not what happens: participants always perform in accordance 
with the strategy associated with the quantifier in the stimulus sentence. 
Our findings illustrate that two closely related quantifiers can be as-
sociated with distinct verification procedures, in line with their lexical se-
mantics, and that each procedure is used consistently as an instruction to the 
visual system. The conclusion is that the logical structure of linguistic ex-
pressions can directly influence aspects of non-linguistic cognition.  
2	   Background	  Research	  Question	  
Lidz et al. (2009) advance a novel hypothesis that there is more to meaning 
than just empirical adequacy and compositionality. There can be several 
truth-conditionally equivalent compositional specifications of a linguistic ex-
pression, but not all of them form equally “good psychological hypotheses” 
about how the derived truth-conditions are verified.1 
The proportional quantifier most can be specified in at least three truth-
conditionally equivalent ways, as shown in (1). Pietroski et al. (2008), Lidz et 
al. (2009), and Hackl (2009) devised experiments to look “beyond” the truth 
conditions of (1) to see how the meaning of a sentence containing most con-
strains the way people verify it against a visual scene. 
(1) Most of the dots are yellow. 
 (a) |Dot(x) & Yellow(x)| > 1/2 |Dot(x)|  
 (b) |Dot(x) & Yellow(x)| > |Dot(x) & ~ Yellow(x)| 
 (c) OneToOnePlus({Dot(x) & Yellow(x)}, {Dot(x) & ~ Yellow(x)}) 
The semantic specifications in (a) and (b) both provide instructions to the 
visual cognition system to estimate the cardinality of the set of yellow dots 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Note that judging a sentence to be true/false in a given context involves: (i) compositionally 
determining what the truth conditions are; and (ii) determining whether these conditions obtain in 
the context. This means that verification procedures can in principle be independent of the 
algorithms that produce truth conditions, as discussed in Pietroski et al. (2008). 
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and to compare it with the cardinality of another set. They differ in what that 
other set is. (1a) requires that the cardinality of the total set of dots be ob-
tained (and its half calculated). In effect, it calls for an algorithm equivalent 
to that of More than half of the dots are yellow. (1b), on the other hand, is 
linked to an algorithm for verification that requires an estimate of the car-
dinality of the non-yellow set (which may employ an estimate of the total but 
does not need to). The alternative in (1c) does not require an estimate of car-
dinalities or comparison, but relies on matching the yellow dots with the non-
yellow dots. The strategies in (1a-c) are semantically equivalent, but not all of 
them turn out to be psychologically viable options for the verification of the 
truth value of sentences containing most against visual stimuli of arrays of 
dots. 
Hackl (2009) used a self-paced counting paradigm with rows of dots in 
two colors to establish that most and more than half are processed differently. 
His results exclude (1a) as a representation of the meaning of most and, con-
sequently, as a verification strategy associated with most, at least as far as 
explicit counting is involved.2 Pietroski et al. (2008) further tested the two al-
ternative options in (1b-c) and found that even when the arrangement of dots 
favored verification by the one-to-one correspondence relation (dots were 
arranged in pairs, with some yellow dots unpaired with the dots in the other 
color), the response accuracy patterns did not differ from the condition where 
the dots were scattered on the screen. No change in accuracy patterns across 
conditions indicates that (1c) was never used to verify (1).  
(1b) can be straightforwardly used to verify (1) when the displayed dots 
are in two colors only, e.g., yellow and blue, as they were in the experiments 
of Hackl (2009) and Pietroski et al. (2008). The cardinality of the target yel-
low set can simply be compared to the cardinality of the blue set, i.e. the non-
yellow set in (1b). When the non-yellow set contains dots of multiple colors, 
obtaining its cardinality requires further computation. Lidz et al. (2009) used 
multiple colors in their experiment to test whether this computation is based 
on the components directly expressed in the meaning of (1). Lidz et al.  pro-
pose that the second argument of the “>” relation in (1b) can be transparently 
computed by subtraction as stated in (2a) below. Otherwise, the set of all 
non-yellow dots has to be selected as specified in (2b). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 However, the assessment of cardinality does not always require explicit counting but can be 
obtained by the Approximate Number System (ANS) (Dehaene 1997, Feigenson et al. 2004). 
Halberda et al. (2008) have shown that children who have not yet learned to count are perfectly 
able to understand sentences containing most. 
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(2) Two alternative computations of  
|Dot(x) & Yellow(x)| > |Dot(x) & ~ Yellow(x)| 
 (a) Subtraction strategy: 
  |Dot(x) & Yellow(x)| > |Dot(x)| – |Dot(x) & Yellow(x)|    
 (b) Selection strategy: 
  |Dot(x) & Yellow(x)| >       
  |{Dot(x)&Red(x)}∪{Dot(x)&Blue(x)}∪{Dot(x)&Green(x)}∪…|   
Lidz et al. (2009) point out that the Selection procedure in (2b) is not 
plausible for psychophysical reasons. A heterogeneous set of non-yellow, 
multi-colored dots that are scattered among yellow dots is not automatically 
selectable as its specification involves a negation of an early visual feature, 
the color yellow (Wolfe 1998). The Subtraction procedure in (2a), on the 
other hand, is based on the psychological evidence from Halberda et al. 
(2006) that multiple color sets can be enumerated in parallel, but crucially, 
this is possible only for the total set of dots and two color subsets (i.e. total, 
target and one color distractor sets), but no more.  
Given this psychophysical evidence, Lidz et al. (2009) hypothesize that 
most is verified using the Subtraction strategy in (2a), at least in the general 
case. The strategy involves the following steps: (i) selecting the superset of 
all dots and estimating its cardinality; (ii) selecting the set of yellow dots and 
estimating its cardinality; (iii) subtracting the cardinality of the yellow set 
from that of the superset to obtain an estimate of the cardinality of the set of 
non-yellow dots; and (iv) comparing the cardinalities of the sets of yellow 
and non-yellow dots. Since the selection of the superset and one color subset 
is done automatically, the Subtraction strategy should always be available, 
independently of how many color sets there are on the screen. However, on 
screens with dots in only two colors, Selection becomes a viable strategy as 
well. Given the findings of Halberda et al., both the yellow set of dots and the 
distractor color set of e.g., blue dots, are automatically selected and their car-
dinalities can be directly compared. Moreover, in this special case Subtrac-
tion involves more steps than Selection and thus may turn out to be 
dispreferred (see (3)). 
(3) The steps in the computation of Subtraction vs. Selection 
Subtraction (irrespective of no. of colors) Selection (two colors) 
1. Estimate the total. 1. Estimate the target set. 
2. Estimate the target set. 2. Estimate the distractor set. 
3. Subtract the target set from the total. 3. Compare with the target set. 
4. Compare the difference with the target set.  
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Lidz et al. (2009) presented participants with the sentence Most of the dots 
are blue, and they had to judge it true or false against a visual display of dots 
in 2 to 5 colors in varying ratios of blue to non-blue dots. The array of dots 
appeared on the computer screen for 150ms.3 Lidz et al. predicted that if par-
ticipants use the Selection strategy they should be successful when there are 
only two colors on the screen. With higher numbers of colors, their per-
formance should rapidly decline, given that they would need to determine the 
cardinality of each subset of non-blue dots (e.g. red, green, etc.) and  sub-
sequently sum the results. The Subtraction hypothesis, on the other hand, 
predicts no difference in accuracy between screens with dots in two colors 
and those with 3-5 colors, because the cardinality of the non-blue set is 
obtained solely on the basis of the cardinality of the total and the blue sets. 
The results of Lidz et al.’s experiment support the Subtraction hy-
pothesis because the participants’ performance did not differ in accuracy as a 
function of the number of colors in the display, but only as a  function of the 
ratio (in adherence to Weber’s law). Crucially, on screens with just two col-
ors, the alternative Selection strategy is in principle available to the visual 
system, and it would even be computationally less costly and more accurate 
(cf. (3)). Yet, even here Subtraction was used, since the accuracy was not 
higher on the two color screens. Thus, Lidz et al. conclude that Subtraction is 
the default procedure for verifying most under time pressure. On the basis of 
this finding they formulate the Interface Transparency Thesis (4): 
(4) “A declarative sentence is semantically associated with a canonical
 procedure for the verification of its truth value that is biased towards
 those algorithms that directly compute the relations expressed in the
 meaning.” (Lidz et al. 2009: 2) 
3	   Polish	  Most1	  and	  Most2	  Majority	  Quantifiers	  	  
We address the question why Subtraction, as in (2a), is the verification 
strategy for (1). One reason could be that under time pressure, the Selection 
strategy (2b) is only possible when there are two color sets, given the findings 
of Halberda et al. (2006). The Subtraction strategy (2a) is usable under time 
pressure independently of the number of distractor color sets, and because of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Under time pressure, counting is impossible, as typical rates of overt and covert counting have 
been reported to be about 240ms per item (Whalen el al. 1999). The ANS is not subject to such 
speed limitations. It generates an approximate representation of the number of items in a set in 
adherence to Weber’s law: the discriminability of two quantities is a function of their ratio. 
Numbers can thus be represented as 'noisy magnitudes' for the purposes of basic arithmetic 
operations like addition and subtraction (Wiese 2003). 
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this universality it can be adopted as the canonical verification strategy for 
most. On this view, Selection in (2b) is excluded not by the semantics of most 
but by the properties of visual cognition. We show that the Selection 
procedure is possible under time pressure, with more than two colors if per-
formed step-wise, yet it is used only when directly specified in the meaning. 
We extend the predictions of the Interface Transparency Thesis to 
crosslinguistic data, providing evidence that the Polish counterpart of the 
English quantifier most also comes with a verification strategy defined by 
Subtraction as in (2a). The result is further – and directly – supported by a 
control condition with a closely related quantifier, which unambiguously 
requires a Step-wise Selection strategy defined below.  
(5) Step-wise Selection strategy: 
 |Dot(x) & Yellow(x)| > |Dot(x) & Red(x)|, & 
 |Dot(x) & Yellow(x)| > |Dot(x) & Blue(x)|, & 
 |Dot(x) & Yellow(x)| > |Dot(x) & Green(x)|, & … 
This control condition in a within-subjects design, where the same group of 
participants is tested on both items, provides additional evidence for the 
Interface Transparency Thesis. Comprehenders appear to be biased towards 
the use of one particular verification strategy that is associated with a given 
lexical item. They continue to use it even when an alternative strategy, biased 
by a closely related item, is cognitively available and could even be less 
computationally costly.  
Polish has two majority quantifiers: większość (from now on Most1) is a 
counterpart of English most, while najwięcej (Most2), has the meaning of 
“the largest subset”. Most2 is true when the cardinality of the target set is 
greater than the cardinality of each of the distractor sets separately; therefore 
its interpretation necessarily involves multiple selection and comparison with 
each distractor set. The two quantifiers are closely related morphologically. 
(6) The morphology of Most1 and Most2 
 (a) Most1: większość, ‘majority’ 
  więk-       -sz-                       - ość 
  ‘many/great’  adjectival comparative‘-er/more’  nominalizer 
 (b) Most2: najwięcej, ‘largest subset / the most’ 
  naj-                      -więc-        
  adverbial superlative ‘-est/most’  ‘many/great’    
  -ej           
  adverbial  comparat. ‘-er/more’ 
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 (c) wiel-e /  więc-ej / naj-więc-ej;    wielk-i / więk-szy / naj-więk-szy 
  many    more    most         great   greater  greatest 
3.1 Materials and Methods 
We conducted an on-line visual verification task, asking twenty native speak-
ers of Polish to evaluate the truth of (7) and (8) against 200ms displays of 
arrays of colored dots, manipulating (i) the ratio between the target color set 
and the (largest) distractor sets and (ii) the number of distractor color sets.  
(7) Większość  kropek jest żółta. 
 Most1    dots   is  yellow 
 ‘Most dots are yellow.’ 
(8) Najwięcej  jest kropek żółtych. 
 Most2    is  dots   yellow 
 ‘Yellow dots are the largest subset.’ 
Each participant judged 360 displays presented in 2 blocks (180 for each 
quantifier, half requiring a ‘yes’ and half a ‘no’ response). Participants saw 
the test sentence for 7s, and after each stimulus was flashed for 200ms, they 
had 3.8s to respond ‘yes’ or ‘no’ by a button press. Yellow dots were present 
on every display, together with 1 (e.g., Fig. 2), 2 or 3 (Fig. 1) other distractor 
color sets. Ratios of yellow and non-yellow dots were 1:2 (Fig. 2), 2:3 
(Fig. 1) or 5:6.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 On the true screens for Most1 the cardinality of the yellow set was more than half of the total. 
For Most2 the yellow set never exceeded the half but was bigger than the largest competitor 
color set. False screens were costructed analogously. Thus, Most1 and Most2 had identical 
screens only on the two color set condition. If with Most2 the largest subset was bigger than the 
half of the total, we would have no way of checking if the participants switched between 
strategies. 
Fig. 1	   Fig. 2	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3.2 Predictions 
By the Interface Transparency Thesis (4) each quantifier should come with its 
own verification strategy, which should be used even when the alternative 
would yield the correct truth value. There is a body of psychological evidence 
pointing to the fact that the selection of a target by the visual system is 
affected by the strategy adopted either consciously or unconsciously (Trick 
2008). From this perspective, an empirical finding that Most1 and Most2 
induce selective attention differently would underscore the importance of 
fine-grained compositional semantics in real-time sentence processing.  
Given that Polish Most1 has exactly the same meaning as English most, 
we predicted that the Polish sentence in (7) should result in the same pattern 
of accuracy. 
The semantics of Most2 involves Stepwise Selection of each color set 
and comparison between the target set and each distractor set as defined in 
(5). Therefore, we expected to find a significant effect of distractor in ad-
dition to a significant effect of ratio. The semantic specification of Most2 
suggests that selective attention should discriminate more than two target 
color sets, but if this is not possible under time pressure, the performance on 
the screens with more than two colors will greatly decline as hypothesized by 
Lidz et al. (2009). 
Direct comparison of Most1 and Most2 on the screens with dots in two 
colors can have two predicted outcomes. Since both strategies are used by the 
speakers of Polish, on two color screens participants could use whichever 
strategy is computationally less costly and more accurate under time pressure. 
The computation by Selection requires fewer steps than Subtraction when 
there are dots in two colors only, as shown in (9).  
(9) Subtraction procedure and Stepwise Selection procedure  
    (a)         Subtraction 
(irrespective of no. of colors) 
Stepwise Selection 
(b)       multiple colors (c)       two colors 
1. Estimate the total. 1. Estimate the target set. 1. Estimate the target set. 
2. Estimate the target set. 2. Estimate 1st distractor set. 2. Estimate 1st distractor 
set. 
3. Subtract the target set 
from the total. 
3. Compare with the target set. 3. Compare with the 
target set. 
4. Compare the difference 
with the target set. 
4. Estimate 2nd distractor set.  
 5. Compare with the target set.  
 6. Estimate 3rd distractor set.  
 7. Compare with the target set.  
 8. …   
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If the semantic representation guides verification, then with Most2 the non-
yellow set should be selected directly and the accuracy should be greater than 
with Most1 where the non-yellow set is computed through Subtraction. Al-
ternatively, if the accuracy is the same with both quantifiers on the same 
screens, it would mean that Subtraction is not used globally for Most1 and 
participants are able to switch to the Selection strategy in favorable 
circumstances. The crucial findings for English most were that the 
OneToOnePlus pairing and the Selection strategy were never used. In Polish, 
however, Stepwise Selection is used for Most2, which makes it possible that 
participants can switch between Subtraction and Selection for the two color 
screens where the two quantifiers lead to the same truth value. Such a finding 
would argue against the Interface Transparency Thesis. 
If participants are overall successful with Most2 just as with Most1 but 
their performance differs on two color screens, it would suggest that it is not 
the case that Selection is cognitively ‘harder’, but that it depends on how 
selective attention is induced by the specifics of the linguistic input. Such a 
result would also suggest that canonical verification strategy is directly com-
putable from the relations specified in the semantics of a sentence that is 
sensitive to sublexical components. Individual morphemes could be taken to 
contribute not only to the meaning of Most1 vs. Most2 but also to the inter-
face with visual cognition. 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1	   Most1	  (Większość)	  
We conducted a 3x3x2 Repeated Measures ANOVA crossing the three levels 
of ratio and the three levels of number of distractor and truth/falsity of 
screens (i.e. whether ‘yes’ or ‘no’ is the correct answer). Our predictions 
were met – there was a significant effect of ratio (F(2, 38) = 76.072, p < 
.001), but no significant effect of distractor (F(1.47, 27.98) = 1.637, p = .215) 
(means can be seen in (10)). There were no significant interactions. The truth/ 
falsity of screens with respect to the test sentence had no effect on the 
accuracy of participants’ judgments, which can be seen in (11). 
The significant effect of ratio and no significant effect of distractor for 
Most1 is the same as the findings for English most in Lidz et al. (2009). 
Most1 is thus compatible with the Subtraction verification procedure in (2a). 
The selection of the target and the total is not affected by the number of 
distractor sets, but only by the ratio between the target set and the distractors. 
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(10) Accuracy of responses for Most1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(11) Most1 on true and false screens 
Most1 – true screens only Most1 – false screens only 
In the experiments of Pietroski et al. (2008) and Lidz et al. (2009), par-
ticipants showed a bias towards a particular verification strategy for most, 
which resulted in a different pattern of accuracy than if a hypothesized 
alternative procedure had been used. We provided a control condition where 
an alternative verification procedure is necessary. We show that Subtraction 
continues to be used even on those conditions, where Selection can easily be 
performed and would in fact yield more accurate results. 
3.3.2	   Most2	  (Najwięcej)	  
Our predictions were borne out: in addition to the effect of ratio F(2, 38) = 
124.77, p < .001, there was a significant effect of distractor F(2, 38) = 17.34, 
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p < .001 (mean responses are in (12)). There was also a borderline significant 
interaction between ratio and distractor F(4, 76) = 2. 48, p = .051. 
(12) Accuracy of responses for Most2 
	   	  
(13) Most2 on true and false screens 
Most2 – true screens only Most2 – false screens only 
The graph in (13) shows a difference in accuracy patterns between true and 
false screens. There is no significant main effect of truth/falsity of screens 
(the overall mean for true screens .721, for false .783), so it is not the case 
that making a false judgment is easier. However, the significant interactions 
between distractor and truth/falsity, p < .001, and between ratio, distractor 
and truth/falsity, p < .001, indicate that participants made judgments 
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differently for true and false screens depending on the ratio and number of 
distractor colors.5 
While accuracy rates with Most1 were affected only by the ratio, 
accuracy rates with Most2 were affected both by ratio and by the number of 
color sets. These results for Most1 and Most2 are consistent with the 
verification strategies in (2a) and (5), respectively. Since Subtraction (2a) 
does not depend on the number of distractor color sets, its computational cost 
remains the same as the number of distractors increases. Stepwise Selection 
(5), on the other hand, does become more computationally costly as the 
number of distractors increases.  
Thus, Most1 is not verified by Selection, as defined in (2b), although 
Selection is a psychologically plausible strategy given its use in (5). It is not 
psychophysics that forces the Subtraction strategy for Most1 and English 
most. The instructions for the visual system are obtained directly from the 
relations expressed in the semantics. With Most1 attention is never directed 
towards the individual distractor color sets, as predicted by the Interface 
Transparency Thesis. Further support for the thesis comes from the com-
parison of accuracy patterns on the condition when the screens for Most1 and 
Most2 were identical. 
3.3.3	   Most2	  vs.	  Most1	  on	  Two	  Color	  Screens	  
Lidz et al. (2009) argued for English most that the fact that accuracy was not 
greater on the two-color condition means that the information automatically 
computed by the visual system was not used. Therefore, the reason for the 
failure to directly select the comparison set must be the semantic re-
presentation of the sentence. Our results provide more direct evidence for this 
conclusion. Our participants behaved differently depending on which quan-
tifier was used, even though the screens they judged were the same and either 
strategy would provide the correct judgment. 
The patterns of accuracy for each quantifier were very different. In both 
cases the accuracy rates were a function of the ratio, but on true screens par-
ticipants were significantly more accurate when selecting ‘yes’ with Most2. 
When selecting ‘no’ on false screens, they were more accurate with Most1. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 This is not surprising since the Selection and comparison procedure is different at each step for 
the confirmation and disconfirmation of (8), i.e. Yellow dots form the largest subset. E.g., on a 
screen with 8 yellow, 10 blue, 7 green, 6 red dots, it is enough to notice that blues form the 
largest subset to disconfirm (8). With 8 yellow, 7 blue, 6 green, 5 red dots, comparison with each 
color set is needed to make sure that yellows are the most. What is surprising is the low accuracy 
with the disconfirmation of (8) on the two color screens. Apparently, judging that (8) is false 
with 8 yellow and 10 blue dots is harder than judging (8) true with 10 yellow and 8 blue dots.  
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Separate ANOVAs for true and false screens yield a significant main effect of 
quantifier type (F(1, 19) = 10.49, p = .004 for true screens and F(1, 19) = 
11.122, p = .003 for false screens. 
(14) Most1 and Most2 on the two-color condition 
true screens only false screens only 
The different performance with each quantifier is fully predicted on the 
account that each involves a distinct verification strategy that is consistently 
used even when the screens are exactly the same. Different behavior (de-
pending on the quantifier used) on the very same screens indicates not only 
that participants do not switch to a more efficient procedure, but that the way 
the procedures differ is specified by the semantics. 
On screens with two color sets the computation for both Most1 and 
Most2 requires the comparison between the yellow and the non-yellow set. 
The instructions for how to perform this comparison are different for each 
quantifier, even though the components for the computation provided by the 
visual system are the same: the yellow set, the non-yellow set, the superset.  
The accuracy with Most1 was no different on true and false screens; the 
means for each ratio were almost identical. This result if fully predicted by 
Subtraction – the same computation is performed for both positive and neg-
ative judgments: e.g., with 8 yellow and 7 blue dots (true) and 8 yellow and 
10 blue dots (false) (i) estimate the target yellow set, 8, (ii) estimate the total, 
15 (true) or 18 (false), (iii) subtract the target from the total 15-8 or 18-8, (iv) 
compare the cardinalities from (i) and (iii) 8 > 7 (true) or 8 > 10 (false). 
With Most2, in order to confirm that yellow dots form the larger of the 
two sets, the non-yellow set is selected directly. This results in higher 
accuracy than confirmation with Most1 where the non-yellow set is com-
puted. A ‘no’ judgment with Most2, however, results in significantly more 
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errors than with Most1, e.g., on a screen with 8 yellow and 10 blue dots.6 
Despite this puzzling effect of accuracy drop with Most2 on false screens, it 
is clear that each quantifier relies on a dedicated strategy for verification. 
Participants do not switch to the more advantageous strategy (e.g., they do 
not use Selection to more accurately confirm the truth of sentences with 
Most1, or Subtraction to more accurately disconfirm the truth of sentences 
with Most2). The two distinct accuracy patterns provide strong evidence that 
the lexical meaning of the functional morphemes that build up Most1 and 
Most2, and their logical syntax, are interfacing with the visual cognition dur-
ing the verification process. 
4	   Conclusions	  
Our experiments indicate that semantics provides a direct set of instructions 
to visual cognition processes. Each of the two Polish quantificational 
expressions większość (Most1) and najwięcej (Most2) biases a particular 
verification strategy that is used as a default under time pressure. Each 
canonical verification strategy overrides other cognitively available strategies 
for truth verification as proposed in Lidz et al. (2009). The following pre-
dictions were met: 
(i) Polish Most1, like English most, is verified using the Subtraction 
strategy. The accuracy in the verification of a sentence containing Most1 is 
sensitive to (i) the ratio between the cardinality of the target color set and (ii) 
the cardinality of the set of dots in other colors. Response accuracy was 
unaffected by the number of distractor color sets. The significant effect of 
ratio and no effect of the number of distractors with Polish Most1 directly re-
plicate the findings of Lidz et al. (2009) for English most.  
(ii) A closely related quantifier Most2 requires the Stepwise Selection 
strategy. The response accuracy with Most2 depends on both the ratio and the 
number of distractors. The availability of Stepwise Selection with Most2 
indicates that it is not psychophysics that precludes the use of Selection with 
Most1 and English most. This result provides direct evidence for the Interface 
Transparency Thesis put forth by Lidz et al. (2009), according to which very-
fication procedures bias those algorithms that directly compute the semantic 
representation. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 This result could be related to the so-called “confirmation bias” observed in psychology 
(Nickerson 1998), so that participants were more likely to overestimate the yellow set and 
underestimate the non-yellow set. On the 5:6 ratio condition the difference between the yellow 
and the non-yellow set was only 1-2 dots. 
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(iii) Our results also suggest that each verification strategy is canonical in that 
it is followed consistently for each lexical item. Specifically, this is indicated 
by the finding that the same group of participants behaved differently 
depending on the quantifier. On the two color condition where sentences with 
Most1 and Most2 were either both true or both false, participants did not 
switch to the more effective strategy; rather, the properties of the linguistic 
input directly influenced the unconscious decision making system associated 
with visual cognition. 
Importantly, the results confirm and extend the proposals and findings 
of Pietroski et al. (2008), Hackl (2009), Lidz et al. (2009) that the com-
positional semantics of quantifiers interacts in predictable ways with the 
visual system during verification. 
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Abstract. This paper explores the relevance of a goal directed characterisa-
tion of the internal structure of accomplishments. The notion of ‘plan’ enables
us to talk about the homogeneity and the continuity of the activity phase at a
sufficiently abstract level, and about non-homogeneity when one consider the
structure of instances of accomplishments in global terms, i.e. including culmi-
nations. Evidence is provided for this intensional characterisation that enriches a
definition the aspectual class based on temporal conditions.
1 Introduction
In this paper we examine arguments for appealing to event-centred criteria in
characterising accomplishments and more generally in identifying subevents.
Initial motivation for our inquiry came from facets of the interpretation of sen-
tence (1) highlighted by two situations in which it is appropriate.
(1) Max repaired the radio in one hour.
a. Max took to pieces only half of the device, worked on that half and
put it all back into one functioning unit in an hour.
b. Max fiddled around with the device for 15 minutes, sat still for 15
minutes and then worked with his hands actively on the device for
30 more minutes and succeeded.
In the situation described in (1a) the theme is not incrementally fully affected,
and in the situation described in (1b) action is not visible throughout the hour.
The first issue has been raised by Rothstein (2004) and presented as a problem
for the analysis of the telicity of accomplishments based on the notion of in-
cremental theme proposed by Krifka (1998). The second point, in our opinion,
raises a problem for Rothstein’s analysis based on temporal schemata, in which
the notion of incremental activity is characterised by a chain structure. In this
paper, we look at existing analyses in a perspective that gives prominence to
∗ Many thanks to the audiences at VIII Workshop on Formal Linguistics, Sinn & Bedeutung 15,
DIP-colloquium at University of Amsterdam, and to B. Copley, J. Guéron and D. Van de Velde for
comments and remarks.
614 Tovena
the goal oriented internal structure of accomplishments in their intensional def-
inition. We point out how the distinction between conceptual intensional events
and real extensional ones is fruitful for discussing the relation between the parts
within an accomplishment, not just between partial and completed events, as
done w.r.t. progressivised accomplishments. The notion of ‘plan’ – a term re-
ferring to the conceptualisation of an event driven by a goal – enables us to talk
about the homogeneity and the continuity of the activity phase of accomplish-
ments at a sufficiently abstract level, and about their non-homogeneity when
one consider the structure of instances of these events in global terms, i.e. in-
cluding the culmination. In section 2, we provide a quick review of key notions
on the aspectual class of accomplishments established by Vendler in his classic
contribution. In section 3, Krifka’s and Rothstein’s analyses are summarised
and the issues raised by example (1) are further discussed, then in section 4
we present a goal directed view of accomplishments and the proposal by van
Lambalgen & Hamm (2005). Empirical traces of plans and interaction between
plans and temporal information are discussed in section 5.
2 Accomplishments in Vendler’s Classification
Vendler (1967) has defined four classes that help us to classify the English
verbs according to the most common time schemata they imply. They are
states, activities, achievements, and accomplishments. Duration and homogene-
ity are two crucial properties in his classification. Duration is taken to ex-
plain the compatibility of accomplishments and activities with the progressive,
which involve periods of time. In this, they contrast with states and achieve-
ments, which involve time instants. Homogeneity is exploited for distinguish-
ing accomplishments from activities: “Any part of the process is of the same
nature as the whole”(Vendler 1967: p.101) only for the latter class, cf. their
different behaviour when combining with temporal adverbials of the form in #
time/ for # time. Activities go on in time in a homogeneous way. If Max ran for
an hour, then it is true that he ran at any time during that hour. On the contrary,
accomplishments are not homogeneous. If Max built a sand castle in an hour,
then it is not true that he built one at any time during that hour.
Grounding aspectual distinctions exclusively on temporal properties of
moments and intervals of time is not satisfactory, as Vendler himself noted.
The non-homogeneity of accomplishments follows from their characterising
property, i.e. their proceeding “toward a terminus which is logically neces-
sary to their being what they are”(Vendler 1967: p.101). As a consequence,
their temporal structure is organised into ordered parts, none of which includes
this terminus, apart from the very last one. This view naturally meshes with
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our conceptualisation of the event as made up of parts that are causally re-
lated at some level. In short, order and a local form of homogeneity are the
ingredients of Vendler’s notion of incrementality. Incrementality is relevant for
accomplishments and activities, as it goes together with duration, which sets
achievements aside, and with a form of change, which sets states aside.We turn
to it next.
3 Telicity and Incrementality of Accomplishments
3.1 Incrementality via a Homomorphism between Part Structures
Krifka (1998) characterises telicity (2) as the property of an event predicate X
that if it applies to an event e, then it does not apply to a part of e that begins
or ends at a different time. Thus, all parts of e that fall under X are initial (INI)
and final (FIN) parts of e.
(2) ∀X⊆UE [TELE (X)↔∀e,e’∈UE [X(e)∧X(e’)∧e’≤Ee→INIE (e’,e)∧FINE
(e’,e))]]
Quantised predicates, as opposed to cumulative ones, fall in the group of telic
event predicates. If an entity is in the denotation of a quantised predicate, it does
not have proper parts that also are in the denotation of the predicate. Quanti-
sation and cumulativity are relevant also for nominal predicates. The transfer
of properties from arguments to the event is regulated by conditions on the
thematic roles of the participants. They are mappings from the structure of the
object to that of the event and vice versa.
(3) mapping to subevents (MSE)
For all x,y in the domain of entities P and all e in the domain of events
E, MSE(θ ) iff θ(x,e)∧ y <P x→∃e′[e′ <E e∧θ(y,e′)]
(4) mapping to subobjects (MSO)
For all x in the domain of entities P and all e,e′ in the domain of events
E, MSO(θ ) iff θ(x,e)∧ e′ <E e→∃y[y <P x∧θ(y,e′)]
Strict incrementality is a property of theta roles and is defined by the joint effect
of MSE, MSO, a constraint that requires subevents that correspond to subob-
jects to be unique, a constraint that requires parts of an object to be participants
in unique subevents, and by excluding situations where both object and event
are atomic. The net result is that the extent of the incremental accomplishment
described in (5) is determined by the extent of the theme and the eating of the
last part of the apple marks the culmination of the eating event.
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(5) Max ate the apple.
As the event grows temporally in (5), the part of the path related to the event
via a theta role also grows (Krifka 1998). The path determines the incremental
structure of the event. However, one can truthfully utter sentence (1) to describe
situation (1a) where the theme is not incrementally fully affected, and telicity
would have to come from a quantised theme without MSE property.
(1) Max repaired the radio in one hour.
a. Max took to pieces only half of the device, worked on that half and
put it all back into one functioning unit in an hour.
Krifka is aware that the extent of the theme is too narrow a domain for the
homomorphism characterising the accomplishment, and has proposed to use
property scales measuring an abstract dimension rather than physical entities,
and considered specific pragmatic requirements.1Krifka’s proposal might be
modified by using very abstract property scales to measure events, not objects,
but this results in a departure from the appealing initial intuitions behind the
mappings between theme and event, that are the essence of his proposal.
3.2 Incrementality as Accumulating Quantities of a Process
Rothstein (2004) has claimed that the generalisation developed by Krifka does
not suffice to cover the reading (1a) where the theme is only partially involved.
In her analysis, an accomplishment is an activity paired with a BECOME event,
which is a change of state that ‘accompanies’ it.2 It has an incremental structure
built with stages3 (Rothstein 2004: 38), and its crucial role is to measure the
accomplishment’s progression. The activity part is related to the developmental
1 E.g. the eating in (5) is taken to be completed before the disappearance of the whole apple because
the core is disregarded. However, this type of pragmatic requirement concerns the identification of
the borders of the object, not its progressive coverage.
2 Dowty’s (1979) BECOME operator applied to Φ yields formulae true at non-minimal intervals
s.t. ¬Φ is true at the initial bound and Φ at the final one. Rothstein’s BECOME events characterise
the incremental part of change events ‘from ϕ to φ , where ϕ is a state which entails ¬φ ’(Rothstein
2004: p.155) and φ is the state lexically specified by the accomplishment predicate. It is not clear
how ϕ can be characterised other than as the stative antonym of φ by stipulation.
3 Rothstein’s proposal uses the notion of stage from (Landman 1992), which is an event e that
‘develops into’ e′ and shares with it relevant properties of the event description, i.e. not just any
part of e′ qualifies as a stage. For the purpose of accomplishments, a stage is a subevent e of the
process part that can be described by the same property that would be used to describe the process
part. The notion of stage helps Landman (1992) to ground the notion of normality, needed in his
modal analysis of the progressive, in the properties of the event descriptions. In this way he gets
around the problem noted in the literature that if a plan is associated with an agent, it cannot be
used for establishing truth conditions when there is no agent planner, e.g. with inanimate subjects.
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structure of the BECOME event via an incremental relation INCR4 that fixes
the order of the parts. In other words, an accomplishment is an incremental
process defined to be isomorphic to a chain lattice that encodes two essential
bits of information, namely incrementality and culmination. The incremental
component is represented via the chain structure and is defined w.r.t. an order
provided by pragmatics and associated to the activity part of the event. The
upper bound of the chain is said to coincide with the culmination that is to be
assigned to the activity part to build the whole accomplishment. The template
for accomplishments is as in (6).
(6) λyλe∃e1,e2[e=s(e1unionsqe2)
∧ ACTIVITY<X>(e1) ∧ Ag(e1)=x ∧ Th(e1)=y
∧ BECOME<Y>(e2) ∧Arg(e2)=Th(e1)
∧ INCR(e1,e2, C(e2))] (Rothstein 2004: p.108)
The radio lying untouched is a problem for Krifka’s proposal.5 Max’s being
idle is one for Rothstein’s because it does not fit in her chain structure of ho-
mogeneous stages. One can truthfully utter (1) to describe situation (1b) where
action is not visible throughout the hour, and the theme is not directly affected
at times like in (1a).
(1) Max repaired the radio in one hour.
b. Max fiddled around with the device for 15 minutes, sat still for 15
minutes and then worked with his hands actively on the device for
30 more minutes and succeeded.
Rothstein’s positing an incremental process amounts to grounding on the event
and on pragmatics the incrementality that Krifka grounds on the theme, but
when the activity part is not locally homogeneous, incrementality cannot be
grounded on it. Landman’s notion of stage is the counterpart of Dowty’s ac-
tivities downward closure postulate on intervals, as both characterise activities
and capture a local form of homogeneity in accomplishments.
4 INCR(e1,e2, C(e2)) in (6) reads as e1 is incrementally related to e2 w.r.t. the chain C(e2).
5 It might be one for Rothstein too, because the BECOME event is constrained to be a change
of state ‘which happens to the theme’ (Rothstein 2004: p.108). The situation is not entirely clear,
because either the BECOME event simply provides a temporal constraint and ensures the transition
from ¬P to P, in which case it could be disconnected from the theme; Or it defines a change in the
theme that should be incrementally regular, because of the chain structure.
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4 The Structure of Complex Events
4.1 The Link between the Parts
Both Krifka’s and Rothstein’s analyses pursue previous work. Krifka’s pro-
posal develops Dowty’s (1979), who models accomplishments and their telicity
in thematic terms. For Dowty, the attainment of a certain result state is caused
by the culmination of a process under the impetus of an agent. The operator
CAUSE he uses in the logical structure, helps him coding the difference be-
tween achievements and accomplishments thematically, in terms of causation
and not in terms of temporal properties of the event. In his view, “accomplish-
ments are partly defined by the changes of state with which they terminate”
(Dowty 1979: vii). In Dowty’s proposal, causality is expressed as a relation
between propositions rather than subevents, and is based on Lewis’s theory
of causal dependence according to whom a counterfactual dependence among
events is a counterfactual dependence among the corresponding propositions.6
According to Krifka, the culmination of the event is introduced indirectly in
the characterization of the event by identifying it thanks to the quantization of
the theme.
Rothstein’s proposal is reminiscent of Vendler’s aspectual classification
based on the temporal properties of the predicates. As seen above, for Vendler
two components are related, i.e. an accomplishment is a process terminated by
a finishing point expressed in the predicate, and the telicity that characterises
this type of predicates is brought about by a change corresponding to the transi-
tion to a resulting state. But he adds that “Somehow this climax casts its shadow
backward, giving a new colour to all that went before” (Vendler 1967: 102). In
a way, the whole event is named after the last link in a causal chain. Roth-
stein explicitly rejects any causal link between process and resulting state. She
leaves to pragmatic the task of saying something about the nature of this link,
but uses a sum of events to enforce temporal contiguity. In her proposal, the
increment in the event is computed w.r.t. a ‘natural and inherent order’ of the
parts of the event determined by real-world knowledge and represented by the
order in the chain structure of the BECOME event.
In Krifka’s and Rothstein’s analyses, the processive part and the culmina-
tion are not directly linked, they just belong to the same unit. The unity of the
event is constructed either all in the theme or all in the temporal structure. There
6 As a potential exception to his proposal, Dowty mentions the class ‘creation of a performance
object’, exemplified by produce a play, perform a sonata. Dowty notes that ‘the state of having
reached the end of the performance of a sonata does in a sense define the successful completion of
perform a sonata’(Dowty 1979: p.186), but adds that this is little enlightening (in contrast with the
crucial role of the coming into existence of a letter in the truth conditions of write a letter).
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is a form of identity that boils down to structural similarity. In the following, we
explore a way to capture the link in the spirit of Vendler’s quotation above. The
unity of accomplishments is grounded in their being events described as goal
driven. The notion of plan is not meant to place conditions directly on what the
process leading to the culmination consists of, rather it provides an intensional
definition that associates constraints on what can be going on at intermediary
stages with constraints on what the global view on the situation has to be.
4.2 Goal Oriented Actions and Plans
Suppose that Max is thinking about the problem during the 15 minutes of pause
sitting still in (1b). One may suggest that some repairing activity goes on all
the same. We still seem to have a problem in Rothstein’s approach, because the
incremental structure is defined in a way that can be read as a constraint impos-
ing homogeneity in a local form, via Landman’s notion of stage, while barring
it in a general form, since the telos must be excluded. Stages have been devised
by Landman to deal with the progressive, where coidentification of (sub)events
is possible because the model provides the set of possible extensions. But (1b)
highlights the difficulty in getting at an intensional characterisation of the as-
pectual class by looking at the extensional parts.
Continuity w.r.t. a goal is the second aspect of accomplishments to which
example (1) draws our attention. The continuity suggested by taking ‘sitting
still’ to mean ‘progress in the repairing by thinking about the problem’ is a
feature accomplishments share with activities. The change that marks the cul-
mination of an accomplishment is due to a force that drives the elements of the
whole structure continuously. The goal is an ingredient of the representation
of the event, but it is not a temporal relation on its parts. It is what enables us
to make sense of the complex internal structure of the event, since it recon-
ciles the activity part, which in itself needs not be strictly homogeneous – no
divisive lexical predicate is applied to it – but is seen as incremental, with an
entity being created, be it an abstract one like the state of a functioning radio
or a performed sonata, or less so abstract like a house. Lexical aspect classes
identify types of situations, which can then be described with linguistic expres-
sions. Plans are goal driven conceptualisations of eventualities and the expres-
sion of a plan relies on the fact that ‘Aktionsart’ choices are ways to encode an
event type while simultaneously possibly indicating related preceding and/or
subsequent event types. Rothstein’s incremental process and isomorphic chain
lattice amount to the unfolding of the plan and could be made to correspond to
the traversal of an abstract path in Krifka’s terms.
We are interested in plans to which we can refer with verbs and the con-
stituents they form. Plans lexicalised by predicates can be viewed as intensional
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characterisations of streamlined sequences of subevents. In intensional seman-
tics in the style of Lewis, expressions are represented by arbitrary functions of
(worlds and other) indices to sets of objects. Moschovakis (1994) has explored
an alternative view that may be more promising from the cognitive point of
view, according to which the intension of an expression is the algorithm that
computes its extension. An algorithm is a semantic object, a form of knowl-
edge representation that shows one how to use a set of operations she already
knows to compute a result.
A plan allows us to enforce the presence of some structure within the
event and may express a cause relation, but not necessarily one that is found
in the physical reality. We draw inspiration from the work of van Lambalgen
& Hamm (2005: 36), who say “Planning means setting a goal and computing
a sequence of actions which provably suffice to attain the goal.” In this frame-
work, a correct plan is like an abstract procedure according to which a goal is
surely achieved in every world in which the premises are met. We would add
that it is perceived as standardized at this abstract level.7
The plan is part of the description conveyed by the verb and is not the
making of a sentient agent, therefore it should be kept separate from contin-
gent epistemic considerations. It embodies the intensional property of telic sit-
uations and (complex) activities. The fact that an agent may have partial knowl-
edge of the world and the presence of contingent facts become relevant in the
realisation/implementation of a plan. Partial knowledge opens the possibility of
there being unexpected events that may affect the realisation of a plan, because
they may change properties in the context. Van Lambalgen and Hamm’s defi-
nition relates to the notion of minimal model, where the events that happen are
all and only those required to happen by the axioms of the system. This rests on
the idea that all changes must be due to a cause, and a property persists unless
an event causes its change. Normality is envisaged in terms of consequences
of a set of premises. In this way, it is possible to keep distinct the plan, which
is defined exclusively with respect to the goal, from its actualisation, which is
determined also by other states of affairs arising or falling back and which can
alter the compatibility of a world with the minimal model. In using a predicate,
the speaker commits herself to the validity of the intensional characterisation
w.r.t. her knowledge state. The commitment w.r.t. the actualisation is mediated
by temporal information, and progressivised accomplishments illustrate one of
the several nonmonotonic phenomena in natural language, cf. section 5.3.
7 The algorithmic process for a plan is far from standardized, as van Lambalgen (p.c.) points out.
When people agree on what the goal state is, variation could arise when defining what causes this
goal state, so as to perform the appropriate sequence of actions to get at it.
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4.3 Causes and Plans
We follow van Lambalgen & Hamm (2005) in seeing causation as a notion
pertaining to the physics of events, but relevant to humans in structuring a cog-
nitive plan from which (the description of) an event originates. Van Lambalgen
and Hamm implement Moschovakis idea of meaning as algorithm in an event
calculus in order to represent the semantics of verbs. They primarily use flu-
ents, which are time-dependent properties as well as partial changing objects,
and time-independent event types, which can initiate and terminate fluents.8
They characterise expressions in aspectual classes via an eventuality structure
that is a quadruple like in (7). Each element may be left empty or be filled
with an object of the appropriate category, i.e. e for an event and f for a fluent.
All the four elements are necessarily instantiated in eventualities representing
verbs in the accomplishment class.
(7) An eventuality is a structure ( f1, f2,e, f3), where
f1=cause: represents an activity, something that exherts a force;
f2=theme: represents a parametrised object or state, which is driven by
the force f1;
e=culmination: is the culminating event, representing the canonical goal;
f3=result state: represents the state of having achieved the goal.
Eventuality structures are used to build scenarios, which are a conjunction of
statements that state the specific causal relationship holding in a given situation.
An elaborate internal structure is specified for each entry, and variation from
person to person is allowed to a certain extent. These statements are expressed
in their event calculus, which contains a truth-predicate stating that a fluent f
holds true at a time point t, and four primitive predicates that are determined
by axioms or definitions.9 This apparatus is sufficient for the first of two dif-
ferent notions of cause van Lambalgen and Hamm use in defining the internal
structure of scenarios associated with lexical entries. This notion is concerned
with instantaneous change, e.g. a collision. The other notion is concerned with
change induced by ongoing action or due to a force that exherts its influence
continuously and culminates in the result state, e.g. filling a bucket or pushing
a cart. Continuous change is concerned with incremental processes and is mod-
elled using two other primitive predicates of the calculus, devised for changing
8 The entity event represents actions with or without being initiated by an agent. A fluent is the
transformation of first-order formulae into terms. Events happen and fluents hold, so that they can
be arguments for the truth-predicate.
9 They concern: i) a fluent that is true initially in the discourse considered and not interrupted or
terminated; ii) an event type e that happens at time point t (thus becoming an event token); iii) an
event that initiates a fluent or iv) terminates it.
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partial objects. Trajectory states that if a fluent holds from time point t to t+d,
then at t +d another fluent starts to hold. This predicate establishes the causal
link and allows us to represent e.g. a force whose influence changes the degree
of completion of a house in a building event, with no need to assume a full
house in some possible world. Release states that the law of inertia10 is sus-
pended so that a force can have an impact on a fluent. This predicate allows
a modification of the stages of an object without specification of concomitant
occurrences of events causing the changes, hence it captures the intuition that
e.g. there aren’t separate actions that initiate and terminate the fluents height(x)
for various values of x in an event of filling a bucket. Together, they enable us
to represent the situation in (1) both if the functioning property is viewed as
acquired gradually or all at once at the end.
In accomplishments, the force is the tension toward the goal and this gives
conceptual unity and homogeneity to a potentially disparate set of subevents.
In particular, the identification of the goal is what enables us to apply the
same description, e.g. ‘build a house’, to different sets of subevents, cf. the dif-
ferent building processes followed in different cultures. The increment needs
not correspond to fluents representing physical properties of a theme, as illus-
trated by example (1). Differences are all the more evident in the case of non-
conventionalised accomplishments. The different streamlined sets of subevents
correspond to different programs that implement Moschovakis’s abstract algo-
rithm corresponding to Frege’s sense or intension, and to our plan, which they
all share. Such sets or programs compute/determine the denotation of the term,
Frege’s referent, and justify its belonging to a specific coherent class.
5 Plan’s Empirical Traces and Other Considerations
5.1 The Plan’s Continuity: Gaps, Lulls and Superevents
As pointed out above, sentence (1) can be used to describe situation (1b) where
action might not be visible throughout the time interval. We have proposed
that the change that marks the culmination of an accomplishment is presented
as due to a force that exherts its influence continuously. The plan encodes the
continuity of the tension towards the goal of repairing the radio, and is un-
affected by Max’s sitting and thinking. His searching the space of causes of
faulting functioning is part of the progression towards the goal.
This view of plans as encoding a tension towards the goal extends to
activities, where the goal is the actualisation of the activity itself. In this sense,
activities can be viewed as culminating at each minimal subinterval. In our
10 Expressible as ‘normally, nothing changes’, this law takes care of the properties that do not
change as the result of an action, cf. the Frame Problem identified in artificial intelligence.
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view, this tension is at the root of the homogeneity Landman (2008) is after in
his discussion of lulls in a Vienna waltz, during which a person is ‘dancing’
also when standing still, at particular points in the sequence of steps. Landman
identifies two axes that we interpret as follows. There is an incremental axis of
progression for the event, along which the plan of the waltzing is mapped, and
which is projected onto a segmental axis for time along which the actualisation
is plotted. Landman insists that progression on the incremental axis is possible
as long as we are willing to say that the same event is continuing. We link
such willingness to the adherence to the plan. Specifications on the intention of
the agent may be added. In his example, dancing a Vienna waltz is a complex
activity socially defined according to a plan. The dancers must stand still at
given times, but the temporal trace of the event contains no gaps because of
this, because all subevents of the object under description in the incremental
axis are parts that can be added along the segmental axis.
Gaps usually come from other events, and correspond to subintervals
whose length should not be added to the duration of a given event. But negligi-
ble interruptions cannot be told apart from non negligible interruptions merely
in temporal terms, because they may or may not be seen to belong to the incre-
mental axis, as illustrated by the phenomenon of event-internal pluractionality
(Tovena 2010). The plan needs to be taken into consideration. Consider first an
accomplishment. Sentence (8a) is not understood to say that Luisa never ever
stopped in her eating the apple, e.g. to scratch her nose. Sentence (8b) also does
not bar negligible interruptions, yet it presents the eating as being discontinu-
ous in a way (8a) is not. The same modification is possible in activities, cf. (9).
The goal oriented view tells us how to sort subevents into parts that belong to a
bigger event, and gaps that do not. The verb in (8b) helps one to make precise
that the event contained lulls that come under the same event description, hence
cannot be neglected in computing the duration although the ‘rule’ that gaps are
not taken into account applies as usual. In a mangiucchiare-event, the eating
is ‘purposefully’ disrupted w.r.t. its canonical unfolding, in the sense that these
idle times are presented as relevant for the standard communicative goal for
which that type of sentence can be used. The suffix on the verb in (8b) overtly
marks that the plan has been modified with respect to its canonical form.
(8) a. Luisa ha mangiato la mela. (Italian)
‘L. ate the apple.’
b. Luisa ha mangiucchiato la mela.
‘L. ate the apple on and off.’
(9) a. Luisa ha dormito tutto il giorno.
‘L. slept the whole day.’
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b. Luisa ha dormicchiato tutto il giorno.
‘L. dozed (fitfully) the whole day.’
Going back to situation (1a) once more, we see that the continuity of the plan
is preserved even in case there are some false starts or failed attempts, in the
sense of wrong diagnosis of the problem, which is not the case for the in-
cremental process the way is defined by Rothstein. A goal oriented view of
accomplishments makes it possible to see the analogy between false starts and
the case of events that have parts that do not directly affect a portion of the
theme, e.g. putting up or taking down the scaffolding in an event of building a
house, which (Rothstein 2004: 9) considers to be a serious problem for Krifka’s
theory of incrementality.
Up to here, what said was useful for ‘plain’ and progressivised accom-
plishments alike. Example (10) shows an interesting discrepancy w.r.t. identi-
fying superevents. The issue was discussed by Ogihara (1989), who talks of the
need of seeing a (coherent) unit for the agent when an amalgamation of some
atomic events counts as collective event.
(10) Max ate/ #was eating three rolls.
Ogihara refers to the agent’s intention, which is external to our notion of plan.
However, the simple past presents iteration of atoms and unique superevent
as equivalent interpretive options, while the latter is the one required for the
progressive and not directly supported by a plan. This observation boosts the
idea of algorithm as a piece of descriptive knowledge with a classificatory role
more than as a way to compute uses and get extensions. van Lambalgen and
Hamm’s treatment seems to ascribe equal felicity to the options in (10).
5.2 Agency and Accomplishments
Prototypical accomplishments can be combined felicitously with manner ad-
verbs, cf. (11). The modification can be seen as introducing an additional con-
dition which is the availability of an agent. Yet, the notion of plan is not inher-
ently associated with that of a (volitional) agent. The data in this section show
that this is the typical case but it is not the expression of a constraint.
(11) Louise intentionally crossed the street.
Accomplishments with inanimate subjects, seem not to naturally occur as the
complement of finir (finish), which is a typical test for telicity, cf. (12).11,12
11 Thanks to Brenda Laca for the observation and the example.
12 The complement of finir must be introduced by de for the telicity test to work. When it is
introduced by par we get the inchoative reading, which is fine for the corresponding form of (12a).
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(12) a. #Les vagues ont fini de creuser un trou dans le rocher. (French)
‘The waves finished digging a hole in the rock.’
b. Les vagues ont creusé un trou dans le rocher.
‘The waves digged a hole in the rock.’
The problem could be due to finir and its requirement for a volitional agent
subject, rather than to telicity. However, first, note that (12a) remains odd even
if we add a volitional agent (13). Second, inanimate subjects are not completely
ruled out, if the unfolding of the event follows a program (14). Furthermore,
the telicity of the predicate in (12b) is not so well established although it passes
the test with in # time, see (15) where tout works as an egressive marker.
(13) #Max a fini de creuser un trou dans le rocher.
‘M finished digging a hole in the rock.’
(14) La machine a fini de laver le linge.
‘The washing machine finished washing (the linen).’
(15) #Max/#Les vagues ont creusé tout un trou dans le rocher.
‘M/The waves digged up a hole in the rock.’
The contrast between (12a) and (14), and the marginality of (15), are explained
away in terms of whether it is possible to add to the implementation of a plan
a constraint defining an action terminating the process which is not specified
only contextually. The vagueness of creuser un trou does not seem to interfere
with the need for picking a time at which the result state of a hole being there
holds (12b), but it does interfere when such a time should mark the completion
of the digging (15). In other words, we may not be sure of when exactly the
predicate starts to hold, but we feel confident enough to judge when the time
is inside the interval at which the sentence is taken to express a true proposi-
tion. When the identification of such an exact time is relevant, as in (12a) and
(15), the vagueness of the predicate affects the felicity of the sentence. Recall
also Dowty’s observation that the conventional implicature of finish should in-
clude the ‘definability’ of the property describing the whole event in terms of
the properties of its steps. Typically, the characteristics of a perspective taken
on a situation are the intentional state of the agent, but they can also be the
characteristics of the physical layout of the relevant actors in the situation, cf.
(16).
(16) The tomatoes finished ripening.
Tomatoes do not ‘plan’ to ripen, but it is in the nature of fruit to do so, and the
scenario would contain actions that are natural events with no specified agent.
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Culmination is determined by a given value in the dimension along which the
progression is recorded. The terminating point is the onset of the state denoted
by the adjective from which the deadjectival verb is derived, cf. (Kearns 2007).
5.3 Plans and Temporal Information
The notion of normality mentioned above, envisaged in terms of consequences
of a set of premises and axioms, is relevant for the expression of a plan via
the assertion of a proposition expressed by a sentence containing given lexical
expressions. Hence, the speaker commits herself to the feasibility of the plan in
the actual world at speech time with respect to reference time. Normality con-
cerns the applicability of a plan. Actualisation usually requires normality up to
completion. When speech time precedes the final time of the eventuality under
discussion, a second form of normality checking is possible and concerns the
actualisation of the plan. Here is where unexpected events enter the scene and
nonmonotonicity is relevant. A first case to mention is due to the progressive
aspect and is known as the ‘imperfective paradox’. Although PROG ϕ entails
ϕ for atelic predicates, such as run – e.g. (17a) entails (17b) – this entailment
seems not to hold for telic predicates, such as build a hut in (18), in which an
event’s anticipated culmination is at issue.
(17) a. Max was running.
b. Max ran.
(18) a. Max was building a hut.
b. Max built a hut.
In possible worlds modal-style analyses (cf. Dowty 1979; Landman 1992), pro-
gressive creates an intensional context, and it is enough for completion to take
place in worlds in the set of inertia worlds or in the closest world to which it
is reasonable to move. Instead, we suggest that by assuming that plans come
with sets of conditions that must be met when the scenario starts, the speaker
commits herself to the feasibility of the plan in the actual world at utterance
time w.r.t. reference time, not to its completion. The point of interruption past
which one would move counterfactually can only be brought about by unex-
pected events, which are external to the commitment. Truth conditions for sen-
tences with progressive forms must include compatibility between the world
at reference time and the conditions on the model imposed by the predicate,
but no commitment is taken on the full realisation, i.e. on the stability of the
model. The counterfactual move is not required in a nonmonotonic approach
(Hamm & van Lambalgen 2003).
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Futurate sentences contain verbs in present tense form and convey that a future-
oriented eventuality is planned (19). They are another relevant configuration.
Here speech time precedes the initial time of the eventuality.
(19) Exams begin next week.
Futurates assert the existence of a plan providing for the actualisation of an
eventuality according to Copley (2008). Our notions of plan differ, and we
think that the commitment is not so strong, although it is heavier than in the
case of choosing a progressivised accomplishment predicate. The plans be-
hind accomplishments are not concerned with positioning goals in time. The
futurate reading looks as if the speaker commits herself to the fact that the pre-
misses are satisfied at utterance time w.r.t. reference time concerning an event
that is to be started in the future. She minimally commits herself to not fore-
seeing events that could interfere with the applicability of the plan, throughout
the interval up to the beginning of the actualisation, temporally suspending
nonmonotonicity.
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Nominal Reference in two Classifier Languages∗
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Abstract. In this paper, we first present observations that have been made con-
cerning the distribution and interpretation of nominals in Mandarin Chinese and
propose an account for them. We will then contrast Mandarin Chinese with Viet-
namese, and show that differences with respect to the syntax and semantics of
noun phrases between these two languages can be reduced to the fact that they
differ minimally in lexical resource. Implications of the analysis for a theory of
semantic variation are also discussed.
1 Mandarin Chinese
Mandarin Chinese is a “classifier" language of the East Asian variety. Thus,
count nouns in this language cannot combine directly with numerals without
the mediation of grammatical morphemes: the classifiers (cf. Ren 1968; Cheng
& Sybesma 1999, 2005; Lee 1986; Li & Thompson 1989; Shyu 1995; Tang
1990; Tsai 1994, 2001; Xu 1996). For example, ‘one dog’ has to be expressed
as yi zhi gou, where yi is the numeral ‘one’ and gou is the word for ‘dog’. The
word zhi is the classifier which enables gou to combine with yi, so to speak.
I am going to assume, following several works, that the numeral c-commands
both the classifier and the noun, and that the classifier c-commands the noun,
as in (1).
(1) NumP
Num
yi
CLP
CL
*(zhi)
NP
gou
It turns out that each constituent of NumP can appear independently in sen-
tences. For example, the bare noun gou, the classifier phrase zhi gou and the
numeral phrase yi zhi gou can all be arguments of verbs. However, these cat-
egories differ both in distribution and interpretation. This fact is captured suc-
∗ I thank Irene Heim and Gennaro Chierchia for valuable discussion.
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cinctly in a quote from Cheng & Sybesma (2005: 263): “In Mandarin, bare
NPs can be interpreted as definite, indefinite or generic. Num-CL-NPs [nu-
meral phrases] and CL-NPs [classifier phrases] are invariably indefinite [...]
All indefinites occur in postverbal position only.”1 Cheng and Sybesma’s ob-
servation is replicated by several other researchers, and will be illustrated with
examples in the following subsections. Some facts which pertain to the use
of nominals as predicatives (i.e. complements of the copula verb) will also be
presented. These, to the best of my knowledge, are novel.
1.1 Interpretation of NP
The sentences in (2) exemplify the interpretation of NP in subject positions:
(2a) shows that bare nouns (NPs) can be definite, singular or plural, and (2b-c)
evidence the generic reading of NP, both as arguments of individual-level pred-
icates such as ‘to be intelligent,’ and kind-predicates such as ‘to be extinct.’
(2) a. Gou
dog
yao
want
guo
cross
malu
road
(Cheng & Sybesma 1999: 510)
‘The dog(s) / *a dog / *dogs want(s) to cross the street’
b. Gou
dog
hen
very
jiling
smart
(Yang 2001: 20)
‘The dog(s) / dogs is/are intelligent’
c. Gou
dog
juezhong
extinct
le
ASP
(Rullmann & You 2006: 176)
‘Dogs are extinct’
The sentences in (3) are examples of NP in post-verbal position. We can see
that NP in object positions has all the readings that NP in subject positions has,
plus the indefinite reading, which is number-neutral. Thus, kanjian gou (see
dog) can mean ‘see the dog,’ ‘see the dogs,’ ‘see a dog,’ or ‘see (some) dogs.’
(3) a. Wo
I
kanjian
see
gou
dog
le
ASP
(Rullmann & You 2006: 176)
‘I saw the dog(s) / a dog / dogs’
1 As can be seen from their examples, Cheng and Sybesma intended the term “generic” to
mean both ‘kind-refering’ (or ‘D-generic’), as in dogs will be extinct, and ‘characterizing’ (or
‘I-generic’), as in dogs like meat (Krifka 1987; Krifka, Pelletier, Carlson, ter Meulen, Chierchia
& Link 1995). We will use “generic” in the same way here. Note, also, that we exclude from the
discussion the so-called “quantity interpretation” of numeral phrases (‘five children cannot finish
ten bowls of rice’), under which these phrases can occupy subject positions (Li 1998). If the anal-
ysis proposed below is correct, numeral phrases in this reading must have more structure than that
represented in (1). I leave this topic to future research.
Two Classifier Languages 631
b. Wo
I
xihuan
like
gou
dog
(Cheng & Sybesma 1999: 510)
‘I like dogs’
c. Turing
Turing
faming
invent
dyannao
computer
(Leo Chen personal communication)
‘Turing invented the computer’
(4a) and (4b) illustrate the use of NP as predicatives (Leo Chen, T.-C. James
Huang, Zhang Min personal communication). Again, we witness number-neu-
trality: the bare noun gou can be predicated of a singular subject like Fido, or
a plural one like Fido and Pluto.
(4) a. Fido
Fido
shi
be
gou
dog
‘Fido is a dog’
b. Fido
Fido
he
and
Pluto
Pluto
shi
be
gou
dog
‘Fido and Pluto are dogs’
1.2 Interpretation of CLP
The next category, CLP [classifier phrase], can only appear in post-verbal posi-
tions, as evidenced by the contrast in (5). In addition, it can only be interpreted
as a singular indefinite: (5a) has the implicature that the speaker bought one
but not two books.
(5) a. Zuotian
yesterday
wo
I
mai
buy
le
ASP
ben
CL
shu
book
(Rullmann & You 2006: 175)
‘I bought a book yesterday’
b. *Zhi
CL
gou
dog
yao
want
guo
cross
malu
road
(Cheng & Sybesma 2005: 262)
Just like NP, CLP can function as predicatives. However, it differs from NP
in that it requires a singular subject: zhi gou can be predicated of a singular
individual such as John, but not of a sum individual such as Fido and Pluto
(Leo Chen, T.-C. James Huang, Zhang Min, personal communication).
(6) a. John
John
shi
be
zhi
CL
gou
dog
‘John is a dog’
b. *Fido
Fido
he
and
Pluto
Pluto
shi
be
zhi
CL
gou
dog
(‘Fido and Pluto are dogs’)
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1.3 Interpretation of NumP
The numeral phrase has basically the same syntax and semantics as the clas-
sifier phrase: it can only appear in post-verbal positions, and interpreted as an
indefinite, as (7) shows.
(7) a. Wo
I
kan
read
le
ASP
san
three
ben
CL
shu
book
(Yang 2001: :133)
‘I read three books’
b. *Sange
three
xuesheng
student
zai
at
xuexiao
school
shoushang
hurt
le
ASP
(Li 1998: :694)
(‘Three students were hurt at school’)
c. *yi
one
zhi
CL
gou
dog
xihuan
like
chi
eat
rou
meat
(Cheng & Sybesma 2005: :262)
(‘A dog (generally) likes to eat meat’)
NumP can also appear post-copula, in which case the subject must match the
predicative in number. (8) shows that the phrase liang zhi gou (two CL dog)
can be predicated of Fido and Pluto, but not of Fido alone.
(8) a. Fido
Fido
he
and
Pluto
Pluto
shi
be
liang
two
zhi
CL
gou
dog
‘Fido and Pluto are two dogs’
b. *Fido
Fido
shi
be
liang
two
zhi
CL
gou
dog
1.4 Summary
The facts just described are summarized in (9). The generalization is that all
nominal categories can be indefinites or predicatives, but only bare nouns can
be generic or definite. Furthermore, Mandarin Chinese does not allow indefi-
nite subjects.
(9) Generalizations about Chinese NP, CLP and NumP
a. Indefinite and predicative: all categories
b. Definite and generic: NP
c. Subjects cannot be indefinite
1.5 The Universe of Discourse
We turn now to the analysis. The starting point will be a domain of quantifi-
cation U which contains both singularities and pluralities (U = {a,b,c, ...,a+
b,b+ c,a+ b+ c, ...}), as assumed in many previous works (Chierchia 1998;
Landman 1989; Link 1983; Schwarzschild 1996). The sum operator + which
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maps singular to plural individuals, and the ‘part of’ relation ≤ which partially
orders U , are understood in the usual way (i.e. x+x= x,x+y= y+x,(x+y)+
z = x+(y+ z),x≤ y↔ x+ y = y).
It would help to define two notions which will feature in the analysis to
be developed below. First, given any subset P of U , an atom of P, or a P-atom,
will be a P-individual which has no proper part which is itself a P-individual.
(10) Atoms of P
x ∈ AT (P) iff x ∈ P∧∀y((y ∈ P∧ y≤ x)→ (y = x))
⇒ ‘x is a P atom iff x is P and has no proper part which is P’
Second, the maximal element of P will be that individual which has every
element of P as part. This definition employs the notion ‘supremum of P’,
which is defined in (12).
(11) Maximal element of P
MAX(P) = SUP(P) if SUP(P) ∈ P, undefined otherwise
⇒ ‘The maximal element of P is that individual in P which has every
individual in P as part’
(12) Supremum of P
x ∈ P→ x≤ SUP(P) and ∀y(y ∈ P→ y≤ z)→ SUP(P)≤ z
⇒ ‘The supremum of P is the smallest individual that has every ele-
ment of P as part’
To illustrate, suppose P = {a,b,a+ b}. Then, MAX(P) = SUP(P) = a+ b.
If P = {a}, then MAX(P) = SUP(P) = a. If P = {a,b}, SUP(P) = a+ b
but MAX(P) is undefined. A consequence of (11) is that if P = AT (P), then
MAX(P) is defined only if P is a singleton.2
Last but not least, I assume that U contains a set G of kinds. Following
Chierchia (1998) and Chierchia & Turner (1988), I assume that kinds are atoms
of the universe, i.e. G⊆ AT (U). At the same time, they are intensional entities,
or more precisely, they are individual concepts, i.e. G ⊆UW . The idea is that
each kind k is an individual correlate of a property P: it maps each possible
world w to the sum individual which encompasses all individuals which are P
in w. This will be made more precise below.
2 To see this, let P = AT (P) and MAX(P) be defined. It follows from the definition of MAX
(11) that there is some x such that (i) MAX(P) = x, (ii) x = SUP(P), and (iii) x ∈ P. Given that
P = AT (P), it follows that (iv) x ∈ AT (P). Now suppose P is not a singleton. Then there is some
y such that (v) y ∈ P and (vi) y 6= x. Given the definition of SUP (12), it follows from (ii) and (v)
that (vii) y ≤ x. Given the definition of AT (10), it follows from (iv), (v) and (vii) that y = x. But
(vii) contradicts (vi). Thus, P is a singleton. QED.
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1.6 Semantic Interpretation
1.6.1 Predicatives
I turn now to the semantics of nominals in Mandarin Chinese. Following Chier-
chia (1998), I assume that nouns in classifier languages are “cumulative” pred-
icates, and that the function of CL is to make predicates “atomic.” The defini-
tions of “atomic” and “cumulative” are given in (13). Basically, X is an atomic
predicate if the extension of X necessarily consists of atoms of X , and X is a
cumulative predicate iff the extension of X is necessarily a set closed under the
sum operation (cf. Krifka 1989; Quine 1960).
(13) X is an atomic predicate iff JXKw = AT (JXKw)
X is a cumulative predicate iff JXKw =+AT (JXKw)3
The classifier CL is defined as in (14). It denotes the atomizing function AT ,
which applies to a set and yields the atoms of this set.
(14) JCLKw ⊆ D<e,t>×D<e,t>JCL XKw = AT (JXKw)
From the definition of CL in (14), we can derive the theorem that classifier
phrases are atomic predicates.
(15) Theorem 1
[CL X ] is an atomic predicate4
We can now explain the predicative use of NP and CLP. Since NP is cumu-
lative, its extension includes both singularities and pluralities, which means it
can be true of both singular and plural individuals, as shown in (16a-b). Since
CLP is atomic, it can be true of only singular individual, as shown in (16c-d).
Assuming that analytically false sentences are ungrammatical (cf. Von Fintel
1993; Gajewski 2003; Abrusán 2007) we explain the contrast seen in (6).
(16) a. JFido shi gouKw = 1 iff JFidoKw ∈ {a,b,c,a+ b,b+ c,a+ c,a+
3 +P is the closure of P under +, i.e. +P = {SUP(Q) : Q⊆ P}. For example, if P = {a,b,c} then
+P= {a,b,c,a+b,b+c,a+c,a+b+c}. In this and all subsequent definitions, free variables are
to be understood as universally quantified over.
4 We prove Theorem 1 by proving that JCL XKw = AT (JCL XKw). Given the definition of CL (14),
this means proving that AT (JXKw) = AT (AT (JXKw)), or more generally that AT (P) = AT (AT (P)),
i.e. that x ∈ AT (P) iff x ∈ AT (AT (P)). Now it follows from the definition of AT (10) that if x ∈
AT (AT (P)) then x ∈ AT (P). The same definition implies that we can prove the other direction by
showing that if x ∈ AT (P) then ((y ∈ AT (P)∧ y ≤ x)→ (y = x)), i.e. that if (i) x ∈ AT (P), (ii)
y ∈ AT (P) and (iii) y ≤ x, then y = x. Given, again, the definition of AT (10), it follows from (ii)
that (iv) y ∈ P, and from (i), (iv) and (iii) that y = x. QED.
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b+ c}
b. JFido he Pluto shi gouKw = 1 iff JFidoKw+JPlutoKw ∈{a,b,c,a+
b,b+ c,a+ c,a+b+ c}
c. i JFido shi zhi gouKw = 1 iff JFidoKw ∈ {a,b,c}
d. JFido he Pluto shi zhi gouKw = 1 iff JFidoKw+JPlutoKw ∈{a,b,c},
i.e. iff ⊥
As for the numeral phrase NumP, we follow Ionin & Matushansky (2006) and
assume that only individuals of the same cardinality can be counted. One way
to flesh out this idea is to require that the predicate P which is the complement
of a numeral necessarily contain only individuals of the same number of P-
parts. This is written into the definition of numerals, as exemplified by the
definition of liang in (17).5
(17) JliangKw ⊆ D<e,t>×D<e,t>Jliang XKw is defined iff ∃n(∀w′(∀u(u ∈ JXKw′ → |u|JXKw′ = n)))
If defined, Jliang XKw = λx(x ∈+JXKw∧|x|JXKw = 2)
From (17) we can derive the theorem that the complement of liang must be an
atomic predicate, and also that the numeral phrase itself is an atomic predicate.
(18) Theorem 2 - Jliang XKw is defined iff X is an atomic predicate6
(19) Theorem 3 - Jliang XKw is an atomic predicate7
The predicative use of NumP follows: as liang zhi gou (two CL dog) denotes a
set of pluralities of dogs, or more precisely a set of duos of dogs, only a plural
individual like Fido and Pluto can be in that set. A singular individual like Fido
cannot be in the extension of liang zhi gou. Again, assuming that analytically
false sentences are ungrammatical, we explain the contrast seen in (8).
(20) a. JFido he Pluto shi liang zhi gouKw = 1 iff JFidoKw + JPlutoKw ∈
{a+b,b+ c,a+ c}
5 Notationally, |x|P denotes the number of P-parts of x, i.e. |x|P = #{y|y ∈ P∧ y≤ x}.
6 Theorem 2 is proved as follows. Suppose X is not atomic. From the definition of “atomic" (13),
it follows that for some w′, AT (JXKw′ ) 6= JXKw′ , hence AT (JXKw′ )⊂ JXKw′ . This means that there
exists some u ∈ JXKw′ such that u /∈ AT (JXKw′ ), which means there is some v ∈ JXKw′ such that
v < u, i.e. such that |v|JXKw′ 6= |u|JXKw′ . It follows from (17) that Jliang XKw is not defined. Now
suppose X is atomic. Then for all w′, JXKw′ = AT (JXKw′ ), hence for all w′, |u|JXKw′ = 1 for all
u ∈ JXKw′ , which means that Jliang XKw is defined. QED.
7 Here is the proof. Suppose JliangXKw is not an atomic predicate. Then for some w′, JliangXKw′
contains v and u such that v 6= u and v+u= u. By assumption, |v|JXKw′ = |u|JXKw′ = 2. As v+u= u,
|v+u|JXKw′ = |u|JXKw′ = 2, which means v = u. This contradicts our assumption. QED.
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b. JFido shi liang zhi gouKw = 1 iff JFidoKw ∈ {a+ b,b+ c,a+ c},
i.e. iff ⊥
1.6.2 Generics
We now come to the generic reading of nominals. First, let us consider D-
genericity, i.e. kind-predication exemplified by sentences such as ‘dogs are ex-
tinct’ or ‘dogs are related to wolves.’
Chierchia (1998) advances a theory of kind reference which include the
following assumptions. (i) There is a linguistic operator – which we will sym-
bolize as “K” in this paper – that maps nominal predicates (i.e. expressions of
type < e, t >) into names of kinds (i.e. expressions of type e). (ii) Kinds are
“individual concepts of some sort [...] functions from worlds [...] into plural-
ities, the sum of all instances of the kind [...].” (iii) The operator is a partial
function, which means that some nominal predicates are not in its domain, i.e.
“not all individual concepts are going to be kinds” (Chierchia 1998: 349-350).
We will adopt these assumptions. We flesh out Chierchia’s idea in the
following definition of K.
(21) JKKw ⊆ D<e,t>×GJK XKw = λw(MAX(JXKw)) if JK XKw ∈ G, undefined otherwise
Thus, K combines with a predicate X and yields an individual concept, a func-
tion from each possible world w to the maximal X-individual in w. Further-
more, the individual concept denoted by [K X] must be a kind: [K X] is unde-
fined if it does not denote a kind.
Given the definition of K, it is clear how to generate kind-predication
sentences, i.e. the D-generic reading. The LF of ‘dog extinct’ will be something
like (22a), which will have the meaning that the kind dog, or canis, is extinct.
(22) a. α
β
K gou
γ
juezhong le
b. JαKw = 1 iff canis ∈ JextinctKw
Let us now turn to the I-generic reading, as exemplified by sentences such as
“dogs are intelligent.” We will assume, following several works, that the I-
generic reading comes about via a generic operator, GEN, which takes a kind
and returns a generalized quantifier (Krifka 1987; Krifka et al. 1995; Chierchia
1998). Basically, GEN takes a kind and a predicate and returns true iff instances
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of the kind generally fall under the predicate. The definition of GEN is given
in (23).8
(23) JGEN XKw is defined iff JXKw ∈ G
If defined, JGEN XKw = λP<e,t>(generallyx(x≤ JXKw(w)→ x ∈ P))
So a sentence such as ‘dogs are intelligent’ will have the LF in (24).
(24) a. α
β
GEN γ
K gou
δ
hen jiling
b. JαKw = 1 iff generallyx(x ≤ JK gouKw(w)→ x ∈ Jhen jilingKw),
i.e. iff it is generally the case that instances of canis in w are
intelligent in w.
We have explain how bare nouns can have the generic reading, i.e. how they
can denote kinds and restrict GEN. It remains to explain why classifier and
numeral phrases cannot be generic. Again, we will base the explanation on an
idea in Chierchia (1998: :350), namely that “something which is necessarily
instantiated by just one individual [...] would not quality as a kind” (Chierchia
1998: 350). We explicate this idea by postulating the constraint in (25), which
basically says that [K X ] would denote a kind only if for some world w’, the
sum individual which represents [K X ] in w’ is plural. We have defined [K X ]
as function from worlds to MAX(X). This means that [K X ] is a kind only if
MAX(X) consists of more than one X-atoms in some possible world.
(25) JK XKw ∈ G only if for some w′, |MAX(JXKw′)|AT (JXKw′ ) > 1.
Thus, a predicate like gou ‘dog’ can combine with K because there is a possible
world where the maximal dog consists of more than one dog-atom. But a pred-
icate like ‘being identical to Gennaro Chierchia’ will not be able to combine
with K, because in every world, the maximal element in this predicate consists
of exactly one Gennaro atom. Given (25), we can prove that K cannot com-
bine with an atomic predicate, because if X is an atomic predicate, MAX(X) is
8 The generic operator assumed in Chierchia (1998) also selects a kind as its restrictor, even though
this is not stated explicitly in Chierchia’s paper (I thank Gennaro Chierchia for pointing this out to
me). For how the word “generally" in the definition of GEN is to be understood, see Krifka (1987);
Krifka et al. (1995).
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either undefined or contain just one X-atom.9
(26) Theorem 4JK XKw is undefined if X is an atomic predicate
Because genericity is expressed via kind-reference, and kind reference requires
cumulative predicates, it follows that classifier phrases and numeral phrases
cannot have a generic interpretation, because as we have proved, both of these
categories are atomic predicates.
1.6.3 Definites
We come now to the definite reading of nominals. Recall that in Chinese, only
bare nouns can be definite. Given that only bare nouns can denote kind, this
fact suggests that definiteness is also expressed via kind-reference in Chinese.
It turns out that there is a very natural way that this can be done. We have
defined kinds as function from worlds to maximal individuals, and it is run
of the mills to analyze definiteness in terms of maximality (cf. Kadmon 1990;
Roberts 2003; Sharvy 1980). So all we have to do is to define an operator EXT
which takes an individual concept and applies it to the evaluation world.10
(27) JEXT XKw = JXKw(w)
This means that EXT combined with [K X ] will give us the meaning of ‘the
X .’ It also means that only [K X ] can combine with EXT , because only [K X ]
denotes an intension. And since only bare nouns can combine with K, only
bare nouns can be definite. So the LF in (28a) will give us the meaning ‘the
dog is intelligent’ in a world where there is exactly one dog, and the meaning
‘the dogs are intelligent’ in a world where there are more than one dogs.
9 Theorem 4 is proved as follows. Let X be an atomic predicate and w′ be a world. Given the
definition of “atomic predicate” (13), JXKw′ = AT (JXKw′ ). We have proved in footnote 2 that
MAX(JXKw′ ) is defined only if JXKw′ is a singleton. Thus, |MAX(JXKw′ )|AT (JXKw′ ) = n only if
n = 1. Since w′ is an arbitrary choice, no w′′ is such that |MAX(JXKw′′ )|AT (JXKw′′ ) = n and n 6= 1.
This means that no w′′ is such that |MAX(JXKw′′ )|AT (JXKw′′ ) > 1. Given the constraint on G (25),JK XKw /∈ G, and given the definition of K (21), JK XKw is undefined. QED.
10 In this sense, EXT has the same function as the operator ∨ of Montague (1973).
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(28) a. α
β
EXT γ
K gou
δ
hen jiling
b. JαKw = 1 iff MAX(JgouKw) ∈ Jhen jilingKw, i.e. iff the dog(s) in
w is/are intelligent in w
1.6.4 Indefinites
Indefinite reading is only available to object nominals in Chinese. To account
for the possibility of indefinite objects, we assume that verbs and objects in
Chinese can compose via the rule of Restrict (Chung & Ladusaw 2004), and
Existential Closure applies at the VP level, binding free variables in it (Heim
1982; Diesing 1992). To account for the impossibility of indefinite subjects in
Chinese, we assume that subjects in Chinese cannot reconstruct into VP (Tsai
2001), hence cannot be existentially closed. The LF of John kanjian gou ‘John
saw dog’ is given in (29a), its truth conditions in (29b).
(29) a. α
John1 β
∃2 γ
t1 kanjian gou2
b. JαKw = 1 iff ∃x(saw( j,x)∧ x ∈ JgouKw)
By hypothesis, JgouKw contains both singular and plural dogs, which means
John kanjian gou is true iff John either saw a single dog, or he saw a plurality
of dogs. This is the result we want (cf. (3)). If instead of gou ‘dog,’ we have
the classifier phrase zhi gou ‘CL dog’ or the numeral phrase yi zhi gou ‘one CL
dog’, we predict the sentence to have the implicature that John saw a single
dog (cf. Zweig 2009).
2 Vietnamese
Vietnamese is a classifier language, just like Chinese. The two languages re-
semble each other with regard to every aspect of nominal syntax and semantics
save the expression of definiteness. Recall that in Chinese, NPs (bare nouns)
640 Trinh
can be definite, while classifier phrases (CLP) and numeral phrases (NumP)
cannot. Vietnamese differs from Chinese in a rather bizarre way: it shows the
exact opposite. Classifier and numeral phrases can be definite in Vietnamese,
while bare nouns cannot.
(30) a. Cho
dog
thich
like
an
eat
thit
meat
‘Dogs / *The dog(s) like(s) to eat meat’
b. Con
CL
cho
dog
thich
like
an
eat
thit
meat
‘The dog likes to eat meat’
c. Hai
two
con
CL
cho
dog
thich
like
an
eat
thit
meat
‘The two dogs like to eat meat’
Our account of this difference has two components. The first is the assumption
that Chinese and Vietnamese differ with respect to lexical resource: instead of
EXT , Vietnamese has T HE, which is defined in (31).
(31) JT HEKw ⊆ D<e,t>×UJT HE XKw = MAX(JXKw)
This allows CLP’s and NumP’s to have the definite reading. The LF for (30b),
for example, would be that in (32).
(32) α
β
T HE γ
con cho
δ
thich an thit
The second component of the account is a preference principle which says that
when both K and T HE can be used, i.e. when neither of them causes type
mismatch, K must be used.11
11 Chierchia (1998) proposes the same preference of the kind operator over the definite article.
Chierchia’s framework makes it possible to motivate this preference. The account developed here
is incapable of this task. Thus, we will leave (33) as a primitive for the present.
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(33) Preference Principle
Prefer K to T HE!
The LF in (34) would then be ill-formed. This explains why bare nouns cannot
be definite in Vietnamese.
(34) ∗α
β
T HE cho
γ
thich an thit
3 Remaining Issues and Conclusion
3.1 Inventory of Semantic Rules
The contrast in (35) in English motivates Chierchia’s (1998) rule of Derived
Kind Predication (DKP). (36) shows the LF of (35a) and how it is interpreted
under application of DKP.
(35) a. John bought dogs
b. *John bought dog
(36) a. α
John β
bought γ
K dogs
b. DKP(JαKw) = ∃x(bought( j,x)∧ x≤ JK dogsKw(w))
Crucially, DKP requires the relevant nominal in the input to be a kind term. As
dogs can and dog cannot denote a kind, we predict that DKP is inapplicable
in (35b), while it is in (35a). Now in order to rule out (35b), we also have to
say that English cannot express indefiniteness by way of Restrict/Existential
Closure, since of it could, (35b) would be well-formed with the meaning of
‘John bought a dog.’
Can we use DKP for Chinese and Vietnamese instead of Restrict and Ex-
istential Closure to effect the indefinite reading for bare nouns? The answer
seems to be negative. Recall that we take numeral phrases in these languages
to be of type < e, t >, and to be atomic predicates. This means that DKP cannot
apply, since atomic predicates cannot be mapped to kinds. We would then pre-
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dict that numeral phrases cannot be interpreted as indefinites, which is wrong.
Now suppose we say numeral phrases are generalized quantifiers, i.e. expres-
sions of type < et, t >. Then we would correctly predict the indefinite reading
of these phrases to be possible, but we would also predict - incorrectly - that
indefinite numeral phrases are possible in subject positions.
Thus, what we have to say is that English has DKP but not Restrict /Exis-
tential Closure, and Chinese and Vietnamese have Restrict/Existential Closure
but not DKP. In other words, we have to assume that languages vary not only
with respect to lexical representation, but also in the inventory of interpretive
rules.
3.2 Conclusion
Research on how the mass count distinction plays out in different languages
promises to inform our understanding of the relation between grammar, cog-
nition and the physical world. Investigation of the contrast between number
marking and classifier languages, and of the micro variation among languages
of both types, should be of special relevance. A vast amount of work in the
semantic literature has been devoted to the meaning of noun phrases in number
marking languages. Analyses of classifier languages, however, have been fewer
and less rigorous, and the micro variation between them has not received much
attention. In this paper, we attempt to take a small step toward eliminating this
discrepancy: we present a set of facts concerning the distribution and inter-
pretation of nominals in two classifier languages – Mandarin and Vietnamese
– and derive these facts from precisely formulated assumptions. Our proposal
builds entirely on suggestions that have been made in previous works. Thus,
we contribute no “new idea.” Our aim is rather to show which old ideas can
be selected – and explicated in certain ways – to capture the observations, and
what implications this has for the parametric theory of language.
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Abstract. This paper argues for a new way of thinking about semantic and prag-
matic effects of particular sentence intonation patterns. The main focus of the
paper is on the so-called rising declaratives, i.e. sentences that have the surface
structure of a declarative sentence but are pronounced with a rising pitch contour.
Rising declaratives differ from both declaratives with a falling pitch contour and
questions in their pragmatic effect. Our goal is to account for this difference.
We propose that rising intonation contour is syntactically realized. Its semantic
import is to determine the resolution of a variable in the speech act projection,
i.e. rising intonation operates on speech acts. The pragmatic effects associated
with rising declaratives are shown to follow from this minimal assumption and
the independently motivated tenets of speech act theory.
1 Introduction
Rising declaratives are declarative sentences with a rising pitch contour, which
we indicate with a question mark in the following examples. They are known
to exhibit pragmatic effects distinct from those of declarative sentences with a
falling pitch contour (e.g. Gunlogson 2003). Most prominently, rising declara-
tives elicit a a yes/no response from the addressee, similar to polar interroga-
tives. This is shown in (1) where the utterance by A is naturally followed by B’s
response with yes or no. An utterance of a falling declarative does not generally
require such a response.
(1) Elicitation of response
A: John has a sister? / Does John have a sister?
B: Yes. / No.
However, besides the obvious similarity in function between rising declar-
atives and polar interrogatives, there are several facts that distinguish these
two classes of expressions. These facts suggest that rising declaratives express
propositions in a way polar questions do not. In this respect, rising declaratives
resemble falling declaratives. As seen in (2a), a rising declarative can be picked
up by the propositional anaphor that and claimed to be true in the actual world.
Clearly, this is not possible with polar questions: they denote sets of proposi-
tions and, accordingly, are not true or false (Hamblin 1973; Karttunen 1977).
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This is illustrated in (2b) where the indicative be correct cannot be felicitously
predicated of the anaphor. Although polar questions may make certain propo-
sitions salient, these do not enjoy the same discourse status as the propositions
introduced by rising declaratives. This is shown by the B’ response in (2b)
where the use of subjunctive mood is obligatory.
(2) Predication of correctness
a. A: John smokes? / John smokes.
B: That’s correct.
b. A: Does John smoke?
B: #That’s correct.
B’: That would be surprising.
Furthermore, (3a) shows that consent to and dissent from a conjunction of two
rising declaratives is equivalent to affirming or negating a conjunction of two
propositions, respectively. For example, a positive reply to A’s utterance in (3a)
entails that I smoke and I drink, while a negative reply entails that either I don’t
smoke or I don’t drink. On the other hand, a single yes or no response to a
conjunction of two interrogatives is not possible, as is shown by the infelici-
tous discourse in (3b). Thus, rising declarative discourses but not polar ques-
tion discourses parallel (dis)agreement patterns found with conjoined falling
declaratives (4).
(3) Conjunction
a. A: You smoke? And you drink?
B: Yes. (I smoke and drink.) / No. (I smoke but don’t drink.)
b. A: Do you smoke, and do you drink?
B: #Yes. / #No.
(4) A: John smokes and he drinks.
B: Yes. (He smokes and drinks.) / No. (He drinks but doesn’t smoke.)
Another property which assimilates rising declaratives to falling declaratives
is the inability to license NPIs, as illustrated by the unacceptable (5a). The in-
ability to license NPIs sets rising declaratives apart from regular interrogatives
since the latter can license NPIs, as is shown in (5b).
(5) NPI licensing
a. *John lifted a finger to help?
b. Did John lift a finger to help?
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Finally, rising declaratives differ from interrogatives in being ‘prejudiced’ or
‘biased.’ There are many types of examples in the literature that illustrate this.
We focus on three examples discussed by Gunlogson (2003) which we take to
be representative. (6) shows that a rising declarative is inappropriate in contexts
where the speaker is supposed to be neutral, e.g. in an unbiased committee
hearing. In such a neutral setting, the polar interrogative in (6a) is appropriate,
indicating that the speaker does not know about the political affiliations of the
hearer. On the other hand, it is inappropriate to use a rising declarative in such
a context. Intuitively, this is because a rising declarative leaves the impression
that the speaker suspects the hearer to be a communist, which is incompatible
with the hypothesized neutrality of the hearing.
(6) Committee hearing
a. Are you a member of the Communist Party?
b. #You are a member of the Communist Party?
(7) shows that rising declaratives cannot be used as conversation openers. An
utterance of a rising declarative in (7) requires there to have been a preceding
exchange between the speaker and the hearer concerning the whereabouts of
Laura. This is incompatible with an out-of-the-blue context.
(7) Initiating a phone conversation
a. Is Laura there?
b. #Laura’s there?
A similar point is raised by (8). Suppose I am sitting in a windowless room and
my friend comes in. If I want to know whether it is raining outside, I can ask
for this information by uttering a polar interrogative (8a). However, it would
be strange for me to use a rising declarative in this context – unless my friend
is holding an umbrella or is all wet. Thus, the use of rising declarative requires
the speaker to have reasons to believe that the expressed proposition is true.
(8) Windowless room
a. Is it raining?
b. #It’s raining? (appropriate only in the presence of an umbrella...)
We have presented four types of differences between rising declarative and
polar interrogatives. These differences relate primarily to what types of objects
seem to be made available by the respective phrases (propositions vs. sets of
propositions) and to what conditions rising declaratives and polar questions
impose on the context (bias). On the other hand, we have also seen differences
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between rising and falling declaratives: only the former elicit a yes/no response.
An adequate theory of rising declaratives should provide an account of these
asymmetries. The goal of this paper is to provide such a theory.
In Section 2, we review three previous accounts of rising declaratives and
some of their difficulties. In Section 3, we present our analysis and derive the
facts described in Section 1. The analysis builds on two ideas: (i) speech act
operators are syntactically represented and parameterized and (ii) rising intona-
tion may constrain/determine their parameters. We also show that our proposal
is immune to the objections to previous accounts that we discuss in Section 2.
In Section 4 we discuss some extensions of the proposal and conclude.
2 Previous Accounts
This section reviews three representative accounts of rising declaratives and
some of the issues that they face. The first is Gunlogson’s commitments ac-
count (2002; 2003); the second is Šafárˇová’s modal account (2005; 2007); the
third is that of Truckenbrodt (2006).
2.1 Gunlogson’s Account
Gunlogson (2002; 2003) models the context of conversation as a pair< cs,ca>,
where cs represents the public commitments (public beliefs) of the speaker
and ca represents public commitments of the addressee. The main component
of Gunlogson’s proposal are the update rules in (9), which say that a falling
declarative updates the speaker’s public commitments, while a rising declara-
tive updates the addressee’s public commitments. Thus, Gunlogson establishes
a sort of form-function parallelism, in the sense that all declaratives are uni-
formly propositional and are used to update public commitments of discourse
participants. In the following, we use ↑ to indicate rising intonation and ↓ to
indicate falling intonation.
(9) Update rules
< cs,ca >+ ↓ φ =< cs∩ JφK,ca >
< cs,ca >+ ↑ φ =< cs,ca∩ JφK>
However, the update rules in (9) do not on their own explain why rising declar-
atives are perceived as biased questions. Gunlogson addresses this issue by
proposing specific definitions of ‘bias’ and ‘question.’ Specifically, she pro-
poses that a context < cs,ca > is ‘biased toward a proposition p’ iff p can
become public commitment of both speaker and addressee, but ¬p cannot. In
other word, c is biased toward p iff at least one discourse participant has com-
mitted herself to p.
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(10) Bias
< cs,ca > is biased toward p iff for some x, cx⊆ p
The notion of ‘question’ is defined as ‘not changing the commitment set of any
discourse participant.’ This is formulated in (11).
(11) Question
φ counts as a question iff < cs,ca >+φ =< cs,ca >
According to these definitions, it holds that a rising declarative counts as a
question just in case there is bias, i.e. if the addressee has publicly committed
herself to the propositional content of the declarative.
(12) ↑ φ is a question iff ca⊆ JφK
An example that Gunlogson presents to support this treatment is the exchange
in (13). With her utterance, A publicly commits herself to the proposition that
she has a sister. Upon A’s utterance, B knows that A has a sister. Nevertheless,
B can follow A’s utterance with a rising declarative. According to Gunlogson,
B’s utterance feels like a question exactly because A has publicly committed
herself to having a sister.
(13) A: I have to pick up my sister from the airport.
B: You have a sister?
The main problem with this account is that it predicts that whenever a rising
declarative is used as a question, it must be clear to both speaker and addressee
that the answer will be yes. Thus, it is not clear what B is asking in (13): B
cannot be asking whether A has a sister, since after A’s utterance, B knows that
A will give a positive answer. Now, suppose that B pretends not to know this.
Gunlogson then predicts that B’s utterance is not a question anymore. This is
because to pretend not to know that A has a sister, B must also pretend that
A has not committed herself to the proposition that A has a sister. According
to the characterization in (12), B’s utterance can then not be intended as a
question.
Another problem for Gunlogson’s theory is that it predicts that a neg-
ative answer to a rising declarative is always a contradiction. Imagine that A
responds with “no” to B in (13). A would clearly be contradicting herself. Gun-
logson predicts that any negative answer to a rising declarative should feel the
same way. This does not seem correct in the light of the following data.
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(14) A: I bought Critique of Pure Reason yesterday
B: You read Kant?
C: No. I just want to have it on the shelf.
Finally, we believe that Gunlogson’s definition of ‘question’ is unmotivated. It
is true that questions have been defined in such a way that they do not contract
or expand the context set (e.g. Groenendijk 1999). But isolating this feature
and elevating it, in contrast to some other features of question, to the defining
property of questions requires further support.
2.2 Šafářová’s Account
Šafárˇová (2005, 2007) develops a modal analysis of rising intonation where
she treats the final rise as a modal operator of epistemic uncertainty akin to
might. In her account she utilizes update semantics (Veltman 1996) and a mod-
ified Groenendijk & Stokhof semantics of the question operator, whereby the
context is modeled as an equivalence relation on a set of possible worlds. The
updates are defined as in (15).
(15) a. c[p] = c∩{(i, j)|JpK(i) = JpK( j) = 1}
b. c[♦φ ] = c if c[φ ] 6= /0, otherwise c[♦φ ] = /0
c. c[?φ ] = c∩{(i, j)|(i, i) ∈ c[φ ] iff ( j, j) ∈ c[φ ]}
The next three ingredients in Šafárˇová’s system are the definitions of strength
and answerhood and a formalization of Grice’s maxims of conversation.
(16) φ is stronger than ψ iff c0[φ ]⊂ c0[ψ]1
(17) ψ is a answer to ?φ iff either (a) or (b) holds:
a. ψ = φ
b. There is an answer χ such that c0[ψ][χ] = /0 and there is no an-
swer χ ′ such that χ ′ is a formula of propositional logic (i.e. con-
tains no ? or ♦) and ψ is stronger than χ ′.
(18) Maxims of conversation
a. Relation: every statement is an answer to an unresolved question
(explicit or accommodated)
b. Quality I: every statement is the strongest statement with respect
to cs
1 To be more precise, iff dom(c0[φ ])⊂ dom(c0[ψ]), where dom(δ ) = {i|(i, i) ∈ δ}. For expository
purpose, we will write ‘c[φ ]’ instead of ‘dom(c[φ ])’, when it is intuitively clear what is meant.
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With these concepts in hand, Šafárˇová (2007: 311) proposes the following anal-
ysis for rising declaratives:
[W]e take the meaning of the final rise to be that of [...] Veltman’s (1996) ♦-
operator [...] [U]ttering [♦φ ] accommodates [the question ?♦φ ] which has ♦φ ,
φ and ¬φ among its answers. In a rational conversation, participants cooper-
ate on finding the strongest possible answers to questions that have been raised
(whether overtly or accommodated). Therefore, if a ?♦φ question has been raised
and there is a participant who knows that either φ or ¬φ is the case, she has to
say so. Thus, a rising declarative [..] will frequently be followed by a ‘response’.
Crucially, this response is not an answer to the rising declarative but to the ques-
tion accommodated due to the use of the rising declarative.
The proposal faces certain issues. The most apparent issue, acknowledged by
Šafárˇová, is the difference between a rising declarative and a sentence headed
by might, which is what Veltman’s ♦ was intended to model. More to the point,
it is not clear why rising declaratives and existential modal sentences trigger
such distinct conversational effects.
Furthermore, the derivation of the positive bias of rising declaratives is
problematic in her system. To do this, Šafárˇová employs the following maxim:
(19) Quality II: every φ is non-redundant
(φ is redundant iff cs[¬ψ] = c[¬ψ], where ψ results from stripping φ
of all instances of ♦)
Given the assumption that cs⊆ c (the speaker believes what is common ground),
it follows from Quality II that the speaker of ♦φ “believes ¬φ to be less likely”
in the sense that “there are less ¬φ worlds in c than in cs” (Šafárˇová 2005: 365).
Namely, for ♦φ to be non-redundant, it must hold that cs[¬φ ] 6= c[¬φ ]; this
means, assuming cs⊆ c, that cs[¬φ ]⊂ c[¬φ ]. However, it is not clear how this
reasoning explains the bias of rising declaratives. Suppose c= {i, j,k, ...},cs=
{i,k} and c0[¬φ ] = {i, j}. Then ♦φ is not redundant (as cs[¬ψ] 6= c[¬ψ]), but
¬φ is likelier in cs than in c, which contains a whole sequence of ¬ψ worlds,
starting with k. Furthermore, in both c and cs, ¬ψ is at least as likely as ψ .
2.3 Truckenbrodt’s Account
Truckenbrodt (2006) develops an account that builds on two ideas. The first
relates to the semantic import of intonation: using a falling declarative ↓ φ
commits the speaker to φ , similar to Gunlogson; using a rising declarative ↑ φ
simply indicates the absence of this commitment, unlike in Gunlogson. The
second idea is that uttering a declarative ↓ φ or ↑ φ , the speaker conveys that
he wants the hearer to make it common ground that φ . Truckenbrodt elegantly
employs these notions to derive the pragmatic effects discussed above. Namely,
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by uttering ↑ φ the speaker, on the one hand, indicates that it is not the case that
she believes φ and, on the other hand, indicates that she wants the hearer to
make it common ground that φ . If the speaker believes that the hearer does not
believe that φ , it is not possible to expect her to make it common ground that
φ . Thus, the speaker who utters ↑ φ must believe that the hearer believes that
φ , and this is the bias that Gunlogson claims accompanies rising declaratives.
What we think is problematic for Truckenbrodt’s theory is the fact that
rising declaratives elicit a response in a way falling declaratives do not. Truck-
enbrodt could claim that the ability of rising declaratives to elicit a response
follows from the speaker not believing that φ and her expressed desire that φ
be made common ground: this desire would not be satisfied if the addressee
does not utter ↓ φ . However, this raises the question why the same does not
hold for falling declaratives. In both cases the addressee plays a crucial role in
making φ common ground; it is not clear why the belief states of the speaker
should make a difference.
To summarize, we have presented three representative accounts of ris-
ing declaratives. Although all three approaches shed important light on rising
declaratives, we pointed out issues that they face. The first was the account
by Gunlogson (2002, 2003). We have argued that its main difficulty was to
come to terms with the questioning nature of rising declaratives in a non-ad-
hoc manner. The second account was the modal treatment of rising declaratives
by Šafárˇová (2005, 2007). Besides pointing to dissimilarities between modals
and rising declaratives, we have argued that it is not entirely successful in ac-
counting for the positive bias of rising declaratives. The third approach was
by Truckenbrodt (2006). We pointed out an issue with deriving elicitation ac-
companying rising declaratives. In the following section, we develop a novel
treatment of rising declaratives that avoids the issues described in this section.
3 Analysis
This section introduces our analysis of rising declaratives. We share with Gun-
logson and Truckenbrodt the idea that the bias of rising declaratives supervenes
on the belief of the hearer in the propositional content of the sentence. Unlike in
Gunlogson, beliefs enter our analysis only indirectly, via the logic of assertion.
This resembles the strategy pursued by Truckenbrodt. We begin this section
by looking at the speech act of assertion and the Performative Hypothesis. We
propose that rising intonation ‘inflects the performative prefix,’ i.e. we argue
that the semantic import of rising intonation is to determine the interpretation
of a variable in the speech act projection. We conclude by deriving the facts
discussed in the first section.
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3.1 Ingredients: Assertion, Belief, Performative Hypothesis
Assertion is one of the most studied topics in linguistics. Accordingly, there are
many theories dealing with it. However, all theories seem to agree that asser-
tion has at least the two properties discussed in this subsection. It is these two
properties that form the basis of our account. First, asserting a proposition p re-
quires believing that p. We call this principle the Sincerity Principle, adopting
Searle’s terminology.
(20) Sincerity Principle (cf. Searle 1969; Grice 1975)
Assert only what you believe
The second principle is a constraint proposed by Robert Stalnaker. It says that
an assertion must be false in some worlds of the context set. In other word,
assertion of p means that p is not in the common ground, i.e. not presupposed.
We call this principle the Informativity Principle.
(21) Informativity Principle (Stalnaker 1978)
Assert only what is not mutual belief, i.e. what is not presupposed
The next ingredient of our theory is the assumption that speech act theory
is part of semantic theory. This is subsumed by the Performative Hypothe-
sis which says that sentences are headed by speech act operators and that the
investigation of speech acts is just the investigation of the meaning of these
operators. This idea is explicitly expressed in a quote by Gazdar (1979: 18f):2
Every sentence has a performative clause in deep or underlying structure [...]
The subject of this clause is first person singular [...] Illocutionary force is se-
mantic (in the truth-conditional sense) and is fully specified by the meaning of
the performative clause itself.
We assume that declaratives used as assertions are headed by a speech act op-
erator, ASSERT, which incorporates the logic of assertion delineated above (cf.
Ross 1970; Lakoff 1970; Sadock 1974; Gazdar 1979; Krifka 1995, 2001; Tenny
& Speas 2004: among others). These assumptions are illustrated on a concrete
example, the sentence John smokes, in the following. The LF of the sentence
is given in (22). We have an ASSERT operator c-commanding the proposition-
denoting constituent. The semantic import of the whole sentence is that the
speaker asserts that John smokes. This entails, given the Sincerity and Infor-
mativity Principles, that the speaker believes that John smokes and that it is not
presupposed that John smokes.
2 It is important to point out that Gazdar did not endorse the Performative Hypothesis.
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(22) a. α
ASSERT β
John smokes
b. JφKc = 1 iff the speaker in c asserts that John smokes
⇒ the speaker in c believes that John smokes
⇒ that John smokes is not in the common ground in c
All variants of the Performative Hypothesis tend to have it as part of the mean-
ing of the ASSERT operator that the assertor is the speaker; this is reflected in
Gazdar’s quote above. However, in contrast to other approaches, we propose
that ASSERT can inflect for person and that this inflection is reflected in the in-
tonation of the sentence. In particular, rising intonation indicates that ASSERT
has a second person feature, while falling intonation indicates that the assertor
is the first person, i.e. the speaker.
(23) Falling declaratives
a. John smokes ↓
b. α
ASSERTS β
John smokes
(24) Rising declaratives
a. John smokes ↑
b. α
ASSERTH β
John smokes
The question that now arises is how the sentences headed by ASSERT, such as
(24b), are used. They are descriptions of the world, so they are either true or
false. So uttering a sentence is giving a description of the world. Now, giving
a description of the world is proposing that that description be accepted as
accurate. Thus, we assume the following rule for using declaratives:
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(25) Rule for using declaratives
A declarative φ is used in context c to propose that c be updated to
c∩ JφK.
It follows immediately from this rule that the speaker of (24b) is proposing to
make it common ground that the hearer asserts that John smokes.
(26) Corrolary
A rising declarative ↑ φ , i.e. a sentence with the structure [ASSERTH φ ],
is used in context c to propose that c be updated with the proposition
that the hearer asserts that φ .
3.2 Deriving the Facts
With the above tools in hand, we can now return to the facts described in Sec-
tion 1. The first fact that we need to account for is the response elicitation effect
of rising declaratives.
(1) A: John has a sister? / Does John have a sister?
B: Yes. / No.
In our system, this is due to the fact that uttering a rising declarative means
making a proposal. A response is expected when a proposal is made. This
is particularly pressing with rising declaratives where it is proposed that the
hearer asserted something and has thus committed herself to a particular propo-
sition. In the case of falling declaratives, where the agent parameter is resolved
to the speaker, a proposal is made as well. The self-verifying nature of this
latter case makes a response from the hearer either redundant or inappropriate.
The second fact involves the difference between polar interrogatives and
rising declaratives with respect to making available propositional antecedents.
(2) a. A: John smokes? / John smokes.
B: That’s correct.
b. A: Does John smoke?
B: #That’s correct.
B’: That would be surprising
In (26a), the anaphor that picks up the proposition-denoting complement of
ASSERT (27). As we can see in (28), it is not unusual that that can refer to
embedded propositions.
(27) a. ASSERTH [φ John smokes]
b. Thatφ is correct
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(28) A: Mary thinks [φ John smokes]
B: Thatφ is correct
However, as we can see in (29), an embedded question seems not to be able
to deliver a unique salient proposition that can be anaphorically referred to by
that.
(29) A: Mary knows [φ whether John smokes]
B: *Thatφ is correct
Now, suppose that the question in the (b)-example in (2) consists of a speech
act operator QUEST and a question-denoting constituent φ . We correctly expect
that φ cannot be picked up by that.
(30) a. QUESTS [φ whether John smokes]
b. *Thatφ is correct
A related set of data was observed in responses to conjoined rising decla-
ratives. Unlike with polar interrogatives, a single response to conjoined rising
declaratives is possible, similar to what we find in (dis)agreement with falling
declaratives.
(3) a. A: You smoke? And you drink?
B: Yes. (I smoke and drink.) / No. (I smoke but don’t drink.)
b. A: Do you smoke, and do you drink?
B: #Yes. / #No.
Namely, a rising declarative expresses a proposition, so a conjunction of two
rising declaratives will also express a proposition; this proposition can be agreed
with or contested.
(31) a. You smoke? And you drink?
b. [[ASSERTH you smoke] and [ASSERTH you drink]]
c. H asserts that H smokes and H asserts that H drinks
If the response to conjoined rising declaratives is yes, we commit ourselves
to the same inferences as when agreeing to conjoined falling declaratives or,
more appropriately, a falling declarative where the complement of ASSERT is a
conjunction.
Now, disagreeing with a falling declarative ↓ φ is not contesting that the
speaker asserted φ but contesting the content of φ . Although it is intuitively
clear why this should be the case (it is non-sensical to contest that the speaker
asserted φ ), it is puzzling that no can then be treated as contesting the proposi-
On the Rise and Fall of Declaratives 657
tion embedded under ASSERT. We propose that this is also what is going when
contesting rising declaratives. In particular, by a negative response to a con-
junction of rising declaratives, one is contesting at least one of the conjuncts
and, accordingly, the propositional content embedded under the assertion oper-
ator. A more thorough investigation of negative responses to and disagreement
with rising and falling declaratives is left for further work.
The strategy just outlined is not available for conjoined polar interroga-
tives. Following the standard treatments of questions, a conjunction of two po-
lar questions is either a four-way partition (cf. Groenendijk & Stokhof 1984) or
a set of four propositions in Hamblin semantics. Now, a yes or no response re-
quires a bi-partition or a set of two propositions (one being the negation of the
other) – otherwise yes or no cannot identify the appropriate cell or proposition
as an answer. Accordingly, we predict a yes or no response to be infelicitous
after a conjunction of polar interrogatives.
The inability of rising declaratives to license NPIs also follows straight-
forwardly since changing the person feature of ASSERT does not create an af-
fective environment which would license NPIs.
(5) a. *John lifted a finger to help?
b. Did John lift a finger to help?
As for the bias of rising declaratives, here is how we account for it. First, it is
natural to assume that when the speaker S proposes that the hearer H asserts
that φ , S must believe that the conditions for H’s assertion of φ are satisfied.
One of these conditions, as we have seen, is that H believes that φ (Sincerity
Principle). Accordingly, a rising declarative ↑ φ gives rise to the inference that
the speaker believes that the hearer believes that φ and will acquiesce to the
assertion. In the committee hearing example the reasoning proceeds in the fol-
lowing way: if I utter (32b), I make the proposal that you assert that you are a
communist; this means I must believe that you are in a position to assert that
you are a communist, i.e. I believe that you believe that you are a communist.
This is exactly the prejudice that we want to account for.
(32) a. Are you a member of the Communist Party?
b. #You are a member of the Communist Party?
Note that we also account for the fact that rising declaratives can be used to
signal an “informative presupposition”, as seen in (33), repeated in (33).
(33) A: I have to pick up my sister from the airport.
B: You have a sister?
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B’s utterance is a proposal that A asserts that A has a sister. The principle
of Informativity dictates that what is asserted is not presupposed. Thus, B in
effects proposes to make the information that A has a sister non-presupposed
information, which is intuitively the case here: B does not doubt that A has a
sister, but only lets A know that this fact was not mutual belief.
Finally, our system does not face the issues that we have presented for
the accounts of Gunlogson and Šafárˇová. First, our system does not preclude
negative responses to rising declaratives. However, more work is needed to
understand how the negative response gets to be interpreted as contesting the
radical of the speech act; this constitutes a well-known problem for all propo-
nents of the Performative Hypothesis. Second, we derive bias from the core
principles of the logic of assertion. Third, the response-eliciting behavior of
rising declaratives is shown to follow from general properties of conversation
– we rely on the intuitive idea that certain proposals to add something to the
common ground require agreement (rising declaratives), while others are auto-
matically accepted due to their self-verifying nature (falling declaratives).
4 Conclusion and Outlook
We proposed a new analysis of rising declaratives in English. Its core ingredi-
ents are the ideas that the speech act operator ASSERT is part of the structure of
the sentence (the Performative Hypothesis) and that it is parameterized. One of
the parameters of ASSERT is the agent/authority of the speech act. We proposed
that rising intonation conditions this parameter to be second person, i.e. rising
intonation ‘inflects the performative prefix’. Falling intonation, on the other
hand, lets the parameter be resolved to default first person. We have shown that
an assortment of facts follows from this assumption once we couple it with the
standard logic of assertion; we have also shown it to be immune to the main
problems of some other approaches. However, since we adopt the Performative
Hypothesis, we do inherit some of its issues, e.g. the puzzle of disagreement or
negative response. We plan to address these issues at a different occasion.
There is a natural extension of our theory from sentences describing as-
sertions to sentences describing other speech acts. That is, we hypothesize that
not only ASSERT but also QUEST and IMP operators are parameterized and
some of their parameters can be shifted. This seems desirable, in particular in
light of the data in (34) and (35), which need to be explored further.
(34) A: Are you going home?
B: Am I going home?
A: Yes, are you going home?
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(35) A: Open the window!
B: Open the window?
A: Yes, open the window!
Finally, there is a salient fact concerning rising intonation that our proposal on
its own does not account for: rising intonation is a root phenomenon, i.e. its
effects cannot be restricted to embedded clauses.
(36) Mary knows John came ↑
6= ‘Mary knows that you assert that John came’
There is an obvious route that we could take: since we have characterized ris-
ing intonation as an operator/modifier on speech acts, we could stipulate that
speech acts cannot be embedded. This would require further argumentation.
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Abstract. The structure and meaning of possessive verbs have received several 
competing analyses in the literature. Almost all the analyses were developed 
based on the English ‘have’ and were intended to apply crosslinguistically. In 
this paper I consider the peculiar degree use of the Chinese possessive verb 
yǒu, in the ‘X+ yǒu + Y + G(radable predicate)’ construction. This degree use 
of yǒu takes a covert small clause as the underlying object that specifies a 
subset relation between two degree intervals. In this use, yǒu does not make se-
mantic content contribution, and only provides a formal mechanism for its 
subject to bind a variable in the covert small clause object. The degree use of 
yǒu shares the same structure and meaning as its other uses. In addition, I argue 
that no existing alternative analysis of possessive verbs can capture the degree 
use of yǒu. In this sense, the paper locates among several analyses of pos-
sessive verbs the most explanatorily adequate one, through examining a 
language-specific phenomenon. 
 
1	   Introduction	  
The structure and meaning of possessive verbs have received a considerable 
amount of discussion in the literature. It is well-accepted that they can appear 
in a variety of surface constructions and have a rather unconstrained range of 
meanings. Intuitively, the meanings of the English verb ‘have’, for example, 
range from being very clear (1a-c), to being less clear (1d-e), to being very 
vague (1f-g) (Cowper 1989, Belvin 1993, Ritter & Rosen 1997).  
(1) a. John has a new car.                         (possession) 
 b. John has a headache today.                    (experience) 
 c. John had a talk with his son.                   (event) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* I am indebted to Mats Rooth and John Whitman for valuable discussion at various stages of the 
research. Thanks go to Zhong Chen, Ed Cormany, John Hale, Xiao Li, Liangyue Lu, Sarah 
Murray, and Ming Xiang, who gave me useful suggestions on how to present the idea. Different 
versions of the paper were delivered at the 8th GLOW in Asia (Aug. 2010, Beijing), the 15th Sinn 
und Bedeutung (Sept. 2010, Saarbrücken), Cornell University (Jan. 2011), and the Ohio State 
University (Feb. 2011). I thank the audiences of all these occasions, Kjell J. Sæbø and Qiong-
peng Luo in particular, for comments and questions. Of course, all remaining errors are my own. 
 
In Reich, Ingo et al. (eds.), Proceedings of Sinn & Bedeutung 15,  
pp. 661–676. Universaar – Saarland University Press: Saarbrücken, Germany, 2011. 	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 d. John had many visitors today.                  (experience?) 
 e. John had a guy shouting at him.                (event?)  
 f. The baby often has a story at bedtime.            (?) 
 g. The shirt had a button pop off of it.              (?)  
This heterogeneous range of surface meanings of ‘have’ is not unique to 
English (see Gutiérrez-Rexach 2006 for similar data in Spanish). In Chinese, 
the exact meaning of the possessive verb yǒu, often taken to be the equivalent 
of the English ‘have’, can too fall anywhere between being very clear and 
being pretty murky, as illustrated below. 
(2) Zhāngsān  yǒu  yī    liàng  xīn  chē.                                   (possession) 
         Zhangsan have one CL    new  car 
         ‘Zhangsan has a new car.’ 
(3) hěnduō dìfang  dōu  yǒu  zhè  zhǒng  qíngkuàng.          (existence) 
 many   place   all  have this  CL     situation  
 ‘This kind of situation exists in many places.’ 
(4) Wáng yīshēng  jīntiān  yǒu  hěnduō  bìngren.         (experience?) 
 Wang doctor   today  have many    patient  
 ‘Dr. Wang has many patients today.’ 
(5) tā guāng  běijīng jiù  qù  le   yǒu  hǎojǐ      tàng.       (?) 
 he alone  Beijing EMP go  ASP  have quite a few  round of trip 
 ‘He went to Beijing quite a few times, (let alone other places.)’ 
(6) tāde  chènyī  yǒu  ge  niǔkòu diào   le.                 (?) 
 his   shirt   have CL  button  pop off ASP 
 ‘His shirt has a button pop off of it.’ 
Given the divergent surface meanings that possessive verbs like ‘have’ and 
yǒu can express, it is reasonable to ask Question 1 below. On the intuitive 
level, the different uses of possessive verbs appear to be related in terms of 
the structure and meaning. Therefore, it is an interesting research topic to 
explore whether and how they are reducible to a common syntactic repre-
sentation and semantic derivation. 
  
 
 
 
There have already been several competing proposals in the literature that 
attempt to give a unified analysis of possessive verbs (Freeze 1992, Landman 
Question 1: Do possessive verbs in the variety of surface patterns have a 
single underlying structure and a single core meaning?  	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2004, Partee 1999, Ritter & Rosen 1997, Sæbø 2009, Iatridou 1996, among 
others). Almost all of the analyses were developed based on the English 
‘have’. They were nevertheless intended to apply crosslinguistically. Though 
empirical evidence within English probably can help pick one analysis over 
the others, language-specific patterns from other languages may be of more 
immediate use for the purpose. In this paper, I discuss the degree use of the 
Chinese possessive verb yǒu. While using Chinese data to address Question 
1, I also hope to answer another related question given below.  
 
  
 
In Chinese there exists a construction – what I call the possessive degree 
construction – where the possessive verb yǒu takes a degree-denoting object. 
The construction provides an essential clue to answering the two questions 
raised above. In the next section, I present the general pattern and properties 
of the possessive degree construction. Then, in section 3 I discuss some non-
degree uses of yǒu to motivate the small clause-based analysis of possessive 
verbs (Sæbø 2009, Iatridou 1996). This is the analysis that I adopt for non-
degree uses of yǒu and that I hope to extend to its degree use. In section 4, I 
analyze the possessive degree construction and argue that the overt degree-
denoting object of yǒu in the construction is always supplemented by an 
appropriate covert predicate. The predicate specifies a subset relation be-
tween two intervals of degree, and contains a variable that is eventually 
bound by the subject of yǒu. Yǒu does not have any semantic content. Rather, 
it only provides a formal mechanism to make the binding possible. Moreover, 
the binding is necessary because otherwise the subject would be redundant 
(Sæbø 2009). In this sense, the degree use of yǒu is not different from its non-
degree uses, in that for all the uses the verb embeds a small clause as the 
underlying object. In section 5, I discuss three existing alternative analyses of 
possessive verbs and show that they all face some empirical or theoretical 
challenges when being extended to the possessive degree construction. 
2	   Chinese	  Data	  
The Chinese possessive verb yǒu can embed a similar variety of linguistic 
expressions to its English counterpart ‘have’. In addition, the Chinese verb 
can appear in the construction in (7), to express that X exceeds or equals Y in 
terms of the dimension specified by the gradable predicate G.  
(7) X + yǒu + Y + G  
Question 2: Is there any independent, crosslinguistic evidence to validate 
one analysis of possessive verbs and rule out the others at the same time? 	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The sentence in (8) is a concrete illustration of the general pattern. Here 
zhāngsān corresponds to the X element, Lǐsì the Y element, and gāo the G 
element. The sentence means that, to put it a bit verbosely, Zhangsan exceeds 
or equals Lisi in terms of the dimension specified by ‘tall’ (i.e. height).  
(8) Zhāngsān  yǒu   Lǐsì  gāo.  
 Zhangsan  have  Lisi  tall 
 ‘Zhangsan is at least as tall as Lisi.’ 
It is worth some space to discuss a few essential restrictions on the individual 
components in the construction. First, the construction expresses comparison 
between X and Y along the dimension specified by G. For the comparison to 
be meaningful, the referents of X and Y must be comparable with respect to 
the dimension. Otherwise, pragmatic infelicity would arise. The infelicity of 
(9) is due to the mundane fact that sunlight cannot be measured along the 
dimension specified by zhòng ‘heavy’ (i.e. weight).1 
(9) %yángguāng méi  yǒu   zhuōzi  zhòng.  
    sunlight    not  have  table   heavy 
 ‘%The sunlight is not as heavy as the table.’ 
Second, in addition to being an entity- or event-denoting expression, the Y 
element also can be a measure phrase. In this case, G can be omitted if the 
context is clear regarding the dimension for the measure phrase. For example, 
if the speaker and hearer are explicitly discussing the height of individuals 
and excluding width and thickness, the adjective gāo ‘tall’ in (10) is optional: 
(10) Zhāngsān  yǒu  liù  yīngchǐ  (gāo).  
 Zhangsan  have six  foot     tall 
 ‘Zhangsan is at least six feet tall.’ 
Third, because the G element specifies a dimension against which X and Y 
are measured, G must be an element that expresses a gradable notion. Non-
gradable predicates cannot characterize a dimension and thus cannot act as G. 
The sentence in (11) is ungrammatical, because something is either imported 
or not, and there is nothing in between. When the gradability requirement is 
met, G can be an adjective, adverb, or verb phrase ((8), (10), (12), (13)).  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The ‘%’ symbol indicates pragmatic infelicity, and ‘*’ indicates ungrammaticality. 
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(11) *zhè  ge  páizi  yǒu  nà   ge  páizi  jìnkǒu.  
  this   CL  brand have that  CL  brand imported 
 ‘*This brand is at least as imported at that one.’ 
(12) Zhāngsān  pǎo  de  yǒu  Lǐsì  kuài. 
 Zhangsan  run  DE have Lisi  fast 
 ‘Zhangsan runs at least as fast as Lisi does.’  
 
(13) Zhāngsān  méi  yǒu  Lǐsì  zūnjìng  lǎoshī. 
 Zhangsan  not  have Lisi  respect  teacher  
 ‘Zhangsan does not respect teachers as much as Lisi does.’  
Fourth, a demonstrative pronoun such as zhème ‘this’ and nàme ‘that’ can 
intervene between Y and G, without affecting the meaning. The sentence in 
(14) contains nàme between Lǐsì and gāo and has the same meaning as (8). 
(14) Zhāngsān  yǒu  Lǐsì  nàme  gāo. 
 Zhangsan  have Lisi  that   tall 
The possessive degree construction has been discussed in many Chinese 
grammar books and descriptive linguistics literature (Lü 1980, Zhu 1982, 
inter alia). However, as far as I know, it has received no theoretical analysis 
so far, despite the fact that possessive verbs in general have drawn 
considerable theoretical attention over the past two decades. In particular, 
there exist four major groups of analyses of possessive verbs. The gist of each 
group is given in (15). Because almost all the discussion is based on the 
English ‘have’, in (15) I use ‘have’ to represent possessive verbs. None of the 
analyses explicitly address the question of whether they are applicable to the 
possessive degree construction, probably because English does not have the 
exact equivalent of the construction. In this sense, the possessive degree 
construction deserves serious consideration. It is likely that it can be used as a 
test to tell which analysis or which analyses of possessive verbs is/are on the 
right track. In this paper I show that the construction does indeed endorse the 
small clause analysis over the three alternative analyses. In the next section, I 
will first cite some non-degree uses of yǒu as empirical motivations for the 
small clause analysis.  
(15) a. Locative existential (Freeze 1992) 
  ‘Have’ sentences and existential sentences have the same underlying 
  structure and are similarly derived. 
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 b. Semantic incorporation (Landman 2004): 
  ‘Have’ denotes a ‘contentless’ relation saturated by its relational 
object. 
 c. Type-shifting analysis (Partee 1999):  
  ‘Have’ specifies some relational property to its object. 
 d. Small clause analysis (Sæbø 2009, Iatridou 1996): 
  ‘Have’ embeds a small clause that links the subject and the object. 
3	   Motivating	  the	  Small	  Clause	  Analysis	  
Sæbø (2009) and Iatridou (1996), among several others, proposed that the 
underlying object of possessive verbs is a small clause (SC), which can be 
either pronounced or unpronounced. The SC object consistently contains a 
variable, either in the argument or in the predicate of the SC. Possessive 
verbs make no content contribution. They only make it possible and nec-
essary for their subject to bind a variable in the SC object. 
It is a legitimate question to ask at this point whether the SC analysis, 
originally developed based on English ‘have’, can be extended to the Chinese 
possessive verb yǒu. Because of the similar behaviors of non-degree uses of 
yǒu and ‘have’, as evident from the example sentences in (1-6), the analysis 
can be maintained (at least) for non-degree uses of yǒu. Out of space con-
sideration, in this section I discuss just a few pieces of evidence from Chinese 
to support this claim.2 
First, non-degree uses of yǒu can take an explicit SC as the object. In 
this case, the SC must contain a variable which the subject of yǒu can bind. 
This variable is usually the internal argument of a relational noun in the SC. 
For example, in (16) the overt object of yǒu, yīxiē língjiàn huài le ‘some parts 
broken’, expresses a proposition on its own and is an SC. The noun língjiàn 
‘a (mechanical) part’ expresses a relational notion because a part is always a 
part to some host (a computer, a car, etc.). The internal argument of the rela-
tional noun língjiàn behaves like a variable which needs to be bound by the 
matrix subject. The sentence can be paraphrased as (17), which does not 
contain the verb yǒu and has the internal argument of língjiàn ‘a part’ filled 
by jīqì ‘a machine’. The equivalence of meaning indicates that in the original 
sentence (16) yǒu has no semantic role to play. It only provides a mechanism 
such that the matrix subject can fill the internal argument of the relational 
noun. Sæbø (2009) has explicitly argued that the saturation is achieved 
through the matrix subject binding a variable in the SC object.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Chinese has no morphological tense or semantic tense (Lin 2005). Thus in Chinese it is difficult 
to tell small clauses from regular clauses. For simplicity I stick to using the term ‘small clause’. 
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(16) jīqì      yǒu   yīxiē  língjiàn  huài   le.  
 machine  have  some  part    broken ASP 
 ‘The machine has some parts broken.’ 
(17)   yīxiē    jīqì    língjiàn   huài    le. 
Second, when non-degree uses of yǒu take a definite phrase in its object, the 
phrase must be followed by an overt predicate. The overt predicate has to 
include a covert variable for the matrix subject to bind. For example, in (18) 
xià chǎng bǐsài ‘the next competition’ refers to one particular competition 
and is a definite expression. Its presence in the sentence is ungrammatical 
unless it is supplemented by a predicate such as yào cānjiā ‘has to attend’. 
Crucially, the predicate itself contains a variable which corresponds to the 
agent role for cānjiā ‘attend’. The matrix subject binds the covert variable. 
Yǒu makes the binding possible and necessary. The sentence, just like in (16), 
can be paraphrased as (19) without the verb yǒu but with the subject of yǒu 
filling the subject position of the resulting clause. Again, the equivalence of 
the two sentences suggests that yǒu makes no semantic contribution to the 
meaning of the sentence, except for providing a formal mechanism whereby 
the subject of yǒu binds a variable in the SC object.  
(18) tā  hái  yǒu  xià  chǎng bǐsài       *(yào   cānjiā). 
 he  still  have next CL    competition   must   attend 
 ‘He still has the next competition *(to attend).’ 
(19)   tā  hái  yào  cānjiā  xià  chǎng bǐsài. 
The two cases that I have considered both involve an overt SC as the object 
of yǒu. There exist many cases in which yǒu embeds a surface DP object 
without an overt supplementing predicate. For such cases, the surface DP can 
be understood to be supplemented by an implicit predicate. For instance, for 
the ‘canonical’ possessive use of yǒu, its surface object is a DP (20). With the 
SC analysis of possessive verbs, the possessive interpretation does not come 
from the verb yǒu per se. Rather it is contributed by a covert predicate which 
requires the referent of the subject to be in possession of the referent of the 
object. Crucially, the predicate cannot be a random one, but is restricted by an 
essential attribute of the object with respect to the subject. A person and a 
book, for example, are essentially related by the possessor-possessee relation 
(Gutiérrez-Rexach 2006). On the other hand, the predicate contains a variable 
for the matrix subject to bind; otherwise the subject would be redundant. 
Given all the considerations, the covert predicate for the canonical possessive 
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interpretation of possessive verbs is something like ‘belonging to e’, with the 
variable e being bound by the matrix subject. 
(20) Mǎlì  yǒu  yī  běn  shū  [  shǔyú   e]. 
 Mary  have one CL   book   belong to 
 ‘Mary has a book.’ 
To cast the above discussion in a more formal manner, I follow Sæbø’s (2009) 
syntactic specification and semantic representation of possessive verbs. In his 
analysis, possessive verbs assume the semantic role of abstraction. They 
transform the SC object into a predicate by abstracting over a variable xi co-
indexed with the matrix subject. However, in order to avoid yǒu making 
counter-intuitive direct reference to variable indexing, the matrix subject 
undergoes Quantifier Raising ((21), from Büring 2004). The predicate 
transformed out of the SC absorbs the trace of the QR-ed subject. The trace 
variable binder introduced by the QR, via variable assignment, makes the 
variable coming from the SC bound by the subject (23). The matrix subject 
has to bind the variable in the SC, to avoid the fate of being redundant. As an 
illustration, the Logical Form and semantic derivation of the sentence in (20) 
is given in (24), with some irrelevant details omitted. 
(21) i. substituting a trace ti for a DP Qi;  
  ii. adjoining Q (without the index) to a dominating node; 
 iii. adjoining a trace binding operator ui to the sister of Q.  
(22) [[ have]] = λф(st) λxe. ф                     (s is the type of states) 
(23) [[ ui]] f = λф λz. [[Ф ]] f [iàz]              ( f is a variable assignment function.)                    
(24) S: ∃xbook(x) ∧ belong-to(Mary)(x)                             
    
      Mǎlì          S: λz.∃xbook(x) ∧ belong-to(z)(x) 
                  
             u3: λф λz. Фf[iàz]     S: .∃xbook(x) ∧ belong-to(f(3))(x) 
                        
                                           t3      VP: λy.∃xbook(x) ∧ belong-to(f(3))(x) 
                               
                                             yǒu: λфλy.ф    SC: ∃xbook(x) ∧ belong-to(f(3))(x) 
                                    
                                                                  yīběnshū                      shǔyú e3 
Hopefully, thus far I have established that the SC analysis of possessive verbs 
can provide a successful account of non-degree uses of Chinese yǒu. The 
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most natural next step is to examine whether this analysis can be main-tained 
for the possessive degree construction. This step is a logical variant of 
Question 1 raised in section 1. In the next section, I show that the SC analysis 
indeed can be extended to the possessive degree construction. 
4	   Analyzing	  the	  Degree	  Use	  of	  yǒu	  	  
One essential component of the SC analysis of possessive verbs is, obviously, 
that their underlying object is consistently an SC. In an attempt to apply the 
analysis to the possessive degree construction, the first task should be to 
determine the SC for the construction. For convenience of reference I will use 
(8) as my example sentence. 
(8) Zhāngsān  yǒu   Lǐsì  gāo.  
 Zhangsan  have  Lisi  tall 
 ‘Zhangsan is at least as tall as Lisi.’ 
It is worth pointing out that Lǐsì gāo in the overt object position of (8) cannot 
be an SC. Here is some evidence for the claim. First, suppose it is an SC, then 
it would express some proposition. Because yǒu does not affect entailment, 
one would then expect (8) to entail the proposition expressed by Lǐsì gāo, 
whatever it is.3 However, the entailment does not go through.   
Second, as discussed in section 2, a demonstrative pronoun such as 
nàme ‘that’ and zhème ‘this’ can optionally intervene between Lǐsì and gāo, 
without affecting the meaning. In Chinese, these demonstrative pronouns 
cannot make reference to a proposition. This is another piece of evidence that 
Lǐsì gāo does not denote a proposition and cannot be an SC. 
Third, a limited number of dimension nouns can act as G. For example, 
in (25) the Y element zúqiú ‘a soccer ball’ is followed by the dimension noun 
dàxiǎo ‘big-small, size’. It is obvious that zúqiú dàxiǎo is not an SC. Rather it 
denotes a degree, the size of a soccer ball.  
(25) nà   ge  mógū    yǒu   zúqiú     dàxiǎo. 
 that  CL  mushroom have  soccer ball  size 
 ‘The mushroom is at least as big as a soccer ball.’   
From the evidence discussed above, I conclude that the ‘Y + G’ chunk itself 
is not an SC. Instead it denotes a degree, viz. Y’s degree on the dimension 
specified by G. For example, in (8) gāo provides the dimension (i.e. height) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 I deliberately remain vague here, because, if used as a clause, Lǐsì gāo can mean ‘Lisi is tall’ or 
‘Lisi is taller’, depending on the context in which it is used.  
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against which Lisi is measured. Lǐsì gāo denotes Lisi’s height, not the 
proposition ‘Lisi is tall’ or some other proposition.  
We have already seen that the possessive degree construction expresses 
some comparative relationship. For a comparison to make sense, the two 
comparison items have to be comparable in the first place. For the possessive 
degree construction, one comparison item is Y’s degree on the dimension 
specified by G (e.g. Lisi’s height for (8)); the other comparison item has to be 
some degree associated with X. 
Furthermore, the degree denoted by the other comparison item cannot 
be just any random degree associated with X (e.g. Zhangsan’s width for (8)). 
Rather, it is X’s degree along the dimension specified by G (e.g. Zhangsan’s 
height for (8)). This restriction is guaranteed by the fact that Chinese does not 
allow cross-dimension comparison using a comparative construction. For 
example, while (26) is perfect in English, its Chinese equivalent is not 
grammatical. The interested reader can refer to Kennedy (2007) for dis-
cussion on this crosslinguistic contrast. 
(26) The door is taller than the table is wide.  
(27) *mén  gāo  bǐ   zhuōzi  kuān. 
  door  tall  than table   wide 
Thus, the two comparison items of the possessive degree construction are 
degrees on the same dimension. Independently, a degree on a dimension is 
modeled as an interval that ranges from the minimum point on that dimension 
to where the degree ends. It is not the maximum point of the degree interval 
(Seuren 1978, von Stechow 1984, Kennedy 1997, 2001). One motivation for 
this representation of degree comes from the Cross-Polar Anomaly (CPA) as 
illustrated by (28), which involves positive and negative pairs of adjectives. 
Treating degrees as points cannot explain the anomaly. In addition, in the 
interval-based representation, degrees are classified into two types: positive 
degrees vs. negative degrees. The CPA is anomalous because it involves 
comparison of degrees of opposite polarity (Kennedy 1997, 2001). 
(28) *The computer is more expensive than the book is cheap. 
It follows that the possessive degree construction compares two degree 
intervals. Moreover, the two degree intervals fall on the same dimension and 
have the same starting point. I assume that possessive verbs generally char-
acterize essential relations (e.g. possession, kinship, part-whole, etc.) between 
the subject and the object. Only when an essential relation is impossible will 
an ‘accidental’ relation (e.g. location, custody) come to rescue (Gutiérrez-
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Rexach 2006). The most essential relation that can exist between two 
intervals as specified above is one interval being the sub-interval of the other. 
But which one is the sub-interval, and which one is the super-interval? To 
answer this question, it is helpful to look at some other uses of possessive 
verbs for hints. 
Possessive verbs can express the part-whole relation. On the intuitive 
level, the part-whole relation coincides with the subset relation. For example, 
(29) says that the three relevant doors exist as part of the house. It is 
equivalent to saying that the set whose elements are the three doors is a 
subset of the set that contains all the constituents of the house. Possessive 
verbs can characterize the kinship relation as well. The kinship relation can 
also be construed as a subset relation. For (30), the set that contains the 
cousins is a subset of the set that contains, say, all John’s relatives. In 
addition, the locative use of possessive verbs, as exemplified in (31), 
characterizes a ‘part-whole’ relation that is restricted to a location (e.g. ‘on 
his left leg’) (Gutiérrez-Rexach 2006). Hence the locative use can be 
understood as involving a subset relation, too. For space consideration, I will 
not discuss how other non-degree uses of possessive verbs characterize the 
subset relation. The discussion based on the English ‘have’ applies to (at least 
the non-degree uses of) the Chinese yǒu.  
(29) The house has three doors.  
(30) John has cousins. 
(31) John has a birthmark on his left leg.            (Gutiérrez-Rexach 2006) 
It is clear that the set associated with the object is the subset, and the set 
associated with the subject is the superset. That is, the subject of possessive 
verbs is ‘super-ordinate’ to the object. I assume that the same consideration 
applies to the possessive degree construction. In addition, the subinterval 
relation is tantamount to the subset relation.4 Therefore, for the possessive 
degree construction ‘X + yǒu + Y + G’, X’s degree on the dimension 
specified by G is the superinterval/superset; Y’s degree on the dimension is 
the subinterval/subset. My analysis thus far predicts that for the possessive 
degree construction to be true, X’s degree on the dimension specified by G is 
a superinterval/superset of Y’s degree on the same dimension. More con-
cretely, for (8) to be true Zhangsan’s height has to be a superinterval of Lisi’s 
height. This prediction conforms to native intuition. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 In this paper, I chose to use ‘subinterval’ rather than ‘subset’ when discussing the possessive 
degree construction, simply because I think it more intuitive to use the former.  
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Under the SC analysis of possessive verbs, yǒu cannot directly set up the 
subinterval/subset relation between the two degrees in the possessive degree 
construction. Moreover, the ‘Y + G’ chunk explicitly contributes one of the 
two comparison items, but there is nothing in the surface construction that 
contributes the other comparison item, viz. X’s degree on the dimension 
specified by G. Under the SC analysis of possessive verbs, both the second 
comparison item and the subinterval relation should have an independent 
place in the representation. 
More explicitly, the second comparison item and the subinterval relation 
are given by the covert predicate supplementing the overt object of yǒu and  
the binding of a variable in the covert predicate by the matrix subject. In 
general, the covert predicate supplementing the ‘Y + G’ chunk is something 
like ‘being a subinterval of e’s degree on the dimension specified by G’, with 
the variable e being bound by the subject. For (8), the covert predicate is 
‘being a subinterval of e’s height’.  
Under this specification, the degree use of yǒu also takes a covert SC as 
its underlying object, which contains a variable in the predicate for the matrix 
subject to bind. Just like its non-degree uses, the degree use of yǒu makes no 
content contribution to the semantics of the sentence in which it appears. It 
provides a formal means to make not only possible but also necessary the 
binding of the variable in the SC object by the matrix subject.  
The formal syntactic representation and semantic derivation for (8) are 
given in (32). Here I assume gāo ‘tall’ to be a function from an individual to 
the height of that individual. Obviously, (32) is exactly parallel to (24). This 
suggests that the degree use of yǒu is not different from the non-degree uses 
in terms of the syntax and semantics. All the verb accomplishes is ab-
straction: it indirectly contributes a lambda for a variable in its object, which 
is always an SC on the underlying level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Degree Possession   673 
 (32) S: tall(Lisi)⊆ tall(Zhangsan) 
    
    Zhāngsān          S: λz.tall(Lisi)⊆ tall(z) 
                  
             u7: λф λz. Фf[iàz]     S: tall(Lisi)⊆ tall(f(7)) 
                        
                                           t7       VP: λx.tall(Lisi)⊆ tall(f(7))          
                               
                                                  yǒu: λфλy.ф      SC: tall(Lisi)⊆ tall(f(7)) 
                                    
                                                       Lǐsì gāo   being a subinterval of e7’s height.  
                                                       tall(Lisi)                λx. x⊆ tall(f(7)) 
As an interim summary, the SC analysis of possessive verbs not only explains 
the non-degree uses but also the degree use as exemplified by the Chinese 
possessive degree construction. Hence, the analysis is explanatorily adequate 
in treating all uses of possessive verbs. The adequacy of the SC analysis 
suggests that possessive verbs have a single underlying structure and a single 
core meaning in the variety of surface patterns where they appear. The 
discussion so far has answered Question 1 raised in section 1.  
As pointed out earlier in this paper, the SC analysis is just one of the 
proposals that are available in the literature regarding the syntax and 
semantics of possessive verbs in general (see (15)). Can any of the three 
competing analyses provide an equally satisfactory account of the possessive 
degree construction? If the answer is negative, then the possessive degree 
construction is a good test to endorse the SC analysis and rule out the 
alternative analyses. The next section shows that this is indeed the case. 
	  5	   Competing	  Analyses	  	  
In section 2, I divided the analyses competing against the SC analysis into 
three groups: Locative Existential (Freeze 1992), Semantic Incorporation 
(Landman 2004), and Type-shifting Analysis (Partee 1999). In this section I 
give a brief summary of each proposal and explain why it cannot be extended 
to the Chinese possessive degree construction. 
According to the Locative Existential analysis, possessive sentences of 
various kinds are existential sentences with a locative argument in the subject 
position. Extending the proposal to the possessive degree construction, it 
amounts to saying that, just like existential sentences in Chinese, the con-
struction has an underlying structure in which the matrix subject starts as a 
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preposition phrase of some form. This runs afoul of native intuition. More 
explicitly, if the subject of the possessive degree construction is a preposition 
phrase in the underlying structure, it would have to predicate of the location 
of the degree denoted by the ‘Y + G’ chunk (e.g. Lǐsì gāo). A degree is not an 
individual but an interval on a dimension. It cannot be predicated of or 
restricted by a preposition phrase. This is evident from the ungrammaticality 
of the sentence in (34), as compared to (33). 
(33) yī  běn  shū  zài  zhuōzi  shàng. 
 one CL   book at   table   on         
 ‘There is a book on the table.’ 
(34) *wǔ  mǐ   zài  zhuōzi  shàng.         
   five meter at   table   on           
The semantic incorporation analysis proposed by Landman (2004) holds that 
‘have’ denotes a ‘contentless’ relation between two entities and a state. The 
object of ‘have’ denotes a ‘contentful’ counterpart of such a relation. After 
the object intersects with ‘have’, the result is exactly the same as the object. 
The rest of the proposal does not matter for the purpose of this paper. As 
Landman himself admitted, the analysis is restricted to cases where ‘have’ 
embeds relational nouns. It cannot be extended to the possessive degree 
construction, because the ‘Y + G’ chunk does not express a relational notion 
of any sort. Lisi’s height (Lǐsì gāo), for example, is a degree that exists on its 
own right and does not have to relate to anything else for it to be degree.  
The type shifting analysis by Partee (1999) differs from Landman’s in 
that there is a division of labor between ‘have’ and its object. Both are 
ascribed relational denotations. In addition, in its semantics ‘have’ specifies 
some property for its object. One general drawback of this analysis is an un-
natural prediction it makes, viz. that ‘have’ is lexically ambiguous among all 
the possible properties that it can establish for its object. There is another 
more specific problem with the analysis when extending it to the Chinese 
possessive degree construction. Because the semantics of ‘have’ is defined 
with reference to what object it takes, the analysis requires the degree use of 
yǒu to include in its semantics the gradable predicate G. Intuitively, it is un-
desirable for a possessive verb to incorporate an adjective, an adverb or a 
verb in its semantic denotation.  
6	   Conclusions	  
The degree use of yǒu is not different from its other uses in terms of the 
structure and meaning. They all take a small clause as the underlying object, 
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which can be either overt or covert. Yǒu is a functional item that does not 
have semantic content on its own. It just provides a formal mechanism for its 
subject to bind a variable in its small clause object. The small clause analysis 
provides a satisfactory explanation of the degree use of yǒu. I have shown 
that other alternative proposals available in the literature all face empirical or 
theoretical challenges. The discussion suggests that the small clause analysis 
best captures the whole range of uses of possessive verbs.  
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Divergent Approximators∗
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Abstract. We often mark uncertainty in our utterances with words like maybe,
but when we mark uncertainty on numerals, some surprising effects, including
approximation, result. This paper describes these unexpected effects and pro-
vides a possible world semantics analysis. This analysis will in turn inform our
view on other scalar modifiers, like approximately. Additionally, it will help
identify a complication for so-called slack regulators (e.g. loosely speaking, ex-
actly), pointing to the unexplored importance of modality in differentiating ap-
proximators. I will propose that some approximators, like maybe, have modal
components and behave differently from non-modal approximators, like approx-
imately, most noticeably in their ability to accommodate contextual information.
1 Introduction
Language allows us to express ourselves with varying degrees of precision (i.a.
Lakoff 1973; Lasersohn 1999; Krifka 2009). Some words like tall have a mean-
ing that varies with context, while other words like heap lack a precise mean-
ing altogether. Furthermore, there are terms with precise meanings that can be
used imprecisely, where context allows. For example, the numeral twenty can
be used to refer to something that costs $20.00 exactly, or where contextually
appropriate a speaker could round and use twenty to refer to something that
cost $19.50. Additionally, there are countless modifiers that affect precision,
such as roughly, more-or-less, and exactly.
Various authors have highlighted these different types of imprecision in
their analyses. For example, Sauerland & Stateva (2007) distinguish forms with
a precise meaning from those which lack a fixed precise meaning. This sepa-
rates the numeral twenty, which has a precise meaning of 20.0¯, from the ad-
jective tall and the noun heap, which have no such meaning. Similarly, Syrett,
Kennedy & Lidz (2010) distinguish forms that tolerate imprecision pragmat-
ically from those that are semantically context dependent. This separates the
∗ Many thanks to Kyle Rawlins, Charley Beller, Kristen Johannes, Mike Oliver, and Lilia Riss-
man for their invaluable discussion. Thanks also to the audience at the Mid-Atlantic Colloquium
of Studies in Meaning, as well as the audience and reviewers at Sinn und Bedeutung 15. This re-
search was supported by an IGERT grant to the Cognitive Science Department at Johns Hopkins
University.
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numeral twenty, which can be used in a round sense where context allows,
from the adjective tall, which varies depending on what it modifies (e.g. tall
person vs. tall building), but does not vary depending on the level precision
appropriate to the context the way twenty does.
Here I propose an additional distinction, one that differentiates between
modal and non-modal approximators. I will illustrate this by first examining
the modal maybe as a marker of uncertainty, which, in the right context (viz.
when applied to a scalar), leads to an approximate reading. We will then com-
pare this type of approximation to that which arises from the use of the non-
modal approximately. The differences between these two approximators will
follow largely from their differing modal statuses, with the most striking dif-
ference being their differing abilities to accommodate contextual information.
We will then compare these types of approximation to pragmatic halos (Laser-
sohn 1999), which suffice for non-modal approximators, but which cannot suf-
ficiently describe approximators with a modal component.
2 Uncertainty and Approximation
An approximate reading can arise when scalars are marked as uncertain. This
can be seen most clearly with scalar numerals combined with the modal maybe.
2.1 Uncertain Numerals
When we use words like maybe to mark our uncertainty with respect to an
item, our interlocutor might entertain alternatives to this uncertain item. For
example, in the exchange in (1) Bill thinks John won the race, but he is not
certain, which he expresses through his response maybe John.
(1) a. Ann: Who won the race?
Bill: Maybe John.
b. {John, Mary, Peter}
As a result of Bill’s uncertainty, Ann may entertain other likely winners, as
sketched in (1b).
When the uncertain item is a numeral, we find a strong tendency for the
set of alternatives to resemble approximation, as in (2).
(2) a. Ann: How many people competed?
Bill: Maybe twenty.
b. {18, 19, 20, 21, 22}
This approximation becomes even more salient if we consider a similar re-
sponse Bill could have made, namely approximately twenty, where the alterna-
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tives entertained by Ann would again look like (2b).
Approximation, however, does not occur with all uncertain numerals, as
demonstrated in (3). When giving the number of the player with the most fouls,
Bill indicates his uncertainty with maybe, again uttering maybe twenty.
(3) a. Ann: Which player has the most fouls?
Bill: Maybe twenty.
b. {20, 6, 77, 15}
Here, however, this uncertain numeral is unlikely to give rise to approxima-
tion. Instead, Ann may consider other players likely to have numerous fouls,
independently of their number.
Additionally, we find that when this approximation effect occurs, the
range of alternatives depends on the numeral. For example, if twenty in (2)
is replaced with twenty-seven, the range of alternatives tends to be smaller.
(4) a. Ann: How many people competed?
Bill: Maybe twenty-seven.
b. {26, 27, 28}
In summary, uncertain numerals lead to three questions: why do uncertain nu-
merals give rise to approximative readings, as in (2), why do some uncertain
numerals fail to give rise to approximative readings, as in (3), and why do some
uncertain numerals give rise to more approximate readings than others, as in
(2) vs. (4)?
2.2 Uncertain Numerals Explained
These puzzles can be given a formal explanation using a possible world seman-
tics, such as the one described in Kratzer (1991), along with Krifka’s (2009)
conception of numerals. Here we will consider alternatives to be sets of pos-
sible worlds (i.e. worlds consistent with the epistemic modal base). These sets
of worlds will be ordered in terms of their plausibility by an ordering source,
as sketched in figure 1.
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w wJohn
wMary
wPete
w w20
w21
w19
w22
w18
alternatives/sets of
possible worlds
more plausible
Figure 1: Alternatives as sets of worlds, ordered according to a modal base.
Here, for example, wJohn represents the set of worlds where John won the race,
and w20 represents the set of worlds where twenty people competed.
Following Krifka (2009) we will assume that numerals represent a range which
can be characterized as the values which fall within one standard deviation
(σ ) of the uttered numeral (µ) on a normal distribution over the number line.
For example, twenty in the sentence This book cost twenty dollars used in a
relatively imprecise context can be considered to have σ = 2, such that twenty
then represents values in the range µ±σ or [18−22], as shown in fi-gure 2. The
normal distribution represents the probability of each value being true, with
probability decreasing as the distance from µ increases. Beyond one standard
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deviation (i.e. beyond the shaded area in figure 2), probability is assumed too
low for consideration.1
... 16 18 20 22 24 ...
... µ−2σ µ−σ µ µ+σ µ+2σ ...
Figure 2: A normal distribution centered at 20 with σ = 2
This range information can be expressed as the propositions pσ in (5), which
picks out worlds where the value intended by the speaker (y) falls within one
standard deviation (σ ) of the uttered numeral (µ), and a family of functions px
in (6), which picks out worlds where the intended value (y) falls within σ−x of
that number (µ) for 0 < x < σ .2 We will let y assign to any world the numeric
value intended by the speaker in that world, representing public uncertainty
about what value the speaker intends.
(5) pσ = λw.y(w) ∈ {Jµ−σK, ...,Jµ+σK}
(6) px = λw.y(w) ∈ {Jµ− xK, ...,Jµ+ xK},0 < x < σ
We can see how this works in the example sentence from above This book cost
1 For simplicity we will assume strict cut-offs at µ±σ . It seems, however, that the border should
be fuzzy, which might result from difficulty determining a precise σ from context. Alternatively,
an applicable use of fuzzy sets is discussed in Lasersohn (1999).
2 As described here, this results in a linear probability curve, not the Gaussian one described above,
a problem which will not be addressed here.
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twenty dollars with µ = 20 and σ = 2. Here pσ = λw.y(w) ∈ {J20−2K, ...,J20+2K} (i.e. picks out set of worlds where the value y intended by the speaker
in that world is between 18 and 22) and px = λw.y(w)∈ {J20− xK, ...,J20+ xK
},0 < x < 2.
As for maybe, I will treat it as involving an epistemic modal possibility
operator. For uncertain numerals (e.g. maybe twenty), the modal base will con-
tain the sets of worlds consistent with pσ (i.e. worlds within σ of µ) and the
ordering source will contain the worlds consistent with the propositions in px
for 0 < x < σ (i.e. will order more closely worlds where the value is closer to
µ).
We now have an explanation for the approximation that arises from uncer-
tain numerals: only worlds where values close to the uttered numeral are true
will be epistemically accessible, so only these values will be plausible alter-
natives. We also have an explanation for why approximation does not always
occur with uncertain numerals: this effect only happens with scalar numerals,
like in (2), not with numerals acting in a non-scalar labeling capacity, as in (3),
which do not represent ranges and are therefore not associated with pσ and px
like scalars are.
And finally, if we consider Krifka’s pragmatic preference for simple ex-
pressions, we have an explanation for why the range of alternatives depends on
the numeral, as we see when maybe twenty in (2) leads to a wider range of alter-
natives than maybe twenty-seven in (4). A pragmatic preference for simple ex-
pressions leads more complex numerals like twenty-seven to represent smaller
ranges (i.e. induce smaller σs) than simpler numerals like twenty. Since twenty-
seven has a smaller σ , its pσ allows a smaller range of possible worlds, leading
to its narrower interpretation as an uncertain numeral (see Krifka (2009) for
details).
To summarize the explanations offered here, first, uncertain numerals give
rise to approximative readings because they involve pσ and px in their modal
base and ordering source respectively, so possible worlds are those in which
the numeral is close to the uncertain numeral. Some uncertain numerals fail to
give rise to approximative readings because they are not scalar and therefore
are not associated with pσ and px. Some uncertain numerals give rise to more
approximate readings than others because they are associated with larger σs,
so pσ allows a wider range of possible worlds.
2.3 Uncertain Scalars
Numerals are not unique in expressing ranges, so this approximation effect
should not be unique to numerals either. Specifically, we expect that whenever
some appropriately range-representing expression is marked as uncertain, it
Divergent Approximators 683
gives rise to approximation. And this is indeed the case.
We can see this, for example, with uncertain colors, as in (7) and (8).
Here, if blue is interpreted as a scalar representing a range of colors within the
blue spectrum (i.e. as not necessarily representing one specific hue), a range
of colors (here with wavelengths from purple to green) might be entertained as
alternatives.
(7) a. A: You say you got a good look at John’s car. What color is it?
B: Maybe blue.
b. {425nm, ..., 525nm}
We even see an effect of complexity, much like we did with twenty vs. twenty-
seven. Here, the more complex color term cyan gives rise to a smaller range
of alternatives (here with wavelengths within the light blues) than the simpler
color term blue, since the more complex cyan will be pragmatically associated
with a smaller σ .
(8) a. A: You say you got a good look at John’s car. What color is it?
B: Maybe cyan.
b. {450nm, ..., 500nm}
This approximation effect can be seen with any item that is used scalarly, in-
cluding such an unlikely term as beef stroganoff. To see this, consider a scalar
interpretation of beef stroganoff, like the one required in the sentence It was
only approximately beef stroganoff. Using this scalar interpretation, consider
the sentence What John cooked was maybe beef stroganoff. This gives the read-
ing that what John cooked was somewhere near the ideal of beef stroganoff, or
approximately beef stroganoff.3
So, the same phenomena we saw with uncertain numerals happen with
other scalars, and the same explanation applies: the scalar represents some
range, and when combined with the modal maybe this range information rep-
resented in pσ and px enters into the modal base and ordering source such that
3 Sauerland & Stateva (2007) provide a different take on this kind of construction. They
consider approximately beef stroganoff infelicitous in (i) because scalar approximators (ex-
actly/approximately) can only combine with scalar items.
(i) Judgments from Sauerland & Stateva (2007)
a. What John cooked was definitely/maybe beef stroganoff.
b. # What John cooked was exactly/approximately beef stroganoff.
Here, I suggest that beef stroganoff can in fact be scalar, and when it is, maybe beef stroganoff and
approximation beef stroganoff give rise to a similar type of scalar approximation. This is much
like the similarity between maybe twenty and approximately twenty discussed above.
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scalarly-close items are more likely alternatives.
2.4 Other Uses ofmaybe
At the beginning of section 2.3 it was remarked that any appropriately range-
representing expression gives rise to approximation when marked as uncertain.
The qualifier appropriately is present to exclude certain readings, especially
those involving epistemic vagueness and uncertain labels, described below.
The non-numeral scalars discussed above (e.g. cyan) are subject to an-
other kind of approximation, termed epistemic by Sauerland & Stateva (2007).
This concerns uncertainty regarding the precise meaning of the word in ques-
tion, as can be seen with the word heap. Saying This pile of rice is maybe a
heap may mean that the speaker knows exactly how many grains of rice there
are, but is unsure if together they constitute a heap. Similarly, The color is
maybe cyan may mean that the speaker knows exactly which hue they have in
mind, but is unsure if it can be called cyan. This is not the kind of vagueness I
am concerned with here. Rather, I am interested in the case where the speaker
does not know the hue, but believes it to be close to cyan.
Another case of uncertainty is the uncertain label discussed in the context
of (3), where the word modified by maybe is acting as a label, not a scalar. It
should be kept in mind that this type of label reading is available for all the
examples above and can cause them to lose their approximate reading, which
again is only available when they are interpreted as scalars.
An interesting case related to this labeling reading can be seen in (9) and
(10), as pointed out by Stephanie Solt (p.c.).
(9) Context: Ann organized, but did not attend, a party last night and hopes
that at least 75 people attended. Bill attended the party and does not
know exactly how many people were there, but believes the number to
be 40, give or take 10.
Ann: How many people were at the party?
Bill: Maybe fifty.
Here, it seems that Bill chose his response to best fit Ann’s expectations, rather
than to reflect the number he really thought was most likely, 40. He chose the
highest likely value, 50, to minimize Ann’s disappointment. This seems to be
an instance of labeling. Bill had several answers he could have given, and for
pragmatic reasons he chose the one called fifty.
Note that this ‘exaggeration’ can go down as well as up, so long as is in
the direction of the hearer’s goals. Compare (10a), where Ann is hoping for a
low temperature, with (10b), where Charlie is hoping for a high temperature.
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(10) Context: Bill thinks that the temperature is around freezing (32°F).
a. Ann: I hope it’s cold enough to go ice skating. How cold is it?
Bill: Maybe 30.
b. Charlie: I hope it’s too warm to go ice skating. How cold is it?
Bill: Maybe 35.
This exaggerative use of maybe does not seem to impede communication, since
it is intonationally distinguished from the non-exaggerative use. In particular,
this maybe is typically stressed and drawn out, and is often accompanied by
a grimace. Therefore, it is unlikely that Ann or Charlie would interpret Bill’s
response as a scalar (i.e. as representing a range of values centered around the
expressed numeral, as in (11c)) such that the actual value could be even closer
to their goal value. Instead, they should recognize this as an exaggerative used
and entertain alternatives along the lines of (11b).
(11) Context: Bill thinks that the temperature is around freezing (32°F).
a. Ann: I hope it’s cold enough to go ice skating. How cold is it?
Bill: Maybe 30.
b. {30, 31, 32, 33, 34}
c. #{28, 29, 30, 31, 32}
2.5 Alternatives as Approximation
Considering the similarity in interpretation between maybe twenty and approxi-
mately twenty, we might wonder if the interpretation of maybe John in (1)
could be thought of as approximation too. This seems quite possible, provided
that we are able to determine the appropriate scales to range over. To see this,
we can think of John as representing a point on some set of scales. Alterna-
tives to John then are like John in certain relevant respects (e.g. speed, pre-
disposition to race, and susceptibility to performance anxiety) and represent
points on these relevant scales that fall close enough to John to be considered
likely. There is a marked difference between maybe/approximately twenty and
maybe/approximately John, which will be discussed in section 3.2.
3 Other Approximators
While we have seen that uncertain numerals can give rise to approximation,
many other modifiers give rise to approximation as well, and the analysis of
uncertain numerals here can inform the way we think of these other approxi-
mators.
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3.1 Approximately
Approximately gives rise to approximate readings (e.g. approximately twenty
people), but not the way maybe does. Instead, approximately expresses that
something falls within a range (e.g. that the number of people falls within some
range around twenty), with a denotation like (12).4
(12) JapproximatelyK = [λn.λy.∃z ∈ {Jµn−σnK, ...,Jµn+σnK}|#y = z]
Here again µ corresponds to the uttered numeral, and approximately takes a
scalar n and some y and returns true if the location of y is within the con-
textually-determined σ of n on the relevant scale.
For example, in approximately twenty people,Japproximately twenty peopleK
= [λn.λy.∃z ∈ {Jµn−σnK, ...,Jµn+σnK}|#y = z](JtwentyK)(JpeopleK)
= [∃z ∈ {Jµ20−σ20K, ...,Jµ20+σ20K}|#people = z]
and if we again assume µ20 = 20 and σ20 = 2, this yields
= [∃z ∈ {18, ...,22}|#people = z]
(i.e. there is some number in the range [18−22] which is equal to the number
of people, i.e. the actual number of people is in the range [18−22]).
Approximately shows the same range effects as maybe, as can be seen by
replacing maybe with approximately in (2) and (4) (note that approximately
cannot replace maybe in (3) to give rise to a reading like (2b), since twenty
here is not scalar). These approximative effects are captured in the denotation
in (12), which incorporates σ to determine its range.
This denotation also captures an important difference, shown in (13).
(13) a. It’s Susan’s birthday today, and she’s maybe thirty.
b. # It’s Susan’s birthday today, and she’s approximately thirty.
Here approximately in (13b) is unable to accommodate the fact that it is Susan’s
birthday (i.e. that ages like 28 and three months are impossible).5 With maybe
in (13a), on the other hand, this information can easily be accommodated in the
modal base, excluding incompatible ages from consideration. This difference
is reflected in the denotation above in (12), where z is drawn from a continuous
range. Note that approximately is still technically consistent with it being Su-
4 For approximately’s counterpart, consider: JexactlyK = [λn.λy.∃z ∈ {Jµn−σnK, ...,Jµn +σnK}
|#y = z, defined if σn<σc,n] (takes a scalar n and some y and returns true if the location of y is
within the contextually-determined σ of n on the relevant scale, where σ is less than some small
contextually-determined value)
5 Note that approximately is acceptable in a very precise context (e.g. Actually, she’s 30 years 14
hours and 22 minutes), but this is not the reading that I am considering.
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san’s birthday, but it suggests that intermediate values are possible. This results
in strangeness, requiring a certain amount of work on hearer’s behalf in order
to fit the utterance to the context.
So, through associating scalars with the kind of information described
by Krifka, the similarities between maybe and approximately, as well as their
differences, can be captured. These are summarized briefly in (14).
(14) approximately
– non-modal
– does not accommodate con-
textual information
– uses σ for range
maybe
– modal
– accommodates contextual in-
formation
– uses σ for modal base
Since approximately is not modal, it is unable to accommodate contextual in-
formation, but since it draws on σ in determining range, it gives rise to the
same roundness effects as maybe.
3.2 Atomicity in Approximation
This discussion of approximately brings up a new question: why is approxi-
mately twenty people as a response in (2) is less offensive than approximately
thirty in (13b)? More specifically, why does approximately twenty people not
mean that there may have been, say, 21.7 people? The solution here is atomic-
ity. In particular, people are considered atomic, and so only integer-increments
of people are considered in (2). Years, on the other hand, are readily divisible,
so non-integer increments are considered in (13b).
Similarly, we can see that the alternatives arising from maybe John do not
tend to be the same as the items that fall within the denotation of approximately
John. Approximately John seems to point to some (possibly hypothetical) per-
son who differs from John only slightly. Maybe John gives a more macroscopic
reading, allowing for alternatives that differ more sharply from John. This dif-
ference may be due to contextual information accommodation: you are pre-
sumably searching for actual people, not hypothetical John-like people, so for
maybe John the range (σ ) needs to be wider if it is to include any alternatives
not already ruled out by world knowledge. For approximately John, on the
other hand, the range will contain hypothetical entities even without widening.
4 Halos
The analysis presented above is reminiscent of Lasersohn’s (1999) pragmatic
halos. According to Lasersohn, some element α is surrounded by a halo of
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elements which differ from α in pragmatically ignorable ways.6
α
α ′
α ′′
α ′′′halo containing true α
and ‘true enough’ α ′, α ′′,
α ′′′
Figure 3: α with its halos, containing α ′, α ′′, and α ′′′, which differ from α
only in pragmatically ignorable ways.
It would seem that the propositions in the modal base and ordering source
above are the same as the information structuring these pragmatic halos (i.e.
the information used to determine what is pragmatically ignorable and how to
order based on similarity). However, one difference soon becomes apparent,
which is seen most clearly through slack regulators.
Slack regulators like the hedges roughly, loosely speaking manipulate
pragmatic halos, functioning to more-or-less expand JαK to include its halo.7
For example, while JtwentyK is only true for 20 exactly, Jroughly twentyK is
true for values that differ from twenty in pragmatically ignorable ways.
To see how the information used in the possible worlds account differs
from one using pragmatic halos, compare the use of maybe with the hedge
roughly in (15).
(15) a. It’s Susan’s birthday today, and she’s maybe thirty.
b. # It’s Susan’s birthday today, and she’s roughly thirty.
Again, maybe can readily accommodate the fact that it is Susan’s birthday, but
with roughly, this does not have the same effect on the halo, leading to infelic-
ity.8 And this behavior is not specific to the term roughly. Even round numbers
(e.g. twenty when it represents [18− 22]) do not accommodate this kind of
outside information. So, while there is overlap in the information structuring
6 Lasersohn writes: “Given an expression α denoting some object x, I like to think of the set the
context associates with x as arrayed around x in a sort of circular cluster, so I will call this set,
together with its ordering relation, the PRAGMATIC HALO of x, or, extending the terminology, as
the pragmatic halo of α”, (Lasersohn 1999: 527) and “HC(α) is understood to be a set of objects
which differ from JαKM,C only in ways which are pragmatically ignorable in C;≤α,C is an ordering
of HC(α) according to similarity to JαKM,C”, (Lasersohn 1999: 548).
7 Jloosely speaking ΦKM,C =⋃HC(Φ)− JΦKM,C (Lasersohn 1999: 545)
8 Note that roughly (like approximately) is acceptable in a very precise context.
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pragmatic halos and the information structuring possible worlds, the overlap is
not complete. Halos deal with precision (px, pσ ) only, while modals accommo-
date precision as well as additional contextual information.
additional con-
textual informa-
tion
pσ , px
modals
halos
4.1 The Hedge like
Now that this distinction between modal (e.g. maybe) and non-modal (e.g. ap-
proximately) approximators has been noted, we may expect to find modal items
like maybe which have been mis-classified as slack regulators. And indeed this
seems to be the case for Siegel’s (2002) like. In her analysis, like α denotes
a variable corresponding either to α or an element within α’s halo. As can
be seen in (16), however, like can accommodate outside information, just like
maybe.
(16) It’s Susan’s birthday today, and she’s, like, thirty.
In other words, like, like maybe and unlike approximately, is felicitous in con-
texts which require discontinuous sets of alternatives. This cannot be explained
by halos and suggests that there is some modal semantic component to like such
that outside information can be accommodated in its modal base, explaining the
felicity of (16).
In summary, halos are similar to the present analysis in the way they de-
termine the range of alternatives/approximation, but halos involve pragmatic
precision only. An additional dimention, modality, is required to capture the
differences highlighted in (13), (15), and (16). The means of approximation
discussed here are divided as shown in (17).
(17) a. Modal: maybe, like
b. Non-modal: approximately, roughly, pragmatic slack/halos/round-
ness
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5 Summary
By examining constructions like maybe twenty I show that information asso-
ciated with numerals can be incorporated into a possible worlds semantics.
This analysis describes their approximating behavior as well as their diver-
gence from constructions like approximately twenty. Scalars represent ranges,
with closer values being more probable. In modal contexts (e.g. maybe twenty),
this information is incorporated into the modal base and ordering source such
that plausible alternatives are those scalarly close, resembling approximation.
It can also be seen that, while this same information may be used in pragmatic
halos, use of contextual information sets these types of approximation apart
and suggests that certain hedges contain modal components. The approxima-
tors with a modal component can then accommodate contextual information,
while non-modal approximators cannot.
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